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Abstract
The 1980s and 90s have seen a focus on telecommunications reform globally. Reform 
has to varying degrees witnessed the introduction of competition, privatisation and new 
institutions that have inherently posed a threat to the dominance of former monopolists, 
now incumbents. In spite of these challenges, incumbents have remained dominant in 
their respective settings and in some cases have regained ground lost at the outset of 
reform.
Research on regulation and regulatory reform has nonetheless remained silent on these 
actors and why they have managed to remain dominant. Additionally, while 
enforcement approaches have shed some light on how firms respond to regulation in 
general, there has not been enough of an appreciation of incumbents as a special 
category and of their effects on regulation.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the ways in which incumbents have responded to 
reform and to uncover the various forces that affect this response. In so doing, it hopes 
to advance an understanding of these actors and why they have remained at the centre of 
their regulatory space. This is undertaken through case studies of telecommunications 
reform in two countries, Jamaica and Ireland.
This thesis shows that incumbents are active participants in the regulatory space, 
adopting creative strategies to heighten competitiveness and maintain dominance in the 
face of change. Secondly, the study takes a more focused view of firms showing that 
they are not necessarily monoliths but may be segmented internally by geography and 
by divergent groups and interests. It is shown that this has important consequences for 
the timing and success of regulatory reform and the design of new regulatory regimes 
with special implications for small states. Finally, the work highlights the fact that the 
incumbent’s response is not only conditioned by regulation. Thus, while important, the 
relationship between the regulator and regulated firm does not explain the full breadth 
of the latter’s behaviour.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INCUMBENT FIRM’S RESPONSE TO CHANGE
1.0 Introduction
The 1980s marked a proliferation of research on regulation. Much of this has been on processes 
of regulatory reform, a term used mainly to refer to the period from the 1980s to early 2000 
where substantial re-adjustments were achieved in the structure and rules governing the utilities 
sector.1 Most of these changes took place firstly in telecommunications, with the sector being 
seen as a trendsetter in regulatory reform.2 For instance, Souter writes that, “The initial 
approach to the regulation of privatised utilities was also developed with telecommunications... 
specifically in mind” (1994: 18). These changes were substantial leading to a gradual shift away 
from monopoly and state provision to liberalisation and competition, as well as an increase in 
the number of legislation and rules in the sector.3 As such, it is the change of rules which have 
facilitated privatisation, liberalisation, competition and the establishment of institutional 
arrangements governing how firms interact with each other, with customers and importantly, 
with the state, that are considered here under the rubric of regulatory reform.4
1 A host of excellent and detailed reviews already exist on regulatory reform in utilities. These included 
Henry, Matheu and Jeunemaitre (2001); Walden and Angel (2001); Braithwaite and Drahos (2000); 
Graham (2000: 151-168); Baldwin and Cave (1999); Gillett and Vogelsang (1999); Baldwin, Scott and 
Hood (1998); chapters 14-17 of Beesely (1997: 251-367); Prosser (1997); Baldwin (1995a); Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers (1994); Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (1994); Hain (1994); Lipworth 
(1993: 39-57); Adam Smith Institute (1992); Kay, Mayer and Thompson (1986). Also see Souter (1994: 
16-17) for a discussion of the similarities and differences in the regulation of some of these industries.
2 That is, in terms of the number and extent of reforms that the sector has undergone when compared to 
other utilities. For instance, telecoms is affected by and has seen more rapid developments in technology 
than other utilities carrying more possibilities for competition (Prosser 1997: 58). This is also seen in the 
growth in the number of laws and rules in the sector. For instance, in Australia the number of pages of 
legislation is said to have increased from 1,600 in 1997 to around 10,000 by 2007 (Berg 2007).
3 See Lloyd (2003); Wallsten (2003); Walden and Angel (2001); Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 322- 
359); Gillett and Vogelsang (1999); Cho (1998); Curwen (1997); Prosser (1997: 58-87); Levy and Spiller 
(1996); Petrazzini (1995); Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994: 195-246); Sikes (1992); Cawson 
(1990); Harper (1989); Kay (1994: 77-88); Vickers and Yarrow (1986) for an outline of some of the 
changes that have been experienced in this area as well as some of the special features of telecoms in 
relation to other utilities and the wider society and economy. For instance, Harper observes that it handles 
a far greater number of individual transactions than any other utility (Harper 1989: 15-16) while Wheatley 
sees this as the largest global machine (1999:1).
4 Others have also used this approach to define regulatory reform. Trillas and Staffiero, for instance, view 
regulatory reform as “the institutional and structural changes that took place in infrastructure industries in 
the 90s, including liberalization and privatisation” (2007: 2-3).
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However, even in this context of wide coverage, there remains some vital areas of work 
that have yet to be covered in the literature. For instance, Christensen and Laegreid suggest that 
even with the growing research on regulation and regulatory reform, there is still not enough 
empirical or comparative analyses and as such, more work remains to be done in filling this gap 
(2005: 2). Further, according to Wallsten, “the most elusive research so far, though has been on 
the effects of regulatory reform” (2003: 220). A gap also exists on one of the main figures - 
incumbents and their response to changes such as regulatory reform.5 According to Fligstein, 
these are firms “that dominate a particular market by creating stable relations with other 
producers, important suppliers, customers, and the government” (Fligstein 2001: 17). In this 
case, the term is used to denote those former monopolists in telecommunications who operated 
under special rights and privileges prior to regulatory reform.6 As such, accounts of regulatory 
reform have tended to downplay or ignore the role of incumbent firms in such processes. Koski 
and Majumdar have also observed that there is still, “relatively little evidence of what ... firms 
have actually done in terms of their behavioural responses” (2002: 455).
The existing literature is therefore, unable to give an insight into why incumbent firms 
have remained dominant in spite of widespread reforms mainly aimed at reducing the 
dominance and control that these former monopolies had over their national telecoms industry. 
In essence, regulatory reform was about reducing the power of these firms in as much as their 
monopoly position, dominance and control over telecoms was seen as the basis of their power 
and prevented others from entering and operating successfully in the market. Much attention has 
instead been spent detailing these changes (privatisation, liberalisation, competition and the 
change in industry rules that have facilitated these processes), but less has been spent analysing 
the incumbent’s role in the development and response to these processes. An answer to this 
question however, requires a focus on the tactics and strategies that such firms have adopted in 
dealing with these shifts in their operational environment or regulatory space; shifts that have
5 Not only after but also during the actual period of industry reform.
6 Carroll and Hannan make a similar argument in their explanation of the value of their demographic 
approach in understanding corporations and industries and how these respond to change (2004: 
especially, 401).
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inherently threatened their positions at the helm of the telecoms sector. The ‘why’ in this case is 
therefore, inextricably linked to the ‘how’ (i.e. how have incumbent firms responded to 
regulatory reform; how have incumbents managed to retain their market power and strength?) as 
well as the ‘what’ (i.e. what tactics and strategies have they employed towards this end?).
The literature on regulatory enforcement has focused some attention on the options and 
strategies available to regulators seeking to get firms to comply with rules. In so doing, it 
indirectly gives an entry into a discussion of the way firms in general respond to regulation. 
Among this body of work is the notable 1992 publication by Ayres and Braithwaite, which calls 
for a responsive or tit-for-tat pyramidal approach to regulation (1992: 19-53, 54-100). The 
Smart Regulation approach also encourages more flexibility in the choice of regulatory 
instruments while allowing for more variety in terms of who can fulfil the role of ‘regulator’ 
(Gunningham and Sinclair 1998: 375-454). Risk regulation has also more recently emerged as a 
significant participant in this debate on compliance.7
For the most part, these approaches help in understanding the choices available to 
regulators in the enforcement game and how regulation may proceed depending on the response 
of regulated firms. However, they remain limited for the present purpose for a number of 
reasons. That is, the emphasis remains on the regulator, with the regulated firm being 
considered mainly as an object of regulation, simply responding to the regulator’s tactics. In so 
doing, these largely ignore the possibility for other actors and concerns (outside of the official 
industry regulator) to shape firm behaviour. To some extent, these approaches also lend to a 
view of these former monopolies as large actors that are slow and unable to change. As such, 
they only give a partial view of regulation, in so far as they do not allow for a more nuanced 
understanding of the force of regulation on firms or how these firms really respond to regulation 
or industry reform. Additionally, there is not enough recognition of the internal differences in 
power and resources which exist among these entities and the impact that these differences may
7 See for example, Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell (2006); Black (2005); Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 
(2001).
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have on the way firms respond to regulation and regulatory reform.8 This is, as it relates to for 
example, the pace and timing o f  reform and the nature o f  the regulatory regim es that emerge 
from such periods o f  reform.
Additionally, these frameworks are limited in their ability to explain the part played by 
incumbent firms in regulatory reform, in understanding how these respond to changes meant to 
challenge their position in their operational space, as has occurred in telecom s.9 Here reforms 
meant to change the position o f  m onopolies, (e.g. competition) and free the sector from the 
control o f  these firms have, nonetheless, seen incumbents remaining at the helm  o f the industry 
in many countries, including Ghana, Barbados, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and South 
A frica.10
Finally, where the regulated firm is considered as a monolithic structure, these 
approaches do not offer much in the way o f  understanding how reforms affect and are 
responded to internally. The same applies for firms who may be structurally dispersed. For 
instance, where the ‘firm ’ is part o f  a trans-national business with head offices and subsidiaries 
located in different countries, as is the case with incumbents/former m onopolies such as, Cable 
and W ireless with its headquarters in London and operations in regions such as the Caribbean. 
Thus, the firm may not be the closed entity that is portrayed but may be segmented internally by 
the different interests at play within the organisation (e.g. the board and management).
Such internal difference as w ell as the existence o f  a number o f  actors which drive 
change in large dominant incumbents may have an impact on regulatory strategies aimed at
8 The responsive approach does to some extent acknowledge that firms differ in terms of their behaviour 
(see Mendeloff 1993: 712). However, the argument here is for greater consideration of size and how this 
affects behaviour or response to regulation.
9 This operational environment is not a strict formal market since the social and informal aspects of this 
are taken into account. As such, social relations, political alliances as well as the cultural norms, which 
operate within the sector and the wider context within which incumbent firms operate, are included here. 
This definition takes the work further in line with the regulatory space thesis, which allows for a 
consideration of social relations in regulation. For instance, Stirton and Lodge, suggest that social 
relations typify the regulatory space, which in turn affect regulatory capacity (2002: 14). In this case, the 
firm’s operational space is also its regulatory space, since the same actors populate it.
10 Ghana Telecom for instance remains the largest operator and one of the single largest employers 
standing at 3,927 in 2002 (Ghana Telecom 2002: 13). In 2007, Deutche Telekom had a little over 80,900 
staff (Deutsche Telekom 2007: 13). For Telefonica this number was 57,058 in 2006 (Telefonica 2006: 
27). Deutsche Telekom, Telefonica and others such as France Telcom have also successfully advanced 
services beyond their national borders, taking increasing market shares in areas such as Latin America, 
Africa and the Middle East, all since regulatory reform.
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achieving reforms and at influencing the behaviour of these actors. For instance, a regulator may 
choose to appeal to the firm as a unit or to specific interests or power brokers within the 
regulated firm. Such internal differences may also dictate the strategies and choices available to 
the firm in its response to industry reform. Thus, while these divergent interests may provide 
points of influence for regulators aimed at securing support for reform, they can also make 
regulatory reform more complex in so far as they increase the number of claims and interests, 
which regulators and lawmakers have to take into consideration when designing a new 
regulatory regime. In the end, such considerations invite a more focused and in depth view of 
the regulated firm at an institutional and organisational level to see how they respond to 
regulatory reform as well as to assess the true extent to which its activities are conditioned by 
regulation, given the success of incumbents in a post-reform era.
This work aims to address these issues by examining how dominant incumbent firms, 
arguably the main objects of regulation,11 respond to regulatory reform, uncovering and 
analysing the tactics used in their bid to protect their position at the centre of their operational 
sphere and the actors that may influence their response. It argues firstly, that the incumbent firm 
is not simply an object of regulation. Rather, it affects the operations of other actors, including 
the industry regulator and helps to shape, as much as it is shaped by regulation. Secondly, 
incumbents are not necessarily unitary or monolithic structures - even if they may appear to be 
from the outside - but are instead internally segmented. This reality may have important 
consequences for how they respond to change and in turn, the pace with which industry reform 
proceeds. Thirdly, a firm’s response to change is not only external but also internal warranting a 
consideration of the ways large dominant, incumbents change internally and the way they utilise 
resources and market power to adjust to change.12 Finally, its tactics need not only be
11 Indeed, Prosser notes that the regulated firm in this instance has in practice been the “enterprise being 
privatised after having benefited from a legal monopoly” (1999: 200). As noted earlier, these are mainly 
incumbents.
12 The economics literature on competition has also helped to shed some light on the way firms respond to 
regulation. Such studies have covered the activities of firms in a number of sectors e.g. pharmaceuticals 
(Bergman and Rudholm 2003); financial services (Flier, Van Den Bosch and Valeria 2003); the food 
industry (Thomas 1999); religion (Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison 2004); the computer industry (Sengupta 
2004); and publishing (Hardstone 2004). One of the most investigated settings has been telecoms
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conditioned by, or be in response to regulation or the regulator’s prompting but may also be 
shaped by other considerations (e.g. competitive pressures), which in the end, challenge the 
view of compliance and firm response as a bilateral relationship involving regulator and 
regulated firm.
These aims will be achieved by examining the process of regulatory reform in the 
telecommunications13 sector in two small countries, the Republic of Ireland and Jamaica. These 
will provide the context in which the above propositions can be tested given that regulatory 
reform has taken place more recently in these countries, a point, which also makes it easier to 
collect information on processes, which are still fairly current. Further, whereas there has been 
some coverage of these cases, they remain peripheral in terms of the wider context of the debate 
and approaches to regulation and regulatory reform even while providing a fertile context for 
examining issues of compliance and the complexities in designing regulatory regimes.14 These 
cases are also relevant in as far as they offer new contexts to test established ideas and for their 
potential to add to existing views and understandings of regulation and regulatory reform, which 
have tended to focus on large developed settings.
It is maintained, that periods of regulatory flux and overall policy reform, are among the 
greatest threats to incumbent firms as these usually imply some change or accommodation, 
which has the potential to affect their privileges and control (power and dominance) in their 
specific operational arena. It is for this reason that a sector such as telecommunications
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Beesley and Laidlaw 1995; Maher 1999; Chon6, Flochel and Perrot 2000; 
Koski and Majumdar 2002; Perry and Shao 2002; Correa 2001; Krouse and Krouse 2005). However, 
these approaches share some similarity with the compliance approaches reviewed above in that they still 
have a narrow view of incumbent firms. Thus, while providing some useful data, the picture presented is 
still a partial one. That is, the emphasis on deterrence strategies and on markets tends to ignore the 
activities of the incumbent after entry has occurred and where deterrence fails. The focus also tends to be 
on firms competing in a market with passing acknowledgement of the non-economic related responses 
when firms feel threatened by market changes. So while these studies have been useful in getting beyond 
presentations of the dominant incumbent as an impotent actor, there is nonetheless, room for a more in 
depth and richer consideration of incumbency beyond a purely economic function. The incumbent firm in 
many ways is more than an economic actor with its operation and impact transcending the economic 
space.
13 To use Coates’ definition, “the controlled movement of electrons and photons for data generation, 
collection, transfer, storage, manipulation and use” (1977: 196)
14 Lodge and Stirton have written some of the more recent reports on telecoms reform in Jamaica (Lodge 
and Stirton 2001: 92-108; 2002; Stirton and Lodge 2002); while for Ireland, Hastings (2003) and Massey 
(2002) have reviewed similar developments from an industrial relations and economic point of view.
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(telecoms), which has experienced a period of sustained reform in rules and structure, offers a 
good platform from which these issues can be observed.
The next section aims to establish the research more firmly within the specific context 
of regulation studies, particularly, in the area of compliance, which has indirectly helped to shed 
some light on how firms respond to regulation. It shows the gaps that exist in this area of 
research in terms of the monolithic representation of the regulated firm while highlighting the 
differences that exist among firms in terms of size and the impact that large dominant firms, 
such as incumbents, can have on the development and success of regulation. The presentation 
also aims to demonstrate how a lack of this limits an understanding of these actors particularly 
on how they have managed to remain strong contenders in the telecoms sector, in spite of 
reforms meant to challenge their positions and the relevance of such an understanding in 
regulation.
This section will then be followed by a discussion of the development of the telecoms 
industry with a focus on incumbent firms and the role they have played in this sector, 
particularly their relationship with Regulators, as a means of establishing the context for the 
research. ‘Regulators’ in this sense is used inclusively to include both line ministers and the 
independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) formed mainly during the last two decades.15 As used 
here, regulation is also taken to be an activity, which can be carried out by non-state actors.16
15 According to the International Telecommunications Union’s, (ITU), a total of 134 Independent 
regulatory agencies existed in 2004 (2005: 5). By 2007, this had increased to 145, a significant increase 
from the 14 that existed in 1990 (Schorr 2007: 3).
16 Admittedly, the term regulation tends to carry different meanings depending on the side of the globe 
from which one views it. However, a discussion of the concept will indicate that regulation and regulatory 
reform particularly for those pre-1990s accounts of the phenomena tend to locate this activity in the realm 
of the state. For example, one of the most oft quoted definitions is that of Selznick’s, which sees 
regulation as the “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are 
generally regarded as desirable to society” (1985: 363-4). This definition resembles Hood et al’s (1999:3) 
later definition of regulation as the mobilization of public authority to achieve a public end. Also, see 
Prosser (1997: 4-6). On the other hand, definitions of regulation in the United Kingdom and Europe tend 
more to be associated with “the whole realm of legislation, governance and social control” (Majone 
1990:1). As such, regulation as an idea and method is seated in various disciplines including political 
science and law. The difference in definitions has in short been handled expertly elsewhere and the 
present research would not obviously benefit from carrying on this discussion. The important point here is 
that this work leans towards a more open view of regulation as an activity that can be carried out by a 
number of actors other than public bodies as presented by authors such as Black (2002; also see Abraham 
and Lawton Smith 2003:2). Also important is the view that regulation is a complex phenomenon in
7
The section then closes with a proposal on the way the firm responds to change, a proposal on 
how the different drivers of change can aid understanding of regulation and an outline of the 
remainder of the work.
1.1 Key Approaches to Regulation
The crux of the argument thus far, has centred on the partial view which current approaches 
have on incumbent firms and how they respond to change. The aim in this section will be to seat 
the discussion within a specific theoretical context via a discussion of regulation and how the 
issue of incumbency has been covered in the regulatory literature. As will be argued the 
emphases in these works encourage accounts of regulation and regulatory reform, which favour 
certain actors and particular accounts over others. In so doing, the role played by key 
stakeholders in regulation, including the regulated firm is often not fully investigated, given the 
importance of this actor for the success of regulation.
The literature on enforcement and compliance has helped to shed some light on how 
firms respond to regulation.17 However, this does not directly discuss the role of incumbent 
firms in detail or as a specific category. The responsive approach for instance, pays close 
attention to the regulator and the strategies that it can employ in regulating the firm. 
Nonetheless, the (by proxy) focus on firms does allow some scope for a consideration of these 
actors and indirectly of incumbent firms in regulatory reform.18 This literature includes a 
number of approaches that have emerged mainly since the 1990s.19 However, these do not all 
warrant individual coverage as they share some of the same challenges that will be highlighted 
in those to be covered here. Admittedly, they are not extremely useful in addressing the main
developed as well as developing states. There is however, less in-depth research on the processes of 
regulation and regulatory reform in the developing world.
17 See Baldwin and Black (2007: 2-3).
18 Johnstone also argues for greater attention to this actor in his work on the role of the regulated firm 
from the point of view of occupational health and safety regulation (1999: 378-381).
19 Among these are the writings of Kagan and Scholtz (1984); Baldwin (1995b); Sparrow (2003); 
Hawkins (2001; 1984); Hutter (1997); Braithwaite and Walker (1987); Parker (2002); Gunningham, 
Kagan and Thornton (2004); Gunningham and Kagan (2005); Fairman and Yapp (2005). There is also the 
more popular responsive approach (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 19-53; 54-100), smart regulation 
(Gunningham and Sinclair 1998a: 375-454) and risk-based approaches (see note 7) to regulation. See 
Baldwin and Black for a review of these and other compliance approaches to understanding regulation 
(2007: 5-15).
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questions posed in this work about incumbents, their response to regulatory change and why 
they have managed to remain dominant actors in spite of these changes. As such, emphasis will 
be primarily on the major and earlier approaches -  responsive and smart regulation. These 
approaches have made significant contributions to this area of research and indeed, much of the 
work that has emerged since their formulation have in one way or another been informed by 
these writings, (particularly, the responsive approach).20
One of the early and more influential approaches within this body of work is that of 
Ayres and Braithwaite (A&B) who in arguing for ‘responsive regulation’ broadened the debate 
beyond the compliance versus deterrence discussion that had typified regulation studies prior to 
the 90s (1992: 20-21; also Baldwin and Black 2007: 5). The authors’ approach rested upon, a 
‘tit for tat’ strategy to be employed by regulators in their bid to shape the behaviour of firms or 
industries.21 Here regulators gravitate upward from softer compliance seeking strategies to more 
punitive measures depending on the response of the regulated firm (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992: 35-39). Enforcement strategies here range from persuasion as a starting point to extreme 
punitive measures of licence revocation in the case of a single firm; while self-regulation to 
command and control type regulatory strategies could be employed for regulating whole 
industries.22 The focus on the regulated firm, or industry, is to the extent that the regulator’s 
strategies can be seen or assessed for the degree of compliance of the regulatee. From such an 
angle, the ways in which firms may respond to the regulator and change based on the approach 
that is utilised by the latter can be understood. For example, firms may decide not to comply 
with soft measures such as negotiations, in which case the regulator can draw for its ‘big gun’ to 
get the desired response. The presentation is however, one of the regulated firm or industry as a 
taker of regulation, almost with a ‘straight-jacketing’ effect, in as much as the option is simply 
either to comply, or not to comply.
20 These include, Parker (2006; 1999); Johnstone (1999); Mendeloff (1993); and later refinements of the 
responsive approach by Braithwaite (2006; 2002). The Smart regulation approach and its relationship 
with more recent concepts and developments such as ‘decentring’ regulation, ’empowering participants’ 
and ‘complementary mixes’ of regulatory tools and techniques is also noted by Black (2007: 58).
21 This followed from Scholz’s earlier recommendation that a tit-for-tat approach can advance the 
benefits, which accrue to all parties in regulation (1984: especially 192-3).
22 See Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 19-53, 54-100) for a more in depth coverage of this approach.
The smart regulation proposition by Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (1998), like 
the responsive regulation approach also suggests a variety of strategies that the regulator can 
employ in regulating firms, albeit with more strategies being made available to regulators.23 
This approach was developed in response to some of the limitations to the A&B’s framework, 
namely the lack of flexibility and limited choice of strategies for regulators. The smart 
regulation approach addresses this by supposing that a bundle of strategies can exist at each 
rung of the enforcement hierarchy. This makes it possible for a more flexible mix of strategies 
and regulators (including, non-governmental actors, such as corporations) to operate at each 
level of the enforcement pyramid, thus offering more flexibility and choice (see Gunningham 
and Sinclair 1998: 399-403). This approach is useful in that, it can potentially help lower the 
costs and other features associated with state regulation (see Baldwin and Black 2007: 11). 
However, like the responsive approach, the focus is largely on regulated industries or the 
regulated ‘firm’ as a universal category with little allowance for internal differences within this 
category or for a consideration of how these affect regulation or the firm’s ability to respond to 
the regulator’s attempts to change the respective industry.
More recent work includes the risk-based approach to regulation.24 Risk regulation has 
taken on increased relevance in organising regulatory regimes25 in recent times (Rothstein, 
Huber and Gaskell: 2006: 91-92). A particular feature of risk regulation is what is seen as its 
“knowledge-generating nature”, making it relevant for compliance related activities, given the 
amount of information required by the latter (Ibid: 94). The main focus is on the “targeting of 
inspection and enforcement resources that is based on an assessment of the risks that a regulated
23 Baldwin and Black suggest that the nature of certain issues may make it difficult to gravitate naturally 
up a pyramid of sanctions, while it may also be difficult to move up and down the pyramid (2007: 6).
The area of risk management has since its entry into regulation studies, witnessed significant growth 
with scholars such as Garland suggesting that, “modern societies are risk managing societies” (2003: 73). 
Also, see authors such as O’Neill (2002) for some of the shortcomings to risk regulation. For instance, 
attention to risk management prerogatives can lead to a business losing focus on its core objectives (2002; 
also in Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell 2006: 106). The emergence of risk regulation and the particular 
features of this approach have been covered expertly elsewhere and hence, do not warrant extensive 
coverage here. See for instance, Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell (2006); Black (2005); Power (2004 and 
1997); the essays in Ericson and Doyle’s edited volume (2003); Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001).
25 Harris and Milkis see a regulatory regime, “as a constellation of (1) new ideas justifying governmental 
control over business activity, (2) new institutions that structure regulatory politics, and (3) a new set of 
policies impinging on business (1996: 25).
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person or firm poses to the regulator’s objectives” (Baldwin and Black 2007: 12). The Risk- 
Based approach considers how regulation can be tailored to minimise risks (and in so doing, 
heighten compliance from regulated firms).
In response to the perceived limitations of these approaches Baldwin and Black have 
suggested a more recent formulation of a “really responsive” approach to regulation which 
appears to be more aware of the complexity of the issues which regulators face in carrying out 
their tasks (2007: 3-4). In so doing, this latter approach resembles the institutional approach in 
Hancher and Moran’s ‘regulatory space’ thesis in so far as it allows for a wider range of actors 
(including large dominant firms) and the impact that these have on regulation and the 
achievement of regulatory goals (see 1989: 271-300).26 The regulatory space thesis also goes 
beyond these, acknowledging that ‘regulated firms’ is not a uniform category; rather, it proposes 
that some large firms, operate as quasi-govemment agencies, given their importance and 
contribution to societies (Ibid. 1989: 274- 276; see Turner 1989: 5). This point is relevant for 
small and developing countries. For instance, large firms such as Cable and Wireless Jamaica 
(C&WJ) have been noted for their overall contribution to “production, employment, income, 
balance of payments, and general welfare” in the Caribbean (Hope 1986: 136). This may have 
implications for the extent to which a regulator may be able to wield sanctions such as licence 
revocation or criminal penalties, given the relevance of the firm’s success for the economy at 
large. In other words, dominant firms influence the strategies of governments and are in turn 
influenced by government and regulators.27 According to Hancher and Moran (also in Baldwin 
and Cave 1999: 30), this makes for a more interesting approach to regulation. One which 
attempts to capture these shifting episodes (e.g. industry change) and relationships and role
26 Hancher and Moran’s thesis is less about compliance but has been included here given its wider 
relevance to this work. In particular its ability to capture the complexity of regulation, relationships and 
social relations involved in regulation are useful frames here. Nonetheless, the regulatory space 
exposition faces a similar shortcoming with the compliance approaches, in that internal dynamics of the 
regulated firm are ignored. That is, it does not allow for a consideration of how internal dynamics of this 
actor and how its organisation and structure could impact on regulation and the regulator’s ability to 
regulate the sector.
27 See Petrazzini (1995: 5). Zeigler notes that this theme of exchange also appears in corporatist writings 
such as Schmitter’s (Zeigler 1988:17). These authors question the dichotomy between the public and 
private - a dichotomy which guides capture approaches to regulation.
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played by incumbent regulatory firms in industry reform and the design of regulatory regimes. 
In other words, these allow for a more eclectic view of the regulated firm and its activities 
within the market.
Finally, one of the classic approaches to understanding regulation is Capture theory, 
which has its foundation in economics (See Prosser 1999: 203). Capture theory goes beyond the 
above approaches by giving more character to the regulated firm suggesting that this actor (or 
industry) can ‘capture’ the regulator and that government regulation was aimed mainly at 
preventing entry.28 Regulation thus, benefited incumbents in as much as it meant that they were 
protected from competition and the public interest was not necessarily represented in this 
relationship (Mueller 1989: 235-238; see also, Lodge 2002: 16). In its portrayal of regulation as 
a bilateral relationship between the incumbent firm and the regulator, this approach resembles 
those compliance approaches above in that though the latter allow for some role of third parties, 
they do nonetheless, portray the relationship between firm and regulator mainly as a bilateral 
affair.29 What this approach offers is a more nuanced view of the regulated and incumbent firm 
-  one, which acknowledges that they are not simply recipients of regulation, but also influence 
rules and regulations. Further, it allows for a consideration of incumbents in so far as attention 
to large powerful firms acknowledges that some firms have more power and influence to direct 
regulatory policy than others.
1.2 Limitations of Approaches
The discussion thus far has highlighted some of the limitations to approaches to understanding 
regulation. This section is aimed at examining these within the context of the present 
investigation of incumbent firms and their response to regulatory reform.30 Thus, while these
28 See the seminal works of Stigler (1971: 3-21); Quirk (1981; especially Chapter 1). Also see Merrill 
(1997: 960-961) and chapter 6 of Ogus (1994: 99-120). Authors such as Prosser have also critiqued this 
bilateral approach arguing that capture can take place by actors other than the regulated firm (1999: 204).
29 For instance, the responsive approach provides a role for public interest groups who will vie with each 
other for a place in regulating industry (See Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 57-58; Braithwaite 2006: 884- 
898).
30 Also see Baldwin and Black, who have carried out a detailed review of the compliance approaches in 
their call for a ‘really responsive’ approach to regulation (2007: 1-24).
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formulations offer much in the way of understanding the regulatory game, they do not say much 
directly about incumbent firms (possibly, with the exception of capture theory and the 
regulatory space approach) choosing largely to focus more on firms as a single category. Even 
here, the main focus is on the regulator, reducing the extent to which the firm can be assessed 
more directly. Capture theory, while allowing for such attention, also has its limits.31
Further, the approaches discussed here have evolved based on the experiences of 
developed countries,32 not giving much insight into the experiences of developing countries 
such as Jamaica. Further, it is difficult to apply the responsive approach in developing countries, 
given the lack of capacity to make this approach flexible (Braithwaite 2006: 896), laying the 
foundation for an investigation of how regulators in such settings can achieve successful 
regulation. Even so not all the countries in the developed world have been given equal coverage, 
also allowing room for a consideration of some of these ignored settings (in this case, Ireland).
1.2.1 Drivers of Change
These theories and approaches examined above are significant and influential in the 
development and understanding of regulation. Nonetheless, the explanatory power of these 
approaches is somewhat limited to the present purpose.
Firstly, the bilateral focus has seen the relationship between regulator and incumbent 
being presented as the most important.33 While there is no denying the importance of this 
relationship such approaches run the risk of ignoring the fact that the firm (like the regulator) 
operates in a space characterised by a host of other actors and interests that also affect its 
activities and choices. Further, and similar to the compliance approaches, the bilateral 
relationship emphasised by capture theory also ignores the role played by other actors and
31 See notes 27 and 28.
32 This includes the regulatory space thesis, which was informed by the experiences in industrialised 
western economies (see Hancher and Moran 1989: 271).
33 See for instance, critiques of the compliance approaches from Baldwin and Black (2007: 1-24). A 
number of works have also emerged over the years highlighting other limitations of enforcement 
approaches to regulation. These include reviews by Mendeloff (1993: 711); Johnstone (1999: 378-390); 
Haines (1997: 219-220).
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interests in determining the behaviour of regulated firms.34 There is little allowance for actors 
outside the regulator to condition the behaviour or effect change in the regulated firm.35
As such, these present a rather static view of regulated incumbent firms ignoring the 
wider factors that may cause a shift in their strategies and tactics or to which the regulated firm 
may respond.36 There is, therefore, still an emphasis on the role of the regulator with the firm as 
the recipient and little attention to the firm as a potentially important actor in its own right with 
the ability to influence as much as it is influenced by regulation. This includes the possibility 
that some of its actions may be determined by factors residing outside the IRA or government. 
The question following from above is: what are the drivers of change for the incumbent? Such a 
consideration is important in assessing the value of regulation, industry change and the degree 
to which the reorientation of incumbent firms and their behaviour is about compliance.37 Such 
knowledge can also help to inform regulatory strategies, offering more variety in the tools 
available to IRAs in small developing countries for shaping firm behaviour. This is important 
for overcoming some of the constraints noted by Braithwaite (2006: 896).
Following from the approaches discussed above, regulation (by the IRA and 
governments) may be seen as one of the main factors affecting firm behaviour. However, this 
does not constitute the full spectrum of change drivers for incumbent firms.38 Included here is
34 Merrill argues that this approach led to interest groups being ignored with emphasis on independent 
industry regulators and regulated industries (1997: 960).
35 The Smart approach is less the case here. Nonetheless, there is still not enough of an allowance for 
roles such as interests/issues (e.g. internal ethos or drive for competitiveness) as opposed to actors as an 
explanation of firm behaviour, neither is there enough room for ‘external considerations’ as in 
international institutions.
36 Some authors have for instance, considered how incumbents behave in relation to other influences such 
as, competition focusing on their response to entry and the deterrence strategies they employ in order to 
prevent new players from entering their markets (e.g. Bergman and Rudholm 2003: 455-465; Etro 2004: 
281-303; Krouse and Krouse 2005: 35-46). Braithwaite has also reworked the responsive approach to 
apply to the developing world where he acknowledges a role of NGOs and a variety of other actors in the 
area of human rights regulation (2006: especially 891-892).
37 Such an understanding may also aid the regulator in assessing what options can be employed for 
controlling risks and regulating firms.
38 Baldwin and Black also emphasise this point noting that factors such as the culture and competition are 
also drivers of corporate behaviour (2007: 7). This type of analysis has been offered by the ‘target 
analytic’ approaches to regulation. See for example, Kagan and Scholtz (1984: 67-95). Using the 
regulatory space approach, Haine’s research suggests that the behaviour of firms to the hazards they 
caused could not be put down to regulation but instead could be understood in the context of pressures 
which they faced in their regulatory space (1997: x, 60); see also Johnstone’s review of Haines’ work 
(1999: 381-382). As noted before, economists have also considered the role of large firms, and
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the role played by other actors including customers, external organisations and interests - e.g. 
IMF, WTO and developed states, such as the United States (US) - competitive pressures, and 
the culture and trend governing the regulatory space at any one point in time. This is important 
since the world in which these firms exist is not static and they too may evolve in line with 
changes in their environments. These pressures exist within the firm’s operational or regulatory 
space.39 On the other hand, drivers also include pressures from within the firm; for instance, its 
internal mission or drive for modernisation and improvement. These may be conditioned by 
changes in its regulatory space or by internal desire for reform. This suggests some scope for 
innovation and independence in the choices and strategies of the firm, in as much as it has the 
capacity to choose how, when and in what manner to respond.40
Knowledge of the drivers of regulated firm behaviour can assist countries with concerns 
around regulatory capacity to overcome such limitations in so far as they are able to design 
more targeted measures to obtain greater compliance. That is, in as much as these offer 
regulators alternative points of access or means to influence the regulated firm, such an 
understanding may offer resources for regulators in small or developing settings a means of 
bolstering regulatory capacity and heightening compliance. For instance, writing of developing 
countries, Braithwaite notes the difficulty for regulators to impose the ‘big stick’ of the 
responsive approach given the demands on capacity (2006: 884).41 A focus on the multiple
particularly of incumbents in competition. However, the internal dynamics of the firm and how these 
affect response and choice of strategies is still largely overlooked.
39 The approach here is similar to a systems theory view of organisations and change in that its focus is 
not on the firm in isolation but rather on interaction and interdependence among a number of variables 
that have an impact on the incumbent. See for example, Greene (1999: 218). This is also similar to 
another approach used to understand regulation - stakeholder theory. However, whereas stakeholder 
theory argues that the regulated firm will be only one concern in the regulator’s frame of activities 
(Prosser 1999: 196) it is suggested that the regulator may also be but one of the number of interests or 
influences on the regulated firm’s behaviour.
40 These drivers of change also bear some resemblance to Rhydderch et al’s drivers of organisational 
change (2004: 217). Other categories of influences have been proposed by Baldwin (1990) and Kagan 
and Scholtz (1984) and HM Customs and Excise (2003). These have been framed in the context of factors 
contributing to non-compliance for firms, again emphasising the regulated/regulator relationship when in 
fact, the regulator is not the only concern for the firm. Haines, on the other hand, looks at the factors 
affecting an organisation’s capacity for ‘virtue’ (good corporate conduct), which includes, the amount of 
competition, which exists in an industry, and the location of “the organisation within the contracting 
hierarchy” (in Johnstone 1999: 379, 383). Also see, Kagan and Scholtz (1984: 67-95); Braithwaite, et al 
(1994).
41 A similar argument can be made for the smart approach.
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drivers of change and influences on regulated firms can, therefore, assist such states in dealing 
with the limitations of compliance approaches and capacity gaps. Further, where a regulator 
faces risks of capture, an awareness of the diverse points of influence or drivers of the 
incumbent firm’s behaviour may allow the IRA or the government to overcome the power or 
force of a large dominant incumbent.
Thus, instead of retracting a licence, regulators may instead choose to appeal to an 
influential external actor (such as, an international agency) for support. Where the state has 
comparatively less resources than the regulated entity, it may seek to elicit the support of other 
local actors to bring pressure to bear on the firm; in much the same way that Braithwaite 
suggests that NGO regulators in the developing world may seek support from more powerful 
international actors such as the EU (2006: 892). In such an event, the boundaries of the 
‘regulatory space’ may expand beyond the traditional conception to include external actors with 
regulation becoming internationalised.42 Nonetheless, the extent to which individual change 
drivers noted above can stand on their own or are unrelated to regulation and its reform may not 
be straight forward. It is debateable, for instance, how far a change in rules - as may take place 
under regulatory reform - can be separated from competitive pressures if these rules allowed for 
the reconstitution of the market and the entry of competition. This will also be considered in the 
context of the change drivers proposed above.
1.2.2 Incumbents as Monoliths
Secondly, most of the literature on regulation focuses on the regulated firm as a single uniform 
structure -  a monolith. Such a static view may ignore the internal reality of actors at the industry 
level (diversity based on size, resource and influence) and organisationally (within the firm) 
given, that these firms may in fact be marked internally by divergent groups and interests.43 This
42 In this way the regulatory space here more resembles Braithwaite and Drahos’s conception of a 
regulation as an internationalised activity (2000).
43 Analyses of state-industry relations in the US come close to accepting that ‘firms’ is not a single 
category. The state is presented as a powerful omniscient mediator merely balancing the interests of 
multiple actors and establishing the rules by which they play. According to Williamson, the problem here 
is that the issue of varying power levels and how it determines the level of access of each group and
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may be the case for incumbent firms who may be able to exercise more influence in the 
regulatory process and over developments in the regulatory space, particularly at times of 
industry change, more so than other actors.44 For instance, incumbents are owners of fixed 
networks to which entrants must connect in order to operate. They are of great importance to the 
pace of developments in the sector, sometimes being able to delay sector reform and the 
development of competition by delaying the transfer of lines to competitors, information to 
regulators or even by refusing to sign on to new industry regulations where these require a 
change in its contractual arrangements. Competition has for instance, been slowed in Barbados, 
given the unwillingness of the incumbent to allow access to its network (See Schmid 2006: 63- 
77). Lodge and Stirton have suggested that the incumbent in Dominica also refused to allow 
access to its network (2002: 20). As such, the way regulators operate and how rules and 
regulations unfold in practice will be affected by the way these firms respond to such rules and 
regulations.45
At a second level, and as will be shown in the cases in this study, the regulated ‘firm’ 
may be a geographically dispersed actor spread across a number of countries with each site 
having different levels of authority as may exist between a head office and its subsidiaries in 
other territories (i.e. a multinational company). At a third and final level, the regulated firm may 
also be differentiated internally among shareholders, employees and managers inviting a view 
of this actor, not just as the ‘regulated firm’ but as an organisation with internal rules, 
governance, structure, actors and interests.46 These stakeholders may in turn, have disparate
impact on the content of policies is not sufficiently addressed or even taken into account given the 
assumption of equality among actors. Though theorists of liberal pluralism have tried to address this issue 
of power imbalance (e.g. Ehrlich 1982) “there is little serious consideration given to the fundamental 
nature of the imbalance” (Williamson 1985:140). By ignoring this imbalance the issue of access and 
variability in influence (as a direct result of power imbalance) are not considered. The view here is that a 
firm at the centre (in this case, the incumbent) will have more influence and access than others.
44 In inferring that regulation is captured by large firms (incumbents) who are protected from competition, 
capture theory does acknowledge this idea of difference and the role of size and resources as determinants 
of the regulated firm’s ability to influence regulation (see Stigler 1971: 3). This is also the case in the 
regulatory space thesis (see note 55).
45 Johnstone argues, a similar point in his discussion of occupational health and safety regulation (1999:
378-381)
46 The stakeholder approach to regulation, for instance, identifies employees, managers and shareholders 
as some of the actors that ought to be considered in regulation (Souter 1994: 10-11). But while the call 
has been made for these actors to be seen as stakeholders in regulation, there has still not been much
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views on organisational objectives and how they should be obtained, a case which may become 
more real in instances of industry reform where there may be struggles to have the final say over 
company policy.
This segmentation has important consequences for regulation and regulatory reform. 
For instance, internal governance and structure may shape the variety and choice of response, 
which firms may adopt in response to industry reform and regulation. These also relate to the 
level of resources that firms may have at their disposal, including their ability to develop 
internal regulatory capacity to counter the force of the regulator and other change drivers. For 
instance, the regulated incumbent firm, which is part of a Multinational Company (MNC) with 
locations in different countries, may be able to access resources through its network of 
companies, equipping it with capacity and expertise, which may frustrate the activities of 
regulators and the development of competition.47 This may constrain the activities of regulators 
particularly in a small or developing country setting where regulatory capacity may be weak and 
the impact of these large actors can be felt beyond their sector.48 As such they may constrain the 
options available to the regulator (making regulation more complex and costly). Further, the 
option of graduating up a set of sanctions may simply be impractical again given the value of 
the incumbent to the industry and overall economy and the costs involved in certain strategies.49
This segmentation has a more direct bearing on regulatory strategies. As the access to 
network resources can dictate the way the firm responds to regulation, so too can the regulators’
attention given to how these really count or matter in terms of how they affect regulation and industry 
reform. Parker’s work has also pointed out the existence of internal actors within large corporate firms 
arguing that these may help to ensure that corporations remain socially responsible (see for example, 
2002).
47 Hancher and Moran also observe that large firms are also, “often multinationally organised 
enterprise... a locus of power, a reservoir of expertise... and an agent of enforcement in the implementation 
process” (1989: 272).
48 This applies in the case of small states such as the islands of the Caribbean. Hope notes that large MNC 
firms, “provide managerial, administrative, engineering, and other technical skills that are in short supply 
in the Caribbean” (1986: 134). For this reason, he suggests that trans-national firms within the region 
cannot simply be understood in narrow economic terms since their influence and activities extend to the 
cultural and political realms (1986: 135). This will be borne out in Chapters two and six. In a similar vein, 
Braithwaite suggests that, “networked corporate power” may be more powerful than that possessed by the 
state and NGO regulators even in developed countries (2006: 891). Thus, even while Hancher and 
Moran’s regulatory space thesis was developed in the context of large industrialised, capitalist economies, 
their description of large actors (see note 32) is also applicable to small developing countries.
49 See Baldwin and Black (2007: 6).
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tactics and strategies be modified to take advantage of a geographically dispersed or internally 
segmented regulatee. For instance, regulators in a small or developing country setting with a 
non-compliant incumbent may not have to use the big stick of licence retraction. It may instead 
try to enrol the support of dominant actors within the firm, or even enlist the support of the 
home country government (in the case of an MNC) in order to secure the company’s support. 
This is in much the same way that it can appeal to actors in the regulatory space to apply 
pressure to the firm.
1.2.3 How Firms Respond to Change
Following from the above there then remains the need for a closer look at incumbent firms and 
how they really respond to industry change brought on by moves such as, regulatory reform.50 
As noted, by accounting for a range of strategies, which may be employed by regulators, the 
smart and responsive approaches do inadvertently acknowledge that firms respond to regulation 
in different ways (i.e. they may comply or they may choose not to comply).51
However, there remains a need for a greater consideration of the response tactics and 
strategies employed by such actors and not only why but also how they change overtime. 
Johnstone argues that knowledge of how firms respond to regulation is important for the success 
of regulatory ideals such as corporate virtue and for effective and responsive regulation (1999:
379-380). Given that the mass of reforms introduced over the past two to three decades have 
partly been aimed at effecting a change in the way incumbents operate and their dominance and 
control over telecoms, it would also be instrumental to consider how these have managed to 
maintain their power in spite of this situation and the processes of reorientation that these firms 
have gone through in response to industry reform. Such a focus also comes in light of the 
presentation of these firms in their former existence as large unresponsive monopolies, 
unwilling to change. Yet, some of these have managed to hold on to significant market power,
50 Compliance approaches do allow for firms to change to some extent as seen in the fact that the 
regulator can allow for a variety of enforcement and regulatory strategies based on the firm’s response.
51 See again A&B (19-53, 54-100) and Gunningham and Sinclair (1998: 375-454).
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making a case for investigating the ways in which incumbents have managed such a feat.52 This 
has implications for regulatory strategies.
Furthermore, the contractual relationship proposed in the compliance approaches and 
capture theory may lead to an oversimplification of the relationship between the regulator and 
regulated.53 Interpreting the firm’s actions simply as evidence of capture may ignore the variety 
of ways in which incumbents may choose to respond to attempts by the regulator to change the 
content and structure of an industry. Rather, a business may choose to remodel itself in order to 
more adequately face new threats or seek to accommodate the regulator’s goals and ambitions 
within its own strategies. This may be the case even more where there is a failure to actually 
prevent industry reform. Thus, a potentially interesting story lies in the way a regulated entity 
deals with industry change in a context where processes, such as capture, have been made less 
likely, thanks to the entry of more players and rules aimed at bringing more transparency and 
openness.
It is proposed that response strategies and tactics for coping with change will include a 
re-orientation in terms of how the incumbent operates in the sector;54 how it changes the way it 
communicates with clients; how it approaches its relationship with regulators, competitors and 
how it perceives its role in the market. These are mainly exogenous in so far as they pertain to 
relations and practices within the regulatory or operational space and not so much to what takes 
place within the firm at an organisational level. Following from this, it is also suggested that the 
firm’s response to change is not only seen in its relations with actors in its operational space, but 
also takes place internally. That is, in the change in the internal rules, priorities, and ethos and 
organisation.55 Re-orientation may be seen for instance, by examining how the firm challenges 
and modifies old behaviour and its new routines and the way it communicates. These internal
52 For instance, whether this has been due to their role as incumbents or some other factor.
53 Support for this view comes from Fligstein, who argues that portrayal of relations need not always be 
that of capture or antagonism (2001:38). Rather, interdependency and bargaining more adequately 
typifies the relationship between states and firms as in newly industrialised countries such as Korea and 
Taiwan who have adopted this partnership strategy in their developmental model (McNamara 1999).
54 For instance, as one of the main players, the incumbent is able to reduce the uncertainties that it faces at 
any one point since it is they that help to define the rules of inclusion (Fligstein 2001: 16-18).
55 This includes culture, which is often expressed as, ‘the way things are done’ in the organisational 
change literature (Cameron and Green 2004: 224; Scotts 1999: 52).
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strategies may include efforts to reduce operational costs, revision of personnel size and 
training, and the introduction of measures to increase efficiency and the search for ways of 
increasing its overall competitiveness.
Johnstone’s brief review of firm response to changes in occupational, health and safety 
standards noted that industrial restructuring had resulted in, “organisations operating through 
multiple business entities, and resorting to outsourcing, franchising, and downsizing” (1999: 
380). For former monopolies in the UK, Souter notes that regulatory reform had forced 
incumbents to become more concerned with the need for cost cutting and a drive for efficiency. 
Additionally, the threat of a loss of market share can result in lay-offs where these pressures 
force a reconsideration of salaries and costs (Souter 1994: 43-44).
As such, the pressures brought on by regulatory reform (technological development, 
price regulation, competition) may force the firm to consider adjusting internally (or 
organisationally) as opposed to simply seeking to change the rules or capture regulation. This 
proposition of external or systemic reforms having an effect on the internal organisation of the 
incumbent is similar to the notion of ‘colonisation’ in organisations. As used in the 
organisational literature, the term describes “external pressures for change that penetrate into the 
‘genetic codes’ of organisations and transform their outlook and workings” (Rothstein, Huber 
and Gaskell 2006: 102; also see Laughlin 1991). Such an outlook welcomes a more varied view 
of incumbent firms, which sees them not only as regulated entities but also as organisations with 
internal structure, capacity and processes, which are influenced by developments in their 
operational space.56
A consideration of these strategies and tactics is important given their ability to indicate 
a firm’s strength and skill to affect or influence regulation. This is useful as this work also aims 
to assess the role that incumbents have played in telecoms reform. Thus, where a firm possesses 
significant resources and internal regulatory capacity, vis-a-vis the regulator, then the success of 
regulation, the extent to which the regulator can proceed with its duties, as well as the
56 The overall approach here is also in line with Baldwin and Black’s call for attention to a “firm’s own 
operating and cognitive frameworks (their ‘attitudinal settings’)”, in order to attain more responsive 
regulation (2007: 3-4).
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propensity of the firm to regulate itself and hinder reforms may be affected. Johnstone who 
notes that the capacity of the regulated firm will affect its ability to comply with regulation 
proposes a similar argument about the nature of the strategy employed by the regulator to attain 
compliance (1999: 379, 381). These will also affect the way in which the firm chooses to 
respond to threats to its power. This debate is especially interesting in the case of incumbent 
firms who have in the past been the recipients/beneficiaries of state protectionism as former 
state-owned entities, with a long history of operation in their respective countries; and in some 
cases “quasi-public bodies” as described by Hancher and Moran (1989: 274-276).
Finally, a failure to view these actors as more complex participants in regulation may 
result in a narrow view of regulation and regulatory reform as well as a failure to appreciate the 
complexity of the regulatory task. Further, analyses of change in regulation may be weakened or 
at best remain incomplete and unbalanced where the complexity of these actors and their 
activities in relation to issues such as regulatory design and enforcement are ignored. 
Accounting for the incumbent and its interplay with other actors and considerations through a 
focus on factors influencing the firm’s activities and its response to change adds to the existing 
approaches by providing a more comprehensive view of regulation and regulatory change. 
Ultimately, this focus can assist in the design of more responsive regulation and identification of 
ways in which regulators can overcome limitations of size or resource.
1.3 Incumbents and Regulatory Reform
This section highlights the importance of focusing on incumbents and advances an argument for 
considering this actor specifically in the context of telecommunications reform. This will then 
be followed by a discussion of case and data collection methods. The chapter then closes with a 
summary of the rest of the work and conclusions. It has been suggested that a case exists for 
considering the dominant incumbent firm in regulatory reform in as much as knowledge of this
actor’s response can help in assessing the effect of regulation and its reform, how regulators in
small and developing countries can achieve more responsive regulation as well as, to assess the 
value of regulation vis-a-vis other factors as an explanation for firm behaviour. In looking at
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these issues, a case can also be made for considering not only the firm’s relationships in the 
regulatory space but also the internal organisation of the incumbent. All this as a way of 
understanding the continued dominance of incumbents after reforms aimed at challenging their 
dominance and power in the telecoms sector. These insights are useful in giving a more 
balanced view of regulatory reform helping to identify and understand the role of actors outside 
the regulator while underscoring the complexities involved in such processes. This section seeks 
to take this discussion further by strengthening the case for examining the incumbent firm and 
also for considering this actor within the backdrop of regulatory reform.
Coverage of regulatory reform has, for the most part, implicitly assumed that 
incumbents have been at the mercy of the state and its agents, in this case the IRA, the 
legislature and line Minister. This goes against the grain, in that it ignores the actual relations, 
which existed between incumbents and their state sponsors prior to the 1980s where these were 
often one and the same and where the state often rested on the views of these actors in making 
sector policy.57 For example, the close relationship between the monopolist and the state (or 
owner) in most countries meant that industry policy was highly geared to the success of the 
incumbent firm, which often meant protecting it from competition.58 Firms possess more 
industry specific knowledge than most governments, particularly in the years prior to industry 
reform and in some developing countries where capacity and resource may be an issue.59 This, 
arguably, places them in a position to attempt to manipulate regulations to their advantage, at
57 In the US for example, the regulator (FCC) has been labelled as an ally of the main incumbent AT&T 
(Hills 1992: 126) even while being seen as one of the most openly competitive regimes in the world 
(Muller 1981: 18). Hall, Scott and Hood (2000) briefly analysed the British incumbent - British Telecoms 
(BT) and the power it had vis-a-vis the main regulators (Government Department and Independent 
regulator). The authors portray the incumbent as having a strong relationship and access to regulators 
leading to it influencing the reform process mainly between 1984-1992 (2000: 87-90). BT's superior work 
force also allowed it to manipulate licence negotiation episodes, especially those with time constraints. 
The authors claim that the independent regulator, Oftel, was constrained by the incumbent’s interests, 
pressures on capacity and time. As such, BT is argued to have remained at the centre of the regulatory 
space with Oftel (the telecoms regulator) and the Department of Trade and Industry (2000:102-3).
5 Where the state owned the sector it granted - as in the case of small developing states or colonies such 
as Hong Kong - monopoly control to a single, sometimes foreign-owned operator who had the 
wherewithal to manage the sector. This was often justified by economy of scale arguments (Lommerud 
and Sorgard 2003: 2). Where the telecoms market was protected, firms were guaranteed profits and some 
governments assured a steady flow of revenue and assistance in governing the sector, as practised in 
countries such as France during the 1980s (Chamoux 1992: 110).
59 See note 54.
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least certainly more so than other players, such as new entrants. This expertise has also meant 
that the firm’s input was (and remains) important in designing, implementing and enforcing 
regulatory policy, making it an important actor in its own right.
However, it has been argued that large organizations while being able to exploit their 
markets lack the ability to change and adapt to future demands due to inertia (See Flier, et al, 
2003: 2165). Remarkably still, this has not been the case in telecoms where large incumbents 
have managed to ride the tide of reform and, as will be shown in this work, have shifted their 
operations and modus operandi over relatively short periods.60 In most cases, these formerly 
stagnant monopolies have neither died nor remained static when faced with (direct or indirect) 
threats to their power. Rather, dominant incumbents have, through a series of structural and 
operational changes, managed to stay relevant and retain their dominance even while the sector 
is still in flux.61 By so doing, they have demonstrated that they are not non-malleable, neither 
are they necessarily hampered by their size. Rather, their size and position of incumbency are 
viewed here as being instrumental for these firms and their aptitude to adapt to change in their 
regulatory space.
Thus, even where they have lost some market share, they remain leaders in the fixed 
line market. For instance, Table 1 shows that over a three-year period, France Telecom lost 
4.9% of its market and Deutsche Telekom 4.6%. While Telefonica had lost a total of 5.7% by 
the end of 2005 (Table 1.1) the company retained an 80% share of the fixed line market in Spain 
(Gow 2005: 25). Returning to Table 1.1, it shows that in the case of the UK -  the forerunner in 
liberalisation, having opened its telecoms market from the early 1980s, the incumbent lost only
60 Deutsche Telekom remains the dominant player with significant market power in the fixed and 
broadband market despite the entry of a number of large operators including BT Global Services. See EC 
(2000: 3); Gow (2006). British Telecoms (BT) also remains the most powerful actor, particularly in the 
local fixed telecoms market (See Ofcom 2004: 2-14). In spite of decreases in market size over the years 
the firm’s revenues and profits also continue to grow (See Ofcom 2007: 259; BT 2007: 9). The story is 
also the same for France Telecom (See Bonnet 2001; Wieland 2003). On the other side of the world in the 
US which has witnessed fierce competition and where the sector has been liberalised for close to two 
decades and was still witnessing a scenario where new entrants had managed to acquire only around 5% 
of the total market of local telecoms by 2000 (Koski and Majumdar 2002: 2-3).
61 For instance, Telefonica has since liberalisation and privatisation acquired massive stakes in Latin 
American territories including Argentina and Brazil (Gow 2005: 25).
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2.2% of its market share in the three-year period with figures reducing and then stabilising. The 
firm’s overall market share was estimated at 82% in 2005.62
Table 1.1: Percentage Decline in Incumbent Market Share in Europe 2002-2005
2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 Total
France Telecom 1.3% 1.4% 2.2% 4.9%
Deutsche Telekom 1.0% 1.7% 1.9% 4.6%
Telecom Italia 0.5% 0.0% 0.9% 1.4%
Telefonica 2.5% 1.2% 2.0% 5.7%
BT 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 2.2%
Source: Willing (2005: 2).
This is not particular to developed countries. In Turkey for example, no other entrant 
has been able to begin operating in the fixed line market, given the costs involved in 
interconnecting to the incumbent’s network (TI 2007). In spite being hailed as a pacesetter in 
telecoms reform in Africa, after leading the way with market reforms in 1997, the incumbent 
(Ghana Telecom) remained the dominant operator up to 2005 (see Mangesi 2007; Alvarion 
2005).63 In the case of Barbados, the incumbent has slowed competition, through overpricing 
and has been slow to allow interconnection to its network (see Schmid 2006: 63-77). In 
Trinidad and Tobago, the incumbent was the only provider of international voice service in 
2006, though this market had been liberalised (ECTEL 2006: 3).
62 Richardson (2005).
63 Some of this has been blamed on the regulator’s inability to provide a levelled playing field for 
operators due to legislative weaknesses, as well as political interference (Frempong and Henten 2004: 
18).
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This experience is not particular to telecoms. Hardstone (2004), for example, examined 
change in the media printing industry showing that incumbents have not been overwhelmed by 
the development of new technology in their field. Rather, they appeared to have been favoured 
by reforms since market changes allowed them to learn about new domains while enhancing 
their power via alliances and acquisitions. They also adopted new strategies that enabled them 
to deal with uncertainties through technological advancements in their sector. So, rather than 
challenge the dominance of incumbents, change merely offered new operational opportunities 
and left the power of the firm intact (Hardstone 2004; especially p. 20).
Almost two decades ago DiMaggio and Powell recognised the area of incumbency as 
one in need of more attention in academia. In particular, the authors highlighted the issue of 
power maintenance and how incumbents deal with situations, which threaten their positions as 
areas, which remained worthy of research (1991:30). This work aims to make a contribution to 
addressing this gap. In so doing, it invites a consideration of the firm not merely as a passive 
actor governed solely by directions given by the state and its agents. Rather, the incumbent is 
presented as a dynamic agent with the ability, not only to respond to changes, but also with the 
power to direct actions within its operational sphere.64
The story of incumbent firms and the tactics they employ in responding to regulatory 
reform is also one about the tactics of large firms in a complex regulatory space where capture 
has been made less likely by changes which have led to a more populated, formal and 
transparent regulatory space.65 In such a case, how do these firms respond to change? What role 
do they play in industry reform? And why are these actors still dominant in spite of such 
reforms? Section 1.2 has already outlined the assumptions and frames, which will be used to 
assess these questions. The remaining task in this section is to advance a more sustained 
argument or justification for focusing on telecommunications and at this specific juncture in the
64 Further, as illustrated in economic studies of competition where it is unable to change policies 
governing its operations, then the incumbent has an arsenal of other tools and mechanisms for coping 
with policy reform. These range from strategies aimed at preventing entry to those, which limit the 
profitability and survival of new entrants upon entry (Bergman and Rudholm 2003: 455-465).
For instance, Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell note contemporary regulation as being, “characterised by 
heightened oversight and accountability” (2006: 92-93). These features have in turn, made it more 
difficult for firms to capture regulators.
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development of the sector (i.e. regulatory reform). The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
methodology and an outline of the rest of the work.
1.3.1 Why Telecommunications Reform?
Telecommunications also offers a pertinent case for a study of incumbency given what 
Petrazzini sees as its dominance by large firms (1995: 12-14). As noted above, it has not been 
uncommon for a close relationship to exist between the incumbent operator and the sponsoring 
government department in most countries, where the latter acted as both owner and regulator. 
This includes countries on the African and European Continents where both had similar 
organisation and management structures (Akwule 1993: 159-60).
Intrinsically, periods of reform offer opportunities for new operators to enter formerly 
closed markets, which may result in challenges being waged to the dominance of the incumbent 
operator. It is at such times that the incumbent will step up efforts to ensure that it does not lose 
out from such reforms. It is proposed that periods of regulatory reform (as those seen in 
telecoms in the last two to three decades) pose a threat to incumbent firms, given the potential to 
affect the firm’s privileges, making telecoms a suitable area for studying regulatory reform and 
the activities of incumbents.
Episodes of change during which negotiation for new structural arrangements take place 
also offer the incumbent a chance to address existing market failings, therefore, offering 
opportunities to remake the sector more towards a desired ideal.66 Periods of regulatory flux 
therefore, offer a useful frame for studying the activities of incumbents during periods of 
industry change. It is here too that the tactics and response of the incumbent as it seeks to 
minimise and control risks and uncertainties may be witnessed. Where it becomes difficult to 
brush these actors (incumbents) aside then one is forced to consider the true relations between
66 As an example, they may choose to use such opportunities to encourage the introduction of rules to 
prevent bypass, especially where they retain ownership and control over the fixed network. In such a case, 
bypass could mean loss of revenues for the incumbent, giving it more incentive to try to address gaps in 
this area.
27
these and the more favoured participants (e.g. regulators) and how these relationships affect the 
process of reform and choice of regulatory strategies.
Telecoms makes for a pertinent area of study and for the application of the themes 
discussed above for various reasons. Telecommunications is an increasingly important area for 
all countries and has undergone an immense number of changes over the past two and a half 
decades. In the case of Jamaica (1.7% of GDP growth in Jamaica in 2001) and Ireland (3.1% of 
GNP in 2001) regulatory reform has seen increases in investments due to increased spending in 
areas such as mobile (Brown 2004: 23; ODTR 2002b). It has been a prime sector for regulatory 
reform and restructuring and has therefore, generated expansive coverage in academia 
(Wheatley 1999: 2). This utility has wide implications given the many activities and issues 
involved in its provision, use and regulation. As the largest global machine (Wheatley 1999:1), 
it handles a far greater number of individual transactions than any other utility (Harper 1989: 
15-16). So not only is it a tradable commodity but it is also an essential means of conducting 
trade (Walden and Angel 2001: 1). Further, it has been affected by and has seen more rapid 
developments in technology than any other utility resulting in more possibilities for competition 
(Prosser 1997: 58). As its share of national economies continues to grow (Cho 1998: 3; Sikes 
1992: 96) it is becoming increasingly important for countries regardless of their level of 
development to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a modem telecommunications 
regime.
Thus, while the shape of the telecom sector has changed, there is room for a 
consideration of the real extent to which these changes have taken place, certainly in terms of 
the power and influence that dominant incumbents had prior to reform. This would also be 
useful for its implications for the role of regulation on firm behaviour and the ways in which 
compliance can be encouraged where the regulated firm is an entrenched dominant actor.
Such studies are important in so far as they add to the focus on regulation and 
regulatory reform by taking the debate forward to actually focus on what has happened to the 
incumbent firms -  the main objects of regulation and regulatory reform in the 80s and 90s. As 
such, this presentation takes off from where most coverage in the regulatory literature ended,
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mainly on the shift in regulatory regimes and the specific institutional and legal changes that 
have been secured. It aims to do this by building case studies of telecoms reform in Jamaica and 
The Republic of Ireland -  one, a small developing and the other, a small developed country -  
both of which stand outside of the main contexts or areas covered in the mainstream empirical 
and theoretical debates on regulation.
1.4 Choice of Cases and Data Collection
The previous sections suggested that there is an argument for an analysis, which considers the 
role of actors apart from states and IRAs in the reform process and to assess their role in 
regulatory reform. Moreover, a study of incumbents holds the possibility of enhancing an 
understanding of the tools and techniques used by dominant firms in their bid to assert their 
power and influence during periods - of reform -  and the ways in which regulators can respond 
to such firms. It is for this reason that this study leans towards a sociological institutional 
approach of regulation, which captures the complexity of relationships in the regulatory space as 
well as the fact that some groups are more privileged than others (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 
11). The approach also allows for attention to the formal and informal relationships, culture and 
contexts (Brinton and Nee 1998: 5) concerns which are important in this study given the 
emphasis on capturing less favoured actors in the process of regulatory reform. Such an 
approach allows for a view of regulation, which acknowledges the role of business and non­
state actors in regulation (as for example, the smart regulatory approach) and regulatory reform, 
thereby allowing for a consideration of the dominant incumbent firm in such processes as well 
as of other groups such as consumers and entrants. This view is given resonance in the 
arguments of authors such as Hancher and Moran (1989) and Black (2002), who through their 
discussions on ‘regulatory space’ and decentring regulation, have suggested that regulation need 
not be an affair carried out wholly by the state.
The selection of cases has been guided by a number of issues. It has been noted above 
that where regulatory reform has been examined, coverage has not been uniform, with some 
countries getting more attention than others, with an emphasis on large industrial nations. Thus,
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small and developing settings have been among the least covered.67 Even more, little attention 
has been placed on the response of the incumbent firm to these reforms. In this way, telecoms 
offer a useful case for the study of the effects of regulatory reform on incumbents, given the 
implications of reforms for these actors. Such sectoral studies are important in allowing a more 
comprehensive view of forces and actors at work in regulation.68
Special attention will be paid to telecommunications reform in Jamaica and Ireland; two 
countries where reforms thought to have been unlikely, have in fact occurred (around the same 
period).69 Jamaica and Ireland are two countries whose only similarity, at first glance, is that 
they are both small and have both been ignored in the academic debate on public policy issues 
such as regulation. However, both share a similar history in as much as they were British 
colonies and share the institutional legacy, which accompanies such a history. In terms of 
economy, both also underwent economic stagnation during the 1980s. However, where 
Jamaica’s economic problems have persisted, Ireland has seen phenomenal growth. Both have 
faced pressures from external forces to reform their telecoms sectors and have also faced 
deficits in regulatory capacity in the early years of reform. This constraint has at least 
theoretically, raised balance of power issues between the regulator and incumbent, making them 
interesting cases for assessing how these play out in sector regulation. In both cases as well, 
telecommunications and informatics have been viewed as key areas of economic and social
67 There has been increasing recognition if the gaps in the coverage of developing countries (see for 
instance, Frempong and Henten 2004; Gutierrez and Berg 2000; Gutierrez 1999; Opoku-Mensah 1996; 
Petrazzini 1995; Mody, Johannes and Straubhaar 1995; Hobday 1990). Additionally, the Jamaican case 
has in fact received attention from Lodge and Stirton (Lodge and Stirton 2000; 2002; Stirton and Lodge 
2002). However, while there has been some coverage, these cases still exist on the periphery of the 
development of regulation and regulation theory with significant attention still being placed on the US, 
UK and other OECD countries. This is understandable given that these states are frontrunners in the 
development of the theory and practice of regulation, with major scholars in the field residing and 
studying in these settings. Rioux has, for instance highlighted the role of the US in the internationalisation 
of telecoms trends (2004: 91-110). Likewise, this is seen in the emergence of concepts such as, the 
‘regulatory state’, ‘post-regulatory state’ and ‘hyper-regulatory state’ (Moran 2004; Black 2007 and 2001; 
Scott 2004; Braithwaite 2000; Majone 1994; Loughlin and Scott 1990; Sunstein 1990). Thus, 
developments in these states often drive the global agenda on regulation. For instance, the developments 
discussed in the telecoms sector have characteristically taken place in the OECD countries before 
becoming more a feature of the landscape in smaller countries and the developing world.
68 According to Strange, sectoral studies also help to avoid the emphasis on the micro while avoiding the 
dependence on a macro or grand approach (1991: 39).
69 Due to the vested interests in the incumbents and protectionist cultures that existed in the 80s (into the 
1990s as well). See Spiller and Sampson (1996) and OECD (2001a: 86).
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activity, with both countries being recipients of investments in this area from North America 
(Schware and Hume 1996: 6-7). As such, regulatory reform has been seen as key to making 
these countries more attractive to foreign investment.
Attention will be on the activities of the incumbents, Cable and Wireless Jamaica 
(C&WJ) and Eircom, Ireland respectively, from the 1980s to present. This period embodies the 
main phases in the incumbent’s development (i.e. from monopoly to privatisation to 
liberalisation and competition). Both countries also view telecom reform as a path to economic 
growth and as a tool for increasing telecom access for citizens and attracting investors.70 In both 
cases, this modernisation impulse has gone against the grain especially given that very strong 
incumbents with close ties to the governing elites dominated telecoms in both countries (as will 
be shown in the coming chapters).
In as much as developments here share similarities with those in other small or 
developing settings they offer the basis upon which countries ignored in the general debate on 
regulation can find their own niche and tools for understanding events and identifying ways in 
which responsive regulation can be achieved in such settings. Beyond the points of similarity, 
the two cases are also distinct enough to allow for regional, national, institutional and historical 
variations; potentially, heightening the explanatory power and application of the findings. 
Accounts of alternative experiences in a comparative framework can offer fruitful insights to 
discussions on regulation and the relationship between context and regulatory strategies even 
while it is accepted that the small case size may limit the generalisability of the findings. In this 
sense, smart regulation, or responsive, is not just about having a different mix of strategies and 
regulations, but also about being aware of the effect of different institutional and regulatory 
settings and how these inform the use of such strategies. As will be shown in the coming 
chapters, this may even mean employing measures, which may be frowned upon in another 
context in order to secure compliance from regulated firms.
The cases of Ireland and Jamaica also highlight some of the deeper issues which are not 
outside the scope of regulation studies and which are essential to understanding how regulations
70 See IDT (n.d.); ACT (n.d.) and GoJ (1998).
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and firms interact with their environment. That is, the various actors and interests at play, the 
social relations and institutions involved in reform, how these interact at a cultural, legal and 
political level and how these inform regulation. So points of general application can be made as 
it relates to countries undergoing legal and administrative reform and particularly, for small 
countries faced with the task of reforming relations in a sector dominated by strong local or 
international firms.
There has been a reliance on mainly primary sources in the form of electronic data (e.g. 
web pages of regulators and incumbents, World Bank [WB], WTO), historical material (e.g. 
newspaper archives), official documentation (e.g. yearly reports and other policy documents), 
interviews (e.g. semi-structured and open interviews of public officials and representatives from 
the incumbents, entrants and commentators in each country) and legal material (e.g. contracts 
and licences). Secondary sources (e.g. journal publications) have been consulted. These allowed 
for a consideration of activities from different points of view and locations (within and outside 
the incumbent’s experience of reform). The work is largely qualitative.
Data collection has been dictated by a desire to overcome biases from a reliance on just 
one source. However, no research technique is foolproof and the usefulness of any one 
technique may be limited by attending weaknesses. Those selected here are no different, but 
there are also ways in which limitations can be reduced.71 Additionally, the sensitivity of some 
issues (e.g. informal relationship between firm and state and the nature of the former’s 
contribution to government policy) was taken as potential limits to the responsiveness of 
interviewees and the rigour of the study. Thus, different information sources and research 
techniques have been utilised (triangulation) to overcome some of the biases involved in
71 The Internet for example, has been useful in connecting the researcher to a wealth of information and 
allowing ready access to experts for online interviews. It thus, offers an inexpensive and immediate 
means of communication and information gathering (Ferguson 1993). The Internet (e.g. via emailing) is 
of tremendous benefit where financial and spatial constraints are at play. Selwyn and Robson (1998) 
have, for instance, provided a more detailed discussion of the attributes and problems associated with e- 
mailing as a research tool. For instance, it does carry a degree of impersonality, which may not allow for 
the discussion of sensitive issues. Additionally, the use of newspapers can also raise issues of 
representativeness and objectivity. On the other hand, other techniques and methods have been used to 
counteract such a limitation were it to occur. However, resources and individuals can be accessed by 
other means including the telephone, personal visits and trips to libraries (located in Jamaica, the Irish 
Republic and the UK).
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conducting qualitative research. Triangulation does not automatically equate to a set of 
information that fits neatly into a whole. Nonetheless, it offers the scope for uncovering ‘the 
whole picture’ of a given episode or phenomena in light of the emphasis on uncovering ignored 
actors and experiences.
1.5 Organisation of Work
The work is organised thematically with Chapters two and three covering the response of the 
Jamaican and Irish incumbents to reforms, based on their activities and interactions in the 
regulatory space. The chapters show that incumbents have a number of ways to respond to 
change, which evolve as industry reform progresses. Faced with the possibility of industry 
change, incumbents chose to use their power and influence firstly to prevent change. Where the 
reality of change became more certain, both incumbents tried to slow down these movements 
then to make attempts to secure as many gains from the process to protect their positions at the 
helm of the sector in a post-reform era. This was done by attempting to leverage their position 
as incumbents in negotiations, attempting to determine the content and path to be taken in the 
new regime. The chapters also depict the ways in which incumbents can frustrate regulators and 
entrants thanks to their influence and command of resources important for successful reform 
and use of the courts to assert their dominance. The chapters also depict the impact of these on 
regulatory strategies where bartering and exchange have been used to encourage compliance, 
particularly in the Jamaican case. Responsive regulation, as depicted in these cases is thus about 
the ability of regulators to extend the regulatory space beyond national conception and rely on 
bargaining and other creative tools, given the small size and weak capacity of regulators against 
entrenched, well-resourced incumbents.
Chapters four and five consider the effect of systemic change on the incumbent’s 
internal organisation and structure. These chapters demonstrate that regulatory reform is not 
only about changes in the regulatory space with incumbents being able to modernise at a pace 
that defies the presentation of these former monopolists and large actors as lethargic. This focus
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allows for an understanding of why these actors remain dominant and the ways in which they 
have managed to do so.
Chapters six and seven cover the second theme in the work, namely, that incumbents 
are not monolithic structures. The chapters focus on the internal organisation and governance of 
incumbents. Emphasis is placed on the various actors and interests at play and how these affect 
the way the firm operates, how it is able to respond to change, and how this affects regulatory 
strategy. Particularly, it emphasises how internal organisation and structure as well as split 
interests, can constrain the strategies and choices of incumbents and regulators. In so doing, 
Chapter six focuses on a geographically dispersed firm and how it is able to utilise this structure 
as an MNC to gain advantage in negotiations with regulators and how this structure affords the 
firm access to resources and regulatory capacity, which rivals that possessed by a small 
developing country and in turn, other players in its regulatory space. The presentation in 
Chapter seven also challenges this notion of the regulated firm as a monolith, again highlighting 
the internal differences, which may exist and how these affect the incumbent’s willingness to 
embrace change. These findings are important in so far as regulators are able to identify routes 
of access and influence within the incumbent and utilise these more skilfully in their activities.
Thus, regulators may choose to break the power and influence of way-ward or 
recalcitrant groups (within a regulated firm or industry) who frustrate their tasks by making 
appeals to other actors and interests within the firm in a local or nationalised regulatory space as 
a route to more responsive and successful regulation. Collectively, the chapters show that a 
number of actors and issues have been at play in conditioning the behaviour of the incumbent 
firms beyond the activities of the IRA and government. These exist within the regulatory space 
as well as in the firm itself. Collectively, these represent endogenous and exogenous pressures 
for change. However, these exogenous pressures are not limited to the firm’s immediate 
operational sphere but also include international pressures, advancing an answer to Hall et al’s 
question as to the existence of an eighth phase in the development of regulation, which has seen 
the increased involvement of international actors in regulation (2000: 210).
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Finally, the work concludes in Chapter eight, with a summary of the main findings and 
a consideration of the theoretical and practical implications of the research.
1.6 Conclusion
This introduction has served to highlight the context, questions and assumptions that will guide 
the presentation in the rest of this thesis. Here the concern is mainly with the way incumbents 
respond to reform and the factors that influence the incumbent’s behaviour. In looking at these 
main themes the work will also take on board the reality that incumbents (and by extension, 
regulatory firms) are not monoliths and that the response to reform is both external (in the 
regulatory space) and internal (at the organisational level). The work will also highlight the 
point that attention to these themes can help to address challenges of responsive regulation and 
inform strategies for successful regulation in small and developing states.
These have to be some of the more pertinent areas of analysis, in an area where one of 
the main imperatives of industry reform has been to change relationships - one of the central 
ones being that between the incumbent and state/regulator. It is this relationship, which was 
thought to be counter-productive to transparency, efficiency and competition. The nature of the 
firm’s power and its activities in the sector vis-a-vis consumers, new entrants and the state 
(including line Ministries and Independent regulators) may, therefore, have implications for 
regulatory accountability, efficiency and the extent to which competition will in fact flourish. 
Where this reality is ignored, then there is the risk of portraying regulatory reform as a smooth, 
uncomplicated process or as simply a matter of designing and implementing efficient rules and 
legislation. Such considerations also have consequence for the design and implementation of 
reform and transition policies in other network industries and markets characterised by large 
dominant firms. As such, this study seeks to direct the attention and debate on regulatory reform 
into another arena and in so doing, capture some of the more complex and informal 
relationships in the regulatory domain.
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As such, the role played by the incumbent firm in the design and implementation of 
industry policy, not only during the monopoly years, but also importantly, during the reform 
period is a fertile area of analysis. In so far as discussions on regulatory reform have 
emphasised the role of the state and Independent Regulatory Bodies (IRAs) they have 
succeeded in acknowledging but one thing, that incumbents do not always fit the image of a 
‘lazy giant’ at the mercy of the powerful regulator (that is, the state through its various agencies 
and representatives). This makes for a reading that should be of interest to students, academics 
and practitioners of regulation and policy-making and to those keen on understanding the role of 
dominant actors and their relationship with the state and its agents.
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CHAPTER TWO
C&WJ’s RESPONSE TO REFORMS IN ITS REGULATORY SPACE
2.0 Introduction
This chapter aims to assess the ways that incumbent firms respond to efforts to change the rules 
and structure in their operational space. It also seeks to identify the drivers or factors, which 
affect the incumbent’s behaviour. It will do this by examining the activities of the Jamaican 
incumbent, C&WJ, during the period leading up to and after reform. The discussion is divided 
along three time frames, 1980-1990, 1991-1997 and 1998-2007 covering the main phases in the 
development of Jamaican telecoms.72 Special emphasis will however, be placed on the 1998- 
2002 period which marked the main period of industry restructuring. The chapter closes with an 
analysis of the incumbent’s response to change where an attempt is also made to identify the 
main drivers of its behaviour. This discussion will also seek to assess the lessons that can be 
learnt from such an understanding of incumbent firm behaviour.
It is argued that such analyses can inform the activities of regulators, namely how to 
achieve more responsive regulation, and hence greater compliance when dealing with large, 
comparatively well-resourced actors in the regulatory space. That is, knowledge of how 
incumbents cope with change and issues affecting its behaviour can help regulators to determine 
what strategies to employ (and when) in order to secure regulatory compliance. This is also 
important for regulators in resource-constrained regimes, since enlisting the support of other 
actors (drivers) in the regulatory task can potentially help to reduce the cost of regulation (time, 
finance and capacity). Essentially, such information can lead to more informed risk regulation 
and responsive regulatory regimes, offering key lessons for how regulators can approach strong 
incumbents when re-designing regulation or seeking support for reforms, which inherently 
represent a threat of these actors’ power and influence, especially where it can predict the
72 Authors such as, Spiller and Sampson (1996: 36-78), Wint (1996: 49-71) and Stirton and Lodge (2002) 
have given sufficient outlines of some of the major developments in Jamaica which taken collectively can 
be viewed as a comprehensive overview of developments in the sector. The aim here is to build a picture 
of reform, which more comprehensively reflects the actions of the main player in this discussion -  
C&WJ.
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behaviour of such firms. These themes will also be carried through in the corresponding 
discussion in Chapter three on the Irish incumbent.
Furthermore, the responsive and smart approaches suggest that regulators have varied 
strategies for dealing with regulated firms. Following from this, Chapters two and three indicate 
that the regulated firm also has its mix of strategies for dealing with regulators, competitors and 
changes that may occur in its regulatory space. As such, the presentation challenges the view of 
incumbents as non-malleable actors or as ‘takers’ of regulation, since they are also actively 
influencing the activities of participants in their regulatory space, including the independent 
regulatory authority (IRA) itself. This is seen in its influence on sector policy and the framing of 
legislative rules, to the timing, implementation and enforcement of these rules.
2.1 Bilateralism and a firm Empowered: Privatisation of Jamaican Telecoms 1980- 
1989
The 1980s emerged with a Government reeling from the effects of debt, rising oil prices, budget 
constraints and unemployment in Jamaica.73 In its bid to address these problems and meet 
targets set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Jamaican government decided to sell 
one of its most valuable assets, the state-owned monopoly provider of domestic telecoms, 
Jamaica Telephone Company74 (JTC).75 The sale was also influenced by an international trend 
towards reducing the size of government (Payton 2003: 100).
By 1985 the parent company of C&WJ, C&W, who already owned 49% of the provider 
of international telecoms, Jamintel, emerged as the likely heir and key beneficiary of 
privatisation, with no outside bids being invited (Wint 1996: 58).76 For instance, C&WJ was
73 Unemployment stood at 30% in 1980 and 21% in 1975 (Hope 1986: 79).
74 The firm became C&WJ in 1998. However, the term C&WJ will be used throughout.
75 Proceeds went directly to the IMF to help offset the country’s debt under the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. See McCormick (1993:8); IADB (2003: 3); Gleaner (2002).
76 C&W, the multinational has had a presence in many countries around the globe. In the 1960s and up to 
at least the 1970s C&W represented the largest telecoms firms in the world (Baglehole 1970: preface). 
Even with divestments since the late 1990s into 2000, its global operations remain one of the largest in 
the world. Its Jamaican leg commenced operations in 1878 as the West India Telegraph and Telephone 
Company. Establishing a connection between the islands in the Caribbean proved to be a viable 
endeavour by the colonial government given the importance of linking its territories in the region and the 
importance of Jamaica as a transhipment point (Ahvenainen 1996: 15-19).
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already making significant contributions to the economy, not only by bringing in foreign 
currency, but also through licence payments and taxes.77 The international market had grown 
since the 1970s, coming to represent a significant portion of total telecom revenues.78 
Additionally, C&W’s size, technology, capital, expertise and branding as a huge multinational 
with investments in other parts of the world and even more - already with a footing in the 
Jamaican sector, made it the obvious choice for inheriting the sector when privatisation became 
necessary.79 All this made the consolidation of a failing domestic market, with a profitable 
international segment, an attractive option, making C&W the likely recipient of Jamaican 
telecoms.
By 1987 both government and firm went into negotiations to hammer out the structure 
of the new regime. This ended with the incorporation of Jamintel and the JTC, into a new 
Company, Telecommunications of Jamaica with its structure outlined in Figure 2.1 (ToJ 1988: 
5). Thus was created the company with the largest annual turnover in the Caribbean (Dunn and 
Gooden 1996: 1). A year later, five Operating Licences were signed.80 These allowed for cross- 
subsidisation of domestic rates by the more profitable international market, which in itself, also 
made reform along these lines politically attractive.81 Indeed, this was one of the main features 
of the 1988 arrangement with the main features of the agreement between the firm and the state 
outlined in below in Box 2.1. Cross subsidisation was to allow ToJ to maintain its position as 
one of the cheapest fixed service carriers, with the country consistently rating amongst the 
lowest globally.82
With privatisation C&WJ’s monopoly extended to international and domestic
77 C&WJ was the largest corporate taxpayer and generated average taxes of J$97 million 1981-1985 and 
J$190 million 1987-1991 (Spiller and Sampson 1996: 72). Available figures suggest that it contributed 
around six billion dollars in taxes over a ten-year period from around 1992 to 2002 (C&W n.d.: 6). 
Additionally, prior to 1997 C&WJ’s contribution of foreign exchange was significant, earning on average 
$150 million US each year from settlement rates (Deane 1998).
78 In 1978, this stood at 20% and 80% by 1991 (Spiller and Sampson 1996: 66). As an indicator of the 
value of the international segment to overall profitability of the account the 1988 Annual Report indicated 
that revenues for year ending March 31 consisted of J$68.7 million from telephone rentals and other local 
services, while J$252.3 originated from International services (ToJ 1988: 11).
79 See Wint (1996: 49-71; 2005: 317-338) for a discussion of these and other rationales for the decision to 
award C&WJ the licence.
80 Collectively termed the All Island Telephone Licence 1988.
81 See Spiller and Sampson (1996: 66) and WB (2005: 45).
82 Interview: senior executive of C&WJ, Kingston, March 21, 2007.
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telecommunications, telegraphy, wireless and telex; it had the right to install or approve 
attachments to its network and set tariffs for such activities (Dunn and Gooden, 1996: 3). 
C&WJ’s licences therefore, placed it in a position of dominance and power, making it the 
natural reference point for the government, or other actors, on Jamaican telecoms.83 Thus, at this 
stage the incumbent is shown marshalling its resource, ties and experience to increase its power 
and control over Jamaican telecoms. The factors contributing to its growth and development (as 
well as its gains in this period) help to establish a basis for the firm’s power later in its 
incumbency.
Following from this, the evolution of the 1988 regime could be viewed as evidence of 
capture by C&WJ given the extensive privileges secured. Further, the close relationship 
between itself and the state had helped to advance its position in this first round of telecoms 
restructuring.84 The Minister was left as the official regulator85 with little or no participation 
being welcomed from interest groups (including customers) in shaping the regime and 
subsequently in regulation. As suggested by Dunn, the public interest was neither protected nor 
represented (1994: 26) with the result that the regime more resembled the contractual type of 
association highlighted in Chapter one.
83 For instance, the firm represented the government’s interests in various international groupings 
including the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization (Noguera 1996). This is not necessarily 
unique to Jamaica or a developing country setting but used simply to suggest some dependence on the 
knowledge and resources possessed by C&WJ, a fact which may have been heightened by the limited 
resources and capacity within the state vis-a-vis that of its developed counterparts, particularly at this 
time.
84 Wint also notes this as reason for the firm being awarded licenses in Jamaica, T&T, and Barbados 
(1996: 57).
85 McCormick makes the point that a reduction in state ownership is usually accompanied by the 
bolstering of its regulatory function as occurred in neighbouring Latin American countries undergoing 
privatisation at the time (McCormick 1993: 1). The example had also been set by other countries such as, 
the US and UK (See for example, Beesley 1997; Bishop, Kay and Mayer 1995; Breyer 1990 and 1982). 
Admittedly, the lack of an independent regulatory body need not be an indicator of lack or even of weak 
regulation. However, this would have been one way of indicating its intention to foster openness and 
objectivity. The failure to introduce more independent regulation may suggest the level of mutual 
understanding, which existed between firm and state and the level of operational freedom that the firm 
was in fact given.
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Figure 2.1: C&WJ Group Structure in 1988
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
THE JAMAICA 
TELEPHONE CO. LTD.
JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF 
JAMAICA LTD.
GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA 
CABLE AND WIRELESS W.I. LIMITED 
OTHER SHARE HOLDERS
SHARE HOLDERS
53.1%
39.0%
Source: TO] (1988: 6)
Box 2.1: Main Features of the 1988 Regime
• Commitment from the state to reduce its ownership overtime
• ‘Exclusive’ ownership over (domestic and int’l) telecoms
• 25-year renewable licence (1988 - 2008)
• 17.5%-20% rate of return
• No change in terms of licence without C&WJ’s agreement
• Adjudicator to settle disputes between firm and state
• Pledge to assist firm to secure loans for investment
Compiled from  SpiUer and Sampson (1996: 72)
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As the instrument establishing the regulatory framework and structure for telecoms, the 
licences were criticised for what was viewed as their very liberal terms. For instance, they gave 
little administrative discretion to the Minister (Spiller and Sampson 1996: 36). In essence the 
Minister had little basis for regulating C&WJ or ensuring that the firm met standards regarding 
quality and service.86 This was exacerbated by what was seen as the secrecy and closed nature 
of negotiations where it was felt that not all aspects of the agreement had been made public 
(Dunn 1994: 26 and Wint 1996: 55).87 Beyond this, the shared ideology and close relations 
between incumbent and state meant C&WJ operated with little restraint.88 Neither were there 
readily available mechanisms through which the public could hold the firm accountable except 
through the courts.
The lesson here is that where the regulatory task resides in a ministry, the focused 
attention and understanding of telecoms needed for effective regulation may be lacking, 
compromising the overall quality of regulation. In the end the Minister and customers were 
unable to provide sufficient counterweight to the firm’s power.89 In effect, the relationship 
closed off access from other parties, a point, which further aided and protected C&WJ’s 
dominance.
However, such an understanding would have to be considered in the context of other 
points residing in Jamaica’s political culture that highlight the limitations in applying capture 
theory wholeheartedly to Jamaican telecoms.90 As noted by the WB, “efforts to develop
86 The licence simply requested that C&WJ deliver continuous and “efficient” service with no measure of 
this efficiency. The Regulator/Minister in turn, did not introduce any direction to this effect.
87 Mills has noted such closed and secretive tendencies as features of governance in small states (1990a: 
320).
88 Matters relating to the sector were not seen to affect others in as much as the public did not necessarily 
understand what was taking place between firm and state (Dunn 1994: 26). As such, outsiders were kept 
out of the policy and regulatory arena leading to dominance and further advancement of C&WJ’s role and 
influence over sector policy and regulation. One interviewee also noted that some public officials had 
their first jobs with C&WJ and as such may have felt an allegiance and desire to protect the firm 
(Interview: Hopeton Dunn, January 7, 2005). Also see Mills (1990a: 317-327; 1990b) for a discussion of 
the impact of small size on governance.
89 The chief of the government’s negotiating team was made the first chair of the privatised body in 1988 
(Interview: former senior staff at C&WJ, November 20, 2006; also in Wint 2005: 328).
90 Namely, the government’s attempt in 1972 to amend the Constitution in order to abolish the right to 
private property raised uncertainty among international investors as to the government’s credibility 
(Spiller and Sampson 1996: 42-43; Wint 1996: 49-50; Hope 1986: 34; Brown and McBain, 1983: 85- 
158). This move to Democratic Nationalism was to witness a process of ‘Jamaicanisation’ or
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privatised production and encourage market-led growth may not succeed unless investors face 
clear rules and institutions that reduce uncertainty about future government action” (WB, 1992: 
1) This point is of particular resonance in the Jamaican setting given past relations between 
business and government. Thus, seemingly extensive conditions may have marked such 
recognition by the Jamaican government and a desire to provide the stability needed for the firm 
to invest in the sector. Thus, while the presentation here allows for capture, it also goes beyond 
this notion suggesting that not all instances of policies going in the firm’s favour can be taken as 
evidence of capture.
With such guarantees the firm was in a position to begin infrastructural improvements 
leading to advances in capacity and quality throughout the sector.91 This is demonstrated in the 
increased growth in the number of telephone lines or teledensity.92 According to Spiller and 
Sampson:
... the implication is that the combination of privatisation and regulatory reform 
provided Cable and Wireless with the incentives and confidence to invest in its 
Jamaican operation, which it did not have before 1987.
(1996: 75)
On the other hand, teledensity was still comparatively low suggesting that this policy 
may not have been as effective.93 Thus, the policy of replacing a government monopoly with a 
private entity meant that in spite of Spiller and Sampson’s suggestion, the conditions had not
nationalisation of key industries, including telecommunications. Even earlier (the 1960s), excessive 
administrative discretion was identified as a problem for investor security. This uncertainty was 
demonstrated for example, in renegotiations for renewal of telecoms licences and rate increases with the 
telecoms firm reducing investments, given the uncertainties it faced concerning its licence (See Spiller 
and Sampson 1996: 47-50; 1994: 30). As such, the government may have suffered from a credibility 
issue, which by the 1980s made it willing to relinquish certain rights to heighten investor confidence and 
security.
91 Attempts were made to advance cellular capacity, business-based communications systems and the 
rehabilitation of external facilities to make the network more robust. In order to enhance the reliability of 
the network particularly against some of the harsh weather conditions periodically experienced by the 
island and reduce line faults, outside plants owned by the firm were rehabilitated (ToJ 1990: 10). These 
efforts along with the digitalisation of the telegraph network were to see marked gains being made in the 
island’s communications infrastructure.
92 Defined as the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants of a region or country. This stood at 
around 2.99 in 1984, 4.46 in 1991, 14.03 for 1997-1999 (ITU 2004). Fixed lines moved from 81,710 in 
1987 to 471,000 in 1999 (Brown 2004: 24).
93For instance, in 1993 Barbados had a teledensity of 30.6, Belize 13.3 and the Bahamas 25.5 (Brown 
1995: 4).
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been provided for the firm to maximise investments in the sector. Rather, the competition or 
rivalry that may have been needed to spur efficiency and greater progress was lacking resulting 
in C&WJ operating with much leeway (See Payton 2003: 101). Thus, by 1990 the waiting list 
almost matched the number of existing lines (88,000) (Noguera 1996: 5). Further, given the 
small number of actors in the regulatory arena in the 1980s-1990s and the direct routes informal 
contact with policy-makers, the firm basically went unchallenged in its position at the centre of 
the sector.94 Some of this was owing to what its longest serving chief saw as, the “cordial and 
co-operative working relationship between the state and [C&WJ]” (ToJ 1988: 7).
The high rate of return was to see frequent rate increases being awarded to allow C&WJ 
to realise its profit, in spite of the ample rates received from resettlement (see Spiller and 
Sampson 1996: 36).95 However, the firm was keen to keep this separate from its local 
operations, particularly where it concerned funding network expansion.96 As such, network 
expansion was done at the state’s expense, given its pledge to assist C&WJ in securing loans for 
such improvements.97
The firm thus became a dominant force in the sector, in this instance, viewing industry 
reform as an opportunity to heighten its power and freedom through greater ownership and 
control. Thus it could act unilaterally, introducing policies without consultation with the 
Minister/regulator or customers.98 These rights essentially limited the possibility of competition 
in telecommunications and most certainly not in the fixed line business. In the end, the 
guarantees ensured that C&WJ would operate risk free with little restrictions on its operations, 
guaranteed profitability and little oversight (Insight 2001: 1). Even so, these developments also
94 The parent company had encouraged this form of relationship with ministers from the 1960s as a means 
of protecting its markets within the Caribbean (Barty-King 1979: 346-347).
95 See note 78.
96 Interview: Senior Executive, C&WJ, Kingston, July 20, 2007.
97 Interview: Former employee of C&WJ, Kingston, November 20, 2006. Sources included the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation who granted the firm £10 million repayable 1991-1998 (ToJ 
1989: 25).
98 For instance, C&WJ blocked direct international dialling through the introduction of an International 
Call Authorisation System (ICAS) in 1989. This was done without discussion with the state or its 
customers (Interview: Senior Executive, C&WJ, Kingston, July 20, 2007). However, the incumbent felt 
the problem of bypass required just such a “drastic measure” and as such, the new system remained intact 
(see ToJ 1989: 11). In 1988 bypass cost the firm $49 million and $70 million or 20% of the total billing 
for outgoing calls in 1989 (ToJ 1989: 11).
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provided the foundation for future challenge in the sector as it pertained to C&WJ’s rights and 
exclusivity. Indeed, it was the uncertainty of the boundaries around these ‘extensive’ privileges 
that laid the foundation for much of the developments in the 90s.
The legality of this ‘exclusivity’ was also questioned given its foundation in the 1893 
Telegraphs Act, which at that point had given C&WJ monopoly over the island’s 
telecommunications network. However, the technology considered under this legislation could 
not have anticipated the revolution that was to take place in communications technology." 
Consequently, the 1988 licences did not make specific reference to C&WJ’s monopoly rights in 
these areas with the firm’s exclusivity over these remaining doubtful. The period of 
‘exclusivity’ (see Box 2.1) was questioned, given the argument that seven or 10 years would 
have been ample time for the firm to recover any investments made in the sector (Dunn and 
Gooden 1996: 3). The stage was thus set for the future challenge of C&WJ’s monopoly.
2.2 C&WJ Pushes for New Legislation: 1990-1997
The 1980s ended with C&WJ securing the prize in Jamaican telecoms -  what appeared to be 
exclusive control of international and local telephony on very favourable terms. The 1990s 
would be spent trying to protect this market as gaps and limitations of the Act on which the 
1988 regime was based became apparent. This led to the second phase of attempts by the 
incumbent to dictate the structure of the sector 1990-1997.
Challenges here were wound up in the threat of bypass100 that had been an issue for 
C&WJ since its incorporation in 1987 (ToJ 1988: 4). The 1990s however marked an increase of 
this practice as firms who wished to have a share of C&WJ’s profitable international market 
began agitating for reform. Bypass was not only a challenge to profits but also to the legality of 
C&WJ’s monopoly with such acts being interpreted as contravention of the 1988 licences.101
99 Particularly, the emergence of value added network services; the role of data transmission fibre optic 
and cellular services were not covered under this early Act. As noted by Stirton and Lodge the Act dealt 
with telecommunications in a pre-Marconi era (Stirton and Lodge 2002: 4; Lodge and Stirton 2002: 10).
100 That is, “illegal network access” (ToJ 1988: 4).
101 Such ‘violations’ were facilitated by the growth of 'Voice over Internet Protocol' (VoIP) technology, 
which allowed consumers to make international voice calls through their Internet Service Providers,
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This awakened C&WJ to the need to protect its status by clarifying and extending its 
exclusivity by pushing for the introduction of new legislation. And so began the firm’s attempts 
to control and direct the legislative agenda and the shape of its operational space in ways 
resembling capture. One of its first strategies was to appeal directly to the government, utilising 
ties and contacts with policy makers to introduce legislation, which would prevent a 
disadvantageous change in its position. Hence, while it remained structurally dominant it now 
sought to enhance the legality of this dominance. Thus, by 1990 C&WJ exerted pressure on the 
state to have the 1893 law updated to include all new forms of communications technology. In a 
letter that year to the Company chair, the Prime Minister agreed to C&WJ’s request, 
acknowledging its intention to extend C&WJ’s exclusivity.102
The incumbent’s hand was strengthened by an economic slowdown, which saw the 
government trying to raise funds through the sale of additional shares in C&WJ. Thus, C&WJ 
offered to pay a greater value for the shares, in return for extending its licence (Lodge and 
Stirton 2002: 4). The sale was carried through in that year with C&WJ owning 79% of the 
Company and the public the remaining 21% (Wint 1996: 55). As in the previous episode, these 
negotiations were not made public. The regulatory space was therefore, a closed arena with the 
state appearing to have been captured by the regulated firm.
It was only in 1993 with moves to introduce the new Bill before Parliament that the 
letter was leaked to the media and the public became aware of C&WJ’s activities. In previous 
episodes the firm’s attempts to direct the shape of the sector did not draw much attention. 
However, the public was now more aware and there had emerged a number of firms desiring 
access to the telecoms market; these lobbied against C&WJ’s efforts ultimately sidelining the
circumventing C&WJ’s network (C&WJ-AR 2001: 7). The rapid pace in the development of 
communications technology also hinted at the potential for further bypass. C&WJ acknowledged this, 
giving it as a rational for bringing legislation up to speed.
02 As noted in the letter, “the Government acknowledges that it was the intention that 
Telecommunications of Jamaica Limited (ToJ) would, under the All-Island Telephone Licence, 1988, 
issued under the Telephone Act, enjoy the exclusive right to provide public telecommunications services 
in Jamaica... In order to rectify the situation, it would be necessary to amend the Telephone Act...I wish 
to give you the assurance that Government intends to take immediate steps to make the necessary 
amendments” (Gleaner 2000b).
46
legislation.103 With the approach of an election, the government sought to avoid losing support 
by pushing through an unpopular legislation, instead promising a new legislation after general 
elections in 1996 (Lodge and Stirton 2002: 10).104 During this time, however, C&WJ did what it 
could to prevent or limit entry in the sector.
Its actions were driven by an insistence on protecting its supposed exclusivity and 
preventing bypass or any move it viewed as being contrary to the terms of its licence until 
legislative reform was secured. Until then, C&WJ took comfort from the government’s pledge 
that it would, “not do anything, which would, in any way prejudice the company as the 
exclusive telecommunications carrier for services in, from and through Jamaica”.105 As shown 
here, the evolution of regulation is also influenced by the electoral cycle, a point that is also 
substantiated in the Irish case (Chapter three). In Jamaica it is shown as affecting the ability of 
the incumbent to influence politicians or sector policy, presenting strong motivation against firm 
capture.
2.2.1 Increase in Sector Regulation
There was however, some recognition that regulation was less than ideal, when attempts were 
made to introduce more transparency through the Fair Trading Commission (FTC), created in 
1993 to prevent abuse of dominance (FTC 2003a: 1). However, the effectiveness and credibility 
of this body was curtailed by capacity gaps.106 Nevertheless, it was the power wielded between 
the minister and the company that remained dominant, especially with what Stirton and Lodge 
note as an internal agreement not to challenge the 1988 licence (2002: 5).
Continued attempts to bolster regulation and increase the distance between firm and 
state witnessed the establishment of an independent regulator, the Office of Utilities Regulation
103 See Stirton and Lodge (2002: 4-5).
104 This is supported by an Inter American Development Bank report on privatisation and regulation in 
Jamaica, which concluded, “ the discussion about privatisation has had more to do with timing (e.g. avoid 
discussion close to elections), rather than with deeper aspects, such as whether privatisation would 
increase wealth, or increase investment” (IADB 2003: 3).
105 See note 33.
106 Problems included weak legislation and budgetary constraints placing restrictions on operations and 
staffing. For instance, the FTC consistently complained of shortfalls in its budget and the constraints it 
placed on its functions and ability investigate complaints (GoJ, 2001b: 8; FTC 2003b: 1).
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(OUR) in 1995.107 The establishment of this mega-regulator indicated more than ever, the 
breach that was to appear in the relationship between firm and state. However, this was not 
immediately evident given that the OUR did not become operational before 1997. Until this 
body became operational, the FTC attempted to offer some restraint on the incumbent’s 
activities, especially in the face of a minister who appeared unwilling to do so.108
The incumbent did not welcome this addition to the sector. In fact, it was to attempt to 
get telecoms excluded from the OUR’s portfolio (Stirton and Lodge 2002: 16). Failing this, the 
incumbent took little official notice of the regulator, even refusing to contribute fees meant to 
keep it operational.109 C&WJ’s response was somewhat facilitated by the deficiencies in the 
1995 OUR Act. As an enabling legislation, it was deficient in that it failed to give the OUR 
sufficient power to force the incumbent to comply.110 Thus C&WJ could ignore the OUR, 
thanks to loopholes in the legislation (Interview: Former OUR staff, Kinston, Jamaica: June 29, 
2001). 111 These deficiencies limited the regulator’s power and legitimacy, ultimately 
compromising its ability to function efficiently. These early years of the OUR’s existence saw it 
growing frustrated at the lack of responsiveness not only from C&WJ but also from other major 
utilities over which it had responsibility. By the end of its first year it noted that a majority of 
the complaints that it referred to the utilities operators did not receive a response. Subsequently, 
the forty day-investigation rate that it had promised clients turned into 60, and in some cases, 
100 days (OUR-CA 1998: 14). This point helps to underscore the importance of equipping
107 This was created at the behest of the WB in return for funding to privatise the national electricity 
company (Stirton and Lodge 2002: 5).
108 In 1995, for example, the FTC brought up C&WJ for excessive charges for Internet access. The 
incumbent later filed a suit challenging the FTC’s right to regulate user rates. This was settled out of court 
(FTC 2003a: 1-2).
109 According to Sections 6 and 7 of the OUR Act, the regulator was to be financed from fees charged for 
its service and particularly, moneys from the regulated companies. The Act had also empowered the OUR 
to oversee service level complaints and establish fees and penalties for the companies it oversaw. 
However, no enforcement power was given to the body, minimising its ability to collect these fees.
110 One interviewee argued that this may have been intentional, as the government did not want to cede 
too much power hence, control to an independent body (Interview: Former C&WJ staff and later adviser 
to Digicel, Kingston, Jamaica, June 20, 2001).
111 The Act did not specifically note any organisation that the OUR would regulate. It simply mentioned, 
“approved organization”, which according to Section 2[1] was, “any organisation or any body of persons 
which by virtue of an enabling instrument, or this Act is made subject to the jurisdiction or control of the 
office as respects the operation of a utility undertaking”. This was used by the incumbent as a rationale 
for ignoring the OUR’s jurisdiction in the sector, especially given subsequent failure to form any 
‘enabling instrument’ (see Stirton and Lodge 2002: 5).
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regulators with adequate, legal and technical support if they are to be seen as credible forces in 
the regulatory space, a finding which also resonates in the Irish case (see Chapter three). 
Furthermore, it could not issue licenses, only making recommendations to the Minister in this 
regard (Section 4, OUR Act 1995). The difficulties faced by regulatory bodies are demonstrated, 
particularly, where they lack sufficient power and resources to carry out their tasks, indicating to 
the incumbent where the real power existed. This remained the case up to 2000, when the OUR 
Act was amended and the 2000 Telecommunications Act was brought into force, giving the 
OUR specific responsibility for regulating the incumbent (Section 4).
The presentation up to this point is of a dominant firm whose role as the regulated actor 
is less clearly defined given it has played a role in defining sector rules and the way regulation 
proceeded with little restraint. This may result from dependence on the regulated firm (for 
expertise, to develop infrastructure), which makes negotiations and regulation more a matter of 
compromise and bargaining in order to achieve optimal results in regulation and the wider 
economy.112 In this case regulation has to be ‘responsive’ to a number of actors and interests 
(including macro issues, such as growth and development) that may result in regulators making 
compromises, reminiscent of capture, with the regulated actor. This is one of the ultimate 
difficulties in achieving, or even defining, ‘responsive regulation’ in any one context given the 
range of issues and actors who may affect regulation at different points.113
As will be shown in the next section, the incumbent also has its mix of strategies to 
respond to changing market structure and rules. Thus, the regulated firm in this context is not 
simply a policy-taker as it is seen attempting to define and direct rules contemporaneously with 
the state.
2.3 Liberalisation and Reform of Jamaican Telecoms: 1998-2007
The practice of protecting the firm from competition even though it had been privatised was to
112 As seen in the government’s need for capital and to develop telecoms and by the impact these had on 
the experiences of 1988, 1990 and 1993.
113 Even while it is accepted that these can in turn help the regulator to become more responsive, 
especially where it is aware of these issues and how they can be used to bring pressure on, and increase 
compliance from large dominant actors.
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end by 1997 when a new Minister took over telecoms.114 The entry of this minister also meant a 
breach in the collegial relations between firm and state, forcing C&WJ to seek more ways of 
protecting and asserting its dominance in what was to be an increasingly contested regulatory 
space.115 Additionally, the conclusion of the WTO Basic Agreement in Telecommunications 
Services (an annex to the GATS Fourth Protocol in 1997) was to provide one of the strongest 
motives and blueprint to reengineer Jamaican telecoms.116 Under this agreement the government 
pledged to provide an enabling environment for competition by March 1, 2000 (Brown 2004: 
25). This drive was also facilitated by the ITU, IMF and WB who helped to sensitise the 
government of the benefits of reform (Ibid: 24). International regulation and support thus, 
afforded the GoJ additional leverage to revoke its agreements with C&WJ. This third period 
was therefore to witness a State that was now emboldened against the private monopoly it had 
created almost a decade earlier. By the late 1990s, telecoms was increasingly being seen as a 
vote winner for any administration willing to champion the cause of small investors and 
consumers (Interview: Former C&WJ employee and adviser to Digicel, Kingston, Jamaica 
2001).117 Thus, though applications had been made to the former Minister for VSAT licences in 
early 1996, it was not till the new Minister took over that these were successful. Five licences 
were awarded in 1998 under the 1973 Radio and Telegraph Control Act. This set the next phase 
of the story in motion with C&WJ bringing a Court case against the government in 1998, which 
was to end with the renegotiation of the rules and structure of Jamaican telecoms.
114 Interview: Owner of a small entrant, Kingston, Jamaica June 2005.
115 This breach was made even more real by the fact that the new minister was not a novice when it came 
to telecoms and competition, having headed the FTC before this appointment. Hence, he brought with 
him an awareness and understanding of telecoms and the possibility and potential for the sector in terms 
of the way it was organised and the potential of competition.
116 The GATS is Annex IB of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement. The Agreement consists of a number of 
multilateral arrangements relating to goods, services, dispute settlement and intellectual property. It 
outlined structures aimed at bringing about global standards in telecom through trade liberalisation 
including increased transparency and the dismantling of barriers to entry. The Agreement became 
effective in 1998. See Annex on Telecommunications of the GATS; Fredebeul-Krein and Fretag also give 
a comprehensive review of the GATS (1997: 477-91). Jamaica was given up to 2010 before it had to 
adopt this system.
117 Various administrations had been harping on the effect that competition could have on the economy 
and society in various political manifestoes and policy documents (JLP 1997: 26-28; 2002: 6; PNP 1997; 
2002: 7). Also see The National Industrial Policy and Ministry Paper No. 37 (GoJ 1998; 2001a). These 
noted the role of communications technology in enabling Jamaica to enjoy access to more 
communications services at lower prices (GoJ 1998:1).
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And so, while the firm’s attempts to influence policy were to continue in the mid to late 
1990s the shift in its relationship with the Minister meant it had begun to diversify its tactics and 
response to threats in its operational sphere, since it could no longer rely on this source for 
protection. This was to move from one underscored by shared understanding, informality and 
trust to one characterised by uncertainty and increasing antagonism. This saw more of an 
emphasis on thwarting competition and industry reform through the use of its incumbency and 
all the privileges afforded by this status. These related to its monopoly over information, its size 
and resources vis-a-vis the government regulators and competitors and could be seen most 
visibly in the turn to the courts and the use of anti-competitive measures.
2.3.1 Anti-competitive Practice as an Exercise of Incumbency
C&WJ’s activities during the early-mid 90s was about cementing its hold over the telecoms 
sector by driving policy and legislative reform to fortify the legality of its dominance. However, 
its ability to direct industry policy became more limited due to increased public scrutiny; it also 
began focusing more on preventing market entry, given a growing breach in relations with the 
line minister and as a way of controlling the pace of movements in the sector.118 These moves 
(also reminiscent of the Irish incumbent’s tactics) increased as more competitors sought to enter 
the market.
In one popular strategy the company would refuse to fill line requests from entrants, 
thus preventing connection to its network.119 Where C&WJ was forced to allow access, it would 
sometimes do so slowly, or grant fewer lines than requested. In 1998 for example, it delayed 
transferring lines to Answering Limited, a small company offering voice-messaging service 
(FTC 1999a). When it eventually filled the request, it also increased line charges by 60%.120 At 
the same time C&WJ unilaterally introduced the same service to its customer’s phone lines
118 As noted by one interviewee from a small competitor, CWJ had, “never been a good partner in this 
[sector]. They want to be the only ones around” (Interview: Kingston, Jamaica June 20, 2005).
119 See “Fair Trading Commission and Cable and Wireless (Jamaica) Limited settle Intouch Voicemail
Suit” (FTC 1999a) and “Cable and Wireless (Jamaica) Limited Responds to Complaint Lodged by the 
Fair Trading Commission” (FTC 1999b).
120 Gleaner (1999).
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without their permission. Such delays therefore placed added pressure on small operators. The 
FTC brought a claim of abuse of dominance against C&WJ in 1999,121 noting, “we believe it 
was only because of the plan by Cable and Wireless to get into the market of value-added 
services that there was this inordinate delay” (FTC 1999a; 2003a: 2). It was also accused of 
false advertising, since it eventually began charging for the service, when it had been advertised 
as free. Faced with threat of action from the FTC, the incumbent agreed to a number of 
measures, including the installation of voicemail only where requested, but justified its actions 
as an attempt to promote, “technical and economic progress” (Ibid).122
While the OUR was slow in getting started, the FTC filled the void, becoming more 
active in regulating against abuse, indicating the various institutional arrangements, which can 
be employed in regulating the behaviour of an incumbent. Thus, where the incumbent chose to 
ignore the sector regulator, the competition regulator played an important role in monitoring and 
checking its activities, in so doing, plugging the gaps of the sector regulator.
2.3.2 C&WJ Turns to the Courts
However, one of the main weapons used by the incumbent in slowing competition, frustrating 
regulation and challenging the legitimacy of regulators was its use of the Court system in the 
late 90s. As will be seen in Chapter three, this is one of the key strategies employed by such 
actors when faced with threats to their dominance. Faced with changing dynamics with 
politicians and growing uncertainty around the rules, and the boundaries of its power, C&WJ 
turned to the Courts to obtain clarity and to reduce risks and uncertainties. The increase in 
litigation since the late 1990s marked a departure from the past, with the judiciary becoming a 
crucial player in the regulatory space.123
This was first used against the FTC in 1995, but since 1998 it became more a feature of
121 See GoJ (1999).
122 The FTC acted under Section 37 of the Fair Competition Act 1993. This was amended in 2001 to 
increase its enforcement capacity and define its jurisdiction (GoJ 2001b).
123 For instance, in spite of the antagonism, which existed between private utilities and the government to 
the end of the 70s, the judiciary was not used to solve any of these disputes. In the case of telecoms the 
then Jamaica Telephone Company had only appealed to the courts against the regulator (Pubic Utilities 
Commission) in 1974 (Spiller and Sampson 1996: 43-44; 54).
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C&WJ’s response to the OUR, though not to the extent witnessed in Ireland (as will be shown 
in the coming chapter).124 Where the OUR or Minister ignored C&WJ’s requests, then it was 
willing to seek resolution through the courts. For instance, while granting the firm’s request for 
a rate increase in 1998, the OUR lessened the amount it originally requested. In a move, which 
was indicative of where the real power existed, the Minster then reviewed the OUR’s decision, 
further reducing the level of increase.125 A further request for a J$20 for directory assistance 
was reduced to J$10.126 Earlier applications for rate increase had for the most part gone 
unchallenged. The minister’s refusal in this instance was one of the first indicators of the shift in 
the relationship and declining influence of the incumbent. The incumbent subsequently called 
for the matter to be referred to an independent referee. The minister’s refusal saw C&WJ taking 
the government to Court to get a ruling on its right for the matter to be considered by a 
referee.127
With the Court being used to clarify regulatory policy and industry structure, the 
incumbent’s capacity to appeal to the Court also constituted a threat to the state and entrants 
who were not as well resourced and thus, were unwilling to go through a system that was slow 
and costly.128 According to one entrant, “we would be wasting resources taking C&W to court... 
they (i.e. C&WJ) get away with a lot of things” (Interview: Representative of a small operator, 
Kingston, Jamaica, June 20, 2005). The act of going before the Courts was also demonstrative 
of the firm’s commitment in ensuring its rights -  as it believed them to be -  were secured, as 
was the case in 1998 when it filed a suit against the state for issuing the five VSAT licences.129 
C&WJ had interpreted this as a direct violation of its 1988 licence conditions and aimed at 
forcing the government to retract the licences and prevent future licences being issued (Stirton 
and Lodge 2002: 6). Thus, where the regulators (state, FTC and OUR) failed to clarify the
124 See note 108.
125 Jamaica Gleaner (2000a); Thompson (2002a).
126 Ibid.
127 On the day of the hearing, the government announced it had agreed to C&WJ’s request and would 
cover the firm’s legal costs (Gayle 1998).
128 Interviews: Former OUR staff, June 20, 2001 and January 7, 2005, Kingston, Jamaica.
129 Minister of Commerce and Technology v. Cable and Wireless (Jamaica). Suit M089/98. aimed at 
forcing the government to retract the licences.
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boundaries of the firm’s monopoly it turned to the courts to seek redress. As such, it was the 
issuing of the VSAT licences, the legal wrangling between firm and state and the clamour for 
entry from investors that triggered the next phase of events that saw the most extensive period 
of reform in Jamaican telecoms.
2.3.3 Negotiated Reform of Jamaican Telecoms
With C&WJ’s decision to take the government to Court, the relationship between firm and State 
became more strained, with the government appealing to C&W Pic. in London and his 
corresponding Minister in the UK to seek support for sector reform and to retract its case 
against the government.130 Added to this pressure, was the fact that while it had been one of the 
instigators behind the break-up of British Telecom’s monopoly in 1982; C&WJ was now 
fighting to maintain the same position in Jamaica. Another of the inconsistencies in C&WJ’s 
behaviour meant that the late 90s saw it attempting to enter the US market even while 
attempting to hold on to its monopoly in the region. This duality helped the Jamaican 
government to earn support from the FCC as well as the UK government.131
Further, one of the main foundations for C&WJ’s struggle to maintain its monopoly 
was also under threat. Namely, the 1997 Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 
Benchmark Resettlement Order stipulating a reduction in the rates that US companies could pay 
foreign firms for telephone calls terminated in the country from 2001.132 These signalled the 
beginning of a new era in the international settlement rate system, indicating the impending 
decline in the firm’s earnings.133 The growth in communications technology and the FCC
130 Interviews: Former staff and adviser to C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica, November 20, 2006; Then Minister 
of telecoms, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005.
131 Ibid. Also see Wint (2005: 330).
132 Section one notes, the Order aimed to ‘establish benchmarks that will govern the international 
settlement rates that U.S. carriers may pay foreign carriers to terminate international traffic originating in 
the United States.” See FCC (1997). The Order was challenged by C&W pic. with over 100 other 
telecommunications providers in 1998. The appeal was overturned January 1999. See Cable and Wireless, 
pic v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America. 344, U.S. App. D.C. 261; 166 
F. 3d 1224.
133 Thus, while C&WJ saw steady increases in net profits up to 2000, it was to witness a decline for the 
first time in 2001. According to C&WJ, this reduction was influenced by the practice of bypass and the 
reduction in remittances due to the renegotiation of the international settlement rate regime (C&WJ-AR 
2001: 6-7).
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agreement had served to lower the political leverage that could be gained from holding on to its 
monopoly (Lodge and Stirton 2002: 17).134 Thus, it appeared that faced with the inevitable, 
C&WJ made the rational decision to give up its monopoly while it was still in a position to 
ensure that it came from the negotiating table with as many benefits as possible. C&WJ and its 
shareholders in London also had an incentive to change their stance, coming to recognise reform 
as an opportunity to redesign the sector so as to eliminate some of the risks and uncertainties 
that had plagued its operations (i.e. bypass and lack of clarity around its rights).135 As the 
profitability of the international market had motivated increased ownership of telecoms in 1987, 
the threat of declining profits now motivated C&WJ to give up its monopoly.
By signalling its willingness for regime change, C&WJ was also signalling its changing 
attitude to regulation. Thus, rather than an attempt to prevent reform, it now sought to embrace 
it and its potential benefits. Whereas formal Regulation had been viewed more as a constraint in 
former years, the firm became more accepting of potential opportunities that more transparent 
regulation could afford, particularly, the potential for it to shape the regulatory framework to 
allow it to remain competitive both in the medium and long term.136 Both firm and state thus, 
went into discussions. Ironically, these discussions marked a return to the closed bilateral 
relationship of the past, with the OUR being excluded from the 1999 negotiations.137 As such, it 
is understandable that the incumbent was slow to recognise the OUR, especially, given the 
government’s own attitude to this actor, once again demonstrating where the balance of power 
existed in the regulatory space.
The discussions were to see the Court case being retracted in 1999 when a Heads of
134 C&W argued that the timing of the Order was unrealistic since other countries, including the US and 
UK had taken over ten years to introduce competition in their telecoms sector. See Benchmarks Order 
paragraph 168.
As it noted in its Annual Report there existed, “a strong tendency towards the introduction of 
competition in certain areas” (C&WJ-AR 1998: 5). On the other hand, C&WJ also recognised the 
urgency with which the Minister wanted reform, a fact, which may have unwittingly strengthened the 
firm’s hand at the negotiating table.
136 Interview: Senior member of regulatory team at C&W, London, February 22, 2007.
137 See Winton (1999). This decision suggested the little regard that the OUR was given by both the 
incumbent and the Minister at this point. Interview: Former senior staff at C&WJ who also acted as an 
adviser to the government on telecoms related matters, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005. He also 
pointed out that this was also indication of an unwillingness to let the OUR take the lead given the 
political stakes involved.
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Agreement (HoA) was concluded between C&W and the State, the main features of which are 
outlined in Box 2.2. One of the key elements of this agreement was the government’s pledge to 
protect C&WJ from one of the main threats it had faced since its inception -  bypass.138 
Interconnection rates would in turn guarantee the incumbent an additional source of income. 
The firm also pledged to sponsor a Spectrum Management Authority (SMA). There was also 
something to be gained from the firm being involved in such a body given the full extent of its 
ownership of infrastructure within the sector. The sooner the SMA could begin its operations 
and the less the distraction of funding, then the more it could prevent abuse of the incumbent’s 
rights as network owners. Regulation in this instance could effectively be seen as regulation for 
or on the incumbent’s behalf.139
C&W pledged not to proceed with any claims for compensation, even with the 
premature termination of its contract.140 Other countries such as Hong Kong had in fact paid 
C&W to give up its licence and the Jamaica government was keen to avoid a similar occurrence 
(Interview: then Minister of telecoms, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005). In return the 
government made a number of pledges, including a promise not to charge the firm for its new 
licences to allow for phased liberalisation. Under the HoA, the government also agreed not to 
issue any additional VSAT licences before full opening of the sector in 2003. The terms of the 
HoA are laid out in Box 2.2, which demonstrates the firm’s pledges and the government’s 
promises.
138 See JTC (1988: 7).
139A 1 s o  given its concern in ensuring that there was no abuse of its infrastructure.
140 See Box 2.1.
Box 2.2 Main Features of the Heads of Agreement Between C&WJ and 
Government of Jamaica (GoJ) 1999
C&W Pledges GoJ’s pledges
End of suit against the GOJ
No compensation for Premature termination of contract 
Sponsor a Spectrum Management Authority (SMA) 
J$16 million for 200 scholarships over three years 
J$90 million for a new call centre 
J$190 million upgrade for Jamaica Digiport 
improvements
Install 217,000 land lines by 2003
Free Internet access to 50 post offices________________
Prevent Bypass
No charge for C&WJ’s licenses 
Free use of Spectrum 
Phased approach to liberalisation 
No New VSAT licenses up to 2003 
Help secure loans for network
The HoA also noted a set of rights and duties, the violation of which would see the 
government compensating the firm for losses (See Box 2.3).141 These were to remain in effect 
six years after the Act had been passed ensuring that even after full liberalisation, C&WJ’s 
dominance over certain areas of the sector would remain unchallenged.
The HoA was to be the precursor to the 2000 Telecoms Act. The Telecom Act 2000 
was to mark the beginning of a new era in a liberalised and fully privatised telecom regime. 
With the new Act coming into effect March 1, 2000, the firm inherited a set of eight enabling 
licences a few days later on March 14 (C&WJ-AR 2001: 23). These were to run up to March 
14, 2015.142 The Act (and HoA) also made allowance for an SMA. This new regime was to see 
the firm being given a 15-year renewable licence entitling it to supply all types of telecoms 
services. Any modifications to the licence had to be agreed mutually. The pricing structure was 
also changed allowing for more flexibility through the use of price cap regulation.143
141 Clause 7.1 of the HoA.
142 These were the: Carrier (Cable & Wireless Jamaica Limited) Licence, Service Provider (Cable & 
Wireless Jamaica Limited) Licence, Spectrum (Cable & Wireless Jamaica Limited) Licence, Domestic 
Mobile Carrier (Cable & Wireless Jamaica Limited) Licence, Domestic Mobile Service Provider (Cable 
& Wireless Jamaica Limited) Licence, Domestic Mobile Spectrum (Cable & Wireless Jamaica Limited) 
Licence, Free Trade Zone Carrier (Jamaica Dig port International Limited) Licence and Free Trade Zone 
Service Provider (Jamaica Digiport International Limited) Licence.
143 Introduced in 2001 (WB 2005: 45).
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Box 2.3 Terms Under which C&WJ’s Compensation Rights can be triggered
C 9.5.11 - where the law is (i) inconsistent with the Policy Drafting Instructions (iii) “in 
away” detrimental to CWJ
C.9.5.3 - where there is a failure on the part of the Minister to issue to CWJ new licences 
“in the manner, at the time specified in and contemplated by the Policy 
Drafting Instructions in the form provided for” by the Agreement’s1 Annexe
C.9.5.6 - where the Minister gives an international facilities licence to a new VSAT or 
Free Trade Zone applicant, or where the permitted International facilities 
licences are not “in conformity with” the policy Drafting Instructions (see 
Clause 3.3)
C.9.5.7 - if Regulations emanating from Clause 4.1of the Agreement do not correspond 
with “the Policy Drafting Instructions (see Clause 4.1)
C.9.5.1.1 - where a court nullifies any part of the new law or Agreement, where 
provisions are determined to be unenforceable and where this impacts 
adversely on CWJ
C.9.9.1 - if Parliament changes any aspect of the Bill within six years o f the effectiveness 
date or any additional laws are passed that have a detrimental impact on CWJ
C.9.9.2 - if within six years o f the effectiveness date of the new law the re-issue or 
amendment of rules and regulations has an adverse impact on CWJ
C. 10 -  if at any time after the effectiveness date of the 2000 Bill any provision of the
latter or the Agreement cannot be enforced or is nullified causing damage to CWJ
1C = Clause
Source: Compiled from the Heads of Agreement between the Government of Jamaica and Cable and Wireless Jamaica 
Limited (1999).
The Act allowed for a phased approach to liberalisation, which was to take place fully 
in three years in March 1, 2003 (Sections 77-83 of the Telecoms Act; Myers 2000). The phased 
approach was said to be in order to give the monopoly time to prepare itself for competition as 
well as to compensate C&WJ for its stranded assets.144 Importantly, the firm was also exempted 
from paying “any regulatory fees or licence fees during Phases 1 and 11” of the liberalisation
144 Interviews: Former Director General of the OUR, 2001, Kingston, Jamaica; OUR advisor, 2002, 
London, UK. C&WJ’s aim was to utilise its period of monopoly in long-distance services to augment its 
strength locally. In so doing, it could meet its goal of becoming the, “carrier of choice in a fully 
liberalised environment” (EIU 2001).
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schedule.145 Commentators including Foga and Newman have observed that the HoA had 
reduced the expansion in network services up to 2001 (2001: 7).
The terms of the Act and the Agreement shared many similarities with the HoA.146 This 
plus the fact that the Policy Drafting Instructions (PDI) were not made available have lead to the 
view that the actual legislation was in fact, drafted by Cable and Wireless.147 According to the 
HoA, “The Parties recognise that before the Policy Drafting Instructions can be implemented 
into Law the Bill prepared consistent with those instructions will be the subject of Parliamentary 
debate and possible modification or rejections by Parliament. The Parties also recognise that 
such modifications or rejections may give rise to certain rights including, inter alia, an 
obligation on the Government to compensate CWJ in accordance with this Agreement” 
(1999:2). As such, the negotiations and resulting agreements concluded in 1999 deserve prime 
consideration when assessing the influence of the incumbent on regulation and the shape of the 
new regime. At last C&WJ succeeded in securing the guarantees that it had so long sought to 
get from the state in order to protect its revenue base. The irony here is that this came as part of 
an agreement meant to liberalise the sector, while it had failed to secure such a promise during 
its ‘exclusivity’.
The willingness of the Government to agree to such extensive privileges may have been 
influenced by a desire to terminate the ongoing court proceedings. As noted by the minister “as 
long as it [i.e. the court case] stood there it probably stood in the way of other things” 
(Interview: Kingston, Jamaica, January 6 2006). On the other hand, the Minster’s actions defied 
the spirit of the existing agreement to advance the firm’s legal monopoly. This would challenge 
a presentation of relationships in the regulatory space simply as capture, since the regulators (in 
this case, Minister) are not unwilling participants in the incumbent’s games. Rather, they are 
shown to support the firm where their interests can be met through cooperation and withdrawing
145 Section 15 of the Domestic Mobile Spectrum (Cable and Wireless Jamaica Limited) Licence 2000.
146 For instance, Sections 77 and 78 of the Telecoms Act reflect the stipulation for staged liberalization in 
the HoA. Protection from bypass also features in a number of sections (9, 51, 63 and 78). Section 82 also 
notes that the firm will not pay for its spectrum license.
147 Interviews: OUR Advisory Board Member (1998-2000), London, June 19, 2000; Former staff and 
advisor of C&WJ, Kingston, January 6, 2005 and November 20, 2006.
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this support, where it was not in its interest. Thus, as economic motivations had driven 
privatisation in the 1980s, a decade later, these resurfaced as a motivator for liberalisation.148
Additionally, while the main features of Jamaican telecoms after 1999 resembled GATS 
specifications,149 it has also been suggested that the government had simply used the GATS to 
justify a position that it had intended to take.150 The most significant point however, is that the 
whole incident demonstrated the tactics taken by a government department as it tried to gain 
support for reforms, particularly when dealing with a deeply entrenched and powerful 
incumbent firm with the incentives and power to withhold support or at least, frustrate reforms. 
As the Minister later commented: “We worked very closely with C&W and some people would 
say too close ...but the aim was to achieve competition” (Interview: then Minister of Telecoms, 
Kingston, Jamaica January 6, 2005).
2.3.4 Empowering the Regulator
Following from concerns that it did not have the capacity to regulate the incumbent 
effectively (Section 2.2), the OUR also came in for attention under the new regime. The OUR 
was emboldened to play more of a role in the sector, allowing it to take over from the FTC. As 
such, it received a significant boost to its power under the 2000 Act [Section 42 (2)], which 
gave it the mandate to set standards by which C&WJ could be held to account.151 Assistance in 
designing the structure and content of the new regime was provided by UK based consultants 
and academics through DFID (Department for International Development). A member of 
OFTEL’s staff was also on loan to the OUR (OUR-CA 2000: 6). Thus, the OUR had been able 
to tap into the resources and expertise of regulators in other countries thus, allowing it the 
capacity to regulate the sector while allowing it time to build up internal capacity. Such 
exchange of best practice and resources is particularly, useful in the developmental years of the
148 According to figures released by the US Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in 1998, Jamaica’s debt 
stood at over $3.4 billion US while debt servicing represented 58.2% of the total government budget by 
2000. The unemployment rate in 1996 stood at 16.2% and 16% in 2000 (US Department of State 1998; 
2001).
149 See note 116.
150 Interviews: OUR staff, June 29, 2001 and former Digicel Consultant and C&WJ staff, January 7, 2005 
Kingston, Jamaica
151 Underscored in the Amended OUR Act of 2000 (OUR 2001: 6).
60
IRA, especially where it does not have the luxury of time to get itself rooted before it needs to 
undertake major episodes of reform.
Nonetheless, the OUR’s activities were still somewhat constrained under the new 
regime, since deviations from the Act would have given way to C&WJ invoking its right to 
compensation, further lessening the possibility of the state departing from the Agreement. The 
OUR and the Minister therefore, eventually made decisions that made it appear as if they were 
simply protecting the firm against competition. For example, after the passing of the 2000 Act, 
an entrant’s (InfoChannel) request for a license to provide Voice-Over-Intemet and other 
services was turned down, though it had received a similar licence prior to the Act.152 This 
move may be interpreted as evidence of the state’s desire to avoid the risk of activating the 
incumbent’s compensation rights and in so doing fulfil its promise to do all that it could to 
prevent bypass. Thus, as shown here regulatory reform does not mean an automatic loss of 
power for incumbent firms. What it may do is force the incumbent to reconsider the ways in 
which it expresses its power and how it utilises this power to secure an advantage in its 
regulatory space (which is also its market).
Furthermore, attempts by the OUR to have regular contact with C&WJ on matters 
relating to customer service was met with little response in the early years after liberalisation 
(OUR 2001: 8). As it noted: C&WJ,
demonstrated a lesser inclination to support this level of interchange. The OUR is 
therefore, not sure that C&WJ views the Regulator’s intervention on behalf of 
customers with the same degree of urgency and importance as is the case with the 
other two regulated utilities.
(OUR 2001: 8)
In other instances, the incumbent has also gone over the OUR’s head to deal directly with 
complainants even after cases had been lodged with the Consumer Affairs Department (CAD) 
of the OUR (OUR 2001: 8). This demonstrates C&WJ’s continued unwillingness to recognise 
the regulator’s jurisdiction over it.
152 Infochannel brought a case against the OUR and Minister in 2001. The original High Court ruling was 
made in Infochannel’s favour in 2002, but was overturned in 2003 (Observer 2003a).
153 That is, electricity and water.
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In an attempt at self-regulation (again to circumvent the authority of the IRA), the 
incumbent initiated its own scheme for measuring service standard in February 2001. This was 
embodied in a Customer Service Charter that came into effect in March 2001 and this pledged 
certain timelines for responding to customer demands for repairs and new services. This it 
argued was in keeping with its desire and willingness to provide guarantees for service quality 
(C&W pic in OUR 2001: 41). Ironically, though this may also be seen as an attempt by the firm 
to move ahead of the OUR in order to design a set of standards regarding breaches that it knew 
it could live with as opposed to allowing the OUR to design a scheme which would be more 
onerous for it. These guarantees were at the outset being made independent of any direction 
from the government or the OUR. Whatever the case, this move by the firm shows the power of 
regulatory reform in nudging incumbents towards making changes and commitments, which 
they would not have made under monopoly. Here the regulated firm appears to have been 
competing with the regulator to design sector rules before the regulator had a chance to design 
its own measures.
While noting the benefits of the scheme was still criticised as suffering, “from certain 
shortcomings that renders it substantially inadequate to ensure a quality of service comparable 
to world benchmarks associated with the best...” (OUR 2001: 41). Particularly, the C&WJ 
devised scheme was inadequate in as much as it ignored some features seen to be important 
indicators of service quality.154 Additionally, insufficient publicity and discussion had preceded 
its launch and the OUR had not been consulted on its design (ibid). There was also no external 
judge of good practice with the firm itself deciding when standards had been breached. That is, 
under the scheme, the Incumbent was also not legally mandated to make any reports to the OUR 
on its attainment of these standards. It also retained the power to decide the level of 
compensation for breaches and when this would be made (OUR 2001: 42) and no allowance for 
external enforcement.
Some o f  the firm’s activities, including making appeals to the Minister over the OUR’s
154 These included an absence of instructions relating to the firm’s technicians visiting customer premises 
and standards and specifications on dial tone delays (OUR 2001: 42).
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head also frustrated the OUR’s work and its ability to obtain transparency in the sector.155 Thus, 
even while liberalisation has occurred and the state/firm dynamics have changed, the incumbent 
has still acknowledged the functionality of the ministerial relationship and has sought to engage 
in tactics of the past to get its way in the regulatory space.
The firm’s delay tactics have also had implications for the OUR and the time taken to 
achieve objectives such as accounting separation (Section 30 [2], Telecoms Act). Six years into 
liberalisation, C&WJ was criticised for its slow pace in separating its accounts and complained 
that it was unable to provide information on its accounting practices in the time required. This 
was due to costs involved in complying with this requirement even while former managers 
affirmed that C&WJ could in fact obtain this without difficulty (Twomey 2005: 3-4).156 It also 
noted that such disclosures could see it releasing sensitive market information. By 2005, 
competitors complained that the playing field was not level, accusing the incumbent of illegal 
cross-subsidisation and the OUR of not doing enough to prevent abuse from the incumbent 
(Twomey, 2005:3; Interviews: Heads of two small telecoms firms, Kingston, Jamaica: June 
2005). Demonstrated here is the firm’s continued use of its position of dominance, size and 
control over information to frustrate the attainment of regulatory goals. This in turn, has 
implications for the OUR’s ability to assess the degree of compliance from C&WJ or to identify 
instances of abuse.157
But even while it sometimes chose to ignore the regulator, it also recognised the utility 
of this actor in ensuring that entrants stuck to the terms of the HoA. Thus, as competition got 
underway, the incumbent also grew to appreciate the virtues of regulation, particularly where 
this meant it was being protected against abuse. Thus, as bypass continued to eat into the firm’s 
revenues in 2001 it also stepped up its efforts to police the sector, pointing out instances of
155 Interview: Former OUR Staff, July 16, 2002. The OUR has been able to withstand pressure from the 
Minister and incumbent, as well as Digicel thanks to the diligence of its first Director-General.
156 On the other hand, authors such as Baldwin, McVoy and Steinfield maintain that holding separate 
accounts for many different products, which share the same facilities as well as same staff is difficult to 
achieve (1996: 319-320).
157 This drew complaints from competitors that the OUR was not doing enough to prevent abuse from 
C&WJ. For instance in 2002, Digicel argued that the “OUR is under some false impression that 
international investors like Digicel can be penalised by the schizophrenic changing attempts at the rules of 
the game and give even further advantage to the incumbent C&W “ (O’Brien 2002: 6).
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abuse to the SMA and OUR (See, C&WJ-AR 2001: 7).
For instance in 2002, the band at which Digicel was initially allowed to set rates (for 
calls made from fixed lines to its mobile network) changed (Thompson 2002a). Nevertheless, 
Digicel failed to reduce prices in line with the decrease. It was the incumbent who finally 
brought the OUR up to date on this, resulting in a downward revision of Digicel’s rates in 2002, 
a point, which drew concerns from Digicel about the OUR’s objectivity.158 The incumbent’s 
actions here (as well as the emphasis it placed on preventing bypass) also suggest the ways in 
which a dominant regulated firm can inadvertently direct the regulator’s agenda. A review was 
in the incumbent’s benefit since the changes recommended by the OUR would potentially affect 
the revenue of its biggest competitor. Here, the incumbent also acts as a regulator (and ally to 
the IRA) policing the market to ensure compliance. Additionally, it also regulates the regulator 
ensuring that the IRA is responsive to developments in the market, a strategy similar to that 
employed by the Irish incumbent (see Chapter three).
Ultimately, the Jamaican regulatory space may be characterised by complex and 
shifting relationships. Such a reality may in turn make the business of responsive regulation a 
very difficult task for any regulator which may run the risk of appearing to be captured by a 
regulated firm (in this case C&WJ) even where it is in fact, acting honourably. Thus, while a 
small regulator may benefit from enlisting the support of actors in the regulatory space, 
questions may arise about its impartiality and objectivity when the supportive actor happens to 
be the dominant player itself.
2.3.5 The Role of New Entrants
The impact of private capital in dictating the nature of reforms is not to be downplayed either. 
However, as in the Irish case, the slow pace in which competition unfolded served to extend the
158 This prompted Digicel’s Chief Operating Officer to comment, “they (OUR) just take Cable and 
Wireless information and say they can’t share it with us because it’s confidential” (Thompson 2002a). 
This is not to suggest that entrants such as Digicel have been more forthcoming. Indeed, as Digicel has 
increased, it too has begun employing some of the tactics employed by C&WJ in preventing entry - see 
Observer (2008).
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firm’s power. Thus, while two cellular licences were granted in 1999, these did not come on 
stream till 2001, giving the firm some time to adjust before competition.159 Nevertheless, from 
2001 entrants such as Digicel have served to peck at the incumbent’s power and influence in 
mobile telephony and Internet services. International support for the development of 
competition also came from the WB (through its private arm, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), which bought an eight percent stake in what was to become the firm’s 
biggest competitor Digicel in 2002.160 These also utilised the Court to challenge the incumbent’s 
power and the 1999 regime.161 So whereas there were no firms powerful enough to challenge 
the incumbent’s power in 1988, the situation had changed by 2000 with more actors willing to 
challenge the incumbent.
Since 1999, the prospect and then reality of competition were to nudge C&WJ towards 
acknowledging the need to readjust its operations and increase its ability to function more 
successfully in a liberalised environment. These reforms were mainly related to the firm’s 
operations and internal organisation, demonstrating the effect of reforms in the structure and 
rules of the regulatory space on the internal operations of regulated firms and former 
monopolists, an argument, which is examined in Chapters four and five.
In such a climate customer care was to play a bigger role in the firm’s strategy. For 
example the recognition that competition was imminent saw C&WJ, by 1998, stepping up its 
drive to broaden its customer base, increasing the issuing of telephone lines to customers. The 
rate at which the firm engaged in this task was described by the OUR as being, “quite dramatic 
when compared to prior periods” (OUR 2001: 10). Its feverish effort to deliver landlines was 
also matched by efforts to increase access to mobile phones. This marked an attempt by the firm 
to increase its customer base ahead of liberalisation by addressing one of the more severe and 
longstanding complaints in the sector access.162 Indeed, this strategy had proven somewhat
159 Digicel has been able to provide an effective counterweight to the incumbent’s influence. The other 
two operators have had little impact in the sector.
160 Observer (2002).
161 See note 152.
162 Nonetheless, unmet demand remains significant, at over 100,000 in 2005 (Ellington 2005).
65
successful in assisting the firm to cope with changes given that it was able to expand its 
customer base in this area and offset some of the losses from other sources by 2002 (see C&WJ- 
AR 2002: 5).
Like the Irish incumbent, C&WJ’s sustained dominance was not all its doing. Rather, it 
has also benefited from the misfortune of its competitors. For instance, a decision to establish a 
USO levy (US$0.02 and US$0.03 for mobile and fixed lines) on all incoming international calls 
in 2005 had the effect of driving operators out of the market (C&WJ-AR 2005: 16). As the firm 
with the USO, C&WJ has benefited from this. Further, while a fixed line operator had entered 
the market (Gotel) its low coverage and small customer base have not been a challenge to 
C&WJ (see Brown 2004: 29). The issue of economy of scale has also surfaced in the mobile 
market. The odds for success are also stacked against the entrants by the different licence 
agreements that have been issued in the mobile market. For instance, while C&WJ was not 
required to make any payments for the use of scarce spectrum resources, entrants were required 
to make such payments, which totalled around US$92.5 million by 2004 (Ibid). Additionally, 
the licences of the two entrants included specifications for network expansion to cover 90% of 
the island over a five-year period as well as conditions preventing them from building an 
alternative infrastructure for incoming and outgoing international calls (Brown, 2003: 3).163 As 
such, they were forced to continue to use the incumbent’s infrastructure therefore, guaranteeing 
the firm sustained income and relevance in the sector.164
That is not to say that C&WJ has benefited completely from the reforms. While 
registering increased revenues since the commencement of liberalisation, its profits have 
nonetheless declined.165 Additionally, in former years it only had to negotiate settlement rates 
with international firms. C&WJ has also accepted that it had yet to get fully accustomed to
163 Beyond this though, the incumbent could also argue that it had already underwritten the cost for the 
formation of the spectrum authority, already had the capacity to ensure coverage across the island and as 
such these requirements were not essential as a preconditions for its operations.
164 Nevertheless, one of these entrants, Digicel has seen immense success in the mobile market out­
performing C&WJ within its first few months of operations in the mobile market, even while charging 
higher rates for its service.
165 For instance, C&WJ received 35% less net profit in 2002 than it did in 2001 (Thompson 2003). 
Nevertheless, by 2007 the firm had seen 10% increase in overall revenue (Collister, 2007)
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competition (See Collister 2006). Further, with wireless broadband and mobile emerging as 
alternatives to landlines, the relevance of the incumbent’s network and hence its dominance at 
the centre of the regulatory space may also decrease in the future,166 a point which may also 
explain its efforts since 2005 to reinvigorate its fixed line business (see Chapter four).
However, “if you say that day one of liberalisation is the start of time then incumbents 
start with some natural advantages.”167 This relates to its ownership over the fixed network its 
resources and size, which have allowed it to buttress itself against some of the threats brought 
on by liberalisation. This statement is even more pertinent when the incumbent’s role in 
designing the HoA and Telecoms Act 2000 are considered. Additionally, the firm is always on 
the ‘tender list’, which helps it remain competitive (Interview: former senior member of the 
regulatory team at C&W pic, London, March 26, 2007). The firm remains the only full service 
provider and the fixed-line provider of choice on the island. That is, it provides “a broad range 
of communication services and information (programming) access” (Baldwin, McVoy and 
Steinfield 1996:3) to businesses such as the Sandals chain and Scotiabank in mobile and data 
service provision, areas that have seen the most active competition.168 Up to March 2006, 76 
licenses had been granted for providing Internet services. However, the incumbent remains the 
dominant provider in these areas (ECTEL 2006: 2).
Nonetheless, these threats to its profitability and dominance were to provide the 
rationale for C&WJ to turn inwards to initiate a number of far-reaching initiatives to restructure 
and modernise its internal organisation and orientation to respond more effectively to the 
changes in its operational space, which will be discussed in Chapter four. As such, industry 
reform came to be as much about changes the incumbent made internally as it was about the 
readjustments in the rules and relationships in its regulatory space, as discussed here. The result 
has been a host of internal reforms, which mark the incumbent under competition as distinct 
from the incumbent under monopoly. The firm’s success in responding to regulatory reform has 
therefore not all been about antagonism, confrontation or attempts at capture, but through
166 Interview: Senior Member of Regulatory Team at C&W pic, London, February 22, 2007.
167 Ibid.
168 See Gordon (2008); and Gleaner (2008).
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undertakings aimed at improving its service, reforming its ethos and structure. A similar 
argument will be made in Chapter five on Ireland.
2.4 Discussion
This final Section aims to discuss more directly the incumbent’s response to reform and the 
main factors affecting its response.
2.4.1 The Incumbent’s Response to Changes in its Regulatory Space
In the 80s to mid-90s the incumbent’s power was expressed through its close relationship with 
the government and line minister. By using its ties and influence with this actor, the incumbent 
was able to secure support firstly for enhancing its power in the 1980s and then for maintaining 
the status quo as seen in its efforts to get the government’s pledge to extend its power in the 90s. 
In such a state, the incumbent was active in encouraging further changes in sector regulation, 
providing that it was aimed at advancing its claims, suggesting that it was not against sector 
reform - just where it threatened its power.
This closed relationship was to evolve in the late 1990s with the relationship between 
firm and state becoming more open, especially as the regulatory space became more populated 
and election brought a change in the minister/regulator. Following from this, the loss of 
influence over the minister witnessed the emergence of an adversarial stance between the two. 
The establishment of the IRA did little to upset the balance of power, given its inability to 
command the incumbent’s attention and the time it took to become functional. This was to 
improve by 2000 with advancement in the IRA’s power, illustrating the importance of 
equipping regulators with sufficient power to carry out their tasks and command respect from 
the incumbent. This point finds resonance later in the Irish case, where the IRA’s failure to 
punish Eircom’s non-compliance threatened the regulator’s credibility.
Where it fails to control sector rules and its ability to influence policy makers and 
regulators is compromised, the firm will choose other means of protecting its market. Thus, as 
seen in the 1998-2002 period, it became more diverse in its strategies, moving more towards
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using its control and ownership of the fixed network to frustrate competition and regulation. The 
regulator and entrant’s reliance on capacity and information from the incumbent has also been 
in the incumbent’s favour. For example, Grindle and Thomas observed that, “the availability of 
information and access to it has long been associated with power”.169 Through its possession of 
information and the fixed network, the incumbent has been able to exercise undue influence on 
the rate of change and competition (for example, withholding information on capacity and 
accounts) and at times the progress made by other players even after they had entered the 
market. These are also points, which help to explain C&WJ’s sustained relevance and power in 
Jamaican telecoms, though it has been less successful in maintaining its dominance than the 
Irish incumbent.
An important strategy here was to include the use of the courts as a means of 
postponing or delaying reform. Chapter three shows this as also being the case with the Irish 
incumbent. As the sector became more transparent and as more players entered the market, the 
incumbent turned to the courts as a means of asserting its dominance and clarifying sector rules. 
This is as opposed to the former practice of appealing directly to the line Minister. This is not to 
suggest, however, that its choice of tactics was linear, since it was known to have tried to 
circumvent the IRA by appealing to the minister even after liberalisation. However, its turn to 
the Courts indicate a decrease in the firm’s informal power and influence over the state, with 
cordial relationships becoming more formal and rule-based.
As the certainty of reform became clear, the incumbent then regrouped, adopting a 
conciliatory approach while attempting to negotiate an agreement that would see it dictating the 
timing and shape of reform (as seen in the HoA and its resemblance with the 2000 Act). The 
effort to be more conciliatory with regulators, especially after the antagonism of the late 90s, 
suggests that the firm also adapted similar strategies to those used by regulators in ‘life cycle’ 
approaches (Bernstein 1955; also Lodge 2002: 16). Namely, where the regulator is argued to 
become more conciliatory, seeking ‘friendly arrangements’ after an initial period of antagonism 
with the regulated firm (leading to capture), it is the firm who in this case gravitates from
169 Grindle and Thomas (1991: 45).
69
antagonism to support and greater compliance with the regulator as it aimed to support the 
latter’s task of preventing bypass.
Nonetheless, the negotiations in 1998 and the resulting agreements and legislation all 
serve to indicate the firm’s strength in the sector. The privileges it received have helped it to 
adjust gradually to reform, while offering even greater protections (e.g. against bypass) than 
during its monopoly. The gains secured here have been important in helping it to cope with 
reform. Its ability to adapt or embrace regulation and reform has been key in helping it 
withstand losses. Its mix of responses has ranged from punitive and formal (e.g. going to court 
to block change) to more conciliatory (agreeing to reform and retracting court case) in order to 
achieve its goals allowing it to adjust to changing demands. Demonstrated here is the degree of 
flexibility, which exists in the firm’s strategies to cope with change. Here the firm’s efforts 
evolved from trying to prevent entry, to attempting to engineer legislative reform as a means of 
protecting its privileges, then attempting to prevent legislative reform as a way of delaying 
competition, its turn to the courts, and the use of its incumbency to frustrate competition. As 
will be shown in section two, its tactics were also to involve a number of changes which saw it 
reorienting its organisation and orientation to become a more effective, responsive and efficient 
operator.
Its response and its position as the incumbent have ensured that the incumbent remains 
one of the key actors in telecoms. Its size and history have also helped it to remain a powerful 
actor who is still able to trade on its experience and longevity, still winning contracts from some 
of the biggest multinationals in the country. Collectively its resources (size, name, ownership, 
experience, wealth and overall value) have helped it to respond to change successfully. Finally, 
its sustained dominance has also resulted from the fact that its competitors, for the most part, are 
smaller operators who do not possess its wealth and resources. Nonetheless, it is shown that 
where another large operator enters the market it may be able to compete with the incumbent (as 
in the mobile market). Interestingly, as suggested by an employee of the OUR, it is now Digicel 
that has attempted to influence the minister in order to secure more favourable terms in the 
sector. Thus, as it has gained dominance, it has adopted strategies similar to those utilised by the
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incumbent, e.g., blocking connections to its network and attempting to access ties and contacts 
formerly used by the incumbent to influence regulation. Following from this, it is suggested that 
the findings from this case may be able to yield insight into the strategies and tools that can be 
used by regulators when dealing with incumbents and more generally, large dominant firms.
2.4.2 Drivers of Change: Determinants of Incumbent’s Behaviour
This section aims to identify the main actors/drivers that influence the incumbent’s behaviour in 
the regulatory space and make a case for the relevance of such information in regulation. These 
will include international forces of regulation (e.g. institutions and states), customers, entrants 
and market pressures. It is proposed that knowledge of such actors may be useful for regulators, 
particularly in small resource-constrained settings (e.g., in small or developing countries) 
highlighting the forces that may be brought to bear in regulating large, well-resourced actors 
such as incumbent telecoms firms.
Of importance here is the role of international institutions, large developed states and 
the motivation and blueprints they provide for states to encourage and support reform. Included 
here are multilateral institutions such as the IMF and WTO. These have had the effect of 
offering the rationale, credibility and legitimacy to the state and ERA in their attempt to regulate 
and reform Jamaican telecoms. As will be shown in Chapter three, the effect of external rules 
and regulations is also demonstrated as having a significant role in the Irish case. Thus, when 
the Jamaican government found it difficult to secure support from C&WJ and faced with a 
lengthy court battle, it turned to the UK and US to place pressure on C&WJ, thus opening the 
way for reform. The FCC Benchmark Order also offered the Jamaican state the backing and 
rationale for changing the structure of local telecoms. Likewise the principles of the GATS (for 
example, transparency and liberalisation) have also played out in local reform. Support has not 
only come through advice, but through funding that has helped to increase competitive 
pressures on the incumbent.
While the state’s response is local it however comes within a particular international
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context, which has varying degrees of influence on its activities, on the timing and features of 
the reform agenda. The classic work of Dimaggio and Powel (1991) and the political transfer 
literature also support the role of international institutions and dominant states (here, the WB, 
IMF, US and UK) as forces for reform at the local level.170 As indicated in Chapter one, much 
has already been written about these and it is not intended that these be reviewed here. The point 
is that external factors have a significant impact on the ability of local incumbents to operate in 
the local regulatory space offering an avenue through which regulators (IRA and state) who face 
credibility or capacity issues can seek support to enforce difficult regulatory policies.
Highlighted too is the fact that the dispersion of regulation may adversely affect the 
credibility of the IRA, with implications for its legitimacy and standing in the regulatory space. 
For instance, the dispersion of responsibility for regulation arguably saw the incumbent ignoring 
the OUR, preferring to relate directly with the minister. On the other hand, the case also 
illustrates that there can be a place for split regulation, particularly in the early phase of the 
IRA’s existence, or where it suffers from capacity or resource gaps. Thus, the FTC was useful in 
regulating the incumbent until the OUR could become active. Further, as the powers of the IRA 
were advanced, legitimacy grew. With this came readjustment in the incumbent’s attitude to the 
OUR; they no longer viewed it as simply a threat, but more as an ally in reducing abuse. Thus, 
the OUR’s standing was to increase as the minister’s presence became less obvious.
Perhaps the bloc that has featured less in this discussion is the public/customers. This 
group did not feature significantly in the regulatory space or the firm’s strategies in the sector in 
the 1980’s and some periods in the 1990s. Influence has generally been erratic and expressed 
through the political cycle as opposed to directly on the incumbent as in the mid 90s when its 
disapproval forced government to suspend attempts to extend C&WJ’s privileges. That is, 
“there are limits to how much governments feel able to deny voters what they want” (Stopford, 
et al., 1991: 159). While influence may be muted prior to, or during regulatory reform, Chapters 
four and five, demonstrate that this quickly shifts as the threat of competition becomes more
170 Also see Rose (1993); Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, 1996); James and Lodge (2001); Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000). Lodge and Stirton (2002: 6-8) discuss international influence in the Jamaican context; 
while Payne (2000) examines the influence of the US on politics and economy in the Caribbean.
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real for an incumbent and particularly after liberalisation. Here, shifting consumer allegiances 
were to become important drivers of the Irish and Jamaican incumbents’ behaviour, arguably in 
ways that could not be secured by the IRA. This is so, given the incumbent’s penchant for 
challenging the IRA and the fact that the core of the post-reform regime had already been 
concluded between firm and state in the Jamaican case, leaving fewer issues for the regulator to 
contemplate. Following from this, it can be noted that the role of consumers in influencing the 
incumbent’s activities may become more pronounced during particular periods, e.g., during an 
election, or where competition exists. Here, the movement of policy was tagged to the 
developments in politics, which dictated what action was acceptable at different points in this 
study. Indeed a consideration of the role of politics or the electoral cycles on regulation and 
policy change is not unique to this context but as will be demonstrated also played a similar role 
in Ireland.
Additionally, another set of factors affecting the incumbent’s behaviour in the 
regulatory space was its competitors/entrants. While the set-up of regulation was not conducive 
to the participation of third parties in the 80s to early 90s, would be entrants were to begin 
forcing their way into the regulatory space from the mid 90s. Their desire to enter the sector also 
helped government to become more aware of the possibilities for renewal by allowing 
liberalisation. Competition enabled by technology and regulatory reform has also had some 
bearing on the incumbent’s activities and position in the sector. Most notably, with the entry of 
competition and the implied threats to the firm’s market power, the incumbent was forced to 
make a number of improvements to its service and operations.
Important too is the role of the regulator, FTC and ministers in determining the level of 
power and influence that the incumbent is able to exercise over the sector. Whereas the state and 
minister may have appeared to be weak prior to the mid 90’s this had changed by the mid 1990s 
thanks to the entrance of a pro-reform minister. The emergence of the sector regulator and the 
FTC, though initially weak, has also been shown to constrain the incumbent’s behaviour. What 
the regulators (minister and IRAs) have done is to provide the legislation and institutions to 
change the incumbent’s power in the sector.
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However, it has nonetheless, been shown that the impact of these groups has, at times, 
been mixed, given the dominance of the firm and the level of resources and relevance it has for 
Jamaican telecoms. As such, the regulators have thus, utilised the other drivers, particularly, 
international influence and unleashed competitive pressures which ultimately, helped to change 
the incumbent’s motivations, in so doing driving a process of reform that the incumbent was 
unable to stop.
2.4.3 Implications of Findings
Arguably, these findings on how incumbents in developing countries such as Jamaica have 
responded to reform can yield important insights into regulatory design, the strategies that can 
be adopted by regulators when dealing with huge incumbents and ultimately, how to achieve 
responsive regulation. As will also be shown in the Irish case, the findings are important, not 
only for developing countries, but also for small states faced with gaps in regulatory capacity. 
This is important, since regulation, not only in telecoms but other areas of economic life, has 
much to do with conditioning the behaviour of actors. Where regulators are able to anticipate 
the response of large actors with the resources to impede reform, then measures can be built into 
the design process, which anticipate and as such, militate against the effects of efforts to 
frustrate regulatory reform. For instance, where the strength and legitimacy of the IRA has 
implications for the success and credibility of reform, then it is important to equip this body 
with the power and resources it needs to command attention and compliance. The Jamaican case 
suggests that where this is not the case, then a large well-resourced actor like the incumbent will 
take advantage of loopholes to abuse or frustrate the activities of the regulator.
The case for the importance of such knowledge and how they can inform strategy and 
design of regulation may also be seen in the turn to courts for redress. Importantly, this occurred 
as informal ties and the state/firm collegiality was compromised. Thus, where capture, or 
appeals to politicians are made difficult, the regulated firms may turn more to the courts to seek 
redress. However, this may slow down reform and frustrate regulation, especially where the 
courts are slow or costly. It therefore means that an efficient appeals process that can be
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accessed by all actors is important, especially in preventing this from becoming another tool for 
incumbents to exercise their dominance and frustrate competition.
Additionally, the findings also indicate the importance of the insertion of third party 
interests in bringing more balance and transparency to regulation. Here, the dyad evolved into a 
more dynamic structure as consumers became more vocal, when entrants and industry 
regulators emerged in the market. Extending the boundaries of the regulatory space may help to 
reduce the strain on regulators (e.g. having to ensure that the incumbent improves network 
capacity, given that consumers may exercise their choice and switch to the best operator). The 
regulator may also impose measures, such as disclosures, on the incumbent to raise transparency 
and allow consumers to make more informed choices. This is not clear-cut, since consumers 
may still not be willing to switch operators. Thus, responsiveness in a developing context may 
mean heightening the involvement of stakeholders, with the regulatory space becoming trans­
national. Indeed, this is a significant point given the trans-national nature of the incumbents. As 
noted in Chapter one, this is also the case for incumbents in large developed countries, which 
have begun moving beyond their locale.
This also has lessons for how regulators in small developing countries or those facing 
resource constraints can directly modify the balance of power or power constellation in its 
favour by bringing different actors into the regulatory arena, particularly where the regulated 
firm is a large, resource-rich MNC and the regulator a small resource-constrained actor. In this 
case, the insertion of international interests served to bolster the position of the state and IRA in 
their bid to reform the sector, thus, breaking the deadlock with the incumbent forcing the latter 
to support reform. National regulators can therefore borrow legitimacy and capacity from 
international institutions to enhance the effectiveness of regulation locally. Exploring the 
regulatory space in this way can also help to reduce the ability of the incumbent to capture the 
regulator.
The chapter indicates a role for a consideration of personalities and ideology on the 
effectiveness of regulation. As argued above, the change in the individual in the role of the 
regulator/minister was important in restraining the incumbent’s power, paving the way for
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liberalisation. Thus, where capture is a concern in regulation the findings also indicate how 
regulation can be improved and the balance of power re-oriented through periodic shifts in those 
who occupy key offices within the regulatory space e.g. ministers, or head of the IRA. Thus, 
achieving responsive regulation, is not only about regulators choosing the right mix of strategies 
but may also be about changing the regulator to match the changing demands of the regulatory 
environment.
Some of the incumbent’s strategies may appear to support claims of regulatory capture 
(e.g. its influence over the HoA). However, the presentation goes beyond capture in three ways. 
Firstly, as argued, there is sufficient ground for questioning the extent to which incidents could 
be interpreted as capture, given that the state’s actions were also dictated by economic and 
political concerns, which could be met by reaching an agreement with the firm. For instance, the 
state’s decision to give more shares to C&WJ and later to change legislation to clarify and 
extend the latter’s powers was not just in response to the firm’s prompting. Rather, it was more 
of a win-win situation for a government, which had already reduced its ownership and sought to 
get a higher value for its shares.
Secondly, and following from the above, the findings illustrate the accommodations, 
which small states sometimes engage in order to secure support for reforms at the sector level 
with implications at the macro level. Securing support for regulation may mean granting 
incentives which may appear as evidence of capture on the surface but which may also be 
interpreted as government’s attempt to ensure support for reforms especially, where the balance 
of power arguably lies in the regulated firm’s comer. In such cases the regulator may have no 
‘tat’ for the firm’s ‘tit’, or (as will also be shown in the Irish case) may be so weak as to be 
ineffective in changing the incumbent’s behaviour. The make-up of the regulatory space may 
therefore, negate certain strategies from the regulator. In other words, the extent to which 
‘responsive regulation’ is achieved, the mix of strategies that can constitute a responsive or 
smart approach may be context specific, a point also accepted by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 
5). Thus, in the case of small (developing, or resource-constrained) countries such as Jamaica 
and Ireland, the ultimate threat of sanctions or licence revocation may not be employed, given
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the value of that firm to the economy and further growth of the sector. Lodge and Stirton make a 
similar point, noting the importance of such accommodation in ensuring “the legitimacy of the 
reforms” (2002: 19). Where the regulated firm is a large, well-endowed actor, whose operations 
hold implications for the economy, bargaining and negotiating may prove more effective since 
the size of the market and the firm’s relevance may preclude threats such as licence retraction.
Thirdly, rather than capture, these findings help to assess the strategies and tactics 
employed by incumbents where capture has been made problematic. Thus the turn to the courts 
and even attempts to ignore the IRA may be indicative of a lack of capture. As such, the chapter 
demonstrates some limitations to utilising capture theory as an explanation for dominant firm 
behaviour and the extent to which this helps to understand regulation.
It also argued that an awareness of the actors affecting the incumbent’s behaviour (the 
role they play and how to use them) is important in determining the success of regulation and 
the degree of compliance from incumbents. Consequently, attention to the different change 
drivers may also have implications for the regulatory strategies adopted at different points in the 
reform process and which drivers can be co-opted, and when to secure desired behaviour from 
the incumbent. For instance, the presentation demonstrates the ways in which regulators in 
small settings can bolster local regulatory capacity by buying in or borrowing capacity from 
regulators in more advanced settings. This includes the loan of regulators from other national 
regulators. Further, where the barrier to entry and competition is legal then the choice of 
regulatory strategy may be to change the rules and laws governing the sector as in 1999. In 
other cases, where the barrier may be one of insufficient information or access then the 
regulatory strategy may be to increase the amount of information available to the regulator and 
entrants.
2.5 Conclusion
What this study has done through the presentation of the Jamaican experience of telecoms 
reform is to suggest the techniques and resources that incumbents utilise in protecting their 
dominance and occupation at the centre of the regulatory space.
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The presentation has demonstrated how a large dominant incumbent firm responds to 
threats firstly as a rule making force in the absence of a formal regulator and later as a 
chameleon in search of ways of maintaining its dominance. Here its activities evolve from an 
attempt to take control of telecoms, utilising the courts and informal alliances with policy 
makers and regulators to assert and protect its power.
As threats become more obvious it seeks to prevent change but where reform becomes 
an inevitability it then seeks to shape and control the reform process to minimise losses and 
risks while allowing itself greater use of its incumbency to deal with operating in a new 
regulatory space. As the threat of competition becomes more real, its response becomes more 
akin to that described by economists with more emphasis on anti-competitive practices aimed at 
preventing entry. As will be argued in Chapters four and five, another of the firm’s strategy 
includes its attempts to reduce the size of the space available to competitors.
Thus, the incumbent has certain natural advantages, for instance, it starts with the entire 
customer base and the infrastructure. It has been able to leverage these as well as its other 
resources (its size, status as a multinational and capacity vis-a-vis the government and its 
competitors) to give itself a head start in a now competitive regime. International firms such as 
Digicel have however, managed to provide a credible threat to C&WJ. However, it remains 
difficult for small players to enter the market and compete effectively. This is most evident 
where the new entrant is not a multinational but a local firm with considerably less 
technological, financial and experiential capacity. Its status and position as incumbent have 
helped it to secure a number of gains at the start of the new regime in 1999 and these have been 
instrumental in giving it the foundation to maintain its dominance, as well as to undertake such 
initiatives as would be necessary to ensure its sustained dominance for some time to come.
As suggested in the opening chapter, incumbents are not simply policy takers but also 
act to shape rules and regulation. Following from this, the firm depicted has been able to utilise 
its power and influence to affect the content of reform as seen in the HoA and the extent to 
which this document established the foundation for the post 1999 regime.
Finally, it is argued that knowledge of the way firms respond to change and the
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issues/actors, which influence their behaviour, can advance regulatory strategies and choices, 
highlighting the ways in which regulators can heighten compliance and responsiveness of 
regulation. Another aim has been to highlight the various actors that influence the incumbent’s 
behaviour. These include international and local actors who are able to influence the 
incumbent’s attitude and choices. Nevertheless, the value of regulatory reform and regulation 
cannot be downplayed. That is, this work has operated with a view that regulation is not only 
carried out by IRA’s or governments. In fact, these actors have been shown, at times, to be 
ineffective in the face of a strong, dominant actor such as the incumbent. Other sources of 
regulatory pressure (e.g. competitive pressure, or international influence) have been shown to be 
key in conditioning the behaviour of dominant incumbents.
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CHAPTER THREE 
EIRCOM’S RESPONSE TO REFORM IN THE REGULATORY SPACE
3.0 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated the ways in which the Jamaican incumbent, C&WJ 
responded to regulatory reform. This has seen the firm first attempting to prevent reform 
utilising ties with policy makers to extend its exclusivity. However, as change in the form of 
liberalisation, competition and an independent sector regulator became more certain, C&WJ 
then turned its attention to delaying reform while increasing its effort to chart the path of any 
future change. As demonstrated in Chapter two (also Chapter six), a large incumbent who is 
able to negotiate from its position of dominance is sometimes able to determine the nature of the 
reform agenda (doing so in ways that do not necessarily support straight forward arguments of 
firm capture). Its response also involved the use of the Courts particularly as a means of 
reducing risks, achieving clarity in the regulatory space, and challenging the authority of 
regulators, a strategy, which heightened as the rules and structure of the market, became more 
uncertain. These moves also included anti-competitive practices, such as those covered in the 
competition literature (e.g. preventing entry).
The incumbent’s response is therefore, presented as being diverse and is not simply 
about whether to comply with rules and regulations, especially where compliance is made 
difficult by the existence of vague or ill-constructed rules and regulatory uncertainties. This case 
therefore, helps to advance an explanation for the continued dominance of incumbents and the 
challenges that they pose to regulation especially given the fluidity in their behaviour and 
tactics. However, it is agreed that awareness of how incumbents respond to change can inform 
more responsive and proactive regulation and information on ways in which the regulator can 
seek to condition the behaviour of the incumbent. Such knowledge can prove useful in times of 
reform, since the activities of incumbents, or former monopolies, are important to the success of 
any new regime, given their size, information, experience and resources.
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As will be shown in this chapter, these strategies are similar to those used by the Irish 
incumbent, Eircom. However, whereas the activities in the Jamaican case have been carried out 
largely by the incumbent, this case demonstrates even more that the resistance to reform is not 
always from the incumbent but from other key industry players, including the government, 
political parties, and unions who act to shield the incumbent from the pressures of reform.171 It 
is argued that this may be due to the extent of external pressure in driving the internal reform 
agenda, particularly, up to 1997. Where there is lack of internal support, successful reform and 
effective regulation may ultimately be distorted. As such, the present chapter demonstrates the 
difficulties of obtaining regulatory reform where there is lack of significant political support. 
The Irish experience therefore, offers an opportunity to view the ways in which (external) 
regional regulation interfaces with local institutional contexts. Additionally, the chapter 
demonstrates that while regulators, as shown in Chapter two, have a number of tools to regulate 
the firm, the latter also has its arsenal of strategies to cope with changes in its operational and 
regulatory space.
The chapter will be organised as follows: Section 3.1 gives an outline of the major 
developments of Irish telecoms as a way of setting the context for discussing Eircom’s response 
in Section 3.2. This is followed by a discussion and analysis of the main findings in Section 3.3, 
which seeks to address the ways in which the firm responds to change. The chapter closes with 
a conclusion in Section 3.4.
3.1 Emergence of the Irish Incumbent Eircom: 1800-1989
The earliest beginning of telecommunications in Ireland is one of private ownership of the first 
telecommunications exchange in 1880.172 However, State control and ownership were to 
become more politically and economically feasible by the end of the 1800s, leading to the state 
negotiating with the private monopoly provider in 1905 to take over the network. Increased 
government involvement was also motivated by a view of private enterprise as being profit-
171 Also see Chapter seven.
172 Hall (1993: especially, 48-65 and 89-105).
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oriented and generally unwilling to proceed with the rate of investment needed to improve 
access, especially in rural areas.173 As will be seen, this view was to resurface in the 1980s and 
1990s, particularly among those (including the incumbent) questioning the viability of reform in 
the shape of privatisation and competition. Following these negotiations, the NTC agreed to 
cede its assets to the state when its licence ended in 1911. The company then became a state- 
owned entity run by the Postmaster-General and answerable to the minister for Posts. Thus 
began the long period of administration and regulation of telecommunications by the Post 
Office (PO).174
Government take over did not translate into a non-problematic or speedy development 
of the sector instead network expansion progressed slowly.175 Telecommunications was still not 
viewed as an area of great necessity; it occupied the lower rung when compared with more 
politically sensitive issues in the budget. As such, an unwillingness to fund projects as well as 
lack of expertise, also underpinned the PO’s inability to improve or modernise 
telecommunications infrastructure.176
By the 1980s however, revenues within the sector had improved, making telecoms one 
of the most dynamic and important sectors in the Republic. Nevertheless, continued 
underinvestment and underperformance continued up to the 80s with Burnham describing 
telecoms as the “most-pressing infrastructure problem” faced by the government during this 
period (2003: 542). Such recognition helped to engender a spirit of reform within the sector.
Even so, this did not extend to support for liberalisation and privatisation (Hall, 
1993:197). The prospect of privatisation did not appeal particularly to the majority of Eircom’s 
employees and some politicians, e.g. Labour party (Hall 1993: 11). With significant complaints 
coming to the government about the firm’s service quality and costs, the government’s decision
173 This was also influenced by the growing relevance of the telephone to the country especially its 
potential in war time, the potential for abuse and the increasing complaints regarding service quality.
Described by Hall as the, “physical nerve-centre” for telecommunications during this period 
(1993:42).
175 This was seen for instance in the protracted inability to meet demand for lines. For example, unmet 
demand stood at 6,700 in 1953, 10,600 in 1958, 16,500 in 1963, 34,000 in 1973 and by 1978 was 63,000 
(Hall 1993: 58).
176 Hall gives a more detailed discussion of these and other issues affecting sector development prior to 
the 80s (1993: especially, 48-65 and 89-105).
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was ‘not to disrupt the status quo’ by privatising but to make slight changes to its status and 
Eircom on the other hand jealously guarded its status as a state-owned company (Burnham 
2003: 544). Rather, by 1984, telecoms were divested partially from the Department of Post and 
Telegraph becoming a state-owned enterprise with the title Bord Telecom Eireann (hereafter 
Eircom).177 The 1983 Postal and Telecommunications Services Act facilitated this move, 
marking the end of a 71-year union between post and telecommunications. By 1987 Eircom was 
reregistered as a public company. Thus, was created the Company that was to dominate Irish 
telecoms. It was the power and control granted to this firm that reform in the 90s aimed to 
unlock.
Regulation came in the form of submissions made by the Chief Executive before the 
Oireachtas Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies. An Ombudsman also had some jurisdiction 
over the sector handling disputes between individual customers in the 80s and 90s. But this 
regulation was not permanent and only cursory. For instance, Section 6 of the 1983 Act noted 
that the Ombudsman’s Office could only make recommendations relating to the firm and the 
sector, since its decisions were non-binding. Furthermore, it could not take legal action against 
the incumbent (Section 5 (1) (a)). Provision had also been made (1983 Telecommunications 
Act, Section: 48) for the establishment of a group (the User’s Council) to advise the minister on 
customer views. This had not been formed up to 1989. As such, with government acting as 
owner and regulator, and with little representation from other groups, the relationship between 
the two remained closed, with little challenge to the firm’s power.
Unlike the Jamaican incumbent Eircom’s monopoly over the sector in the 1980s was 
not intended to be exclusive, as it did not include equipment used on customers’ premises.178 In 
establishing the duties and obligations of the incumbent the Act gave the firm immunity from 
any action being brought against it for losses due to the Company’s failure to provide or 
maintain telephone lines (Section 88 (1) [A, B and C). In so doing the Act removed any legal 
measures in the way of forcing Eircom to maintain certain levels of service standard. As will be
177 This was only to become Eircom in 1999. However, the more recent title will be used throughout this 
work.
178 See Section 87(1), 1983 Post and Telecommunications Act.
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demonstrated in the next section, this failing would be addressed by the introduction of 
competition in 1998, making a case for the importance of regulatory reform as a means of 
creating the incentives and space in which the incumbent would be motivated to make overall 
improvements in its operation and service.
The relationship between the firm and state, particularly in the 80s was closed. The 
Minister was said to be in charge of policy matters relating to the sector while the day-to-day 
management of the Company was left up to the Board and its managers (Interview: senior staff, 
Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003). The management who inherited the Company in 1983 
had managed to form a close partnership with the state where the former was recognised for 
having brought a firm, fraught by losses and industrial disputes in the 70s into a stable profit 
making company of the late 80s (Burnham 2003: 542-544). This association was not often 
stretched to include new comers to the firm; especially those who chose not to accept the rules 
and norms within the Company. As such internal divisions marred the activities of the 
Company: some had more access to key decision-makers than others. Thus, when Brendan 
Hynes, became Company manager in 1992 he sought to reform the relationship between firm 
and state and even those within the Company itself as he felt relationships were too informal 
with little paper trail for the Company’s decisions, resulting in the Board appealing to the 
minister to have the chair removed.179 They also took issue with what they deemed to be his 
supposed anti-public enterprise stance, a point that the leader of one political party took as a 
mark against the chair.180 The whole incident indicated the extent of political support given to 
the firm. Whereas CWJ spoke with one voice, Eircom was more internally segmented; with 
different factions having varying levels of access and influence over the direction of company 
and sector policy, a point, which will be dealt with in Chapter seven.
Even though this facilitated entry, Eircom remained the dominant player with all value- 
added network service providers (VANS) leasing its lines and no competition in long distance
179 Gallagher (1992c).
180 Gallagher (1992b). The chair was of the view that the firm was too willing to base its success on past 
achievements instead of preparing for the future (Ibid.). This change had come after two other chairs had 
been removed. In fact, issues of unwillingness to change and misuse of power were to however, see the 
company with four different Chairs in the space of 15 months by the end of 1992.
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service. The firm’s control over the latter was also important since like C&WJ it could continue 
cross-subsiding local rates from the profitable international market (MacMahon 1995: 301). As 
the biggest telecoms operator, the firm’s success was vital to the economy, a fact, which was to 
help it to win support from the state.181 It also was to play an important role in increasing the 
nation’s attractiveness as an investment hub, promoting Ireland as a European base. The 
Company was important given the contributions it made to the state’s budget and the jobs it 
brought into the economy.182 Allowance was made under section 110 (5) of the 1983 Act, for 
the Minister to impose duties on the incumbent in accordance with obligations of its licences. 
Under this provision, the Company was to make significant contributions to the exchequer. In 
1992 for example, the state received a total of (IR) £41 million from Eircom in dividend 
payments and taxes and (IR) £35 million in 1991 (Murdoch 1992). By 2001 the firm was paying 
€138 million in corporate tax to the state (Eircom Annual Report 2001: 42). Payments were 
made regardless of the level of profit (or loss) received by the firm in any year. In this way, the 
Irish incumbent had less operational freedom when compared with C&WJ, in terms of its 
control over revenues. This may also help to explain the apparent lack of commitment to 
privatising the firm since there would have been some difficulty in tying such an obligation to a 
privately owned company. The Company was also viewed as a tool for buttressing the economy 
from instability and unpredictability. Its title as the Irish Telecoms Company (Telecom Eireann), 
and the fact that state owned enterprises (SOEs), such as Eircom were viewed as, “symbols of 
an independent and proud economy”, help to indicate the sentimentality associated with the firm 
(O’Toole 1992: 14).183 These realities were to see the incumbent having more political support
181 For example, faced with high interest rates in 1993 and the devaluation of the Irish Pound against its 
main trading partner, the UK, Eircom was requested to reduce telephone rates for businesses. 
Additionally, whereas prior to its conversion, Eircom operated at losses of around £100 million annually 
by 1992 its annual turnover was £780 million with a profit of £90 million (Gallagher 1992a: SI2).
182 For instance, Eircom was the largest employer during the 80s and 90s and this meant that it remained 
one of the most important companies in Ireland (Burnham 2003: 543).
183 This shares some similarity to the “national champions” concept that was developed mainly in the 
1960s in relation to the close link between state and industry in France where the tradition is one of strong 
government intervention in industry. Here companies were formed based mainly on the needs of the state 
and to carry the country’s flag globally. In turn, protection and funding were provided by the state and 
these also performed functions similar to those carried out by the state, thus acting like state agencies in a 
manner similar to that depicted in the regulatory space approach. See, for example Hayward (1995: 5); 
McArthur and Scott (1969); Verdin and Van Heck (2001), and Vernon (1974).
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and relevance to the Irish economy when compared to its competitors; points, which set the 
context for the state’s attempts to protect the firm from further competition in the late 80s and 
90s.184 As such, while a number of other SOE’s were privatised, the state clung to Eircom.185 
The basis of its continued dominance included its status, knowledge, finance and experience, 
assets, which were to help maintain the incumbent’s dominance (Interview: Former Telecoms 
Minister, Dublin, November 11, 2003). These ensured that Eircom’s position at the centre of 
telecommunications operation and policy remained intact in the 80s and 90s.
3.2 Reform of Irish Telecoms: 1990 - 2007
Nevertheless, with increasing attention on utilities and competition in the European Union 
(EU),186 the firm’s power was to come under threat from 1990. This came through a number of 
Directives, which provided much of the momentum and direction for the reform of Irish 
telecoms.187 By 1996, Directives emerging from the Commission had made it clear that member 
states should undertake measures to liberalise their telecom markets completely by 1998.188 
Services outside voice telephony were to be opened from July 1996. States were also given up 
to nine months after January 1996 to ensure compliance with instructions to liberalise access to
184 As such, the profitability of the Company means that it is seen as a “jewel in the crown of the semi­
state sector” (Sweeny 1993: 6).
185 Ibid
186 See Graham (2000: 118). Additionally, the literature on EU regulation is expansive. The aim here is 
not to review these but simply to acknowledge their existence to the extent that they relate to the present 
discussion.
187 The push within the EU began mainly in the 80s and was aimed at preparing member states for the 
single market. The rules pertaining to telecoms were outlined in a 1987 Green paper, which called for 
liberalisation of a number of telecoms services including, the supply of terminal and network equipment 
and access to national networks. The operations of national telecoms and voice services (which, 
accounted for around 90% of telecoms revenues) were excluded (see Carroll 1993). Guidelines here have 
included, Council Directive 92/44/EEC, of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to 
leased lines. http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/9244eec.html; Commission Directive 
96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full 
competition in telecommunications markets. Official Journal L 074, 22/03/1996 pages: 13-24. http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0019:EN:HTML. Accessed: August 14, 
2008; Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7, March 2002 on 
Universal Service and User’s Rights relating to electronic communications networks and services 
(Universal Service Directive) which sets out the parameters and measures for universal service provision; 
European Communities (Electronic Communications and Network Services) Universal Service and 
User’s Rights) Regulation 2003, SI. No. 308, 2003. Even more relevant for the current discussion is 
Directive 90/338/EEC and specifically, article 2(2), which required Eircom to give up its exclusive right 
over the provision of voice telephony on January 1, 1998.
188 Ibid.
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cable television networks that needed to conduct operations in areas of telecoms already 
liberalised. Nevertheless, discussions on privatisation remained politically charged up to the mid 
1990s with implications for the stability of coalition governments during these years (see 
Gallagher 1993b; Kelly and O’Regan 1993c).
By 1993, competition was to grow in the international market, with companies such as 
BT and ESAT Telecom (a local company) offering international services to businesses.189 
Nonetheless, the unwillingness to privatise Eircom and to seek an extension to its monopoly 
indicated the government’s sustained protection of Eircom. Furthermore, in 1994, the State had 
required all entrants to those areas of the market that were open to pledge that they would 
interconnect to the incumbent’s network and would not offer voice telephony (Massey and 
Shortall 1999: 3-4).
For most of the 80s and certainly up to the early 1990s, the incumbent did not appear to 
be keen on the idea of competition. The approach it took was to highlight the negative effects 
that competition may have on the sector, noting, that competition would result in higher prices, 
to allow it to compete (see Gallagher 1992b). Thus, on the eve of rate increases for residential 
consumers in 1993, it warned that this was to be expected- not because of its monopoly, but 
from liberalisation and competition from international competitors.190 Acknowledging the 
inevitability of regulatory reform, however, Eircom, as did C&WJ, argued for a gradual 
introduction of liberalisation as being in the nation’s best interest. No longer was the argument 
against privatisation and regulatory reform but against a ‘gung-ho attitude’ in the adoption and 
implementation of such initiatives.191 As will be argued later, this was to evolve into Eircom’s 
attempts to frustrate regulation and competition, as seen in its relations with the IRA and 
entrants discussed later in this chapter.
189 Dalby (1993a).
190 Hogan and O'Halloran (1993).
191 Ibid.
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3.2.1 Derogation and Competition Delayed
Nonetheless, the trend was to shift gradually by the mid 90s, with increasing support for sector 
reforms, as businesses and consumers began calling for curtailment of the incumbent’s 
dominance as a route to reducing prices, especially for business.192 As noted, this came about as 
a part of a larger EU programme of liberalisation and privatisation that had begun from the 
1990s demonstrating the effect of international/regional regulation at that level.
The EU’s influence did not go unchallenged, however. Thus, despite such indicators of 
change the signals from the state regarding its true understanding and direction for the sector 
were quite mixed.193 While professing its intent to enforce competition, Massey suggests that 
the government’s actions have not always been in line with the zealous fervour found in such 
policy statements (2002: 7). In 1996, for example, Eircom was allowed to purchase majority 
ownership in the country’s largest cable television company, Cablelink, even while dialogue on 
sector reform was ongoing, both nationally and regionally. In fact, it was the government that 
lobbied the EU (on Eircom’s behalf) to allow such a move.194 What this did was to reduce the 
possibility of competition, given Eircom’s increased dominance in this market. So while the EU 
was aiming to achieve liberalisation, the Irish state was making moves, which were to go 
against the very idea of an open market, with Eircom extending its coverage over key segments 
of the sector.
However, this was not the only way in which the government seemed undecided on its 
precise direction as it related to telecoms. Seizing upon allowances in Directive 90/338/EEC, 
Ireland made known its intention to request derogation from the requirement to liberalise
192 See, Dalby (1993a). Business groups believed that private ownership would free-up government 
revenue for job creation and debt reduction. See IT (1992: 12). Also see Burnham (2003: 537-556).
193 The state’s hesitation to break up the firm’s monopoly in the 1990s occurred even in the face of 
recommendations from within the country for change. Between 1991 and 1993 various reports, (e.g. 
Culliton 1992) had been produced recommending competition, reduction of telephone rates, rebalancing 
and greater efficiency throughout the telecoms sector. While the state was keen on initiating rebalancing 
it was not as speedy in meeting the deadlines set by the latter report to have competition and lower prices 
in the sector. In hesitating to implement these aspects of the reports, the state succeeded in demonstrating 
its unwillingness to assume the task of breaking up Eircom’s monopoly.
194 Interview: Representative of an industry group, IBEC (Dublin November 7, 2003). Another 
interviewee also noted that it was customary for the firm to assist the Government in preparing its 
position papers to the EU through the consultation process (Interview: Former Comreg staff, Dublin, 
November 7, 2003).
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telecoms for 5 years. The reasoning here was that some states needed more time to prepare for
. . 1 9 5competition.
Thus, whereas in this case the government had gone out of its way to protect the 
incumbent, the Jamaican incumbent had to actively lobby its government to act on its behalf by 
the mid 1990s. The Irish firm’s response to reform is therefore, deeply linked to that of the state 
with the pressure for regulatory reform coming more from an external source.
In seizing upon the only concessions given to member states, the Government was 
ensuring that entrants would remain dependent on Eircom’s network for an extended period. 
According to the government its response was precipitated by what it felt to be the need to ‘buy 
time’ (IT 1993a: 6). This move was intended to have allowed the Company to position itself to 
be in the lead when competition was finally introduced. In so doing, the government increased 
the possibility of Eircom’s future dominance by buying the monopoly some time to augment its 
position within the sector before full competition was introduced.196 There was also political 
support for this move with unions the head of the CWU, David Begg, urging government from 
1993 to ensure that the country’s peripheral position within the EC was taken into consideration 
when determining the timing of liberalisation (Gallagher 1993c: 9).197 Thus, “with good 
motivation to protect Eircom” the government had decided to go ahead and request derogation” 
(Interview: Senior Official in Eircom, November 10, 2003, Dublin).
But as argued by interviewees, the decision not to introduce competition as early as 
possible was to have the opposite effect, in that the motivation to make the necessary changes to 
reduce costs and increase efficiency was missing, propagating the inertia of the past.198 As will 
be shown in Chapter five, the incumbent’s tactics after this period were more focused on
195 See, IT 1993a. Derogation was obtained in December 1996 up to January 2000 under the Commission 
Decision of 27.XI.1996 concerning the additional implementation periods requested by Ireland for the 
implementation of Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC “as regards full competition in the 
telecommunications markets (C[96]3342).”
196 The possibility of derogation also helped the state in its bid to form a Strategic Alliance with KPN of 
Holland and the Swedish firm, Telia. By extending the period under which the firm could extract 
monopoly profits then Eircom would seem more attractive to investors (Interview: Senior official at 
Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003; Chari and McMahon 2003: 37).
197 Interview: Senior civil servant within line Ministry, Dublin, November 5, 2003.
198 Interviews: Senior Official in Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003; Former minister for the telecoms 
sector 1997-2002, November 11, 2003.
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extending its portfolio in the sector as opposed to more persistently addressing issues of 
efficiency and effectiveness. The state therefore went beyond the Jamaican government in its 
bid to protect Eircom from competition, indicating the dangers of obtaining regulatory 
compliance where the regulator is a supranational body and where the State does not have a 
similar ideology or motivation for regulatory reform.
One interviewee cited both this incident and the cable link affair as two very clear-cut 
examples of incidents of collusion between firm and state or to be more precise, “examples of a 
dominant firm capturing government’s agenda”.199 However, in commenting on the request for 
derogation, senior staff within Eircom noted “there was an unwillingness of government to 
throw Eircom to the competitive winds...it was more self interest on the part of the state than 
saying we need to protect Eircom necessarily” (Interview: Dublin, November 10, 2003). It may 
however, have been the case that the government’s action was driven more by political 
expedience, namely a desire to support the unions, the majority of Eircom’s employees and 
political parties who were not supportive of competition than by senior managers within the 
firm.200 Indeed, Eircom’s chairman had been known to express support for privatisation and 
competition since the 80s201 as the government was known for making decisions based on 
political expedience.202 The lesson here is that the incumbents are not necessarily monoliths but 
may be internally segmented. This has important implications for how its choices in responding 
to change and regulations in its regulatory space. As shown here, some interests may be more 
dominant than others and may in turn be able to form alliances with actors in the regulatory 
space, including government regulators, to distort the intentions of regulatory reform. The 
source of Eircom’s dominance was therefore, not only due to its legal status in the sense of 
possessing sole rights to the provision of certain services or through its size. Rather, State 
policies and activities have at times (whether directly or indirectly) had the effect of cementing 
and extending the incumbent’s power.
199 Interview: Representative of an industry group, IBEC (Dublin November 7, 2003)
200 See Hall (1993:11).
201 See, Gallagher (1992d).
202 Gallagher (Ibid).
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3.2.2 Privatisation and Liberalisation of Irish Telecoms
While the fixed network remained closed, competition was to begin in mobile service when the 
door was opened for the selection of a second operator to compete with Eircom’s mobile arm, 
Eircell, in 1995. ESAT Digiphone, which commenced operations in 1996, won this. The entry 
of this player was not to pose much threat to the incumbent’s position. The introduction of 
competition in this area was still not done wholeheartedly. For instance, the government had 
faced threats of being taken before the European Court to force it to implement EC directives 
aimed at increasing competition, indicating a lack of support for competition.203 No records 
suggest that such action was undertaken. However, this does indicate the extent of the 
government’s unwillingness to challenge Eircom’s dominance. This point also makes a case for 
viewing external regulation and regulatory institutions as a tool for achieving national reforms. 
EU directives and threats of court action have been used in nudging the Irish state and 
incumbent towards having a competitive regime through regulatory reforms.
Privatisation, which seemed to be a taboo in the 80s was becoming more palatable, 
though full market liberalisation was still not as accepted at the start of this period.204 The first 
step towards privatisation of Eircom followed shortly with the sale of 20% of Eircom to a 
Scandinavian group in 1997 after negotiations, which had begun in 1995.205
This was carried further in 1999, with the Scandinavian group gaining an additional 
15% and the firm changing its name from Telecom Eirann to Eircom.206 Ownership of Eircom 
was to change yet again in November 2001 when it was purchased by Valentia 
Telecommunications Ltd.207 Thus, full privatisation was finally achieved. Employees managed 
to secure equity in the Company increasing their ownership from 15% in 1999 to 30% by 2001. 
Industry reform was not only about the change in rules in the incumbent’s operational space, but
203 As occurred when the government refused to change what was viewed as the incumbent’s repressive 
pricing plan and failure to implement EC Directive 90.3 88, which permitted private competition in 
telecoms. See Kelly and O’Regan (1993a); Carroll (1993).
204 See Massey and Shortall (1999: 4); Keena (2008).
205 These were Royal KPN NV (KPN) from the Netherlands and Telia, from Sweden.
206 Hastings (2003: 152) and “Eircom (2000a). The changing pattern of ownership and the impact this had 
on the firm is discussed in more detail in Chapter seven.
207 See ODTR (2001e).
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also about the internal reordering, which took place in response to these external impulses. This 
theme is examined in more detail in Chapters six and seven. Additional privatisation was 
however, to come within a larger context of sector reform, which marked a transition in support 
for market forces. This change was helped by the election in 1997 of a pro-reform coalition.208 
This was comprised of Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats. Both parties were more 
sympathetic to reforms than previous coalitions, which included Labour and Democratic Left. 
Thus, as in the Jamaican case, the electoral cycle is shown as a critical element in the timing of 
reform. As such the derogation was to end prematurely when it was decided that full 
competition would be introduced by the end of 1998. As such, the country immediately sat 
about preparing itself to meet the initial EU deadline of December 1998. All in all Massey 
affirms that “the decisions to bring forward the full liberalisation of telecommunications and 
order the sale of Cablelink... would appear to represent an ad hoc response to a particular 
situation rather than a major shift in Government policy” (2002: 11). The decision to liberalise 
earlier than planned also came amidst concerns that the Company was not advancing at the rate 
of its competitors in neighbouring countries. There were further concerns about the potential 
loss of foreign direct investment (Ibid).209 As such, the government’s attempt to protect the firm 
and allow it time to advance its network to meet competition proved unsuccessful.
The Company also had to divest itself of its cable television business, Cablelink.210 
Even while competition had existed in the mobile market since 1996 with a second licence 
being issued to Meteor in 1998, the incumbent’s operations still dominated the market.211 By 
2001, this continued dominance prompted Comreg to force the firm from the market with a 
pledge not to re-enter this segment of the market for a period of three years from 2000 (Eircom
208 Interview: Former Minister, Dublin, November 11, 2003.
209 Irish telecoms was to have been among the worst in terms of prices and quality (IT 1993c: 6).
210 Cablelink was sold in July 1999 to NTL for £535 million with the new owner pledging to develop its 
broadband network to compete directly with Eircom by delivering faster and more efficient telephony, 
Internet and digital TV (ODTR 1999: 16-17). Eircom was also made to give up the various subsidiaries 
owned by Cablelink (Eircom 2000: 38, 52).
211 In 2001 Eircell was estimated to control 60% of the mobile market (See BW 2001).
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Annual Report 2001: 52).212 This was purchased by Vodaphone (Eircom Annual Report, 2001: 
9). Eircom had also been determined to be the carrier with the Strategic Market Power (SMP) 
and had been mandated to meet certain universal service obligations (USO) befitting this title.213 
Thus, over a short period, Eircom was to see itself undergoing a number of changes in its 
ownership, size and structure. Reorientation in the rules and regulation of its operational space, 
collectively posed a threat to the incumbent’s size, profits, market share and hence, power and 
dominance.
This came amidst complaints about the need for further investments and the reduction 
of Eircom’s debt. Indeed, it has been argued that the Scandinavian investors had also influenced 
the request for derogation by asking the Irish government to extend the length of time in which 
the firm would operate as a monopoly by four years. During this time other operators would be 
prevented from entering the market, allowing additional time for infrastructural and service 
improvements (Chari and McMahon 2003: 37).
As is shown here and later in this chapter, the role played by the EU has served to bring 
another dimension to discussions of regulation and the constraints on incumbents in much the 
same way that the role of the WTO and the US have influenced Jamaican telecoms and the 
extent to which the incumbent has been able to exercise its dominance (albeit the external actor 
in this case exists at the regional level). Both cases demonstrate the effect of the 
internationalisation of regulation and the role of supranational institutions in driving states 
towards reforms even where local motivation may be lacking. In so doing, these cases illustrate 
the dynamics between external legislation and local contexts and the challenges and 
complexities faced when these collide. As such, the development of the telecommunications 
industry in Ireland has been influenced significantly by its membership within the European
212 Eircom had managed to increase its profile in the mobile market with earnings from this segment 
accounting for 20% of overall revenues in 1999 (Eircom 2000c).
213 That is in accordance with European Communities (Electronic Communications and Network 
Services) Universal Service and User’s Rights) Regulation 2003, SI. No. 308, 2003. Its obligations 
include provision of fixed line, payphones and directory services as well as the maintenance of public 
telephones and extending access to rural Ireland (Comreg 2006: 3). Section 10 of the Regulation also 
requires Eircom to publish performance indicators relating to this status.
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Community and the directives flowing from this source. These have helped to provide the 
motivation and model for developments in the Republic.
So strong has been the influence from this source that it has been concluded that the 
whole process of regulatory reform in Ireland would not have progressed so speedily and to 
such an extent had it been left up to the country’s politicians.214 What the EU did was to 
supplant national and political will with a regional desire and drive for modernisation. Thus, 
while one former chairman had noted in 1992 that the firm was unwilling to face the future, the 
onset of competition legislation from the EU meant that ready or not, both firm and state would 
have eventually had to contend with full competition at some point in the future (Gallagher 
1992f).
3.2.3 The Incumbent and the Independent Regulator
The change in the incumbent’s circumstance was perhaps most graphically seen in the changes 
in the regulatory institutions over the years. Thus, a key aspect of reform has been in the 
modification in relationships and structure of Irish telecoms, similar to that witnessed in Chapter 
two.
Since the first set of reforms in 1983, sector regulation was handed to the line minister 
who made the rules by which the sector was governed, laying the foundation for the close 
association between firm and state. Licensing functions were the sole purview of the line 
Minister. With little external intervention the firm was able to secure rate increases considered 
by consumers to be excessive.215 The close personal ties between the two also meant that 
interaction was at times less structured and informal, especially in terms of reporting 
relationships (Gallagher 1992c).216 In fact, despite the intention of giving the Company more
214 Interview: Senior civil servant, line Ministry, Dublin, November 5, 2003.
2.5 Kelly and O’Regan 1993b.
2.6 An OECD report on Irish telecoms has also commented on the culture of close ties between politicians 
and businesses (2001a: 52).
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independence under the 1983 reforms, there were times when the role of politician/owner and 
management became blurred leading to accusations of corruption.217
An important development from the negotiation for privatisation in 1995 was the 
government’s pledge to move towards the establishment of a permanent regulator. This came as 
an attempt to achieve more independence and transparency in the firm’s relations with the state. 
By 1997, an important institution was added to the mix when the independent sector regulator 
(Office of the Director for Telecommunications Regulation and from 2002 Comreg) came into 
being.218 Up to this, and arguably even after, the Minister’s office and the firm remained at the 
centre of the sector. Responsibility for sector regulation was removed from direct ministerial 
control. Thus, for the first time, an independent regulatory agency for utilities had been 
appointed representing a breach in the incumbent/state dyad.219 The ODTR was charged with 
implementing the reform programme within the context of EU Directives. Its mandate covered 
all forms of transmission networks, their regulation and licensing.220 By 2000 discussions were 
underway once more on the drafting of a new Communications Bill aimed at revamping and 
clarifying the institutional arrangements for the regulation of telecoms and related industries. 
This move was prompted by the failings of the institutional arrangements designed to keep the 
incumbent in line. The new Bill was enacted in April 2002 and created a new regulatory body 
known as the Communications Regulator (Comreg).221 The effect of this legislation and the 
other major features of the telecoms regime in Ireland between 1982 and 2002 were to change 
the relationship between the firm and government from what it had been for close to a hundred 
years while reforming the entire operational environment of the Company.
217 See Maher (1992: 14).
218 Section 2, Telecommunications Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1996.
219 As noted by the firm, “absence of a clearly stated and well “policed” regulatory environment is not in 
the interest of any player in the market place” (TE 1998:15).
220 The 1983 Postal and Telecommunications Act supplies the construct for the Regulator’s duties along 
with the 1926 Wireless Telephony Act and amendments in the Telecommunications (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1996. These responsibilities have been transferred to ComReg under the 2002 Act. The 
Regulator is able to fund its activities from fees charged for its activities. Excess monies are paid into the 
Central Fund in accordance with Section 30(7) of the Communication Regulation Act 2002.
221 This is the title that will be used for the remainder of this paper.
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While the 1983 Act had allowed for the establishment of an advisory group to the 
minister, it was not until 1993, however, with unsettlement among customers about the firm’s 
service and poor customer relations222 that the Minister for Communications decided to 
establish a Telecommunications Advisory Group as intended in 1984.223 This was also formed 
in the face of complaints about the level of rate increases awarded to Eircom. The Group was 10 
years in coming and was seen to be of little use in ensuring that Eircom was monitored 
effectively.224 Indeed, one of the first notable moves in this year was its decision to refer Eircom 
(then TE) to the competition directorate in the European Commission in a move meant to flex 
its muscles (TE-AR 1998: 15).
The Regulator has been key in monitoring the sector since liberalisation. It has been 
instrumental in laying down the guidelines for the incumbent’s conduct In so doing, it has 
helped to bring more openness, thereby removing some of the ‘murkiness’ involved in 
governments involvement in processes such as the granting of licences (Interview: Reporter at 
the Irish Times, Dublin November 10, 2003). These covered the quality and delivery of service 
as well as the timing.225 With the establishment of an independent regulator, came a change in 
relations and privileges, which the Company had previously enjoyed. Tied to this was the 
requirement to become more formalistic in relations with various actors and in its reporting and 
record keeping practices. This is visibly seen in the regulator’s stipulations for Eircom to design 
its own Service Level Agreement outlining the standards it would uphold with its clients 
(ODTR, 200Id). It has also been able to build relationships within the telecoms industry gaining 
consensus around key indicators through publications on the performance of operators in
222 See Office of the Ombudsman 1998.
223 Kelly and O’Regan (1993b). Its main task was to advise the Minister on the effects of rate increases on 
customers and monitor their application.
224 As a Fine Gael Spokesman went on to state, “I have no doubt but that all places on it will be reserved 
for loyal supporters of the coalition government (Fianna Fail and the Labour Party), and that it will be 
totally under the thumb of the Minister and will have no independent statutory basis" (in Kelly and 
O’Regan 1993a).
225 These included stipulations that companies design their own Service Level Agreements indicating the 
standards that clients could expect. See ODTR (2001d; 2002b and 2002c). By 2006, the Regulator was 
again proposing new targets given what it saw as a need for improvement in Eircom’s installation time 
and repair of reported faults (Comreg 2006: 3).
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relation to agreed standards.226 In so doing, Comreg also elicited the help of the public in 
regulation by raising awareness of sector standards and prices, hence influencing their ability to 
make informed decisions about operators (See ODTR 2002b: 1-5).
The publication of objective standards also aimed to increase transparency and 
information; in so doing they elicited the support of actors such as entrants and customers in 
monitoring the incumbent against formal standards. As seen in the Jamaican case, this 
constitutes one way in which a young or resource constrained IRA can heighten its reach and 
effectiveness (i.e. by enlisting the support of others). Here, greater information flux, through 
disclosures from the firm and IRA may be argued to have helped to increase the size of the 
regulatory space by allowing more actors (customers and entrants) to have a role in monitoring 
the activities of the incumbent.
Comreg has also guided the incumbent’s action by issuing various directives concerning 
activities such as the pricing of its products. In 2001 the regulator issued the incumbent with a 
series of directions concerning the pricing of its wholesale ADSL product, which it believed to 
be potentially discriminatory. In issuing the direction concerning this matter, the regulator also 
stipulated a time frame in which the firm had to respond to these directions, failing which the 
launch date for its product could be affected (ODTR 2001b: 1). The firm’s exercise of power 
has therefore, not been without some constraint with the Regulator providing one of the main 
points of control over Eircom. Hence, threats also played a part in the arsenal of regulatory 
techniques employed by the Regulator when dealing with Eircom. Thus, its regulatory power 
has not necessarily been shown in punitive form but rather, through its advice and ability to 
establish ex ante standards and measures by which operators are guided and monitored.
The IRA has therefore marked a significant addition to the sector. The incumbent’s 
activities have therefore been influenced by the shifting direction of rules and structure of the 
regulatory space, highlighting the importance of regulatory reform and the IRA’s activities in 
shaping the incumbent’s activities. For instance, in accordance with the regulator’s prescriptions
226 For example, its Measuring Licensed Operator Performance (MLOP) programme was designed with 
the aim of establishing indicators by which powerful fixed line operators (Eircom) were to be judged.
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for separate accounting in 2000, Eircom turned its attention to overhauling its accounting 
practices.227 This is not to suggest that Eircom simply complied with the regulator’s directions. 
Since this was not before it made various submissions, which noted the difficulty and cost that 
was involved in such an effort. This was used by the firm as a rationale for requesting additional 
time in which to allow it to prepare its accounts and procedures to comply with the regulator’s 
demands. Thus, Eircom was able to gain additional time for adjusting its operations in line with 
industry regulation without being penalised and as in this case extend its time of operation under 
a regime, which allowed it more freedom in the organisation and use of its accounts. The firm 
even went on to suggest that it had difficulty meeting all of Comreg’s accounting requirements, 
given the risk that such disclosures would force it to give up commercially sensitive 
information 228
As such, the incumbent’s response involved tactics of delay and where it complied with 
the regulator’s rulings, it sometimes sought to set the pace for its compliance, in so doing 
buying itself additional time to comply with Comreg’s directions. The incumbent’s response 
may also have been determined by awareness of Comreg’s limitations in forcing it to comply. 
As such, the incumbent has not always been forthcoming as Comreg noted in 2001 after Eircom 
failed to publish requested information on its pricing structure. According to Comreg, “despite 
extensive contacts, Eircom has to date failed to satisfy the Regulator that their proposed 
wholesale prices are cost oriented and non-discriminatory” (ODTR 2001b). One interviewee 
described these tactics of delay and challenge as Eircom’s attempt to direct the regulatory 
agenda. In the end, such activities served to frustrate the regulator and its ability to carry out its 
task effectively.
Prior to privatisation and liberalisation, a contractual relationship existed between firm 
and state. Liberalisation had seen another contractual relationship being formed. However, 
whereas the previous relationship was more collegial, the latter has been marked more by 
conflict and tension, particularly during the first years of reform. With increased uncertainty and
227 See (ODTR 2000c).
228 Ibid.
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operational risks from industry reform, the regulator/regulatee relationship is therefore, shown 
to become more contentious. This may have been exacerbated by the ‘newness’ of the IRA, 
which (as the actor responsible for redesigning and monitoring sector rules) could be seen as 
representing one of the most significant threats to Eircom’s hold over the sector. Additionally, 
the imperative of reform, particularly, in the mid 1990s to early 2002 meant that as the 
incumbent and the operator with the SMP, Eircom’s operations were subjected to closer 
scrutiny than other operators.229 Regulation, thus, appeared as a bilateral relationship between 
Eircom and Comreg with observers noting that Comreg appeared to have interpreted, “telecoms 
regulation essentially [as] regulation of the incumbent”.230 To some extent, this relationship has 
been unavoidable, given the regulator’s need for information on Eircom’s (and by extension, the 
nation’s) capacity, particularly at the start of liberalisation. Eircom did not always welcome this 
close association. What was seen as frequent requests from Comreg saw Eircom complaining 
that it was not being given sufficient time to respond to such requests and to prepare responses 
to consultation papers.231 The Comreg’s reliance on the incumbent ensured that Eircom 
remained at the centre of the regulatory space and was a key point of reference on matters 
relating to the development of Irish telecoms.
Even so, Eircom has at times also displayed duplicity in its relations with regulators 
moving from confrontation to support, drawing one interviewee to comment that Eircom was in 
no way “The victim of regulation”. As he went on to note, these episodes only served to 
highlight Eircom’s tactic of adopting “strategic incompetence” when faced with regulations, 
which it was unhappy with (Interview: Senior figure with a mobile operator in Dublin,
229 There is some merit to this given that measures developed by Comreg have seen more attention being 
placed on the incumbent than other operators. For instance, the MLOP looks at the major fixed line 
operators with Eircom remaining the dominant of these operators. Thus, where two of the major concerns 
of such a programme covers, the “provision of public payphones by Eircom... supply of regulated 
services from die operator with Significant Market Power (Eircom)”, then the incumbent becomes one of 
the main targets of regulation (ODTR 2002b).
230 Interviews: Senior staff at Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003; CWU, Dublin, October 30, 2003. On 
the other hand, their statements need also to be taken in the context of the keen interest of these two 
organisations in ensuring the success of the firm and in maintaining its operational freedom.
231 Ibid.
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November 11, 2003).232 Whereas it did sometimes frustrate Comreg’s effort it also at times 
sought to be more conciliatory emphasising the similarities between its aims and those of the 
Comreg’s, particularly after liberalisation.233 The suggestion here is that as reform becomes a 
reality and the rules clarifying the new regime become more precise, the incumbent may 
become less antagonistic towards the regulator, especially as the uncertainties in its market 
decrease. This change of tactic may also be seen as an indication that the incumbent no longer 
views the regulator in an antagonistic light given its recognition that reform had not detracted 
from its power as originally anticipated.234
It has also been suggested that the pace of reforms in 1998 may have reduced the time 
in which the state and Regulators could prepare for liberalisation, with matters of transparency 
not being adequately addressed (See Massey 2002: 9).235 The regulator’s ability to direct 
Eircom’s activities had also been compromised by a lack of effective power. This had been the 
case prior to and after liberalisation. Prior to the formation of the IRA, a Competition Authority 
also oversaw operations in the sector.236 However, its attempt to direct Eircom’s activities was
232 The firm noted that this was an error (Interview: Former staff of Eircom and Comreg, Dublin, 
November 7, 2003). It was also accused of selling services below cost to customers in 2002.
233 As Eircom noted, both wanted to improve the quality, delivery and overall efficiency of the sector and 
“we have huge information that Comreg needs” (Interview: Senior Eircom Official, Dublin, November 
10, 2003).
234 As shown later in this and Chapter five, Eircom has emerged from the reform process with its status as 
the Irish telecoms firm intact.
235 For instance, the state has been criticised for not setting up sufficient measures to protect consumer’s 
post-liberalisation (Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003). Customers were 
directed to lodge complaints with operators such as Eircom, even while it had been accused of being 
“arbitrary and unjust” when dealing with complaints prior to liberalisation. Comreg also echoed the 
inadequacy of its complaints procedure in 2002 (Comreg 2002: 2). There has also been a tendency to 
favour producers over consumers in consultations and access to the policy-making mechanisms of the 
state (See OECD 2001a: 86). This is not to imply that all producers have the same level of access. Indeed, 
small operators have argued against the bias towards the larger operators (predominantly the incumbent) 
within the market (Interviews: Dublin, November 6 and 12, 2003). Massey (2002: 4-9) also suggests that 
the speed with which the Competition Act was accepted in the Oireachtas in 2002 was also influenced by 
the approach of a general election, again demonstrating the role of politics on the timing of reform both in 
Jamaica and Ireland.
236 Other sources of regulation included The Fair Trading Commission, which was created under the 1953 
legislation on competition, The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1953. It was responsible for 
investigating anticompetitive practices and making recommendations to the Minister. This was replaced 
by a 1991 Competition Act, creating the Competition Authority. Its content was guided by Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty of Amsterdam Articles 81 and 82), that is, [1991] OJ C233/2, 
[1991] 4 CMLR 946. These prohibited anti-competitive practices, collusion and abuse of dominance. 
Also, see Graham (2000: 118-127).
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made difficult by lack of political support and inadequate legislative power.237 The minister was 
also authorised to initiate court proceedings against acts of anti-competitiveness, but as Massey 
notes, this had never been done (Massey 2002: 4).238 As such, Eircom’s power, particularly in 
the years leading up to privatisation, went largely unchecked. Attempts by the Authority to 
bring action against businesses such as Eircom, were not even supported by the Government. 
One instance was to witness the Authority being recommended to “stick to its knitting” after it 
attempted to take action against Eircom for anti-competitive practices (Massey 2002: 7). As 
such, weak capacity was to be an issue in Comreg’s ability to monitor Eircom as it had been for 
the OUR in Jamaica, demonstrating the constraints, which can sometimes be faced by regulators 
in small states in carrying out their tasks. These gaps have had negative consequences for the 
regulator’s ability to manage the incumbent’s behaviour in the sector. According to one former 
employee of Comreg and Eircom, “the power that the regulator has and the legislation [has not] 
been up to scratch...” Subsequently, the legislation, “.. .hasn’t been strong enough to impose the 
regulator’s will on the incumbent” (Interview: Dublin, November 7, 2003).
3.2.4 The Use of the Courts
The regulators in Jamaica and Ireland took some time to commence operations. In both cases 
the entry of the regulator and liberalisation were to mark a significant transition in the way the 
incumbent responded to regulation. However, whereas in Jamaica, the use of the Courts was 
first marked by the breakdown in relations between the firm and state, in the Irish case, this was 
heralded by loopholes in Comreg’s Act.239 The act of challenging the regulator’s decisions 
usually resulted in the suspension or delay of the ruling until clarification came from the
237 The Competition Authority’s effectiveness was limited in the years prior to the creation of Comreg 
given its inability to conduct investigations and take action against abusers. The Court decided if a firm 
had engaged in an anticompetitive practice and the level of fines for such action. The 1991 Competition 
Act was, for example keen on keeping the scope of the Authority to its minimum as increased powers 
would ultimately require a level of manpower, which could not be provided (See Massey 2002).
238 The Competition Authority’s Act was finally amended allowing it to initiate civil proceedings (Section 
7, Competition (Amendment) Act, 1996). Breaches were also made prosecutable through fines or 
imprisonment (Sections 2 and 3).
239 OECD (2001a: 95-97).
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courts.240 For instance in 2000, Eircom brought an action against Comreg for its decision to
force Eircom to modify the length of time it would take to deliver leased lines to entrants.241
Implementation was then postponed with Eircom being able to delay compliance until the case
had been resolved. This tactic was compounded by the technicality of telecoms regulation,
which limited the speed with which a court, that was already slow, could make decisions242
Such moves gave Eircom more time and room to manoeuvre before the actual introduction of
regulatory orders. Thus as noted by one interviewee, Eircom has used the court system:
[to] perfection; the [court] cases delay the [regulator’s] decisions coming through...
And what they do, they’ll take the cases [to court] for a certain length of time and 
then the case would be dropped. But it would be a year down the road ... the 
original decision hadn’t been able to be implemented and what happens is that at 
that stage it is too late, sometimes. That’s been a very key tactic that it’s used... 
it basically held up the whole [regulation] process.
Thus, as in the Jamaican case, the expansion of the regulatory space was to witness the 
incumbent turning more to the court and not to politicians to assert its dominance, with the 
judiciary being used to frustrate regulation, delaying entry and hence, the progress of 
competition. A year later Eircom had also brought action against Comreg’s decision to increase 
the number of services covered by the incumbent’s Reference Interconnection Offer, again 
delaying its implementation (ODTR 2000b: 6). Eircom’s activities frustrated the regulator’s 
efforts, compelling the latter to think twice about making changes not supported by Eircom. The 
firm’s defence centred on the fact that while it brought six cases against the regulator (up to 
2003) none of these had ever been concluded in Court.244 Furthermore, “at the end of the day we 
have to do things to protect our company against unreasonable intervention by the regulators” 
(Interview: Senior official, Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003). Nevertheless, such actions 
may have affected sector stability and certainty for regulation and entrants.
241 Eircom (2000d)
242 Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003. It has also been noted that Judges still 
need to become more familiar with telecoms a point which may also slow the pace in which cases have 
been concluded (See OECD 2001b: 67).
243 Ibid.
244 As occurred when Eircom settled out of Court in 2002 on a case it had brought against Comreg’s 
proposal for Local Loop unbundling and the prices for interconnection (ODTR 2002a: 1).
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This form of response was to become a feature of relations between firm and regulator. 
As such, regulatory reform can inadvertently provide perverse incentives for strong, well- 
resourced firms, such as incumbents to reduce the effectiveness of regulation by taking 
advantage of omissions and shortcomings in rules and regulations. Thus, where there are players 
with more knowledge and expertise of the market then there is potentially more scope for such a 
player to recognise legislative gaps and to possess the resources to take advantage of such 
omissions. Such actions may keep the regulator on the defensive, forcing it to spend its time 
protecting itself and rationalising its actions. In so doing, the incumbent can inadvertently fmd 
itself dictating the IRA’s agenda at any given point as well as its success in addressing issues on 
its agenda. Such difficulties make the business of regulatory design even more important, since 
the strength of the rules that are designed at this point will be important in charting the course 
for the incumbent’s actions and how it relates with regulators and competitors. As seen in the 
Irish case, the incumbent has been able to benefit from loopholes in industry regulation, which 
has allowed it to dictate the pace at which transparency and competition can be achieved and 
ultimately, affect the prospects of its competitors. This can be done in ways that do not 
necessarily support capture, since the regulator is not acting on Eircom’s behalf.
However, while the incumbents in the cases examined in this and the previous chapter 
are shown as challenging the regulator’s authority, the chapters in Part two demonstrate that as 
the certainty of competition and liberalisation is brought home to the incumbent, it will turn its 
attention inward to focus on adjusting to reform through organisational reorientation as opposed 
to attempting to challenge regulators and entrants.
Legislation in March 2000 removed such perverse incentives in the regulatory system 
since the appeals process could no longer prevent the enactment of a regulatory decision. The 
2002 Communications Bill further improved upon this by setting specific timelines within 
which applications for review should be made. It also specified that the public interest and the 
legal sanctity of decisions should be considered by firms rather than the individual strength of 
regulatory rulings when deciding whether to challenge Comreg (OECD 2001a: 97). The use of 
the courts therefore lessened after the more turbulent years 1999-2003, which marked the
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regulators efforts to facilitate entry. This reduction also suggests a decrease in antagonism 
between Comreg and Eircom and the level of uncertainty experienced by the incumbent firm as 
it settled more into competition. However, this remains one of the ways that Eircom has ensured 
it remains a force, checking the regulator’s activities in the sector. In 2005, for instance, Comreg 
was forced to take Eircom to Court for its failure to comply with a 2004 Market Requirements 
Document (MRD), which outlined requests from access seekers concerning the unbundling of 
the local loop.245 In this case, the incumbent came out even more emboldened by the Court’s 
ruling that the firm had a right to appeal Comreg’s decisions - notwithstanding that this was 
after a second round of appeals that engendered concerns about the prospects of companies 
seeking access to the local loop. In another case: 2003 was to see Eircom bringing Comreg 
before the high Court for the latter’s decision to introduce a flat fee for access to the fixed 
network. Comreg expressed its disappointment at the incumbent’s action as it felt this would 
affect entrants (RTE 2003). This form of challenge was to continue as recent as 2008 with the 
firm promising to challenge Comreg’s decision for it to reduce monthly charges for its leased 
lines (Collins 2008). As one competitor noted, “legal action only results in uncertainty and this 
is bad for consumers and bad for competition” (Collins 2008).
The incumbent’s antagonism and attempts to challenge the regulator is, to some extent, 
understandable given that Comreg’s mandate was to implement the reform programme within 
the context of EU Directives. As the harbinger of change (competition, liberalisation, disruption 
of the existing status quo and the agent responsible for overseeing reform) the Regulator 
represented one of the greatest threats to Eircom. Hence, its challenge may be seen as an attempt 
to question the integrity and competence of the Regulator’s office as a means of reducing the 
IRA’s ability to regulate the sector. The presentation therefore goes beyond capture to indicate
245 Eircom appealed against the Court’s ruling to comply with the conditions under the MRD refusing to 
comply even after Comreg gained a second enforcement order. Eircom’s point of contention surrounded 
what it saw as deficiencies in the MRD as to the precise nature of Comreg’s request and Comreg’s failure 
to allow it to analyse and make appeals against the MRD. See Eircom Ltd. v. Commission for  
Communications Regulations [2006] IEHC138 (29 July 2005) and Examiner (2005).
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one of the ways in which regulated firms relate to regulators and how they attempt to direct 
regulation, where capture is precluded by regulatory reform.246
3.2.5 The Incumbent and Entrants
The firm has also benefited from the actions of other players in the market (e.g. government and 
entrants) that have helped it to stay ahead of the field.247 That is, it has been the recipient of 
some good fortune suggesting that its sustained dominance has not only been about how it has 
responded to reform; given its grounding in the market as the incumbent, it has been able to take 
advantage of the mishaps of entrants. For instance, the cost of investing in alternative 
infrastructure has meant that its dominance in areas as the provision of fixed voice services to 
businesses and residences remains intact.248 As will be argued in Chapter five, much of the 
achievements are due to the reorientation in the way the incumbent re-organised for 
competition.
Competition has also not progressed to the point initially anticipated, another point 
which has benefited Eircom. For instance, the cost of leasing lines from the incumbent had 
proven burdensome for some operators, leading to their demise.249 Additionally, the OECD has 
for instance, described the licensing as “onerous, complex and costly” (2001a: 95), a point, 
which again adds to the number of obstacles faced by entrants. Thus as the incumbent, Eircom 
has been best placed to benefit from the difficulties faced by entrants and the loopholes in 
regulation.
246 Eircom’s challenge before the High Court in 2003 saw Comreg pledging to protect the integrity of its 
procedures and to ‘vigorously contest’ Eircom’s challenge, suggesting that it viewed the firm’s activities 
as a challenge to its authority and competence. See, RTE (2003).
247 The speed with which the decision to end derogation was made and rules passed had also served to 
decrease the time in which competitors could prepare themselves to compete with Eircom, slowing the 
development of competition. As argued above, it also reduced the regulator’s preparation time.
248 For instance, after two years of competition in 2000, 78% of local calls made by SMEs were through 
Eircom, 71% of national calls and 69% of international traffic was done through Eircom. After a year, 
these figures had increased to 79%, 78% and 78%, consecutively.
249 See Pognatchnik (2006). The cost of access was to remain high up to 2008 with Comreg requesting 
Eircom reduce its price from €8.41 to €2.94 per line per month (Collins 2008). In 2006 an operator was 
forced out of the sector due to its inability to pay Eircom for leased capacity, with Eircom cutting service 
to the 40,000 customers on the entrants network.
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It has also gained from the actions of its competitors against each other, which have at 
times postponed full competition in some areas of the market. For example, the duopoly in the 
cellular market was to go on for 18 months after the granting of the third licence, as the 
company who lost out in the bid challenged the regulator’s decision before the Courts.250 
Eircom was inadvertently given more time to operate without much challenge so that by 2001 
Comreg was forced to exclude Eircom from this market for fear that its presence was preventing 
further growth in the area (Eircom Annual Report, 2001: 52).251 Thus, fostering a competitive 
market may require a regulator to do more than simply liberalise a market since liberalisation 
does not automatically equate to competition, as the presence of a dominant player may be 
enough to dissuade competition
3.2.6 Anti-competitive Practice as a Response to Reform
The slow pace in moving forward with the reform agenda in the 90s served to prolong the 
power and relevance of the incumbent. Since liberalisation, the slow pace in rolling out services 
such as broadband and developing an alternative network, plus the onerous licensing process 
have meant that Eircom remains an actor with power and force vis-a-vis other actors, including 
the regulator. Furthermore, by the time the sector was fully opened Eircom had more regulatory 
capacity than its competitors.252 Having this capacity meant that the firm was able to show up at 
more meetings and make more contribution to discussions on regulation than its competitors.253 
Eircom was, “such a dominant force in the country...that they still tended to swamp any 
competitors that came in” (Interview: former Telecoms Minister, Dublin, November 11, 2003). 
This is yet to change, since by 2006 the firm had (after intense restructuring -  see Chapters five 
and seven) once more become a public company and re-entered the mobile market254
250 See Keena (2008).
251 The incumbent’s absence did not lead to expansion of the number of operators.
252 Interviews: Senior civil servant, line Ministry, Dublin, November 5, 2003; Mobile operator, Dublin, 
November 12, 2003.
253 Interview: Entrant in the mobile market, Dublin, November 12, 2003.
254 Eircom Annual Report (2006: 234); TI (2006).
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But while Eircom has benefited from failures in regulatory design and the actions of 
politicians and entrants, the incumbent has not always played the role of a willing or honourable 
participant in the regulatory space. Its actions here go beyond that related to regulators (as 
described earlier) to its relationship and activities with its competitors. Thus, as far as it 
concerns relationships in the sector, that between regulated firms (incumbents and entrants) and 
not only that between the IRA and regulated firm is important, since this is sometimes where the 
effectiveness of rules aimed at encouraging entry and access and fair play can be addressed. 
This is similar to the Jamaican incumbent’s delay in granting access to its network, which 
resulted in competitors being unable to carry out their business, in turn illustrating the 
credibility and capacity gaps faced by regulators (See Chapter two).
Prior to the late 1990s, Eircom emphasised the dangers that full competition could bring 
for the country and consumers.255 By the late 90s however, this tactic had moved to warnings 
against wholesale adoption of European models of telecoms reform.256 Eircom had also urged 
caution as it related to the pace at which local loop unbundling could take place given the 
expense and resources involved.257 As illustrated above, this was to become one of the areas that 
tested the relationship between the firm and regulator, with the former sometimes choosing not 
to acquiesce to demands for information on its capacity. Such actions have in turn had 
implications in its relationship with entrants, since Comreg’s inability to secure compliance here 
meant the operations of entrants, were compromised. For instance, one of the concerns at the 
start of competition was the slow delivery of leased lines and connection to Eircom’s circuits, 
which in mid 1999 was recognised to be a significant problem for entrants, forcing Comreg to 
design a strategy for addressing this instance of regulatory failure.258 Further, in 1999 concerns 
were raised by entrants about Eircom’s operations with the incumbent’s size and coverage being 
viewed as a concern for entrants demanding Comreg pay special attention to preventing cross­
subsidisation and achieving separate accounting in Eircom (ODTR 1999: 16).
255 As argued in Section 3.2.1.
256 Interview: Senior official in Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003.
257 Ibid.
258 ODTR (2000a). One strategy was to increase the level of fines that Eircom had to pay for failing to 
meet expectations.
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Eircom has also been accused of setting prices, which are not cost oriented in the sale of its 
products and services, such as wholesale ADSL259 products, to entrants (ODTR 2001b). In other 
instances, Eircom was accused of discriminatory practices in routing Carrier Pre-Selection 
Service (CPS) in 2001. This came after complaints from Other Licensed Operators (OLOs), 
including ESAT, prompting an investigation by Comreg (See ODTR 2001a). Comreg later 
cleared the company, but this raised questions about its operations and particularly around the 
need for separation between its wholesale and retail business (see ODTR 2001b). Indeed, as 
recent as 2005, Comreg and Eircom were back in the courts over Comreg’s attempt to achieve 
further rebalancing and its concern that the incumbent’s refusal to comply would cause, “serious 
economic and/or operational problems” for other companies.260 Such incidents demonstrate the 
limitations of regulation in obtaining compliance from such dominant, entrenched actors in the 
regulatory space.261 Thus, the firm had a natural advantage thanks to its incumbency and did not 
hesitate to use this position to its advantage, delaying the growth of competition in the 
market.262
This is not to suggest that Eircom has not been adversely affected by reform.263 
However, the internal reforms (See Chapter five) undergone since liberalisation have helped it 
reduce price and increase quality to the extent that 82 of every 100 users who switched 
operators in 2005-6 chose Eircom (Eircom Annual Report, 2006: 4). It remains the most visible
259 Such tactics were not new given that Cablelink made similar accusations in 1993, making it difficult 
for this firm to compete prior to its acquisition by Eircom (Oneill 1993: 7).
260 See 245.
261 Resulting in a court case: Eircom Ltd.. v. Commission fo r  Communications Regulations [2006] IEHC 
138(29 July 2005).
262 The overall importance of the firm for the development of the sector may also have emboldened 
Eircom in its acts of defiance. One of the growing concerns of Irish government since 2000 has been the 
need to increase the nation’s broadband capacity (ODTR 2001d: 1). As a small country, Ireland’s 
remarkable growth since the 1980s has been due largely to its ability to pull foreign investments mainly 
from countries such as the US - See Schware and Hume (1996: 6-7). However, the nation’s broadband 
capacity, at the start of the century, was one of the worst in Europe (ODTR 2001 d: 5). Eircom was 
recognised as the Company with the resources and experience to make improvements (Interview: Senior 
official in the line Ministry, Dublin, November 5, 2003). As such, it could assist the government to meet 
EU requirements for cheaper broadband while making the country a more attractive one for investors. 
And so Eircom’s sustained relevance comes from the fact that it still has a stranglehold over the telecoms 
market and as such, it remains a vital component of any government policy aimed at achieving reforms in 
the sector whether it is to fulfil national or EU policy guidelines.
263 For example, while remaining the dominant player in 2003, the Company commanded 55% of telecom 
revenues - and 38% where mobile communications is included (CWU July 2003b).
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operator in the market. Its takeover of the mobile operator Meteor in 2005 meant that the latter 
now had capital to invest and was to see a 50% jump (10-15%) in market share by 2006 
(Eircom Annual Report 2006: 5). This will be shown in the chapters in Part two, which 
demonstrate the effect of regulatory reform and regulation on the internal structure of incumbent 
firms. Both incumbents are shown searching for the most effective way to restructure their 
internal orientation in order to find the best fit between the shifting structure of their 
operational/regulatory space and their internal structure.
3.3 Discussion
This final section discusses the main findings on how the Irish incumbent has responded to 
industry reform and the various factors, which influence its actions. The incumbent’s action, in 
this case, closely resembles that of the Jamaican incumbent, in so doing, carrying through the 
theme that incumbents/former monopolies are not static, one-dimensional actors, since they too 
are able to respond to changing rules in the regulatory space. It is this capacity that has enabled 
them to remain powerful actors in a post-regulatory reform era.
3.3.1 Incumbent’s Response to Changes in its Regulatory Space
The chapter has shown that as the operational space and threats in this space have changed, the 
incumbent has responded in a number of ways. Thus, at the start of the period under study, 
Eircom sought to protect its market by attempting to prevent reforms, which would compromise 
its dominance. This was accomplished through its ties with politicians and the lack of wide 
support for reform. Thus, whereas in the Jamaican case, the firm actively lobbied the state to act 
on its behalf, the Irish state has been keener to act for Eircom even where the senior managers at 
the firm did not necessarily request such protection. The difference here may be explained by 
the fact that the government in Ireland was not only the regulator, but also owner of the national 
monopoly. A discussion on the incumbent firm’s response in this case, is therefore as much 
about how a national government responds to external regulation, particularly where there is not 
much local support for reforms. Here, the late 80s to early 90s were to see the firm warning
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against the introduction of competition, highlighting the negative effects that this would have on 
the country (including higher prices).
As the inevitability of reform became apparent (thanks to various EU Directives), the 
firm argued against speedy adoption of reform. Thus, as the Jamaican incumbent, Eircom 
sought to delay the introduction of competition, in a move meant to allow it more time to 
prepare itself for reform while extending the period in which it could operate under its former 
status. However, its activities were to take on another form, thanks to the entry of the IRA in the 
late 1990s. With this actor came greater transparency and openness as well as confrontation 
between the incumbent and the IRA, making the regulatory space more contentious than ever 
before. Eircom has since set itself against the industry regulator, directly challenging its 
authority at various points since 1999.
Eircom’s desire to pit itself against Comreg may be explained in various ways. Firstly, 
the timing of entry in the Irish market is important. That is, it was created just before full 
liberalisation and privatisation. As such, its birth would appear to have heralded the emergence 
of a whole new structure and a host of new rules and regulations, which threatened Eircom’s 
operations and relations. Thus, as in Jamaica, the independent regulator in both cases emerged 
around the same period (1997) and could understandably be seen as representing the coming 
shift in the sector. As such, it is understandable that the incumbents in both cases would have 
seen the regulators as the harbingers of change and as an embodiment of the threats, which they 
were to face to their dominance, hence their persistence in challenging the regulators in either 
case (this is with good reason, since the sector regulators were charged with overseeing the 
reform programme).
Secondly, the regulator’s ability to carry out its responsibilities, as well as, the 
legitimacy and confidence with which it is able to do so will be determined by how effective it 
is asserting its position vis-a-vis the incumbent, particularly at the start of the reform process. 
Much of the confrontation and uncertainty between the incumbent in this case has been seen in 
the early years of reform. Thus, up to 2003, Eircom had brought a total of six cases against 
Comreg. This pattern of challenging the regulator was also demonstrated in the Jamaican case.
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The incumbent’s challenge in both cases can be interpreted as a questioning of the incumbent’s 
legitimacy and place in the sector. Much of this challenge has, therefore been through the 
courts. However, the dependence on Eircom for information and support has also given the 
incumbents extra power in this relationship (that is not to suggest that the regulators have been 
captured or are powerless). As such, their response has also involved attempts to frustrate and 
delay the activities of the regulator in enabling competition and market entry with both involved 
in withholding or delaying meeting requests made by the regulators. As seen in this chapter, the 
incumbent has also used the courts as a means of delaying the introduction of industry 
regulation.
These challenges may be seen as a questioning of the strength and legitimacy of 
Comreg and as such, a challenge to the regulator’s ability and competence and may be 
understandable to some extent given the fact that the IRAs in both cases were excluded from 
some of the major negotiations for industry reform.264 Following from this, the Irish case serves 
to highlight the dangers of hasty reform and the importance of designing robust rules and 
regulations as a foundation for the regulator’s ability to carry out its responsibilities officially. 
The strength of such legislation, especially at the start of the reform process, is important in 
dictating the level of success or failure of the reform agenda as rules are implemented and the 
new regime takes its form. Additionally, the dangers of not equipping regulators with sufficient 
power and resources to demand respect and secure compliance from their charges stand out as 
another key lesson from the Endings. A similar point can be made for the Jamaican case, 
especially in light of the unwillingness of that incumbent even to recognise the existence of the 
sector regulator in its first years; a step which it was able to take, thanks also to gaps in the 
IRA’s founding legislation.
But while such challenges may be viewed as a threat to the regulator’s ability, such 
actions may also help to heighten the transparency and efficiency of regulation. That is, these 
may force regulators to ensure it is more proficient and rules more robust, thus, indicating ways 
in which the regulated firm (in this case incumbents) also act to monitor the regulator and its
264 See note 137.
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effectiveness. The roles of regulated!regulator are therefore, shown as fluid, with each group 
acting to check the power of the other.
The presentation also helps to indicate the ways in which regulation and its reform can 
be made more responsive to the context, that is, via constant adjustment and environmental 
conditioning as rules are designed or modified based on developments in the regulatory space. 
Therefore, as it became obvious that the court was being used to delay the regulator and 
competition, the rules were updated to remove such incentives for abuse as was done in 2002. 
Likewise, the 2000 Telecoms Act in Jamaica was important in plugging gaps in the OUR’s 
founding legislation. On the other hand, it is also shown that even where rules may be well 
designed, they may still not realise their goals. In this case, the Court was still used as a means 
to frustrate regulation, thus dictating the limits of regulation and its reform.
Here, as in Jamaica, the use of the Courts appeared as the IRA’s became operational 
and relationships formalised. This trend also emerged as the relationship between the firm and 
state became more open. The lesson here is that as relations become more open and transparent 
(symbolised in the emergence of the IRA) the incumbent in turn modifies its response, given the 
loss of access to politicians. In such an event, the court thus becomes the base from which the 
incumbent can maintain its control and presence in the sector. Given the resources and capacity 
possessed by Eircom (and C&WJ) it has been able to exercise this option more than other 
operators. Additionally, the slow pace at which proceedings go through the courts has meant 
that only firms with sufficient resources and time (such as the incumbent) have been willing to 
use this route. Thus, as the rules of the game change, the incumbent too is able to rethink its 
response and challenge regulation. Whether in monopoly or liberalisation, the incumbent is able 
to find ways to challenge regulation, making a case for the relevance of these findings. That is, 
where regulators can anticipate and understand the ways that incumbents respond to regulation 
before hand, they may be better placed to decide when and what strategy to utilise in order to 
secure compliance. Thus, where the incumbent is deeply entrenched, as in Eircom, more time 
would have been given in the early phase to allow for unbundling before liberalisation.
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Likewise, as seen in the Jamaican case, an awareness of points of access and influences on the 
incumbent is useful in overcoming resistance from such actors.
Where the incumbent is unable to prevent reform and entry, it can make it difficult for 
entrants to compete successfully. This is seen for instance, in the pricing of products. Indeed, 
this marked one of the final phases in the incumbent’s response to reform and is conditioned by 
a realisation that reform is a reality as well as an awakening to the fact that their ability to 
respond to reform is as much about its orientation and organisational capacity as it is about its 
ability to influence regulations, delay competition or call upon the support of other actors in the 
regulatory space. Additionally, the firm has also been subjected to various operational 
restrictions, which have challenged its role and position and in so doing, brought some change 
in the sector. This is seen for instance, in the change in bilateral relationship between state and 
firm and in the emergence of a triangular relationship (firm, government and regulator) in the 
late 90s. This has since expanded to include entrants and, as will be shown in Chapter five, a 
more dynamic role for customers.
Thus, while the incumbent was forced to exit certain areas of the market, particularly in 
the first few years of liberalisation, it has nonetheless remained an indomitable force in the 
sector. As has been shown its size and capacity have meant that in some instances, other smaller 
firms have been unable to compete especially where they are unable to meet the costs of 
interconnecting to the incumbent’s network or to lay out alternative infrastructure. As such, 
sustained dominance is not only about the ability of incumbents (in this case) to reform and 
respond to change, but also the result of natural selection where smaller firms have been unable 
to keep up with competition. Furthermore, while the break-up of the incumbent was achieved in 
some areas (having lost its mobile and cable TV operations) the firm has also been allowed to 
re-enter the mobile market while unbundling has yet to be achieved, suggesting that rather than 
the disintegration that had been the aim, the incumbent is actually re-integrating and old 
arrangements are returning, with the re-nationalisation of Eircom. Such activities may 
ultimately heighten concerns around transparency and openness. The Jamaican incumbent also 
remains dominant in the fixed network, a position it will maintain for some time to come.
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The presentation therefore, indicates ways in which incumbents respond to change and 
act to shape their operational space, particularly at the height of regulatory flux. In so doing, the 
chapter considers one of the areas that has been neglected in the literature on regulatory reform, 
i.e., why are incumbent firms still dominant actors in spite of reforms that have inherently 
challenged their positions at the head of telecoms. The firm’s dominance has largely been based 
on its relevance to the Irish economy before reform and this has continued through the post- 
reform era. Importantly, the sustained dominance of this incumbent is largely linked to a 
number of factors related to the way it has responded to industry reform. Much of this involves 
skills, resources and sheer size of the incumbent. Beyond this it has benefited from the actions 
of the state as well as competitors. The lesson here is that the incumbent is not simply a taker of 
regulation but has been actively involved in influencing the course of reform and how it is 
regulated. In so doing, the incumbent has developed its responses and strategies for regulating 
itself, the regulator and the market in much the same way as the regulator develops its own list 
of measures to deliver more responsive regulation. Knowledge of such strategies can be 
important for regulators and policy makers when they are seeking to reconfigure regulatory 
regimes.
3.3.2 Drivers of Incumbent Response
This next section is aimed at discussing some of the main factors and agents influencing the 
incumbent’s behaviour within the regulatory space, highlighting how these can inform 
regulatory choice, ending with an attempt to highlight the impact of this information.
Among the key factors shaping the incumbent’s behaviour in both Chapters two and 
three have been the role of regulatory reform and the regulators (IRAs and government) in 
nudging large dominant incumbents towards making changes necessary for advancing 
efficiency, quality and effectiveness in their respective sectors. Thus, even where the extent to 
which competition exists can be challenged and where specific institutional concerns (e.g. 
economies of scale) may dictate the level of competition which small markets such as those of 
Ireland and Jamaica can accommodate, the threat of competition (facilitated by liberalization
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and instruments such as RIO) is shown in these cases as being sufficient to achieve regulatory 
goals such as, increased transparency and overall increase in performance. Importantly, given 
the size and reach of the incumbents in such small states, overall sectoral performance (for 
instance, issues of standards, access and quality) may be more about the performance of the 
incumbent and the level of improvements that it is able to undertake than necessarily about the 
extent to which competition exists in a market.
What regulatory reform has done is to provide the incentives for incumbents to make 
the improvements necessary for increasing their performance, and by so doing the overall 
performance of the market. Following from this, the vibrancy of competition will also be 
determined differently in different contexts. Thus, for Ireland and Jamaica, a vibrant market 
does not preclude a dominant actor nor does it mean a host of providers must exist for the same 
service. Hence, as demonstrated in the Jamaican case, the mobile sector may be seen as highly 
competitive with the incumbent C&WJ and Digicel battling for market share and the struggle 
between the two being mediated by the existence of a third provider.265 Whereas this may not be 
an indication of a competitive market in a larger context such as the UK or US, as will be shown 
in Chapters four and five, customers in both countries have benefited from increased value, 
choice and lower prices even while some have chosen to exercise their choice by returning to 
the incumbent.
Regulatory reform (i.e. privatisation and liberalisation) and the activities of industry 
regulators as they seek to implement, monitor and enforce telecoms rules and regulation are 
presented as important in determining incumbent behaviour. Thus, much of the incumbent’s 
activities have been in response to, or an attempt to comply with Comreg’s prescriptions. These 
have helped in shaping the existing telecoms regime. These can be seen in Eircom’s exit from 
the mobile market and the various service level agreements, as well as information that it has 
had to provide on its capacity and performance.
265 By 2008 four mobile operators existed with the last entrant battling with Digicel (now the dominant 
mobile operator) to gain access to its network (Observer 2008).
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As it concerned the government more directly, this actor has over the two decades under 
study, assisted the incumbent in prolonging its dominance in the face of EU push for change 
either through its unwillingness or lack of haste in implementing various policies in the sector. 
As shown, government policy has not traditionally favoured disintegration of the incumbent or 
any move that could hurt its dominance. Ironically, nearly a decade after reform the incumbent 
has returned to government ownership and has begun re-integrating. On the face of it, the 
government’s action in protecting the incumbent from competition may be understood as an 
instance of capture by the firm. However, this reasoning is less pertinent when the government’s 
actions are taken in light of the importance of Eircom’s monopoly for the economy. These areas 
represented the mammoth portion of earnings in the sector. The significance of Eircom’s 
earnings and the government’s role as owner up to 2001, meant it had an incentive to protect 
Eircom from threats to its dominance.
Indeed, there may be more ground to argue the 80s and 90s as an instance of a state 
capturing an incumbent especially since the incumbent (i.e. managers) did not request some of 
the protections and interventions made by the government on its behalf. Further, as will be 
shown in Chapters five and seven, it was not until the full departure of the state from the firm as 
owner that the incumbent initiated the most extensive internal reordering of its operations and 
structure. Thus, in this case, the government has more often than not been an enabler, helping 
the incumbent to maintain its dominance rather than necessarily, acting as a constraint to the 
incumbent.
But where the state has not always been willing to curb the incumbent’s behaviour, 
external actors such as the EU have stepped in to provide the motivation, which has sometimes 
been lacking nationally. As shown in Chapter two, external actors are able to influence local 
regulation, where national desire or will is absent. Critics such as, Graham (2000: 118-127), 
Thatcher (1997), Scott (1996), are among those who have highlighted the role of the EU and its 
directives in shaping reforms in telecoms at the national level. The aim has not been to redo this 
work, but simply to illustrate the impact that these have had on the incumbent. As such, the 
findings here substantiate those of the critics, from an Irish experience, emphasising the impact
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that these have had on the position of the incumbent specifically in supplanting local will as 
well as offering a template (via EU directives) for reform. In the Jamaican case, the WTO 
GATS Agreement and even the US have been influential in breaking the incumbent’s hold over 
local telecoms.
However, external intervention was welcomed in Jamaica helping to fortify local 
regulators (Industry regulator and the Jamaican Government); thereby offering increased 
legitimacy and leverage against a large dominant trans-national incumbent. This source has 
however, been less welcomed in Ireland. Nonetheless, both countries have used the threat of 
action from an external actor to secure compliance from their incumbents, indicating the role of 
external/international agents of regulation where national regulators are unable to secure desired 
behaviour from their incumbents (or as in the case of Ireland, from the government itself). As 
such, international agents of regulation may be useful in offering regulators alternative 
regulatory strategies or additional leverage for modifying the behaviour of large dominant firms, 
such as the incumbents examined in this work. Both cases illustrate the dynamics and effects of 
external sources of regulation and how these play out in a national context. External actors are 
therefore shown as having a role in heightening compliance and modifying the behaviour of 
incumbents in particular markets.
But whereas the Jamaican government had a desire to reform the sector and sought to 
elicit the support of external actors in securing compliance from the incumbent, the Irish 
government appeared to have had less of an appetite for reform, most notably before 1997. The 
momentum for reform in Ireland was more from the EU with less buy-in from the government 
as it sought to protect the incumbent.
As in the Jamaica case, market pressures also come into play when considering the 
factors affecting the incumbent’s behaviour and hence, the options that regulators have in 
regulating incumbents. As noted, some of the incumbent’s activities have been informed by the 
threat of competition and the uncertainties that it faced. For instance, the threat of competition 
has seen Eircom engaging in anti-competitive practices aimed at increasing the difficulties for 
entrants. It has also spurred it into increasing its service and competitiveness in order to win
117
back and maintain its customer base. The impact of this is however, to be made more obvious 
in Chapters four and five.
It is argued that regulation and its reform may be viewed as among the most important 
factors driving the incumbent’s behaviour (including the role of the EU). It could be argued that 
the pressures are not independent of regulatory reform and the activities of the IRA since the 
latter have been important in opening the door for customers and competitors to have a greater 
impact on the incumbents. Regulators are therefore able to influence incumbent’s behaviour by 
modifying rules and incentives and restructuring the regulatory space to include more actors and 
competitors, who in turn place pressure on the firm.
However, not all the firm’s behaviour has been about compliance or a desire to make 
the regulator’s job easy. The many efforts made by the incumbent to frustrate the regulator 
suggest that Eircom has not always made the regulator’s job easy. That is, the findings suggest 
that the activities of the regulator have been shown to be important in directing the activities of 
the incumbent. Nevertheless, there does exist some limitation on the impact of rules and 
regulatory reform since these are not always sufficient in engendering a more competitive 
market (e.g. in the local loop and the mobile market). Rather, persistent monitoring by the 
regulator to identify abuse, which may not necessarily come in the form of direct or obvious 
anticompetitive practice by the incumbent, must follow liberalisation. Further, as shown in the 
Irish case, the very presence of the incumbent in a particular segment of the market (as in the 
mobile market) may be enough to prevent entry, even where the rules allow entry. As such, 
responsive regulation may mean retracting the incumbent’s licence to operate in particular 
segments of the market for a specific period (as was the case for Ireland) or indefinitely.
On the other hand, lack of competition (e.g. due to unwillingness to invest) is something 
that the regulator has less control over. Whereas it can apply rules, which will affect the 
incumbent’s operations and market structure in order to create an ideal environment for 
competition, investors may still be unwilling or unable to enter the market (even with the 
incumbent’s exit). As seen in the Irish mobile market, the incumbent’s presence may not in fact 
be a deterrent to entry, since no operator entered the market after its mobile licence was
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rescinded. Alternatively, preventing Eircom from re-entering the market for three years may 
have been too short a time to allow the build up of sufficient levels of confidence from potential 
entrants. However, as has also been argued, the costs involved in the licensing process may also 
have acted as a disincentive to entry. A solution may require action that goes beyond the 
activities of the regulator. For example, a specific response may be to offer financial incentives 
to entrants. For instance, the greatest threat to the Jamaican incumbent has come from Digicel, 
who received some funding from the WB.
Finally, these findings are important for a number of reasons. They show that it is not 
just the firm/regulator relationship that is important in determining the success of reform and the 
incumbent’s behaviour. Rather, other factors such as the incumbent/entrant and incumbent/state 
relationship are also important. Following from this, pressure not only comes from the 
regulator, as in IRA, but others -  here external actors. This suggests how far regulation and its 
reform can help to explain incumbent firm behaviour. As argued here, regulation is shown as an 
essential driver of incumbent firm behaviour, even if much of the latter’s time is spent fighting 
this influence. Perhaps though, the fact that the incumbents in both cases have been eager 
(Eircom more than C&WJ) to challenge this actor is indicative of which actor incumbents view 
to be among (even) the greatest threat to its dominance.
Nonetheless, where the regulator is unable to carry out its task effectively given 
capacity or legislative gaps, then it can utilise these other drivers in carrying out its tasks. As 
such, it can be argued that what regulators need to do in dealing with incumbents is to 
understand how the different drivers and issues affect how they operate and how regulatory 
strategies can in turn be informed by the existence of such drivers. For instance, some of these 
(e.g. regulatory inputs and reforms) can be controlled by the regulator, while others (e.g. 
ordinary market pressures) may be uncontrollable. Where the regulator is faced with non- 
compliance, it may impose fines or prevent the incumbent (regulated firm) from implementing 
certain upgrades in the market as the Irish regulator has done.
On the other hand, while rules have been introduced to encourage competition, the 
market has failed to develop as expected given the existence of other factors, which the
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regulator is unable to control. For instance, it is unable to force investors to enter the market 
though it can create the incentives to encourage entry. Indeed, the regulator’s knowledge of 
these drivers may also prove instrumental in securing compliance, since it can appeal to external 
regulators and oversight institutions such as the EU for support. The ability to appeal to third 
parties in regulating the incumbent is also important in reducing strain or lack of capacity and 
legitimacy for a small operator. Borrowing support and legitimacy from regional regulatory 
institutions, such as the EU, therefore helps to reduce the cost and strain on the resources of 
local regulators.
A similar point has already been made for the Jamaican case. However, whereas Ireland 
benefited from its membership in the EU, accessing legislative blueprints and the enforcement 
powers of this actor (as a last resort in the compliance regime), Jamaica had to benefit more 
from the support of states such as the US and UK. This point may be indicative of the lack of 
presence of the local regional governance institution CARICOM (the Caribbean Community) 
when compared to the EU (see Payne and Sutton 2007; and Payne 1981 for a discussion of 
CARICOM and of the issues that have hampered the union since its formation in the late 
1970s). This suggests that small states may in fact benefit from joint regional approaches which 
may help to lower the cost and increase the legitimacy of local regulation.
Such strategies can also prove important for withstanding regulatory capture. In fact, the 
ongoing battle between a firm and IRA may be indicative of the firm’s failure and the 
regulator’s success in avoiding capture. Further, even for those areas over which it has less 
control, the regulator can still create the conditions or incentives for the market and players to 
move in a particular direction even though it cannot actually force the incumbent or other actors 
to actually take its bait (for example, pulling the incumbent’s licence in a particular segment of 
the market).
Finally, the chapter shows that the firm influences as much as it is influenced by 
regulation, affecting the timing and success of rules. This point hints at the complexity of the 
regulator’s tasks as well as a reason for the incumbent’s sustained dominance. Thus, regulation, 
as the regulated firm, can be a shifting target with the regulated firm (incumbent) shifting its
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strategies and response in line with the regulator’s activities. Indeed, such a reality would make 
responsive regulation a difficult task for any regulator, regardless of location or size.
3.4 Conclusion
The drivers or factors affecting the incumbent’s behaviour have been shown to include external 
regulatory institutions including the WTO, the EU and its various directives. External influences 
also include countries such as the US, which dictate trends and patterns, which are followed by 
small and developing countries. In both cases, the regulators borrowed legitimacy, expertise and 
skills from external sources to bolster their legitimacy at home. Other drivers include 
competitive pressures provided by entrants and the threat of (and actual) competition. 
Regulation and its reform as well as the embodiment of these processes (IRAs) have also been 
shown as having a significant impact on the activities of the incumbents, with these setting the 
context and conditions which allowed for entry and competitive pressures to be brought to bear 
on the incumbent.
Both Chapters two and three have also highlighted the limitations of some of these 
drivers. For instance, not all of the incumbent’s behaviour can be interpreted as an act of 
compliance with regulation, a point, which suggests some limitation to the extent to which 
regulation, itself can be successful or can modify the dominance of such actors. This helps to 
shed light on the continued dominance and success of incumbents and former monopolies after 
the introduction of reforms, which were aimed at modifying their control and positions of 
dominance.
The chapter also sought to make an argument for knowing how incumbents respond to 
reform and the ways in which their behaviour can be conditioned and compliance heightened, 
particularly when the object of regulation is a large, dominant, resource rich incumbent and the 
regulator a small resource constrained actor or where local will for limiting this actor is absent. 
Both the incumbents are therefore, shown as initiating similar strategies over periods which 
covered the years leading up to and after the implementation of much of the reform agenda.
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Thus, there has been some change in the tactics used by Eircom (and C&WJ) in 
asserting and protecting its influence vis-a-vis other stakeholders as it moved from the prospect 
to the reality of reform. Thus, both are shown as attempting to warn against the possible adverse 
results of competition, then attempting to delay industry reform. However, as the firm 
recognises the inevitability of reform, it then seeks to direct the content of the reform process 
calling for a staged approach to liberalisation. The introduction of the independent sector 
regulator heralds a new phase in relations within the sector with this actor emerging as the main 
challenge and embodiment of the threats to be faced by the incumbent. Subsequently, the 
incumbent seeks out this actor challenging its authority and legitimacy, a practice, which 
heightens as the uncertainties and reconstruction of the sector is enhanced. This also involves 
the increased use of the courts to challenge the regulator’s legitimacy and rulings, as a means of 
frustrating the activities of other actors. Additionally, this helps to seek clarity in regulation, 
demonstrate its strength and protect its dominance. These activities increase as the uncertainty 
and threats are perceived to increase. As will be shown in Chapters four and five, these then 
evolve into the incumbent’s search for an organisational structure that would best equip it to 
operate in a changing operational environment. Therefore, its re-focus on internal structure can 
be seen as an attempt to enhance its responsiveness to the developments in its operational space 
as opposed to focusing solely on trying to control the actors and developments in this space. It 
has been able to accomplish much of these because of its position of dominance, its size and 
resources, all features of its incumbency and points, which are helpful in explaining the 
sustained dominance of incumbents after reform. Beyond these, it has also benefited from the 
protections received from government as well as from deficiencies in its competitors and IRA.
Additionally, Chapters two and three have collectively indicated that knowledge of the 
actors and issues affecting the incumbent’s behaviour is therefore, an important way of 
strengthening local regulatory institutions, heightening the legitimacy and transparency of 
regulation, ensuring compliance, and for providing the motivation for governments to initiate 
reforms even where there is no political will. The presentation, particularly in Chapter two also 
makes a strong case for a consideration of individual states such as the UK in discussions on
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global regulation and the impact that these have in directing national agendas in neighbouring 
countries. In the Jamaican case, international influence offered an opportunity for blame 
shifting, since the government could call on the agreements made with external multilateral 
agencies and its need to comply with rulings from states such as the US, as rationale for reform 
at the national level.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EMBRACING REGULATION: INTERNAL REORDERING AS A RESPONSE TO 
REGULATORY REFORM IN C&WJ
4.0 Introduction
The firm’s response to regulatory reform has been both internal and external. In the case of the 
latter, the previous chapters depicted the tactics and manoeuvres of incumbent firms in Jamaica 
and Ireland to proactively deal with the advancements in their operational space -  advancements 
brought about by regulatory reform. Emphasis was on the modifications in its relationships, 
including those with line ministers, the independent regulator and competitors. The chapters 
depicted the ways in which regulators in small countries can increase their capacity and tools for 
regulating large dominant firms by increasing the size of the regulatory space as well as the 
compromises, which they sometimes employ in regulating such actors. Whereas the Jamaican 
case demonstrated the role of a powerful resource-rich firm against a small developing country, 
the Irish experience was more about how political forces can act to protect the incumbent 
(which also increases the role of customers). Additionally, the Irish case particularly illustrated 
the way changes in regulation lead to incumbents, identifying new arenas for demonstrating its 
dominance through the legal system.
However, the firm’s response to reform is not only external, but may also be internal -  
organizational -  as it attempts to reorder itself to remain successful in an operational space 
which increasingly became more competitive. Likewise, the internal response to modifications 
to be discussed in this chapter were about the firm’s ambition to modernise as well as its 
obligation to comply with regulation with the pressure of competition (which also increases the 
role of customers) providing further drive for change.
As such, this and the following chapter depict the attempts of incumbents, C&WJ and 
Eircom, as they embrace, or internalise reform as a way of coping with changes in their 
operational environment from within. The focus on internal reform is essentially about going 
beyond the image of the firm as a monolith viewing it inside out. In other words, regulatory 
reform is not only about changes in the relationships and rules in the regulatory space. It has
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also seen the reordering of structure, personnel, internal governance and ethos within the 
regulated incumbent.
More immediately here, attention will be placed on the developments within the 
Jamaican incumbent from the 1990s to the present. However, greater focus will be on the main 
period of regulatory reform 1997-2003 and beyond. This is the case for a number of reasons. 
Prior to this period the firm’s internal activities were not so much about responding to changes 
in regulation since it was the main provider and as noted in Chapter two had little regulatory 
restraint from the state. Additionally, though bypass was an issue for the firm, competition was 
not yet a major factor in so far as state policy prior to the mid 1990s did not appear to support 
such a notion. As noted by Dunn and Gooden, the decision to form a new telecoms Act, 
following the uproar around the firm’s attempt to enhance its exclusivity in the early 90s, 
suggested that, “no significant changes in the direction of competition and further liberalization 
[were] expected in this new legislation”.266
Furthermore, it was not till the late 90s with the change in the Minister and ideology267 
that the threat of competition took on new meaning for C&WJ. It is, therefore, in these later 
years that the firm took more strategic and decisive steps to reform itself internally in order to 
deal with the changes, which had begun to take place in the telecoms market. Finally, and even 
more importantly, it is during this period that it faced its most serious threats.
The chapter highlights the strategies that the firm has adopted internally in its response 
to regulatory reform. It shows how changes in the regulatory environment spurred C&WJ to 
reform its structure, size, the quality and quantity of its personnel and services, modifying its 
internal processes to heighten its ability to relate to its customers. Importantly, too while the 
chapter depicts how these changes and the need to comply with the regulator’s directions
266 Dunn and Gooden (1996: 4). This was to be put on hold, only taking on new vigour in 1999 resulting 
in the 2000 Telecommunications Act.
267 The government had begun to change its view of its role in the economy much in the same way that 
other countries such as the UK and US in the 80s and 90s had stepped back from providing certain 
services directly. The new public management literature, for example, gives some insight into this 
ideological shift in government. See for example, Osbome and Gaebler (1992); Rhodes (1994; 1997); 
Lane (2000); Kettl (2000); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000). This shift was also demonstrated in 
government’s industrial policies (see for example, GoJ 1996).
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resulted in modification of the firm’s modus operandi it also shows how its activities were 
informed by a deeper advancement within the firm of the views and ideology governing or 
validating its operations. Beyond these practical lessons, the presentation also adds to the 
literature on regulation through its depiction of how industry reform can bring on a modernising 
impulse within a former monopolist and thus, how regulators can encourage incumbents to 
improve value and choice for customers by introducing and legitimising competitive pressure 
via regulatory reform on incumbents. The chapter closes with a discussion of the fmdings and 
conclusion.
These findings are important in so far as they depict the choices and options available to 
incumbent firms as they attempt to cope with the shifting rules, relations and other changes, 
which constitute a threat to, established market positions. In so doing, it offers an insight into 
the activities of former monopolists as they attempt to become leaner and more efficient in an 
environment of shifting rules and pressures. Ultimately, the power of such insights is their 
usefulness in informing the design of regulatory reform strategies and institutional mechanisms 
to anticipate and address the pressures that may come from dealing with dominant incumbents. 
The findings also advance an understanding of incumbency and of the creative strategies which 
these actors adopt when they have failed to prevent change, prevent entry or where capture of 
regulators is not feasible. Thus, in spite of its size a large dominant incumbent is able to utilise 
its assets (size, expertise and wealth) to reform itself in line with modifications in its regulatory 
space. Through these, it has been able to maintain its significance.
4.1 Organisational Reform as a Response to Industry Change
Having failed to prevent telecoms reform, faced with the threat of competition and loss of power 
as well as other external threats to its position by 1999, Cable and Wireless was forced to find 
new ways of operating in a redesigned space. The increased openness and transparency 
achieved through the establishment of new institutions (the OUR, the 2000 Act and other 
regulatory guidelines governing behaviour) also limited the ways in which C&WJ, had in the 
past, expressed its power in the sector. As such, certain unilateral decisions that had been seen
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before were less the norm while it was to become increasingly less likely that the firm could 
count on politicians to simply change rules in its favour.268 Growing consumer disenchantment 
with the level of access, coverage, reliability and price by the end of the 1990s269 and the 
potential loss of profits were also to nudge C&WJ to rethink its organisation and operational 
ethos.
It has been aided in this endeavour given the experience and resources it possesses. That 
is, like other incumbents C&WJ is also a large firm with expansive resources and capacity270 
These have enabled it to initiate a number of changes in its operations and organisation that 
might not have been manageable in a smaller firm with less financial resources, skills and 
capacity. The three-year period before full liberalisation, also allowed the firm the time to make 
certain adjustments to prepare it for full competition by 2003. Thus, the firm’s position as an 
incumbent allowed it some room to manoeuvre, in taking the necessary steps to move its 
operations forward. All in all, it is not so much about whether or not these strategies or ways of 
dealing with industry reform were necessarily unique given that these may in one form or 
another embody tactics that may be employed by other firms. Rather, in the context of Jamaican 
telecoms and the experience of incumbents (former monopolies), the extent and pace at which 
these modifications were undertaken was innovative. These reforms marked the extent to which 
the incumbent had shifted in its attitude and approach on how to maintain its position in the 
market as well as how to deal with impending threats in its regulatory space. Following from 
this, visibility, not just in telecoms, but also in the wider communications sector, has become 
more of a competitive advantage.
The prospect and reality of competition ignited a competitive impulse within the 
incumbent, nudging it towards acknowledging the need for a different type of action, one that 
would endow it to function more successfully in a liberalised environment. The resources and 
capacity it possessed as an incumbent and the additional time it had been awarded due to this
268 As had been the case when it had persuaded the government to expand its exclusivity over the sector 
under the old regime.
269 See Brown (2003: 3).
270 See Section 1.3.
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status, allowed the firm to make important adjustments to its operations. The remainder of this 
chapter is dedicated to discussing these reforms. It concludes with an analysis and summary of 
the main arguments. But firstly, a brief review of C&WJ’s internal/organisational operations 
prior to reform will be undertaken in order to allow for a full appreciation of the internal 
reforms, which the firm has undertaken mainly since 1999 and how these have marked C&WJ 
the monopoly from C&WJ the incumbent.
4.1.1 The State of C&W’s Operations Prior to Reform
An outline of the incumbent’s operations prior to reform helps to advance the case of industry 
change as an instigator for internal reform marking this period an important juncture in which 
the firm was forced to reckon with problems that had been glossed over during its monopoly 
years.
Prior to liberalization, the Company had various problems with its service, which was 
beset by frequent unplanned and unexplained breaks, a failing, which even the incumbent was 
willing to accept (C&WJ-AR 1998: 6). One complaint concerned the firm’s slow pace in 
meeting requests for landlines. For instance, in 1990, the number of installed lines was 88,000 
while unmet demand was almost the same as for the installed base (Noguera 1996: 5). An 
annual report from the OUR’s consumer affairs department noted other problems faced by the 
firm. These included:
[SJeveral substantial issues of concern, also including billing matters, that had 
caused customer discontent in the just completed year [that is, 1999]. These 
included disconnections, unavailability o f service, unscheduled interruption 
of service and community-wide issues the most frequent of which was poor 
signalling related to its mobile phone service.
(OUR-CA 2000: 20)
These were compounded by problems of unmet demand; poor service also extended to mobile 
services where credit requirements, the high costs for handsets, and the tariff regime271 meant
271 This was based on a ‘Receiving Party Pay’ principle, which meant that the owner of the handset would 
pay for all incoming calls.
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poorer customers were also denied access (Brown 2003: 4). It was estimated that at the start of 
the liberalisation process C&WJ had over 200,000 outstanding requests for line rentals 
(Interview: Senior official, C&WJ, Jamaica, March 20, 2007). Figure 4.1 gives further 
indication of the nature of complaints. For instance, in the 1999-2000 reporting year, the OUR 
noted that 21% of complaints concerned the unavailability of service, with unscheduled 
interruptions receiving 22%; billing complaints were the most frequently reported issue (28%). 
Overall, complaints about C&WJ’s mobile service constituted around 22% of the total number 
of complaints reported against the firm (OUR-CA 2000: 20). Frustration with the slow pace in 
addressing these issues has since been given as an explanation for the rush to take up the 
services of its main competitor, Digicel when competition began in 2001.272
Figure 4.1: C&WJ Distribution of Customer Concerns -  1999/2000
21%
□  Billing Matters ■  Disconnections
| G Unavailability of Svce. C Unschd. Intrpt. Of Svce.
■  Community-wide Issues. 1  All Others
Source: Annual Report (OUR-CA 2000: 20).
Customer dissatisfaction went beyond simply being a concern of its existing customer 
base. As one interviewee observed, telecoms and utilities in general tended to be an emotive
272 Interview: Senior executive at C&WJ, Kinston, March 20, 2007. This happened even where the 
incumbent’s rates were lower than Digicel’s.
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issue for citizens.273 The number of complaints reaching the various regulators on the cusp of 
reform underlined the extent of dissatisfaction against the firm vis-a-vis other service 
providers.274 This marked what was becoming an intense love-hate relationship between the 
Company and the public. And so, even though the sector had grown after privatisation the social 
outcomes of the first stage of reforms had still not been met.275
Issues that the firm had failed to deal with successfully prior to reform were thus, to 
become more pronounced (for example access to fixed lines) by the end of the 1990s to early 
2000, as reform made these issues more pertinent. This was especially so since customers could 
now go elsewhere to meet their needs.
4.1.2 Network and Infrastructure Upgrades
Following from the above, one of the first areas to be addressed by the firm was the level of 
access to telephone lines. With the recognition that competition was around the comer, the firm 
had, from 1996, significantly stepped up its drive to increase its customer base by moving ahead 
with the issuing of telephone lines to customers.276 This is seen in the figures for 1996-1998 in 
Figure 4.2, where though experiencing a steady increase over the years, this period was to see 
rapid growth in the number of lines installed. Though the pace slowed in 1999 and 2000 this 
was to pick up once again in 2001. Here its installation rate increased by over 100% as it sought 
to increase its customer base. The rate at which the firm engaged in this task was even noted by 
the OUR, who described its efforts here as being, “quite dramatic compared to prior periods” 
(OUR 2001: 10).277
273 Interview: Current Manager of C&WJ Foundation who also has 30 years experience with the 
incumbent, Kingston, Jamaica, March 21 2007.
274 The majority of complaints lodged with the FTC against utilities companies in 1999 were also made 
against the incumbent (see OUR 2001: 9-11).
275 See notes 92 and 93. This was visible in the low level of teledensity on the island.
276 Thus, the suggestion is not that the attempts to improve infrastructure and service were completely 
new. Rather, the pace and extent of these moves only increased with the push provided by reform, 
indicating the value of liberalisation as a strategy for forcing reforms in large dominant firms.
277 The decline in these years could be explained by the increasing uncertainties in the telecoms market 
and the conflict between the minister and the firm, which also began in 1998. This shows the possible 
effect that market uncertainties and conflict between regulator and their charges can have on the latter’s 
willingness to commit to future outlays in the respective industry. Furthermore, this decline may also be
130
Figure 4.2: Increase in the Num ber of M ain Lines 1993-2001
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Source: C&WJ (Various Annual Reports 1998-2001).
But in spite of this increase, since 1998 telephone access remained unchanged. Indeed, 
the obligation to increase the number of main lines was one of the pledges the firm had made to 
the government in Section 7 of the 1999 HoA. The incumbent failed to deliver on its promise 
instead reinterpreting its obligations to fit more closely with its desire to focus more on the area 
where it felt it needed to enhance capacity and competitiveness even more, its mobile service 
(Twomey 2005: 7). Thus, while increasing its offering of telephone lines the firm also adopted 
the strategy of simultaneously extending coverage of mobile services as a way of meeting the 
unmet demand in fixed landlines (C&WJ-AR 1998: 12; Twomey 2005: 7). This shift marked 
the firm’s attempt to bolster its coverage in mobile services, given that this was to be the area in 
which it would first experience significant competition.
Thus, attempts to realise improvements in service standard and quality since the late 
1990s were to see network improvement becoming a more central feature in the firm’s 
operation. Consequently, it installed six new cellular sites in the main city of Kingston and 
surrounding areas while two new sites were installed in Montego Bay, the second city between
put down to the shifting emphasis in the firm as emphasis on upgrading its mobile infrastructure may 
have also caused some of the shifts in the level of fixed lines installed.
1997 and 1998. New switches were installed to bolster capacity across the island.278 It also 
began transforming its network from an analogue to digital system in 1998 to increase the 
reliability of its mobile service (C&WJ-AR 1998: 5 and 6).279 Emphasis was therefore, piaffed 
not only on increasing coverage but also on advancing technology and capacity (Green 2004) 
with Erickson Latin America being commissioned in 2000 to assist it in its bid to improve and 
expand the mobile network (C&WJ-AR 2001: 10) 280 A fibre-optic ring was also built around 
the island, while the international satellite system was upgraded (C&WJ-AR 2000: 5, 10). These 
steps were to ensure that the Company’s network was more robust and efficient.
Rewards were to come from these efforts as it witnessed growth in take-up in these 
areas, which helped to offset some of the costs of its restructuring exercise as well as help ease 
the overall effect of income loss from the renegotiation of the international settlement rates.281 
Thus, taking advantage of the potential for growth and augmenting revenues lost from the 
opening up of the sector the firm began to enhance its broadband capacity by commissioning a 
high-speed access node in order to increase efficiency and use of the Internet (C&WJ-AR 1999: 
5). The Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) network was also expanded to increase 
availability across the Island. This offering was to become one of the firm’s more popular 
services (C&WJ-AR 1999: 12). Improvements in the Internet and data segments of its 
operations brought a 100% increase in revenues in these areas by 2002 while its mobile 
operations also brought increased earnings in that same reporting year (C&WJ-AR 2002: 5). 
The process for making collect calls locally was also simplified through automations. 
International roaming and wireless Internet access were also introduced in 2000 (C&WJ-AR 
1999: 6).
278 Continued improvements in C&WJ’s mobile network were to see it attaining a 47% improvement in 
the quality of its voice channel by 2002 and a 57% improvement in cell sites across the island (C&WJ- 
AR 2002: 6).
279 With 100% of the network digitalized in December 2000 (C&WJ-AR 2001: 6).
280 Green (2004).
281 Indeed, the continuing losses from international call settlement had provided an incentive for C&WJ to 
step into gear to improve its network competence and competitiveness in the local market. See the 
company’s annual report for 2002 (C&WJ-AR 2005: 5).
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The growth of technology in the communications field was to have a marked impact on 
the firm’s ability to modernise its operations.282 For instance, this was to allow C&WJ to reduce 
its holdings, department size and personnel, given that it no longer needed the extensive 
equipment and space it used under monopoly (Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, March 20, 
2007). However, while the technology made some of the improvements practical and easier it is 
the reality that many of these developments in communications technology were not new and 
had been used to justify reform in other countries (such as the UK) over a decade earlier. It is 
suggested here that it was the reality of regulatory reform, which saw the firm’s circumstances 
changing enough to make it mindful of the need to utilise the existing technology to enhance its 
business.
The drive for greater capacity and more advanced infrastructure also saw the firm 
stepping up investments as shown in Figure 4.3.283 Nonetheless, in spite of the increases 
witnessed over the years, spending had declined briefly in 1998, then rising slowly in 1999 
(Figure 4.3). Interestingly, this decline also matched the years during which the firm arguably 
experienced its greatest uncertainty, given the growing contention between itself and 
government. However, expenditure was to take off rapidly again in 2000 when it began making 
much more serious attempts at improving its infrastructure and performance and then again in 
2002 after a brief decline in 2001.284 This dip in investments also indicates the impact of 
uncertainties and turbulence in the regulatory space on incumbents. Namely, it may choose to 
reduce investments in the sector, especially at the height of such uncertainties until it receives 
some clarity or certainty as to the prospects of its operations. This again indicates the 
importance of accommodation and conciliation from regulators when dealing with entrenched 
actors. Beyond this, the increase in expenditure is significant in demonstrating the seriousness 
with which the firm viewed its need to prepare for competition. This allowed C&WJ to address
282 For a discussion of some of these developments since the 1980s and their impact on the 
communications sector, see Hall (1993: 78-85).
283 For instance, capital spent was to move from around US$70 million to US$100 million by 1999 
(Brown 2003: 3).
284 See note 276. The fortunes of the firm’s main shareholder (C&W pic) had been adversely affected by 
the failures in other areas of its global business forcing retrenchment and a re-examination of its 
operations (note 433).
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some of the main concerns with its mobile service (discussed earlier) with much of the 
investment being in this area (C&WJ-AR 1999: 12).285
Figure 4.3: Trend in C & W J's Capital Expenditure 1993-2004 (J$Million)
Capital Expenditure ---------2 per. Mov. Avg. (Capital Expenditure)
7,000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Compiled from various C&WJ Annual Reports 1992-2003.
This increased spending on infrastructure for its mobile service also suggests the extent 
to which the firm had been behind in efforts to deliver this service at acceptable levels. Indeed, 
this is corroborated by members both within the local and head office of the C&W Group who 
noted in various interviews that the commercial focus in the 90s had not been on mobile 
services but rather on Internet.286 As such, the level of investment that had been necessary to 
keep the firm’s service at an expected level had not been forthcoming. However, faced with the
285 C&WJ was therefore, intent on using its three-year grace period to enhance its competitiveness ahead 
of the introduction of full competition.
286 Interviews: Former senior staff at C&WJ, Jamaica, November 20, 2006; July 27, 2004; senior 
executive at C&WJ, Jamaica, March 20, 2007; present and former members of the senior regulatory team 
at C&W pic, London, February 22, 2007; March 26, 2007.
prospect of competition in cellular telephony at the end of 1999, the firm began increasing 
access to mobile telephones (see C&WJ-AR 1998: 5). By 2000 it had been noted that the firm’s 
initiatives to raise its stakes in this area had seen it giving more access than its infrastructure 
could support (OUR 2001: 10). Ironically, the frequent disruptions in service caused by this 
haste were only to help in nudging more customers to its competitor’s network when they did 
begin operating in 2000 and 2001. And so, by the end of 2001, the firm had been “caught out” 
by the pace at which competition had taken off in this segment of the market.287 Network 
improvements, therefore, marked an attempt by the firm to increase service and customer base 
ahead of full liberalisation in 2003. By addressing some of the more severe and longstanding 
complaints in the sector (e.g. access), the incumbent aimed to repair its image of being 
unresponsive and slow.
This section has shown how the threat of competition provided the push for C&WJ to 
initiate moves to improve its network. As shown in Figure 4.3, the majority of this increase was 
carried out up to 2003 when full competition began, again indicating the value of the extra three 
years in allowing the firm to prepare for competition.
4.1.3 Service Diversification and Improvements in Customer Care
The increased attention to infrastructure and network quality were seen as a means of increasing 
revenue options as the firm sought to diversify its operations away from a strict focus on 
traditional fixed services. The network improvements described above thus, not only related to 
service quality, but also allowed for an expansion in the number of activities, which could be 
accommodated on the firm’s infrastructure. These improvements also related to the firm’s 
ability to expand its services as well as to improve customer satisfaction. Through these 
improvements in infrastructure C&WJ signalled one of the more significant criteria for success
287 The provision of service to rural communities had also been an issue over the years and as such, this 
was one of the areas in which the firm sought to expand its service (C&WJ-AR 2001: 7).
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in the new environment - customer satisfaction.288 Its customer service ethos has subsequently 
undergone considerable amendments as it attempts to pacify the public and its customers.
As noted earlier, one of the more prominent complaints against the firm was its level of 
customer service; a problem, which, as shown in Chapter three, also plagued Eircom.289 More 
emphasis has subsequently been placed on achieving greater quality in customer care and 
service options as a means of enhancing the C&WJ brand. This has seen customer service 
becoming a more essential aspect of the firm’s operations from as early as 1997, when it 
stepped up outreach programmes aimed at improving the way it was perceived by the public.290 
As noted by a representative of the firm,
the only way we can stay ahead in markets.. .is through effective sales 
and marketing and really understanding [that] it is the relationship with the 
customer which is key to everything.. .it may sound a little clich6 to 
say that but it is true. 91
One of the key responses to the move away from its network has been to focus more on 
improving the quality and variety of its services (Interview: Market Researcher, C&WJ, 
Kingston, Jamaica, March 22, 2007). An articulation of its customer service approach was the 
introduction of different price plans to suit a variety of usage patterns, this in an attempt to 
increase products and payment options for its clients. This was reasoned as a move to lighten 
the impact of rebalancing on customers (C&WJ-AR 1999: 4 and 5). These include the low user 
payment plans, which were designed to accommodate different categories of customers, in both 
landline and mobile services. The Low-User Package introduced in 1999 saw a 50% reduction 
in line rental rate for customers on this plan (C&WJ 1999: 5). This was extended by 2001, at 
which point a total of seven cellular payment plans were in existence contrasting with the one
288 As one of its chairs noted in 2002, “our success will be based on our determination to maintain our 
long-term customer value propositioning” (C&WJ-AR 2002: 4).
289 Also see C&WJ-AR 1998: 6.
290 This programme was extended in 1998 across the island and saw managers and other company 
officials actively locating themselves in public spaces to talk to the public and introduce the firm’s 
products. See C&WJ-AR 1998:11-12.
91 Interview: senior member of regulatory team at C&W pic, London, February 22, 2007.
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which existed prior to 1999.292 These have seen customers having more choice as well as 
opportunities for reducing call charges based on their usage.293
Flexibility has not only been attained in service packages and charges but also in the 
area of bill payment. As such, an automated bill payment scheme (Easi-pay) was introduced in 
2001. Through this scheme customers have been able to pay telephone bills over the phone 
(C&WJ-AR 2002: 7). More online payment schemes have also been introduced. The number of 
payment points has been increased while there was also a move to per second billing for mobile 
calls in 2002, moving away from per minute charging. Its main competitor, Digicel, had in fact 
adopted this approach first, indicating the direct effect of competition on the firm’s strategies 
(Thompson 2002b). In accordance with Johnstone’s observation on dominant firms in industrial 
restructuring, C&WJ also began partnering with other businesses to carry out its operations 
more efficiently (1999: 380). For example, circa 1998, the firm joined with local banking 
institutions and businesses in order to allow customers to pay telephone bills through the latter’s 
branches (C&WJ-AR 1998: 6; 1999: 6). Direct debiting was also introduced in that same 
period. These moves were significant in reducing the time customers spent queuing in the firm’s 
branches while allowing it to close some of its offices across the island (and reduce operational 
costs) (C&WJ-AR 1999: 12). In other instances, existing spaces within which the firm 
interacted with the public were improved to give a more friendly face to the public (Ibid). Thus, 
customers were now to play a more significant role in C&WJ’s operations, with more effort 
being focused on increasing customer satisfaction.
Whereas service provision under the old regime was premised simply on C&WJ 
maintaining an “efficient” telephone service with not much direction as to what this meant the 
firm has since liberalisation, been keen on making specific guarantees to its customers. Its
292 See OUR (2001: 26).
293 This attention to customer care also had another practical motivation. One former employee of the 
company noted for instance, that the first year of rebalancing had seen the average customer bill moving 
from around J$ 1,000 to around J$3,000 with an increase in disconnections in 2000 (Interview: Former 
employee of C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica, June, 2001). It was therefore, in the firm’s interest to ensure 
customers were offered more ways of managing their usage, reducing the extent to which the firm would 
be hit by non-payment. Additionally, the growing availability of mobile service as an alternative to 
landlines provided incentives to seek ways of reducing the risk of customers giving up their landlines and 
switching to competitors’ network.
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service level agreements have been among the improvements made.294 Such promises have 
subsequently seen the incumbent offering the most competitive rates to its mobile customers 
(Interview: Market Researcher C&WJ, March 22, 2007). Further, in a gesture, which also 
indicated the reorientation in the firm’s operational ethos, services that had previously been 
offered freely, were now to incur a fee. These included directory assistance, which for the first 
time in 2002 saw customers paying J$10, this as the firm moved towards finding ways of 
improving its resources given losses from the decline of its international profits (see note 
134).295
Whereas complaints of poor service or abuse of dominance against the Company had 
increased in the late 90s, these had been reduced by the first year of liberalization. For example, 
of the major utilities (including, water and electricity) regulated by the OUR, 41.7% or 647 
complaints were registered against the firm at the end of March 1999. By March of the 
following year this had been reduced to a third (324), with this reducing even further to 27% or 
206 in 2001 (OUR 2001: 9-11). This can be construed as tangible evidence that the Company 
had adopted better management practices successfully strengthening its customer orientation 
profile. In this way it has proved that it is able to make modifications to suit the specifications of 
any market -  closed or open. The impact of regulatory reform in opening the way for 
competition, which allowed a greater role for customers, can be seen. Arguably, the desire to 
become more competitive and the threat of customer retreat provided even more motivation for 
service improvement than any direct instruction on customer service may have had on the 
incumbent.
Its efforts to increase the quality and variety of service saw it advancing its ownership 
over important areas in the sector. However, increases were more strategic than in the case of 
the Irish incumbent where expansion was more wide-scale and counter-intuitive to the efforts to 
reduce costs and increase efficiency (See Chapter five). As such, C&WJ’s undertakings and 
advances were more measured and fewer in this instance. One of these moves to expand its
294 See note 86.
295 Thompson (2002a).
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operations and spread its tentacles throughout the sector was its decision to extend its control 
over Jamaica Digiport International (JDI), taking full ownership of this subsidiary in 1999 (see 
C&WJ-AR 1999: 34; 2000: 24).296 Extending its ownership over this Company was thus, to see 
the incumbent controlling one of the main gateways for competition on the island, further 
increasing dependence on C&WJ’s network.
These have also helped to introduce more flexibility in the incumbent’s processes, 
particularly in the way it interfaces with clients. In so doing, it has been able to position itself in 
the market as a dominant force in spite of the introduction of rules, which challenged its security 
and privileges to an end. These also have had the effect of improving customer service. The 
emphasis on quality and variety ultimately related to the desire to increase its competitiveness 
with regulatory reform having paved the way for this new emphasis.
The reforms discussed so far were largely related to network or infrastructural 
improvements. Others relate to improvements in service options and customer care, suggesting 
that incumbents can be responsive and are able to adapt to change. The discussion further shows 
the ways in which C&WJ adjusts to reform, namely by addressing areas of its operations that it 
had been less willing to update prior to industry reform. These include its capacity and the 
introduction of more choice in its offerings. In so doing, the sections have also shown the effect 
of the reform of industry rules and structure as incentives for an incumbent to improve its 
network and services in a way it had not been willing to do in the past - neither at such rapid 
pace nor to the extent described.
4.2 Organisational Restructuring
There are also those strategies, which relate more specifically to the incumbent’s organisational 
structure (e.g. personnel, management) as well as its image. These make the case for 
considering large regulated firms as flexible, adaptable actors in the regulatory space. Like the 
efforts described above the reforms to be discussed were aimed at improving services,
296 See OECD (2003: 9). This had been established to provide information-based services such as data 
entry and telemarketing to businesses, particularly free zones and offshore firms operating on the island 
(C&WJ-AR 2007; ToJ 1988: 4).
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introducing more variety and competitiveness and in the end help the incumbent to deal with 
change. But whereas these former efforts related mainly to network and service the reforms in 
this case were more generally aimed at addressing issues relating to management, organisational 
responsiveness, cost reduction, reshaping the operational culture with downsizing and out­
sourcing becoming important strategies.297
To respond to the poor customer service affecting the firm and as a way of preparing 
itself for competition, C&WJ initiated steps to improve its interface with its customers from 
1998. This involved some amount of internal reorganisation and restructuring implicit in the 
creation of a Customer Service Division in 1998. The firm was to quickly realise gains from this 
revitalized approach to customer service. By the end of that year for example, it had succeeded 
in reducing the time it took for customers to pay bills moving from an average of 45 to 10 
minutes.298 This was achieved in nearly 90% of its business offices (C&WJ-AR 1998: 6). By the 
end of the following reporting year, this had been reduced to approximately 6 minutes (C&WJ- 
AR 1999: 5). A call centre was also built in order to shrink its response time to customer queries 
(C&WJ-AR 1998: 6). A second call centre was commissioned in 2000 resulting in a bigger and 
more centralised customer care unit (C&WJ-AR 2000: 5). The aim was to reduce the time and 
increase the ease of conducting business. C&WJ subsequently realised an increase in its 
response speed after it managed to reach a 98% answer rate to calls coming into the Centre with 
90% of these being answered in 20 seconds or less (C&WJ-AR 1999: 12).
Information and knowledge of the market also took on a new role in the firm’s 
operations as it sought to increase capacity to gather and assess market information to guide its 
operations. The Integrated Communications Services Division which was created between 
1998-1999 was for instance, charged with coordinating activities in data and new media services 
such as, email and Internet (C&WJ-AR 1999: 4).299 A Business Intelligence Unit was also
297 Much of this has been covered in the New Public Management literature (see note 267). This, in much 
the same as governments have been said to have trimmed down and shifted their tactics for managing and 
governing economies in the 80s and 90s.
98 This was still not enough to prevent complaints, as shown in Figure 4.1.
299 The retail functions of this division were later given to the Retail Services Division in 2000 (C&WJ- 
AR 2001: 6).
140
established to monitor the evolving needs of the market. The unit gathered and monitored 
customer information through the use of tools such as surveys. These focused on getting 
feedback on the firm’s products, brand awareness and perceptions relating to the firm (C&WJ- 
AR 2001: 7). Here C&WJ sought to minimise risks through increased forecasting and 
assessment of its operational space with market research becoming a more prominent feature of 
its operations (Interview: market researcher at C&WJ, March 21, 2007). In particular, this 
allowed it to access information to aid the design of its programmes in a more calculating way, 
increase its ability to forecast demand and assess the effectiveness of advertising campaigns 
(Ibid.).
This improved form of engagement with the public was extended through the addition 
of focus groups and seminars, which have helped it to increase the visibility of its products and 
services (C&WJ-AR 2002: 6). As such, the value of information and the way the company 
actually collects this information has changed in recent years. While making it more difficult for 
the firm to control what was happening in the market, these efforts increased the need to collect 
market data as a means of managing and controlling emerging risks using these data to inform 
the way it organised and resourced itself in a post-reform era.
Organisational restructuring was to continue into 2000 with the creation of a number of 
departments and teams at the end of that year. These all represented the streamlining of various 
departments and the amalgamation of various tasks that had formerly spanned a number of 
different departments, representing the downsizing that Johnstone highlighted as a response to 
reform (1999: 380). These departments included firstly, a Network Services Division (NSD) 
with responsibility for coordinating engineering functions within the organisation. Through this 
the firm began transforming its network to improve its IP (Internet Protocol) and data base 
services. A Customer Support Group was also formed within this Division, its responsibility 
extending over all ‘customer-facing’ activities within the NSD. This group was charged with 
giving more focused attention to satisfying customer needs (C&WJ-AR 2001: 5).
A significant aspect of the firm’s new customer-focused regime was the establishment 
of a Retail Services Division in 2000, created to improve relations between the firm and its
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clients. Among its responsibilities was the development of new standards and services that 
could be delivered by the firm, while consolidating retail activities previously disparate (C&WJ- 
AR 2001). Finally, a Risk Management and Revenue Assurance Group was established in 2000. 
This would effectively serve as a revenue protection body, securing the firm’s assets and 
business operations against potential threats or uncertainties. This helped C&WJ to reduce its 
size and streamline by reducing its holdings in fixed assets acquired in previous years. For 
example, as the company sought to reduce its property, the value of leased assets moved from 
J$19,781 million in 1999 to J$14,967 million in 2000 (C&WJ-AR 2000: 29). Indeed, these 
measures represented the increased uncertainty of operating in a post-monopoly era and the 
incumbent’s attempt to exercise some control over these by increasing its ability to monitor 
developments in the market and ensure that its operations evolved accordingly.
4.2.1 Increase in Internal Regulatory Capacity
Whereas the firm had ignored the OUR in its early years, its relationship with this actor and 
with regulation was to change significantly from 2000. This change was to be mirrored not just 
in its increased dealings with this actor as seen in Chapter two but importantly in the firm’s 
internal reorientation as well. As such, one of the most significant additions to C&WJ’s 
structure and personnel in 2000 was the establishment of a Legal, Regulatory and Policy 
Division (LRPD) (C&WJ-AR 2001: 7). The Division was to, “proactively participate in 
deliberations on Government policy matters that may have an impact, directly or indirectly, on 
C&WJ’s operations” (C&WJ-AR 2001: 5). As suggested in Chapter three, the Irish incumbent 
in maintaining its visibility in the sector has also adopted a similar tactic. This adds strength to 
the argument suggesting that the firm has now placed more stake on the strength of legal 
persuasion as opposed to informality and direct routes to the minister.
Prior to regulatory reform the firm could be said to have been a more “engineering led 
business”.300 Thus, even though the firm had a corporate lawyer prior to 1998, there had not 
been much emphasis on enlarging this capacity internally prior to liberalisation since expertise
300 Interview: Senior Regulatory staff at C&W pic, London, February 22, 2007.
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could be hired from outside the firm (Interview: senior executive at C&WJ, Kingston, March 
20, 2007). Legal and regulatory affairs were thus, not necessarily seen as an important part of 
the firm’s strategic planning. Legal and regulatory affairs only came in for attention where 
necessary. However, the establishment of this division marked recognition of the increasing 
relevance of legal and regulatory expertise.301 With the move towards regulatory reform, this 
area became one of the “number one value driving issue” with which the firm had to contend 
from the late 1990s.302
Thus, the LRPD has emerged as a result of a number of movements in the telecoms 
sector. The establishment of this Division has been influenced by the renegotiation of sector 
rules and subsequently, a greater degree of oversight since the late 1990s. These have meant that 
regulation has taken on a new value within the firm’s operations. So from having one lawyer on 
staff, the incumbent has since taken on approximately nine lawyers in the LRPD with additional 
capacity still being secured externally. 303 The LRPD was charged with participating in 
discussions affecting policy, directly or indirectly and ensuring that the firm keeps up with the 
increasing legal requirements brought on from regulatory reform (C&WJ-AR 2001: 5).
The firm’s future is also now more dependent on the quality of its regulatory team. So 
much so, that the head of the regulatory division not just in C&WJ but the wider C&W group is 
now a part of the senior management team (Interview: Senior Regulatory staff, C&W pic, 
London February 22, 2007). As a consequence, the firm is now “armed to the teeth” with 
technical and regulatory expertise to provide effective oversight of the firm’s businesses and 
monitor the rules in the sector (Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, Kingston, March 20, 2007). 
Regulation has since become one of the top priorities in the firm moving from being a side 
issue, buried under other departments to having its own place within the firm’s organizational 
structure.
301 This was substantiated by the then minister for telecoms, who also noted that there had been a shift 
away from a focus on technology, to the legal arrangements governing the sector (Interview: then 
Minister of telecoms, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005).
302 Interview: Former member of the senior regulatory team at C&W pic, March 26, 2007.
303 As will be shown in Chapter six C&WJ has also benefited from skills in the regulatory expertise of its 
head office in London.
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Demonstrated here was the increasing relevance that the external environment was 
having in re-ordering the firm’s priorities and outlook, internally. As the number of rules and 
claims on the firm have increased, so too has the firm’s requirement of legal and technical 
expertise. The firm has had to relate to more actors, including the regulator and entrants as well 
as, draw up agreements (e.g. RIO) by which entrants will access its network. The culture within 
the company has, therefore, changed with gentlemen’s agreement being replaced by legally 
binding documents. Furthermore, increase in the size of the legal and regulatory Department is 
also related to the number of legal challenges, which have increased against the Company over 
the years and as it also challenged others including the government.304 As such, the need to 
comply with regulation has necessitated the increase in internal legal and regulatory expertise as 
much as this has been about the firm’s ability to police the sector to ensure that the activities of 
entrants do not contravene the legal rights and privileges which C&WJ has as the incumbent 
(e.g. bypass).
This expansion may at first glance appear inconsistent when placed against the 
continued downsizing exercises of the firm given that numbers are being increased even while 
overall personnel size is being reduced. More than that though, is the demonstration of the 
firm’s will in shifting the balance in internal skills and capacity away from areas that are archaic 
or that have been muted by competition. Instead, regulatory reform has necessitated new skills 
and competencies in areas such as regulation and marketing indicating the shifting demands and 
preoccupation within the firm.305
This heightened preoccupation with regulation and regulatory reform is also 
demonstrated in the Company’s annual reports. These underscored the modifications in the 
reality of the firm’s approach and preoccupation over the years. Policy and regulation and the
304 These have been discussed in Chapter two.
305 The heightened relevance of legal and technical expertise has not only been felt by C&WJ but on other 
actors as well with smaller operators viewing the incumbent’s capacity here as a threat. Nonetheless, as 
has been shown others such as Infochannel, though small, have been willing to make a show of strength 
in this department. However, the significant difficulty in all these is that C&WJ has been able to retain a 
full time and sizeable legal team. Up to 2005, its competitor, Digicel had one person who was in charge 
of regulatory affairs though it was also willing and able to outsource what legal and technical expertise it 
needed (Interview: Head of regulation at Digicel, Kingston, Jamaica 2005).
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impact of these on the firm were ignored in former reports. Since 1998, however there has been 
growing coverage of the subjects.306 The change in the firm, consequently seen in its reporting 
mimics the evolution in the national debate taking place in the sector, again demonstrating the 
impact of the external changes on the firm’s internal mission and organisation. As such, the 
reports have been keen to point out the impact that the changing regulatory regime both 
nationally and internationally were having on its relations with regulators as well as the impact 
of these on internal structure and capabilities (C&WJ-AR 1998: 5).
4.2.2 Personnel Reforms
Further, with the creation of new Departments at the end of 2000 and ongoing restructuring, the 
firm has managed to reduce its staff complement in order to reduce its overall costs and improve 
efficiency, even while increasing numbers in areas such as regulation. Thanks to a number of 
redundancies during the main adjustment years of 1999-2002, staff numbers declined by 1,100 
(Table 4.1).
However, as the figures show, this type of modification did not end there, as personnel 
size was further revised downwards by 450 in 2004, as the firm continued to experience 
uncertainty. The continued downward movement of personnel corresponds with the firm’s 
search for an appropriate staff compliment to maximise efficiency and savings as will also be 
seen in Ireland. Overall, the firm has moved from employing over 4,500 prior to liberalisation, 
to 3,207 in 2001, 1,694 in 2005 and 1,300 in 2007 (C&WJ-AR 2001: 23; 2005: 30; Interview: 
Senior executive at C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica, March 20, 2007; Edwards 2001).
306 See for example, C&WJ 1998; 2000.
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Table 4.1: Staff R eduction in C&W J 1998-2004
Year Redundancy
1999 230
2000 *
2001 297
2002 608
2003 60
2004 450
Source: C&WJ Annual Reports 1999-2004 and Jamaica Gleaner February 18, 2004.
Key: * Figures unavailable.
A fundamental component o f the downsizing programme has been the turn towards 
contracting or outsourcing, especially o f those services that were not necessarily directly related 
to telecoms provision.307 Since 2000, more activities that had been carried out in-house were to 
be hived off, including the wiring o f customer premises (C&WJ-AR 2001: 7). Much o f  its fleet 
o f vehicles was also sold and its garage department slashed (Interview: Senior executive at 
C&WJ-AR, March 20, 2007). Contracting out allowed the firm to continue reducing the number 
o f processes and tasks carried out in house, simultaneously lessening the need to sustain the 
number o f staff that it had under monopoly. In so doing, it could concentrate on those activities 
more essential to its operations and competitiveness.
Through the firm’s intervention, staff made redundant was later retained by some o f the 
new companies to whom the incumbent had out sourced its services (C&WJ-AR 2001: 7). The 
approach to downsizing was governed by the desire to lessen dislocation among staff that had 
been made redundant. But even with the reduction in the size o f its staff, C&WJ remains one o f
307 Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica, March 20, 2007.
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the largest employers on the island (Interview: Senior executive at C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica, 
March 20, 2 0 0 7 )308
The effect o f the uncertainties since the beginning o f sector reform is not only depicted 
in the downward movement of staff and contracting out but is also mirrored in the pattern of 
changes in the firm’s senior management (Table 4.2). From 1991-1998, C&WJ had the same 
chairman in the form o f Mayer Matalon, the man credited for having successfully negotiated for 
the government in 1987 (Interview: Former senior staff at C&WJ, January 6, 2005). But then as 
shown in table 4.2, the position o f Company chair was to change a total o f four times from 1998 
to 2000.
Table 4.2: Company Chairmen of C&WJ
Chair From To
Mayer Matalon 1989 1998
Carl Grivner 1998 1999
Donald Reed 1999 2000
Robert Lerwill 2000 2003
Leonardo de Barros 2003 2006
Rodney Davis 2006 2007
Phil Green 2007 Present
Source: C&WJ Annual Reports 1998 -  2007.
The composition o f the firm’s Directors was also to change frequently due to retirement, 
terminations and resignations between 1998 and 2002 (see Table 4 .3 ) .309 The number o f 
Directorial posts also declined from an average o f 14 prior to 2000 to about 10 since 
representing the further reduction in size.
308 Indeed, in a population of 2.7 million 1,300 direct jobs as well as indirect employment through out­
sourcing makes the firm a significant contributor to the Jamaican economy.
309 Also see Observer (2001a; 2001b); and even later -  Observer (20003b; 2003c).
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Table 4.3: Number of Directors Serving C&WJ 1997-2006
Period Number of 
Directors
Number of 
Resignations
1997-1998 14 3
1998-1999 15 5
1999-2000 14 6
2000-2001 10 1
2001-2002 9 0
2002-2003 10 2
2003-2004 10 1
2004-2005 10 2
2005-2006 11 2
Source: C&WJ Annual Reports 1998-2005.
The resignations from the board in the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 period underscored the 
internal turbulence the firm had experienced during these years as it attempted to remodel itself 
in the face o f threats to its position and also as it sought to locate the skills and competencies 
that would help it to move forward. Again 1998-2000 (Table 4.3) reflected the difficulties faced 
by the incumbent in the regulatory space. As noted by one interviewee, the firm had not always 
been successful in getting the right mix o f leadership and staff quality in the period immediately 
following liberalisation (Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, Kingston, March 20, 2007). The 
levelling off in the post 2000 period (Table 4.3) suggests that the firm was beginning to get this 
balance right. The change in senior management was therefore, informed by the need to secure 
the experiences and individuals more aware o f the need for change and competition in order to 
assist C&WJ to shrug o ff its monopoly outlook (Ibid.).
This point is also substantiated in changes in the skills set o f its senior team over these 
years. One o f the first and more obvious shifts, and one that has been dealt with in more detail 
in this chapter, was the growth o f its in house cadre o f legal and regulatory expertise with this 
eventually gaining prominence by being placed in a separate department. The background o f its 
senior staff has become more varied, with personnel not necessarily from a telecommunications
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or engineering background.310 Rather, skills, such as sales and marketing, areas outside the 
traditional focus of the company have become more important (Interview: Senior executive, 
C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica, March 20, 2007).
This shift in preoccupation was made even more explicit when three members of the 
management team who had been with the company since its early years, were replaced in 
2001.311 This was done in order to facilitate the entry of individuals with more specific 
experience and skill in customer care, marketing and sales. Such a practice was in line with the 
reorientation in the firm’s strategies, specifically its view of customer service and skilful 
marketing as areas of competitive advantage over newcomers in a post-liberalised regime. This 
trend was not always supported universally throughout the ranks of senior management.312 
Consequently, the team leading the firm in 1998 was not the same that emerged when the 
liberalisation process was completed in 2003 with a total of 11 leaving the incumbent between 
1998-2000 (Table 4.3).313 These have been among the more obvious alterations in the make-up 
of skills and competencies since reform, as C&WJ seeks to “create a better alignment between 
the market segments that are emerging and the relevant expertise available within the 
organisation” (C&WJ-AR 2002: 6).
Restructuring in the early years of adjustment not only modified management structure 
in terms of skills but also saw a reduction in hierarchy (C&WJ-AR 1999: 5). This process was 
extended through to 2002 when, through downsizing and convergence, the firm had six senior 
managers, whereas in 1998 there were nine. This was again to climb314 but even so, this 
indicated a constant search for the right skills and organisational structure to meet the needs of 
the firm and to equip it to face the uncertainties brought on by operating in a space characterised 
by a mix of new rules, actors and customs. It is within this context as well that some positions
310 This was revealed from a review of the skills and experiences of most of its existing board members 
and senior executives. See C&WJ-AR (2006 : 6-11).
311 See note 309.
3,2 Ibid.
313 Only one of the senior management team members with the company in the early 1990s was still on 
hand in 2006 (C&WJ-AR 1997-2006; corroborated by an interview with a senior executive from C&WJ 
Kingston, March 20, 2007).
3,4 C&WJ-AR (1998-2006).
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had experienced frequent shifts throughout the main reform years (1998-2002) as shown in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Even more, whereas company management and board members have been 
mainly foreign nationals, this has shifted since 1999 with more nationals heading up such
315posts.
As hierarchy has diminished, emphasis on results and delivery has also heightened with 
managers having more responsibility for performance. Thus, with the frightening pace at which 
its main competitor, Digicel entered the market in 2001 and with the realisation that it lacked 
sufficient capacity to compete effectively, C&WJ took the decisive step of firing the head of its 
mobile arm (Simpson 2001 ).316 Such a move stood out even more in light of the sustained 
underperformance in this area over the years.317 Quality had therefore, taken on new 
significance for the firm. Not only was Digicel making great strides in this market, but take-up 
in this area also suggested that this was where C&WJ would be waging its most serious battle 
for dominance. It is within this context that the very rare measure of letting a manager go under 
such circumstances was taken. This practice has become less unique since 2001 as more 
individuals entered and exited the firm - as demonstrated in the changes in senior management 
structure (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The result has been a greater degree of accountability and 
responsibility for meeting set targets (C&WJ-AR 2001: 7). Thus, as new individuals took over 
the position of company chair, these were also removed or replaced based on their performance, 
again demonstrating the increasing results-oriented approach adopted by the firm.
Readjustment therefore, had not only been about staff cut but also about addressing the 
quality and skills of its personnel. This retooling was to take place not only among senior 
management as specific efforts were made to retool and retrain staff. Training has been guided 
by the need to build a more informed and knowledgeable staff, particularly in the area of 
customer relations (C&WJ-AR 1998: 6). This again was allied to C&WJ’s efforts to improve
315 Around 100 foreign nationals had made up the senior management team in former years; by 2007 this 
had been reduced to approximately 15 (Collister 2007).
316 This decision had come the weekend after its mobile services had crashed causing major 
embarrassment for the firm especially in the face of its campaign to lure customers away from Digicel 
(Simpson 2001).
317 Users of its mobile services had been experiencing poor quality and expensive service for years with 
mobile phones being marketed as a luxury item (Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, March 20, 2007).
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customer service by enhancing staffs ability to respond quicker to customer requests and bill 
payment. The Learning and Development (L&D) team has been instrumental in this regard. 
Through this team human resource development has taken on a new dimension as C&WJ 
sought to enhance skills and competencies (C&WJ-AR 2006: 7).
Other measures included the introduction of a Crew Activity Management software, 
which enabled the firm to coordinate and place its technicians in the field. Through this it has 
secured improvements in the responsiveness of its technicians. New equipment was also 
introduced to enhance the responsiveness and accuracy of their decisions (C&WJ-AR 2002: 7). 
These also illustrate the growing use of technology to assist the incumbent to become more 
responsive and the increasing attention to customer care.
4.2.3 Brand Renewal
Over the years, the firm has tended to play a positive role in the country, thanks to its 
benevolence. In this way, it also acted as a partner with the government by assisting it in 
carrying out some of its responsibilities to govern the country (Interview: Head of C&W 
Foundation, Kingston, Jamaica, March 22, 2007).318 These acts of benevolence and the firm’s 
long history in Jamaica and the rest of the Caribbean had seen it developing the image of a 
paternal figure throughout the region.319
This legacy has however, not all been positive.320 By the end of the 1990s the firm 
found itself having to grapple with the perception that it was an archaic structure that was not 
able to contend with modem times (Interview: Market Researcher, C&WJ, Kingston, March 21, 
2007). Indeed, this had been one of the issues that had seen a swell of support against the firm. 
These perceptions had led some observers to describe the firm as a “damaged brand”,
318 Assistance has covered areas such as sports and education. In fact a former head of C&W once noted 
in a speech, that C&W was the biggest corporate citizen in the West Indies having made significant 
contributions to islands such as Jamaican over the years (in Hope 2001).
319 This image is best described by a former chair who noted of C&WJ, “...W e have been here for well 
over one hundred years, been a major enabler for economic activity and growth; played a major role in 
the development of the social fabric through the strong belief in our corporate social responsibility and 
are committed to being here now and in the future.” See Hope (2001).
320 Specifically, its poor customer service and low network quality in its mobile service already outlined 
in this chapter.
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particularly given the early losses it incurred in mobile services and its level of unpopularity in 
the late 90s to early 2000.321 These legacy issues were to follow the firm into liberalisation and, 
ultimately, affected views on the quality of the C&W brand.322 It did not help either, that the 
firm had at this point appeared to be fighting against the opening up of Jamaican telecoms, an 
act which served to do some damage to the firm’s image on the island (Interview: Then Minister 
of Telecoms, Kingston, January 6, 2005).323
Thus, one of the most significant issues with which the incumbent has had to contend 
has been the need to change the image it inherited from its years as a monopoly, especially 
when faced with entrants who had no such history. This therefore, emerged as one of the more 
significant areas in which the C&WJ has shown that as a large incumbent firm, it is capable of 
accepting change and even more of changing itself swiftly after years of lethargy. Further, the 
moves to be discussed in this section also demonstrate that not all of its activities are directly 
related to the regulator’s instructions, but a desire to remain current.
One of the first moves towards revamping its image involved the firm changing its 
name from Telecommunications of Jamaica to its more recent incarnation -  C&WJ.324 The 
decision to adopt the C&W title for all its operations around the globe in 1998 was seen as a 
positive move from a marketing standpoint.325 That is, C&WJ was recognised as a global brand 
with an established presence in telecoms, a point, which was viewed as an advantage in an age 
where more new firms were emerging more rapidly thanks to the developments in 
communications technology. As it later observed in its annual report, success was to be defined 
by its ability to shift “the attitudes and cultures towards the business expressed by staff, 
customers and business partners” (C&WJ-AR 2006: 14).
While acknowledging the importance and longevity of the C&W brand, the firm was 
forced to go even further in revamping its image as a way of attracting customers. This was to
321 Interview: Deputy Director-General of the OUR, London, 2003.
322 Interview: Senior executive at C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica March 20, 2007. This was not helped by the 
difficulties being experienced in the parent company at that time (see Chapter six).
323 See Chapter two.
324 C&WJ-AR (1998: 4).
325 Interview: Former senior member of regulatory staff at C&W pic, London, March 26, 2007.
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take place most visibly in the re-profiling of its mobile operations, one of the places where it 
faced the most serious threats and where quality and service had been an issue. Thus mobile 
operations were re-branded under a new name - ‘B-mobile’ as it sought to step away from the 
negative image of the past.326 The company colour for this segment was also changed.327 Indeed, 
some of the moves here could be linked to the requirement to maintain separate accounts as laid 
out under the 1999 regime.328 However, the extent of the re-branding went beyond regulatory 
requirements, possibly suggesting that this was not simply about compliance but also an attempt 
to distance this area of its operations from the negative aspects of the C&WJ legacy.329
Re-branding did not end with the firm’s mobile operations but was extended to the 
remainder of the firm though not to the full extent seen with ‘B-mobile’. Specifically, corporate 
philanthropy became a more strategic aspect of the firm’s operations with increased donations 
being made by the firm.330 In a move to institutionalise this area of its business, the C&WJ 
Foundation was established in 2003 as a way of bringing more organised and strategic focus to 
the firm’s benevolence.331 This represented the firm’s attempt at formalizing this practice of gift 
giving while using corporate social responsibility as a tool for changing perceptions and 
heightening its profile on the island. This came through an acknowledgement that it had not 
always underscored the full extent of its involvement in Jamaican society.332
Brand loyalty has also become more critical since reform has meant it is no longer the 
“only kid on the block”.333 Activities have also been focused on its attempts at capturing 
allegiances and sympathy, not of the OUR/regulator, as may have been the case prior to the late
326 Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, Kingston, March 20, 2007.
327 This was changed from the customary blue to yellow-green, marking a deviation from the trademark 
colour sported by the Company.
328 But as noted in Chapter two, the firm had yet to do so up to 2005.
329 These moves were therefore, influenced by a recognised need for “something new” and in keeping 
with the demands of the local market”. Interview: Senior member of regulatory team at C&W pic, 
London February 22, 2007.
330 For instance, in 2002, this had reached J$45 million, representing a 50% increase over the previous 
year (C&WJ-AR 2002: 8).
331 Interview: Manager, C&WJ Foundation, Kingston, March 21, 2007.
332 Ibid. The Foundation’s activities are wide-ranging, but its main emphasis has been in education, 
offering free computers and Internet to all Government-aided schools on the Island with some of these 
being updated to broadband since 2005 (C&WJFoundation 2006: 1; C&WJ-AR 2006:61).
333 Interview: Manager, C&WJ Foundation, Kingston, March 21, 2007. Also see C&WJ-AR 2000: 5.
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90s, but now more about appeasing clients and the public. The establishment of the C&WJ 
Foundation noted in this section was one way that it has sought to build this loyalty.
The use of advertising and marketing has also been key in its bid to change its image 
and coordinate its response to reform.334 This has emerged from the realisation that the strength 
of its future performance lay in its ability to appeal to younger users, especially in mobile 
communications.335 The extent of its advertising and marketing was to be stepped up as the 
intensity of competition increased from 2001.336 From 1998 C&WJ had acknowledged that, 
“one of the activities that the company encourages is the introduction of our services to the 
younger generation, as early as possible” (C&WJ-AR: 12). However, it was not till the entry of 
competition that its efforts in this area gained momentum.
Fixed services were increasingly to come in for attention after 2002 and attention to the 
mobile network and competition in this area had seen less attention being placed on this area of 
activity after 1999.337 Indeed, the value of this area had declined rapidly over the years with the 
number of fixed lines being far outstripped by mobile subscription. 338 Ironically, where 
liberalisation has been touted as a means of increasing access to telephones, this has arguably 
not been the case here where the emphasis on mobile competition has seen declining take-up
334 Advertising has thus increased as the firm aims to sensitise the public to its range of products 
(Williams 2004). Around 2001 mid-way the liberalisation process, the firm waged an advertising 
campaign reminding Jamaica of the contribution it had made to the country over the years. The video laid 
out its vision for the future, suggesting the benefits that were to accrue to the country and citizens through 
their continued support and C&WJ’s success. The emphasis placed on the Let's Keep in Touch campaign 
can be gleaned from the quality of the video produced, which won a national award in that same year 
(C&WJ-AR 2001: 12). The Company’s annual report describes the video as featuring “heart-warming 
images of caring, togetherness and communication among persons from all walks of life, [which] has 
enjoyed immense popularity with Jamaicans locally and overseas” (C&WJ-AR 2001:11).
3 See Williams (2004).
336 Only Digicel is able to command as much attention. Its ability to buy more airtime than other entrants 
and its knowledge of and how to utilise the popular culture to increase its visibility were an advantage. 
This was marked by more frequent use of figures from popular culture in their advertising campaigns. Not 
only did the firm hire these entertainers for individual marketing events but it also began tying some into 
long-term contracts as spokespersons for the firm. Indeed, this struggle for prominence through 
sponsorship was to lead to one of the more serious squabbles between Digicel and C&WJ. As each sought 
to stamp its mark on West Indies cricket individual players were signed up to deals with each operator, 
which prevented them from accepting any endorsements by the other operator. This was a difficult 
position given that even while one operator had signed individual players, the other was overall sponsor 
of the West Indies cricket team leading to a series of claims and counter claims between the two sponsors 
(Naraine 2003; see C&WJ 2004).
337 See Twomey (2003: 7).
338 By 2003 the number of mobile subscribers was nearly 1.5 million in a population of around 2.5 while 
there were only 450,000 fixed lines (Brown 2003: 5).
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and a lowering in the level of teledensity on the island (even as regional averages continued to 
rise).339 This indicates a failure in regulatory design and the limits of industry reform where 
little incentives exist to encourage investments in all areas of the sector.340 In this instance, at 
least, liberalisation appears to have had a regressive effect on the telecommunications sector. 
For instance, it has introduced measures to give users more control over their monthly 
expenditure, with door-to-door sales tactics being introduced to target customers.341 There has 
also been more variety in the mode of communication with customers, as well as an ongoing 
search for different approaches and techniques for keeping existing customers and attracting
342new ones.
With advertising and market research taking on more significance over the years the 
firm has been able to heighten its visibility in the telecoms market after the early battering 
suffered at the hands of Digicel (Interview: Market Researcher C&WJ, 22 March 2007). 
Through these means the Company was able to make itself appear to be more dynamic and 
understanding of the communications needs of a population that was increasingly aware of 
choices and quality of services it could access. Pronouncements of the demise of ‘brand 
‘C&WJ’ may therefore have been a bit premature at the time.
Key to the firm’s response in this area has been its size and resources, which have 
allowed it to engage in the level of marketing that other operators in the market have not been 
able to match. Digicel has been the only one to come close to or match its dominance in this 
regard. Even so, the incumbent’s knowledge of the culture and relations within the society has 
enhanced its ability to coordinate its response to sector reform and to make appeals to the 
nation’s sentiments. This has been demonstrated in the firm’s use of popular entertainers and
339 Local teledensity had peaked at 19.8 % in 2000. Main stations in service also witnessed declines since 
liberalisation receiving a 13.2% reduction in 2002 (436, 890) over 2001 (487, 729) (WB 2005: 46).
340 Ibid.
341 C&WJ-AR 2006: 12; 27. These moves saw the introduction of a prepaid service for home phones. 
C&WJ also returned its attention to its fixed network adding over 28,000 new fixed lines in 2006 (See 
C&WJ 2006-AR: 12).
342 For example, music, athletics and golf have been used to appeal to different category of users from 
young people, to businessmen. Gifts and ‘give-aways’ have also formed a part of this strategy to build 
brand loyalty (Interview: Market Researcher at C&WJ March 22, 2007).
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athletes in its campaign as well as its references to its years of operations and benevolence.343 
Given the strength of the firm’s marketing and brand, the presence of other operators besides 
Digicel has not been as visible in the sector, hence its continued success.344
The effect of industry change on the firm’s brand and image has been visible in the way 
it communicates with the public and shareholders as seen in a review of the formatting of its 
annual reports from 1988-2007. Prior to 1998, when the firm’s position was still intact, the 
reporting style tended to be more formal with little or no emphasis or coverage of 
entrepreneurial activities outside the firm’s operations. This was to change by 1998 when the 
reporting style in its annual report began to include a focus on the firm’s largesse and gifts 
throughout the country.345 In an effort to increase the visibility and ‘human face’ of the firm, it 
also began including pictures of its managers and other representatives interfacing with the 
public. It is perhaps not pure coincidence that this change in tone and format came about n the 
late 1990s, at a time of increasing uncertainty in the telecoms market and during its most 
turbulent relations with the state.346 Subsequent reports have continued to highlight this ‘softer 
side’ thus, demonstrating the effect that competition and sector reform have had on the firm 
over the years.
Attempts to re-brand its image were also matched by further modifications in the 
incumbent’s language and approach to its customers. Thus, phrases such as “relationship 
management” and ambitions of “exceeding customers’ expectations”, were to become more 
obvious in its discourse (C&WJ-AR 2001: 5).347 It was also in 2002 amidst fierce competition
343 See for example, C&WJ-AR 2001.
344 C&WJ has therefore been able to overcome the more negative images from its past with its own 
research on the success of its strategies showing heightened sensitivity and awareness of its services and 
the C&WJ brand (Interview: Researcher at C&WJ, March 22, 2007).
345 As the firm began emphasising its role as a model corporate citizen, pictorial highlights emphasising 
its good relations with the public and its many donations in areas such as, education and sports also 
became more of a feature.
346 It is worthy of note also that this revamping was also heralded by a re-branding of the local firm from 
‘Telecommunications of Jamaica’ to ‘Cable and Wireless Jamaica Limited’ in February 1998 as C&W 
Pic sought to unify its operations around the world. See Cable and Wireless Jamaica Limited (1998: 10).
347 This is similar to efforts of incumbents such as, Deutsche Telekom, who faced with liberalization and 
losing market share in the 1999 into the new millennium found itself closely managing the kind of 
information that came from the organization. So much so, that it was eventually accused of eavesdropping 
when it attempted to monitor calls between its staff and the media given fears that sensitive information 
was being leaked (BBC 2008).
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from Digicel and its effort to reshape its profile and operations that the incumbent more 
obviously began to affirm its role as a ‘corporate citizen’ in the published annual reports (See 
C&WJ-AR 2002: 5).
4.3 Embracing Regulation: Internal Reordering as a Response to Industry Reform
The previous sections have demonstrated that reforming the rules and structure of the 
telecommunications sector not only leads to changes in the regulatory space, or environment 
within which firms operate, but is also responsible for changes within the internal organisation 
and structure of incumbent firms. This has occurred as the incumbent attempts to adjust 
internally to meet the challenges brought on by the upheavals in it operational environmental. 
Changes in the rules, structure and motivations within the regulatory space meant established 
patterns, structures and ethos within the firm also became outmoded. Thus as industry reform 
became more of a reality, C&WJ began a process of re-orientation or co-evolution to enable it 
to become more efficient, responsive and economic. In this way the incumbent is shown 
embracing regulation, not in the sense of capture; rather this is more in line with the 
presentation in this chapter, namely, C&WJ’s internalisation of regulatory principles and the 
extent to which it has used regulatory reform to drive improvements in its operations.
The effect of industry reform on the capacity and structure of the firm was very visible 
in the new departments created but mostly so in the emergence of a department solely dedicated 
to regulation. As will be shown in the next chapter, the experience here stands out from those in 
Ireland, where that incumbent sought to extend its size and ownership as an immediate response 
to reform. Indeed, the development of capacity in this area is directly linked to a number of 
developments in the regulatory space and in the firm’s experience with other actors in the 
sector, indicating the effect of the external operational environment on the internal organisation 
and structure of the regulated actor. C&WJ’s experience and history of legal challenges being 
waged against agreements that it had concluded with the government may have nudged it to 
develop internal legal and regulatory capacity. Failure to secure explicit legal boundaries around 
its rights in 1988 had resulted in challenge to its authority. The failure to ensure that its
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exclusivity had been confirmed in the mid-1990s instead of simply accepting a gentleman’s 
agreement on the matter suggests a second reason for the emphasis on developing its own 
internal regulatory capacity. Additionally, the culture that emerged on the eve of liberalisation 
was more confrontational with the cordiality that had been witnessed between firm and state 
receding. This was to be replaced with mistrust on both sides. Thus, the move towards greater 
emphasis on technical and legal regulation may be seen as indicative of this situation in which 
gentlemen’s agreements were less the norm and less trust existed among the main parties.
Further, as more operators entered the operational space more cases have been brought 
against the firm and likewise, it has also had to resort to the courts, a point which helps to 
understand the growing internal regulatory capacity. Given the extent of C&WJ’s involvement 
in designing the new regime (through the HoA), it has had a lot to gain from ensuring proper 
policing and that breaches did not occur, hence the need to police the activities not only of 
entrants but also those of the industry regulator. Collectively, these have given the incumbent a 
reason for developing its own regulatory capacity, indicating the extent to which reforms in the 
external regulatory space has affected its internal organisation and motivation.
The distance placed between the firm and the state by privatisation and regulatory 
reform have seen the incumbent building a more competent technical and regulatory team 
internally that is more aware of the formal rules of the game. As such it is now more adept at 
dealing with an independent regulator and is more focused on tracking and monitoring 
developments in the sector specifically to assess their relevance and implications for its 
operations. In this sense, the incumbent is even more proactive than in former years as it seeks 
to keep abreast of its rights and privileges under the new regime. Furthermore, the advancement 
here is truly indicative of a cultural shift under the new regime where informality and cordiality 
have been replaced by legal and technical intelligence, transparency and accountability in 
relations.
The reforms were also to raise certain issues relating to governance at a number of 
levels within C&WJ. The first point related to its internal organisation and management as seen 
in the reduction of layers to reduce some of the hierarchy in the firm. Linked to this was the
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decision to give individual managers more autonomy and responsibility for results and 
performance. Indeed, at times this meant replacing senior staff who had been with the firm from 
the 1980s with “outsiders” who were less set in a culture and mindset that had come with 
operating in a monopoly. These new comers to the firm were from more varied backgrounds 
outside the telecoms field, but that had gained prominence since industry reform.
Internalisation may be demonstrated in a number of ways highlighted in the findings. 
Overall, C&WJ has been motivated by the recognition that it could no longer simply rely on its 
name or history to gain customers or engender brand loyalty, particularly since its relations with 
the public and ministry had taken a turn for the worst. Even more, with the growing indication 
that liberalisation would be introduced in the sector at the end of the 1990s, C&WJ realised it 
had to do more about addressing those aspects of its service that had been problematic in the 
past. These internal modifications have included the introduction of new payment packages, 
increased access to products and service offerings, new departments and skills. These changes 
emerged as the company continued to restructure itself to become more efficient and responsive 
to the requirements of competing in a new environment with even more demands. These 
improvements have seen C&WJ being marked out for the increases it had achieved in its 
efficiency and for improvements in rationalising personnel.348
These internal modifications were also to have an external impact in so far as they 
affected relations between the firm and actors in its operational space, including clients. Thus, 
according to a market researcher with the Company, the firm has been able to change its image 
from that of a “stodgy” to a more “hip” firm (Interview: C&WJ 22 March 2007, Kingston 
Jamaica). Chapters two and three showed that of the main actors affecting the incumbent’s 
behaviour in the regulatory space, customers were among the least. However, as it regards the 
incumbent’s internal drive, this was to become one of the most important drivers in Jamaica as 
in Ireland, as will be shown in Chapter five. As Hancher and Moran have observed, consumers 
are able to determine which competitor has been successful through choice (1989: 201). This
348 Gleaner (2003).
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has served ultimately, to increase the value of consumers as determinants of incumbent firm 
strategies and behaviour in the post-reform era.
This process of internalisation is also seen in its emphasis on customer service. So not 
only did the firm change in terms of its structure and ethos but also the way in which it 
communicated with and utilised consumers and the public. As demonstrated for example, in its 
re-branding and the changing tone of its advertising campaign, C&WJ had gradually begun to 
converse with the public on a new level, viewing customer service as more integral to its 
survival and ability to plan and forecast future needs and trends in the market. By finding new 
ways to engage with clients, gauging customer satisfaction and market needs it could avoid the 
surprises it met in the first year of competition in mobile telephony where customers left for its 
competitors even where prices in the latter were more expensive. Events here went beyond the 
dictates of regulatory policy, demonstrating the effect of actors and relationships outside that of 
the regulator-regulatee dyad as a motivator for the incumbent firm’s behaviour. The value 
placed on customer care and marketing suggested that the firm was moving away from the 
problems it had been known for under monopoly to becoming more responsive and adaptable.
However, its survival was about more than simply addressing complaints such as access 
to telephone lines and service quality. As shown in this chapter the incumbent has been more 
willing to initiate meaningful changes in its operations, focusing more resources on managing 
its internal modernisation programme. The change in the internal structure, rules and response 
of the firm were to be seen, for instance, in its establishment of new departments. Key here has 
been its emphasis on hiring specific skills to buttress its internal regulatory capacity. Thus 
whereas Souter (1994: 44) suggested that regulatory reform may compromise the quality of 
training given the attention to costs, this has not necessarily been the case here. Rather, 
emphasis was placed on increasing the quality and experience of staff, importantly with the firm 
seeking these outside of the communications sector. Attention was placed more on increasing 
training and capacity in those areas (e.g. sales, customer service and marketing) that took on 
new significance with competition and increasing consumer demand.
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The effect of regulation may also be seen in attempts to place some distance between 
itself and its mobile operations. However, as argued, the extent of these activities were not 
required by the OUR. This incident illustrates the limits of regulation in two ways. Firstly, there 
are limits to the extent that industry regulations are able to condition the behaviour of regulated 
firms. The separation required here was more about separating accounts as opposed to such 
structural separation. As noted in Chapter two, the firm has been less willing to comply with 
this requirement. Secondly (and relatedly) not all the incumbent’s activities are a direct response 
to regulation by the IRA. That is, this move indicated an internal recognition of what was 
needed to increase its operations in the mobile market.
All is not lost for IRAs however. Firstly, such information and awareness can help 
regulators to identify those instances (e.g. those described here) where its intervention may have 
little effect in order to devise alternative strategies for reaching the regulated firm. This is where 
knowledge of the factors affecting incumbents’ motivations and operations (as outlined in 
Chapters two and three) may prove useful in obtaining the end that direct regulation by an IRA 
may be unable to obtain. In such cases, the tactic may be to unleash the forces that would 
provide incentives for firms to adopt change. Thus, as seen here, changes in rules allowed for 
competitive pressure (from entrants) and consumer choice to have a greater role in pushing 
internal reforms that have benefited the overall market, arguably more so than a requirement 
simply to invest or improve service might have done. Nonetheless, this makes it difficult to 
separate regulation from such market pressures in accounting for firm behaviour, given the role 
of regulation in opening the gates and legitimising processes such as entry. Responsive 
regulation is therefore not about IRAs going it alone or doing things directly, but about creating 
an enabling environment in which other processes and actors can condition the behaviour of 
large dominant firms, especially where resources and balance of power may not permit the 
IRA/govemment to directly challenge the firm successfully. This follows from the assertion in 
Chapter one, that regulation is also carried out by actors other than the state and IRA and that 
the relationship between the incumbent and other actors in the regulatory space is also important 
in considering how firms respond to regulation and change.
Furthermore, the findings go beyond the competition and compliance literatures to 
suggest that a response to competition is not only about pricing and preventing entry, but also 
about the efforts to respond at the level of organisational change and human resource 
adjustments, not capture. These considerations are much more than simply a question of 
compliance or not. The message was that service was in fact improved and more responsive to 
customer needs; not old, slow and unresponsive; hence, its ability to remain relevant post 
regulatory reform.
As a lesson for regulators, the findings illustrate the importance of good relations 
between regulators and regulated firms. Thus, compliance is not only about whether rules are 
weak or strong but also the extent of cordiality, which may exist between the two. As seen in 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3, investments dipped in 1998 and 1999, while increase in lines also dipped 
significantly in 1999 with both periods representing some of the more turbulent years in the 
firm’s relationship with the government. This had also been the case in 1961, when then owners 
of the JTC had refused to invest in the sector until the terms of its licence had been concluded 
(Spiller and Sampson 1996: 47-48). Where regulation and its reform are fraught with 
uncertainties and contention, this may prove a disincentive for further investment. It is therefore 
not surprising that the firm began increasing its investment after industry structure had been 
worked out. This may also explain the government’s emphasis on protecting incumbent’s 
market and willingness to give seemingly liberal terms (as shown in Chapter 2).
4.4 Summary and Conclusion
“Liberalisation is now in [C&WJ’s] rear view mirror” as it has now begun to move forward 
with its business strategy.349 However, the onset of liberalisation and competition promulgated 
by regulatory reform continues to be a defining episode in C&WJ’s history given its 
significance in shaping its present and future. The threats brought on by industry reform forced 
the incumbent to devise a strategy that involved it changing from within as opposed to simply 
seeking to modify the rules and policies in the regulatory space. A complete cultural and
349 Interview: senior member of regulatory team, C&W pic, February 22, 2007.
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operational shift has subsequently, taken place throughout the entire firm, in line with changes 
in its operational space. Focusing on the incumbent firm in this crucial period of reform is 
useful in understanding the impulses and pressures it faced as well as its strategies and tactics in 
moving forward to maintain its relevance.
In summation, a number of lessons or themes emerge from the presentation of the 
internal strategies adopted by the incumbent as it seeks to adjust to reform. The main story is 
about how regulatory reform stimulates change in former monopolists and incumbent telecoms 
firms. Within this realm, five main approaches or tactics have stood out. Firstly, and one of the 
more significant strategies was the increasing emphasis on growing legal and regulatory 
capacity. Secondly was the simultaneous increase of attention to advertising, sales, branding and 
market research as the firm sought to step up its public relations machinery to increase its 
visibility and profile in the sector. Third, was its attempt to increase its network capacity and the 
quality of its infrastructure. The approach to customers and customer service, which became 
more strategic and focused marked a fourth and related visible change in the firm’s approach. 
Finally, the emphasis on reducing size and scope (as seen in the reduction of the size of its 
personnel, ending free directory assistance and outsourcing, even while attempting to assert its 
position in newer telecom services (IT and mobile), marks the fifth pattern observed in the 
firm’s response.
The firm’s tactics were not necessarily strictly about cutting its scope willy-nilly but 
rather about taking a more strategic approach by increasing its presence in more profit- 
generating areas, while stepping back from some of its undertakings in its former incarnation as 
a monopolist (e.g. wiring customers’ premises and divesting itself of certain assets).
As it concerns regulatory design, the findings illustrate the importance of engineering 
reforms in rules and legislation and how these can lead to more successful regulatory results. 
That is, by unleashing the force of competition by giving consumers a greater role in the 
regulatory space through choice, the IRA/govemment has been able to indirectly spur behaviour 
modification in the incumbent that has resulted in benefit for consumers. This indicates ways in 
which regulators can create certain incentives and increase value for consumers. Following from
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the above, the findings illustrate the processes of co-evolution, which take place between the 
firm and its regulatory space, mainly with environmental changes (i.e. evolution in the rules, 
structure and make-up of the regulatory space) acting as the decisive driver in spurring 
organisational and behavioural change.
Internal reform is therefore, seen as another coping or response mechanism adopted by 
incumbents when faced with changes in their operational space. Thus validating the worth of 
regulatory reform in re-orienting the motives and ethos of monopolies and increasing 
transparency in the regulatory space. Such a principle has value beyond the present discussion 
on telecommunications to its larger application on how to shape behaviour in other areas of 
economic and social life.
Finally, it is not so much that these tactics, or those to be discussed in the Irish case, are 
unique to the incumbent firm, or about whether it has ever adopted every strategy discussed. 
The point here is that the pace and breadth of these reform are unique in such firms and that 
these came about as a result of industry reform, which brought about the opening up of the 
telecoms sector. The next chapter considers similar issues as it relates to the Irish incumbent, 
Eircom, albeit that these developments, in the case of Eircom, have come about in a round-a­
bout fashion. The important point here is that the developments in both cases had a fairly similar 
end, in spite of regional and developmental differences.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EMBRACING REGULATION: INTERNAL REORDERING AS A RESPONSE TO 
REGULATORY REFORM IN EIRCOM
5.0 Introduction
The following chapter discusses the ways in which the Irish incumbent, Eircom sought to 
prepare itself for industry reform in the late 1990s. It also examines the strategies used by the 
firm to adjust to reform particularly in the years after full privatisation in 1999, bringing 
forward the discussion from Chapter four on the Jamaican incumbent.
As with the previous chapter, the present discussion shows that, faced with significant 
modifications in the rules and structure of their markets, regulated incumbent firms will look 
inward to restructure their internal organisation to meet the challenges posed by these market 
shifts as a way of heightening their competitiveness and ability to monitor and track 
developments in the sector. Particularly, this is where the firm’s ability to directly influence and 
shape the content of sector rules and policy is reduced. Like the previous chapter, the analysis 
also invites a more complex view of regulated incumbents and the ways in which they respond 
to change.
As in Chapter four, the Irish case depicts the ways in which incumbent telecom firms 
have managed to maintain their dominance in the face of increased risks and unpredictability 
wrought by regulatory reform. In this way, it advances the story of regulatory reform beyond the 
focus on public policy, beyond the point where new legislation was passed and beyond the 
focus on independent regulatory agencies to consider how regulatory change is internalised by 
the incumbent. Here, the impact of policy and legislation enacted to secure industry reform, and 
how these have unfolded in the firm’s operations are the significant items of interest. In so 
doing, the particular ways in which incumbents have managed to hold on to a significant share 
of the market in the face of these threats becomes clearer.
The chapter is organised along the lines of Chapter four. As such, attention is placed, 
firstly, on describing the nature of the incumbent’s operations prior to reform as a way of setting
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the context for considering the ways in which regulatory reform have affected the firm. The 
chapter closes with a discussion and summary of the main findings.
5.1 Internal Response to Industry Change
Redrafting of rules and relationships in the regulatory space has been crucial in nudging Eircom 
towards reforming its operations and rethinking its strategies. Collectively, the reforms 
presented here have been hailed as being unlikely had it not been for the changes that had been 
attained in the telecoms regime mainly since 1997 (Interview: Senior official, Eircom, Dublin, 
November 10, 2003). These include privatisation, liberalisation and the establishment of an 
independent regulatory body.
5.1.1 The State of Eircom’s Operations Prior to Reform
The improvements to be discussed in this chapter were important for a number of reasons. Like 
the Jamaican incumbent, the relationship with customers was not always ideal prior to 
regulatory reform. For instance, customer satisfaction had also been affected by inaccuracies in 
the firm’s billing practices.350 Problems here related to faults in its equipment. For instance, 
metering and cabling errors saw call charges from some customers showing up on other users’ 
accounts.351 Prior to reform, criticisms were also levelled at the way in which consumer 
complaints had been handled. Its approach here was simply described as ‘unsympathetic’ (see 
for instance, Yeates 1993).
Like the Jamaican incumbent, Eircom also faced an inability to meet the demand for its 
service, given the backlog in filling line applications.352 This practice went against the spirit of 
the 1992 EC directive on telecommunications.353 Though no specific time was given within this
350 As occurred when a customer received a bill for (Irish) £15,000 for usage from October 1985 to March 
1986 but was unable to get a response to complaints lodged with the firm. The matter was eventually 
resolved through the help of the Ombudsman who noted that the individual’s pattern of usage did not 
suggest that the customer’s bill could be that high (Office of the Ombudsman 1994).
351 Office of the Ombudsman (1995).
352 Office of the Ombudsman (1998).
353 Regulation 4 (2), “European Communities (Telecommunications Services) Regulations, 1992”, S.I. 
No. 45 of 1992.
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Directive, it nonetheless noted that requests for leased lines, should be fulfilled within a 
“reasonable period” and Eircom’s delay was viewed as going against this principle. In other 
instances, the firm would cancel line applications with little information to clients about the 
reasons for such action.354 Customer service was therefore, not one of Eircom’s strong features.
A series of scandals surrounding management’s use of official power was to further irk 
the sensibilities of customers. These scandals often related to issues of accountability of 
managers and state officials responsible for the Company.355
Additionally, problems of overstaffing, the political sensitivity affecting the level of 
fees that could be charged for its service and inadequate financing all combined to threaten 
Eircom’s ability to finance operations during its years of public ownership (Gallagher 1992e: 
12; Murdoch 1993: 14). For instance, it was expected to develop the country’s telecoms 
network up to 2000, while it was also expected to make contributions from its annual income to 
the state (Dalby 1993a: 14).
Improvements were also limited by failure to grant the firm’s request for investment 
capital. Furthermore, it received only 27% of the total amount requested for investment from the 
state in 1993 (Ibid). The Company subsequently, had to borrow to make investments in the 
sector. But its status as an SOE also meant that limits were placed on such borrowing (TE-AR 
1998: 4-5). Section 27 of the 1983 Post and Telegraph Act, for instance, stipulated that the firm 
had to secure consent from the Minister of Finance and its line minister before it could borrow 
funds. The amount to be borrowed also had to be set by the MOF and Minister with 
responsibility for the sector. This led to concerns about the pace of developments within the 
incumbent and hence, the state of the country’s telecoms sector.
Further, while Eircom’s management had been successful in carrying it through the 80s 
after telecoms had been divested from the post office it was obvious by the 1990s that Eircom 
could no longer simply rely upon its achievements of the past (Gallagher 1992b: 12). Rather, it 
now had to go out of its way to initiate reforms that would help it to become more competitive.
354 Office of the Ombudsman (1999).
355 (See Gallagher 1993d; Gallagher 1993e; O'Brien 1991).
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Among these improvements were those relating to the quality of its products as well as those 
aimed at improving client interface.
Thus, as in the Jamaican case, the Irish incumbent in the immediate years before 
regulatory reform found itself suffering from a legacy of poor customer service and tardiness in 
the delivery of telephone lines. Consequently, the company was described as being a “mess” 
during the first year or two after sector liberalisation.356 By the mid-1990s, the firm was being 
criticised by citizens and groups, such as the Confederation of Irish Industry,357 for its lack of 
responsiveness, efficiency and innovation, making it more advantageous politically to speak 
about reforming the firm and changing its relations with the state.
In the end, regulatory reform, in the form of privatisation, competition, new rules and 
the accompanying uncertainty to the firm’s established position were to provide the motivation 
and rationale for Eircom to make necessary adjustments to update its culture, organisation and 
modus operandi. As one interviewee noted of these changes, “(a)ll of a sudden, the culture at 
Eircom had to respond to dramatic challenges it did not have before”.358 Regulatory reform has 
therefore been instrumental in providing the impetus for Eircom to reform its organisation and 
operations. Importantly, much of these had begun from 1997 - prior to liberalisation given that 
like C&WJ, Eircom had managed to secure an extension to its monopoly in order to prepare 
itself for industry reform.
5.1.2 Effect of Regulatory Reforms on Eircom’s Size and Scope
C&WJ had responded to reform by reducing its size and updating its infrastructure and service. 
As will be revealed in this section this has been the ultimate end of the Irish incumbent, Eircom, 
albeit arriving here in a more schizophrenic fashion. As reforms brought more uncertainty in the 
sector, the firm sought to identify a new line of defence. With this in mind it firstly sought to 
increase its activities and relevance in the sector by increasing the number of areas in which it
356 Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003.
357 As noted earlier, such groups believed that freeing up the firm to private hands would free-up 
government revenue for investments in job creating schemes and reducing the national debt. See IT 
(1992).
358 Interview: Senior Official, Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003.
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operated, as it attempted to envelope the sector. The second and third strategies were a direct 
result of this first, since its attempt to increase coverage was to simultaneously result in an 
increase in the incidence of partnerships and alliances and finally in the number of holdings and 
subsidiaries owned by the firm. These steps marked Eircom’s attempt to advance its power and 
control via an increase in its size and scope.
The first set of internal reforms was aimed at enhancing its coverage over the breadth of 
the sector by advancing its range of services. As Eircom sought to reposition itself in 1998 when 
full liberalisation was to become effective, it began to place more emphasis on advancing fixed 
line business in order to offset the declining use of this service. This it achieved by taking 
advantage of improvements in communications technology and the increasing demand for more 
advanced services facilitated by such developments.359 With this in mind, Eircom commissioned 
Ericsson to assist it in enhancing its switching technology. This was done in January 2000, at a 
cost of £10 million and again served to signal the shifting views on how the company saw its 
future role and sustainability in the sector. As the then CEO of Eircom, Alfie Kane put it, “there 
is no doubt but that our business is changing considerably and is moving away from being 
primarily voice centric to being data centric.” 360 Such attempts to advance capacity and 
competence in data, Internet and media services were meant to allow it to reposition itself to 
take advantage of opportunities in these areas. Its coverage also increased into telecom related 
activities such as Internet consultancy, website development, e-commerce and security and 
monitoring services as well as software development.361
The second type of activity aimed at increasing its size and scope relates to Eircom’s 
attempt to increase its capacity and plug gaps in its competence via strategic alliances with other 
companies in the sector. Nevertheless, this tactic was not new and had, in the past, culminated 
in the first bout of partnership with the KPN/Telia group in 1997. Such arrangements were 
amplified from 1997 into 1998. These included its 1998 alliance with AT&T through their 
subsidiary, Unisource (TE-AR 1998: 17). Eircom also took advantage of its position as owner
359 Eircom (2001e).
360 ODTR (2001 d: 1).
361 See for instance, Eircom Annual Report (1998; 17; 2000: 70; 2001: 25).
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of the fixed network entering into IRU (Indefeasible Rights of Use) contracts, which allowed it 
to trade capacity on its cable network with other operators, helping it to secure even more 
partners (Eircom 2000: 76; 2001: 44). These alliances were crucial to Eircom since they allowed 
it to extend its reach over the sector. Partnerships with international telecoms firms permitted 
access to a ‘global platform’, which helped in enhancing Eircom’s service to multinationals 
based in the country (TE-AR 1998: 17). Indeed, the firm’s position at the centre of the market 
meant that it was an attractive partner for some operators wishing to enter the sector, since they 
could trade capacity as opposed to compete directly with the incumbent. Such a move, 
inadvertently allowed Eircom not only to monitor the activities of new entrants but also to 
reduce the number of operators with whom it would be in direct competition.
Prior to 1998 the Company was able to spread its tentacles to all areas of the sector by 
forming strategic alliances or creating subsidiary operations.362 These activities took place in 
service areas enabled by what was then considered to be emerging technologies, including the 
Internet and mobile telephony where Eircom even owned firms that were competing against 
each other. For example, Eircom established EirPac (Public Packet Switched Data Network 
Service) in 1984 to handle value-added services such as email and information retrieval and it 
also owned Eirtrade, the provider of Electronic Data Interchange services (Hall 1993: 81). So, 
unlike the Jamaican incumbent, the firm was always willing to take advantage of the 
developments in communications technology preferring to saturate and control emerging sectors 
rather than leave room open for competition.363 Other acquisitions and start-ups included 
DASSNET (Data and Special Services Network), which was formed to manage Eircom’s digital 
private circuit network (Hall 1993: 82). Cablelink was also formed to offer services in cable 
television on Eircom’s behalf.
Indeed, the firm’s joint ventures also spanned the research field as with one of its 
subsidiaries, Broadcom Eireann Research Limited. This division assisted the firm in building
362 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 1996-97 Country Profile of Ireland, the firm was 
involved in 18 other companies conducting business in related areas. It managed to accomplish this feat 
by having different degrees of ownership and control of these companies (EIU 1997: 25).
363 However, this is not to imply that its willingness to take up new opportunities was at an ideal level.
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expertise and competence in monitoring and assessing local market developments. Its 45% 
share in this firm indicated its long-term support and interest in research and development, an 
area which, as shown in Chapter four, had also taken on new significance since liberalisation 
(Eircom Annual Report 2001: 10). One of the aims of research was to track trends and 
developments, which could be used to inform the firm’s activities in what was becoming an 
increasingly chaotic market. Again, demonstrated here, is the increasing relevance of market 
research as a means of heightening the firm’s knowledge and responsiveness in the telecoms 
market. In so doing, it also had the opportunity to monitor the activities of its competitors, an 
activity which was not so much of importance under the old regime since it operated for the 
most part as a monopolist and where its proximity to policy makers meant that it would have 
been able to directly inform the policy agenda. In so doing, the firm could reduce risks and have 
more informed policies.
Joint ventures were not simply about expansion of size and scope since these have also 
been about cost reduction. That is, some of these schemes allowed the firm the option of 
bolstering its capacity without necessarily having to spend vast amounts to secure alternative 
capability. In 2000 it initiated a number of heads of agreements with other firms in order to 
enter contractual and out-sourcing arrangements with them. These commercial joint ventures 
represented one way in which competition had forced an emphasis on cost reduction and the 
need to find more efficient ways of doing business. In effect, cost reduction had been one of the 
firm’s primary imperatives since it was privatised partially in 1997 and strategic alliances 
allowed it to bolster capacity and size without adding greatly to operational costs.364
A third and related response was its effort to increase its number of holdings and 
subsidiaries, which also came partly as a result of its attempt to enhance its capacity through 
strategic alliances. Acquisitions in that first year of privatisation included, “100% of Atlas 
Limited, 100% of Lan Communications Limited, 100% of Western Cellular Limited, 100% of
364 This was important since one former chair had accused the company of having the most overhead of 
any other telecoms firm (Gallagher 1992d: 12). Indeed, within this first year the firm had managed to 
achieve a 10% reduction in operating costs as a portion of its turnover ratio (from 50% to 40%) a feat that 
was also helped by staff cuts. See Eircom (2000c).
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Talk to Me Limited, and an increase in the Group’s interest in Person to Person Limited (from 
25% to 51%)“ (Eircom 2000: 70). It also owned companies such as, Irish Telecommunications 
Investments Pic and Phonewatch Limited a security and monitoring system for home and 
businesses (Eircom 2000: 63). The firm’s acquisitions were therefore to increase during this 
period. This climb is shown in Figure 5.1 below which gives an idea of Eircom’s principal 
subsidiaries and business ventures in recent years. Of immediate relevance is the rapid increase 
in the number of subsidiaries up to 2001.
Figure 5.1 Eircom's Principal Subsidiaries and Associated Undertakings
■  Undertakings 
□  Subsidiaries
£20
20061998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005
Year
Source: Eircom’s Annual Reports 1998 -  2006
Thus, as the reconfiguration of the content and structure of the telecoms sector got 
underway, Eircom also increased its number of acquisitions helping it to sustain its profile over 
the breadth of Irish telecoms. In this sense the developments in Eircom in the first three years of 
reform significantly diverge from the experiences of C&WJ in its first years of reform. That is, 
Eircom’s immediate response was to expand and extend, while C&WJ immediately downsized, 
indicating the diverging rationales guiding each actor.
The story has not been one of unbridled expansion and acquisition, however. For 
instance, while acquiring more entities up to 2001, reconstruction of sector rules and the need to
172
foster competition in areas such as, mobile and cable television meant that the firm had to give 
up some areas of its activities at the regulator’s behest.365 But even here, this decision simply 
represented the firm’s attempt to comply with Comreg’s (then ODTR) direction and not 
necessarily out of an internal desire to recede from this area of the market. Given the 
incumbent’s expansionary impulse, it is debatable if it would have divested itself of these 
operations on its own. As it made clear in 1999 -  one year into liberalisation -  it intended to 
address the challenges (including competition and pressure on its position in the market) 
brought by liberalisation in order to:
ensure Eircom maintains its position as Ireland’s leading communications supplier.
This will include a strong focus on new ways to grow our business, improve 
productivity levels and enhance the range of products and services to customers
(ODTR 1999: 15).
As such, the expansionary policy described in this section marked Eircom’s intent to fulfil this 
pledge with the decision to reduce its size in certain areas being more about the need to fuel 
competition given Eircom’s dominance in these areas.
Furthermore, the retrenchment from the peak of 2001 (Figure 5.1 above) suggests that 
the firm may have in fact been a little over ambitious in the number of operations and services it 
had taken on since 1998. As such, it had by 2001 begun to backtrack on this expansionary 
policy reducing its undertakings and giving up some of its national and international 
acquisitions and multimedia services (Eircom Annual Report 2001: 9).366 Retrenchment in these 
areas was meant to allow the firm to focus more on maintaining dominance in its main areas of 
operation, particularly fixed services. In this sense, divestment of services, such as mobile and 
cable TV, allowed Eircom to focus its attention more on increasing value in its core business. 
This marked a move away from the all-encompassing approach that had accompanied name
365 This point helps to demonstrate the direct influence of the regulator in attempting to curb Eircom’s 
control over the sector. As noted in Chapter three, the firm’s first foray into this area in the early 1990s 
had already been seen as potentially anti-competitive, in that it did not promote diverse ownership of the 
communications industry.
366 Among these were: Ebeon, a website and e-commerce firm; Nua, an Internet consultancy firm and 
Viasec - resellers of security products. The latter was closed in 2001. Its business in Northern Ireland and 
the UK was also cut back (Annual Report 2001: 25). Flexicom, which offered card-processing solutions 
in various currencies, was also demerged.
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change in 1999. Closing subsidiaries meant skills and capacity could be freed to concentrate on 
areas such as improving its fixed line offerings to businesses and residential customers. 
Proceeds from these sales allowed Eircom to cut debts that it had been acquiring over the years 
(Eircom Annual Report 2001: 31). As such by 2003, the firm had made significant progress in 
remodelling itself becoming a leaner and more efficient operator where its success would be 
based on its level of efficiency and competitiveness in specific areas of the market, not its ability 
to offer service in every segment of the market.
This decrease continued and by 2004 Eircom’s undertakings and subsidiaries had 
dropped to 24 from a high of 38 in 2001, decreasing further in 2005, reaching 18 in 2006.367 
This later pattern suggests a serious rethink of the fervent acquisitions of the early years of 
adjusting to regulatory reform and a changed operational environment. Indeed, Eircom has itself 
acknowledged that some of these tactics might not have been the best. As a senior figure noted, 
“a lot of things happened during that post.com boom period which, in hindsight, might not have 
been the best options in terms of the commercial future of the company...” (Interview: Dublin, 
November 2003). Thus, while recognising the value of developments in the regulatory space, 
retrenchment here was also affected by recession in the telecoms sector at the start of the new 
century (Ibid.). In this case, developments were about the effect of international pressures on the 
incumbent’s internal operations forcing it to reduce its size and costs. In this way, the IRA’s 
regulation can also coincide with other issues or actors to drive internal change in large 
dominant incumbents.
Beyond this explanation, its policy of attempting to increase ownership as a response to 
regulatory reform may also suggest that the firm had not quite managed to overcome its 
monopolistic tendencies of the past where size and reach were seen as the basis for success and 
dominance in the sector. The shift in the telecoms regime was eventually to bring more 
awareness to the need to also improve performance and service as a means for market success. 
As Eircom’s chairman noted in an annual report produced on the cusp of full liberalisation,
367 (Eircom Annual Report 2001: 47-50; 2002: 43-45; 2004: 103-104; 2006: 112-113).
174
“(our) future in a fully open marketplace will be highly influenced by the quality of the service 
we offer to our customers” (TE-AR 1998: 17).
5.1.3 Improvements in Service Quality and Customer Care
An important part of the firm’s restructuring concerned its efforts to improve service quality as 
well as its relationship with the public and customers. Reforms have therefore, forced Eircom, 
to place more priority on improving its network and services while raising the profile of its 
customers as key determinants of its performance in a competitive regime. The new emphasis 
on customer care is explicit in statements such as that of the Company Chairman in 2005 (Ibid.). 
Its attention to customer service was demonstrated in the use of consumer panels and the 
adoption of an integrated measurement system (IMS) aimed at monitoring satisfaction levels 
among its users. This system was meant to be a regular and ongoing feature of the firm’s self- 
assessment process (TE-AR 1998: 17). Through these the incumbent has been able to heighten 
its ability to gauge user perception about its performance with such information then being used 
to inform future activities, another strategy reminiscent of C&WJ.
A hallmark of this new approach was the incumbent’s attempts to increase the relevance 
and attractiveness of its services, even attempting to make a direct link between Company and 
government policy (Interview: Senior official, Eircom, Dublin, November 2003). It was able to 
increase its client base by reaching a wider cross-section of audience, including children and 
young adults. New services were, therefore, developed specifically with this segment of its 
users in mind.368 Additionally, Eircom pledged IR£10 million in 1998 to a campaign to make 
information technology more an integral feature of the primary and secondary schools in the 
country.369 Thus, in the second instance the firm ensured that its activities complimented the
368 In April 2000, for instance, the firm introduced a calling card and an accompanying (Carry a Call 
Card) campaign aimed at children. According to the firm, its campaign aimed to, “create awareness 
amongst young people of the importance of having a call card in order to keep in touch with their parents 
when the need arises.” (Eircom 2000c).
369 The Company also followed up this emphasis within schools introducing the concept through 
information packs and posters to principals. Community Liaison Officers (with the police - Garda 
Siochana) also assisted the firm’s campaign by including information on the card in their safety 
presentations to schools (Ibid).
175
state’s intention to increase awareness and the use of information technology in schools (Eircom 
Annual Report 1998: 21).370 Eircom strategically linked its mission here with that of the 
government, identifying linkages between public and Company policy.
It also heightened its emphasis on other customers -  including its business and 
residential clients. As it related to its business clients, Eircom sought to increase its profile as a 
more business-oriented firm in order to gain leverage in what was one of the more competitive 
areas of its fixed line operations. This has been achieved through the introduction of more 
flexible billing strategies and pricing plans for different businesses.371 Schemes such as, “Circle 
of Friends” and its three Options packages (Options 15, 30 and 50) also saw residential 
customers receiving discounts for calling bespoke numbers. The result was greater choice for 
clients in the way they were billed and paid for services. Eircom also sought to increase the ease 
with which customers were able to switch between these options thereby increasing the ‘exit’ 
mechanisms available to clients. Thus, by 2000 customers were able to receive specially tailored 
billing plans based on individual usage.372 As with the Jamaican incumbent, Eircom therefore, 
changed its approach to customers with its strategies now being more closely informed by a 
desire to increase value to customers. Here, the threat of reform, as well as the actuality of this 
reform has provided the incentives for Eircom to review its approach to customers.
As a result of this flexibility some customers were able to receive reductions in their 
call charges- one of the major gains that has been credited with regulatory reform (Interview: 
Senior official, Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003). This view has been substantiated by other 
observers of Irish telecoms who have noted that much of the innovations described here may not 
have been made by the firm had it not been for competition (Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, 
Dublin, November 10, 2003). These were to result in overall reduction in telephone prices.373
370 Also see TE-AR (1998: 19-21).
371 Eircom (2000h). Schemes for small and medium sized business, such as the Optimiser Discount 
Programme implemented in 2000 allowed for pricing that was more closely aligned with individual usage 
patterns.
Eircom (2000i).
373 As an example of the reductions under the firm’s discount plans, a customer signing up to Option 502 
would realise overall reductions of 4% in local daytime calls; 39% in national daytime calls; 39% in
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This was also the case with international call charges particularly to the US where rates 
moved from IR£ 1.12 in 1993 to 0.24p in 1998 (TE-AR 1998: 15). Table 5.1 further illustrates 
the level of Eircom’s rates in 2000, at which point international calls were as low as 12 pence 
per minute. Furthermore, whereas there was only one flat rate in 1993 and 1998, by 2000 this 
had been segmented into day, evening and weekend rates (Table 5.1). However, not all this 
reduction has been due to the firm’s benevolence or efficiency savings. Rather, rebalancing and 
readjustment of international settlement rates also help to explain these reductions (as with the 
Jamaican case).374
Table 5.1: Movement in Eircom's Prices (for Calls to US and Canada) 2000
Old price per min New price per min Reduction
D ay 23p 15p -34.7%
Evening 20p 12p -39.9%
W eekend 17p 12p -29.3%
Source: Eircom (2000f).
Traditional services that had been provided prior to industry reform also came up for 
review. These included Directory Enquiries. Here the technology platform in call centres was 
advanced with the quality of staff manning these operations also being improved through 
retraining. As with the cost reduction strategies discussed above, efforts here were not in vain, 
translating into evident gains for the firm. For instance, directory enquiries experienced a 
subsequent growth of 18% and a six second reduction in the average answer speed for calls
national evening calls; 25% in all international calls; of 8% for calls from fixed to mobile lines within 
Ireland; and up to 350 minutes call credit for evenings and weekends. See, Eircom (2000i).
374 The firm itself hinted at this when it observed that there had been significant reductions in overseas 
rates, particularly in 1998 (TE 1998: 15). This occurred the year after the 1997 Benchmark Resettlement 
Order.
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made to this service.375 Furthermore, a survey of customers in 2000 found that 85% were 
satisfied with this service.376
Crucial among the improvements to existing or more traditional services were those 
relating to its fixed line business. This was to become the firm’s mainstay after the Industry 
regulator had forced it to divest itself of its mobile operations and cable business by 2002. As 
seen earlier, the firm had, by this time, also rethought its policy of outright acquisitions and 
expansion in favour of a more measured program of de-mergers and retrenchment, divesting 
itself of assets acquired in the first years of operating in a liberalised market. Thus, by 2002, it 
also began consolidating its business more around its fixed line business, which had always 
been (but even more so now), the firm’s main area of operation. Thus, furthering its bid to 
modernise its infrastructure, the firm took the decision to begin building its fixed wireless 
access technology after being awarded a wireless licence by the regulator in 2000. In the end the 
incumbent has been able to expend much more energy and focus than the Jamaican incumbent 
in developing the fixed line network to the extent where it remains the dominant operator in 
spite of competition (Eircom Annual Report 2006: 4). Through this the firm could introduce 
more wireless voice, ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) and Internet at a greater 
speed. Such expansion would allow the incumbent greater coverage with improved quality. 
Importantly too, this would also help to advance access among rural communities.377
Collectively, the investments and injection of new skills and capacity discussed above 
were not in vain. An examination of select indicators a year or so after liberalisation (see Table 
5.2) indicates that industry reform which brought new rules, relationships, structures and 
ownership patterns might have been one of the better things to have happened to the incumbent. 
Indeed, a review of these key indicators would suggest that regulatory reform has in fact led to a 
growth in the size of the overall communications market and that as the incumbent, Eircom has 
in fact benefited significantly from this increase. The figures here show that the biggest growth 
areas were in the newer services of Internet and mobile telephony, which realised increases of
375 Eircom (2000j); Gol (1980). The Ombudsman Act 1980, No. 26 of 1980 (Accessed 29/01/07).
376 Ibid.
377 Eircom (2000k).
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175% and 62%. Likewise, Eircom’s profits also rose by 18% in that year though its revenues 
had only increased by ten per cent. Though it was to take a tumble in 2002 profit was back up 
by 39% in the 2003/2004 operating year (Eircom Annual Report 2004: 10).
Table 5.2 Selected Performance Indicators of Eircom One year Into Competition
Internet
Traffic
Mobile
Customers
Internet
Customers
Fixed Line 
Customers Revenues Profit
300%  t 62% t 175%  t 3% t io%t 18% t
Source: Eircom (2000c).
The years immediately preceding full liberalisation had seen the firm increasing its 
number of holdings in the sector. This may be seen as Eircom’s way of increasing its coverage 
and ability to monitor and control developments by lessening the scope for others to compete 
with it. This expansionary impulse was to increase significantly in the first three years of 
liberalisation. The above discussion demonstrated this impact on the firm’s size and scope but 
this impact was also to be felt more directly on human resources and particularly, on the number 
and quality of its personnel.
5.1.4 Personnel Reforms
[Eircom’s] ability to compete successfully in the future will depend 
crucially on the commitment of the people who work in the company, 
and on their ability to become truly customer driven. It is the people, 
rather than the technology that will determine our future success.
(TE-AR 1998: 23)
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As with the Jamaican incumbent, another area that came in for attention was the size of the staff 
that had been sustained throughout monopoly. Overstaffing had been recognised as one of the 
firm’s most serious problems from the 80s and this did not change into the 90s with staff costs 
representing a significant portion of overall operating costs as shown in Figure 5 .2 .378
Figure: 5.2 Relationship Between Operational and Staff Cost: 1996-2005
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Source: Eircom’s Annual Reports, 1996-2005
Consequently, during these years and up to the time of its full privatisation in 1999 the 
firm’s role as the largest employer meant that it remained one of the most important companies 
in Ireland (Burnham 2003: 543).379 The importance of this point taken in the context of the high 
unemployment rates of the 1980s and 1990s made discussions on the size of the firm’s 
personnel (and privatisation) politically charged.380 These views on the firm ’s role were to
378 21,000 staff in 1979, 19,000 in 1984 and 12,700 in 1993 (Gallagher 1993a: 7).
379 Ibid.
380 For instance, between 1983 and 1988 unemployment stood at 16.4%. In 1991, for example, job losses 
had surpassed the number of jobs created in the country. While in 1992 it stood at around 283,000. See 
Caniffe (1992); Taylor (1993b).
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continue into regulatory reform (see Chapter seven) affecting the levels of efficiency and 
change realised in the first few years of regulatory reform.381
As such, political support for substantial reduction in the number of staff employed by 
the Company was not strong. Opposition from these sources had been a significant hindrance to 
the firm’s ability to attain operational efficiency prior to liberalisation as commercial decisions 
had at times been adversely affected by the need to maintain employee numbers and other 
political considerations (shown earlier).382
But even while decreases had been realised, over the years, the staff count remained 
high with opposition to drastic cuts remaining up to the late 1990s. It was not till 1997, with the 
move to partially privatise the firm, that the staff complement fell to its lowest ever when it 
reached 10,995 (as seen in Figure 5.3). This was to fall once again in 1998 as the new owners 
sought to modernise the company. Even where this figure represented the gradual downward 
movement in numbers over the years, 1998 still stands out as a significant juncture in the firm’s 
history since it marked the lowest number that the firm had been able to attain up to that point. 
The decrease also coincided with the decision to fully liberalise the telecoms market and 
represented the success of the senior management in winning employee agreement for reforms 
that were necessary in assisting the firm to face competition successfully. Significant too is the 
fact that this juncture came at the point where the firm concluded an Employee Share 
Ownership Plan (ESOP) (also in that same year) in which employees were to be given shares 
for their agreement to assist the organisation in meeting certain targets.383 The conclusion of this 
agreement served to indicate the internal bargaining, which regulated firms undergo in order to
381 As noted in Chapter three, the firm faced dissent from employees as well as political and union 
opposition on the extent to which market principles, such as privatisation and job cuts could be 
introduced. Indeed, one political party (Labour) had seen the government’s continued ownership of key 
industries such as telecoms as a necessity in helping to provide employment for the population (Nally 
1992: 6).
382 As noted by Murdoch, “Telecom's problem is that it is controlled by the Government of the day and 
subject to political decisions rather than commercial ones” (1993: 14). For example, concern over the 
number of persons that it had to keep in occupation had seen claims that Eircom’s investments in areas 
such as telemarketing in the 90s was simply to allow it to increase employee numbers. It was instead felt 
that such investment would have been better spent improving the existing telecoms infrastructure 
(Gallagher 1993f: 7). Nevertheless, some reduction had been attained over the years.
383 See TE (1999: 137-138).
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secure the internal support for innovations necessary to change its operations to cope with the 
reconfiguration of its regulatory space.384
Source: Compiled from Eircom’s Annual Reports 1998-2006.
In this way, the move towards downsizing was influenced by a recognition that it 
needed to reduce its staff. Privatisation nonetheless, helped pave the way for the firm to make 
the adjustments it needed to reduce its size, providing a route to which this could be obtained 
smoothly. Thus, through the ESOP, Eircom could undertake the immediate adjustments needed 
for updating its operations. These included redundancies, which took place in 1998, allowing 
the firm to achieve such a milestone in personnel size (Hastings 2003: 152). It also allowed 
Eircom to offer an Employee Share Ownership Trust, which allowed the firm to make
384 This is a theme which underscores the discussions to follow in Chapter seven
Figure 5.3: Trends in Eircom 's Headcount 1995-2006
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substantial changes to its compensation and work practices that were thought to be more 
advantageous commercially. These included a reduction in overtime and the introduction of a 
more flexible workday (TE-AR 1998: 18). In noting the many achievements of the firm for that 
year, including a 5% reduction in its cost to turn over ratio, the Chairman noted in his 
contribution to the 1997-1998 Annual Report that,
even more significantly for the future, we concluded a partnership deal with the 
coalition of unions in Telecom Eireann, which will allow us to accelerate and 
complete the necessary transformation in every aspect of how we operate... on 
which we can together build a fully competitive environment.
(TE-AR 1998: 9)
Indeed, in the 1997-1998 reporting year Eircom had taken the decision to remove its 
bonus schemes which together with staff reductions had brought around IR£45 million in 
savings (TE-AR 1998: 11). Yet again, in spite of these achievements there remained some 
acknowledgement that the size of the Company’s personnel was in fact beyond that needed to 
be efficient and as such, more action was needed to reduce numbers and improve 
productivity.385 This remained one of the more delicate issues, which Eircom had to handle after 
1998. However, the firm’s response in these initial years was confounding in so far as its actions 
did not suggest that it necessarily accepted downsizing as a route to greater competitiveness or 
cost efficiency as might have been suggested above.
Indeed, numbers were to climb significantly from 1999-2001 stretching beyond the 
immediate pre-monopoly years. The increase may be related to the firm’s attempt in the first 
phase of market reform to increase its coverage and reach over the entire telecoms sector. In so 
doing, it could monitor and take more control of the developments in the sector through 
advanced ownership and, control. This is as opposed to utilising its proximity and relations with
385 Indeed, even Eircom recognised that the reductions it had managed to achieve from the 1980s to early 
1990s were still not enough but nonetheless, there was not enough of a motivation to achieve more 
reductions in staff figures. See Murdoch (1993:14). This sentiment was reiterated even after privatisation 
and liberalisation (Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003).
183
ministers and policy makers, as may have been the preference prior to privatisation and the 
entry of an independent regulator.
Following from privatisation and liberalisation, Eircom quickly leaped into action 
increasing the size of its portfolio, as shown earlier. Thus, ironically, its response to these new 
challenges represented a reversal in the general trend as it started adding to the size of its 
personnel. As the number of holdings and ventures under the Eircom pic. brand increased so did 
the size of its workforce, hence, explaining the sudden change in the direction of the movement 
in Figure 5.3 from 1997-2001. In one instance, 286 new staff were taken on to man a scheme to 
increase the number of payment options for small and medium-sized businesses.386
Table 5.3 also gives a closer look at personnel movement in the first four years of 
liberalisation. The increases noted here were to take place even after its cable television 
business; Eircable was discontinued at the regulator’s behest in 2000 (Eircom 2000: 81).387 
Even more, while realising redundancies of 740 in 1997, an additional 350 specialists were 
taken on while others were placed throughout the Pic’s operations (TE-AR 1998: 11). Indeed, 
the areas in which new staff was taken on suggests the changing emphasis of the firm and where 
it believed it most needed to bolster capacity to increase competitiveness. Many were placed in 
the firm’s mobile operations and charged with manning the increasing sales and marketing, 
activities that had taken on new significance since competition (as in the Jamaican case).388 
Fixed services, which accounted for many of these new activities and its mobile operations were 
also, to account for the increase.389
386 Eircom (2000h).
387 This had previously employed 270 persons.
388 The firm’s re-entry into the mobile market in 2006 also explains the rise in staff in the same period in 
Figure 5.3.
389 See notes 366 and 347.
184
Table 5.3 E ircom ’s Personnel Structure
Date Mobile Fixed Line and other Communications Cable Total
1999 570 11,323 270 12,163
2000 917 11,689 - 12,606
2001 1,528 11,593 - 13,121
2002 191 10,338 - 10,529
Source: Eircom’s Annual Reports (2000-2006).
The increase in staff also suggests that some of the reductions that had been attained 
under the ESOP were to some extent purely cosmetic since those whom were laid off from one 
department were simply redeployed to other areas within the Company (TE-AR 1998: 13). 
Included here were some of the 3,500 staff that was to be removed over the three-year period 
from 2000.390 This juggling was to become more a feature of the firm’s operations in the 
immediate post reform era resulting in, “significant movement of employees within the 
Company and subsidiaries” (Eircom Annual Report 2001: 5 1).391
This emphasis on redeployment may be related to the initial fear of liberalisation and its 
potential impact on employment among staff, unions and some politicians (raised in Chapter 
three). Following from this, the sensitivity o f this issue was recognised by the firm ’s 
management who also wanted to maintain employee support for the restructuring it wanted to 
undertake internally. Redeployment and not only outright redundancy was important during 
these early adjustment years. This was managed by a Resource Business Unit established 
specifically to manage the whole personnel restructuring process and importantly, to address 
fears relating to downsizing.
However, the imperative of reforms was accelerated when by 2001, 20% of the market 
had gone to competitors and prices had generally been reduced by approximately 18%.392 In 
spite of the 26% increase in overall revenues in the fixed, mobile and broadcasting segments of 
the telecoms market between September 2000 and December 2001, the firm now had to share
390 Eircom (2000c).
391 This was also the case for example, in 2000 and 2002 when the firm divested itself of Eircable and 
then Eircell (see Eircom Annual Reports 2000-3).
392 See ODTR (200Id: 1).
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this increase with other operators providing an incentive for it to make the kind of changes, 
which to an extent, which had been resisted for so long.393 Thus, with a larger group of service 
providers and the prospect of even more entering the market, the firm had to do more to cut 
costs and reduce the potential negative effect of such changes on its income and dominance. 
Figure 5.2 further indicates the close relationship between the firm’s operational and staff costs. 
Thus, while the relationship deviated slightly in 1999, there has generally been a close 
relationship between the two. For instance, where staff numbers reached a climax in 2001 this 
trend was replicated in its operating costs making an even stronger argument for the firm to 
place more attention to this aspect of its operations if it were to move forward successfully.394
Following from this, Eircom committed itself to a three-year programme of intensive 
restructuring in order to re-position itself in the market in March 2000 (Eircom 2000: 53). A 
significant aim of this restructuring was to reduce its overall cost base by March 2003 while 
increasing its competitiveness. A total of €412 Million was committed towards this programme 
in 2000 (Ibid). Through this programme a reduction of 3,500 in employee numbers was to be 
achieved (Eircom 2000: 53).
An important aspect of Eircom’s cost containment was therefore, related to the number 
of staff it hired. As argued above, the firm had been unable to reduce this to an optimum in the 
first three-years of reform with increases actually being realised. Added to this was its 
continuous acquisitions and expansion up to 2001, which further saw operating costs increasing. 
In fact, total operating costs had gone from €801 million in 2000 to €905 by 2001. It was not till 
the major reforms of 2002 that this figure plummeted to €731 million as it began selling some of 
its operations. Further efforts, including staff reductions contributed to 2% reduction in 
operating costs in 2003 (Eircom Annual Report 2004).
The upward trend in employment was halted by 2002 when overall figures had again 
begun to decrease. This was achieved when Eircom began reducing its holdings and operations
393 Ibid.
394 Thus, even whereas other factors may also account for the rise given the proportion of the increase in 
the operational costs vis-a-vis staff costs in 2001, it is still the case that there is still visibly a close 
relationship between the two.
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including, the de-merger of its mobile business (in Figure 5.3 above). The more recent trend of 
staff reduction began with the firm moving fully into private hands at the end of 2001 (See 
Eircom Annual Report 2006: 4). The suggestion here is that ownership does matter for the 
firm’s performance and the way it responded to regulatory reform. As such, with the further 
removal of political constraints on the firm it was thus able to reform personnel structure in 
order to reduce costs and heighten its performance. These measures were also affected by the 
continuing decline in the firm’s revenues and share value as well as the losses incurred from 
competition. 395 On the other hand, re-nationalisation in 2004 did not halt the downward 
movement of staff. One possible explanation here is that the government had by then woken up 
to the need to maintain the reforms that had been initiated by the private partners from 2002.396
Attention to human resources not only focused on attaining the right level in staff size 
but also to quality and training. As such, further changes adopted by the firm included a greater 
emphasis on training and expertise as well as the redrafting of its organisational chart. As it 
related to skills, one of the sources for accessing expertise was through the first set of private 
partners acquired in 1997, the KPN and Telia group. This strategic alliance was used to 
introduce a wider pool of resources needed to make certain changes in the quality of its 
personnel (TE-AR 1998: 17). One of the resources accessed through this network was the 
experience and staff with knowledge operating in a competitive regime (Ibid). Other specific 
areas of skills improvement related to staff operating traditional services such as directory 
assistance. These were retrained while this department was restructured in 2000 to increase 
productivity. Attention to skills and competencies within the firm, therefore, complemented the 
improvements made in enhancing service options and network quality, as in Jamaica.
The review of skills and structure was also extended to the senior management team 
through the redrafting of management competencies. Again, the strategic alliance was to prove 
useful with managers and board members with specific business and retail experience being
395 Murray (2004).
396 Indeed, the improvements that were made between 2002-2004 helped to lay the foundation for the 
Company’s future and by 2006 investors were able to receive a 62% return on their 2004 purchase 
(Eircom Annual Report 2006: 4). Also see Chapter seven for an expansion of this discussion.
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loaned to the Company from 1997.397 Whereas it was felt that the management which existed 
under state ownership was unresponsive and hesitant in embracing change, the move was made 
in the late 1990s to replace these with individuals believed to have a better understanding of the 
demands of operating in a competitive environment (Interview: former telecoms minister, 
Dublin, November 11, 2003; also see for example, TE-AR 1998: 17).398 Senior management 
was therefore restructured from 1997 as the firm sought to secure the competence to oversee its 
restructuring its operations. New management thus, came in when the sector seemed poised for 
further liberalisation by 1997. By the time the reforms were actually introduced the management 
had had a head start in cementing the company’s position at the centre of the sector by initiating 
certain moves which were to help it to modernise some of its processes and approach (even 
while these were aimed at increasing market coverage and resulted in size in increased size and 
scope).
Greater emphasis was also placed on remuneration at the management level with 
increased links between performance and salary. As noted by a Company chairman, “a critical 
ingredient in achieving success is having the right management team properly focused on a clear 
set of business objectives.”399 Salary increase was, therefore, seen as an important strategy for 
attracting greater expertise and encouraging the level of performance the incumbent felt was 
necessary for its growth.400 For instance, collectively, executive board members received a 
remuneration package of €2,210,989 with salary payments amounting to €689,737 in 2000. By 
2001, this had been reduced to €1,331,442 and €512,696, respectively (Eircom Annual Report 
2001: 5).
However by 2004, the total remuneration package had grown significantly with the 
executive team receiving over €5,706 million. While a review of the annual reports for this 
period does suggest that the greater number of Directors and board members may explain the
397 Staff from partners headed up these business units within the Company, namely, its corporate business 
unit, the enterprise business unit and business process development, suggesting again where the firm had 
lacked certain skills (TE-AR 1998: 17).
398 Indeed a Price Waterhouse report had from the early 1990s noted the need for a restructuring of the 
senior management team (Maher 1992).
399 Eircom (2000c).
400 Ibid
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increase, this loses significance when the share of the full figure is examined. That is, one 
person - the chief executive was to have a majority share of €5,606,215 of the full figure in 
2004 compared to €1,224,185 in 2001. Again this illustrates the primacy placed on 
remuneration as an incentive for increased performance and results. Increases here were seen as 
a reward for bringing the Company throughout the turbulent period of privatisation back to 
nationalisation in 2004 (Eircom Annual Report 2004: 47 and 2001: 5).
Finally, as with the reforms in its personnel, privatisation was to free the firm from state 
restrictions on its ability to secure funds and how it utilised such investment.401 The firm could 
now seek the financing it needed to make the investments necessary for improving its 
infrastructure. Additionally, under public ownership the government had from time to time 
required Eircom to pay over dividends to the state outside of its regular tax payments.402 Private 
ownership also removed the state’s claims to the firm’s profits and the risks of the company’s 
income being diverted to bolster the state’s budget.403
5.1.5 Re-branding
Like the Jamaican incumbent, Eircom found itself having to deal with ‘legacy issues’ at the start 
of reform. A significant pillar of its response was to be its attempts to rescue of its image from 
some of the battering and negative perceptions it had inherited over the years. A key plank to 
this strategy was the change of names, which took place in 1999 resulting in what was then 
Bord Telecom Eireann Pic becoming Eircom Pic. Thus, like the Jamaican incumbent this case 
shows the full extent to which incumbents have been willing to go to redesign themselves to 
face change. It also suggests the importance of image and perceptions in the way the incumbent
402 See for example, Murdoch 1992.
403 As noted earlier the firm had to pay over these dividends regardless of its level of profit forcing the 
firm to borrow to invest in the sector. However, it had prior to privatisation taken the decision to stop 
these payments, as it needed to invest in infrastructural growth. The cessation of this practice as well as 
the firm’s ability to raise new capital from its partial privatisation had seen borrowing being reduced 
significantly over the years. In fact, whereas net borrowing stood at around IR£950m in 1994; IR£700m 
in 1996; it had by 1998 fallen drastically to IR£172m (TE 1998: 4). Nonetheless, even while the firm had 
ceased its payment in the early 90s its continued status as a public company meant that up to 1998 the 
state could impose its claims to its profits. Privatisation was to officially remove this claim and the risk 
that it could be employed in the future.
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is able to respond to change and likewise the extent that it is willing to go to change this image. 
In such, cases, the ability to change this image may be considered a competitive advantage for 
the firm.
The choice of names was practical, signalling its move away from traditional telephony 
to more modem forms of communication. As the firm noted in its Annual Report of 2000 this 
move was meant to emphasise, “to the market place the shift which ha(d) taken place within our 
business, from a telephone company to a communications company” (Eircom 2000: 38). In 
other words, emphasis was no longer narrowly on traditional forms of communication - the 
telephone - but had now transcended more recent forms of modem communication, including 
mobile telephony and the Internet. The name change was also symbolic and may be understood 
as a direct attempt to break from the stigma attached to its former status as a government owned 
monopoly. It was thus made a new Company, not only in ownership and modus operandi but 
also in name. To date, Eircom remains the most recognisable company in the market.
Furthermore, Eircom’s donations and philanthropic endeavours have been key in 
helping to raise its profile and strengthen its brand. However, its activities here have been 
governed by internal demands for restructuring. Thus, faced with continued uncertainties during 
its restructuring in the 2003-2004 reporting period the firm began stripping back its brand 
support and sponsorship activities as a way of reducing costs. These were once again taken on 
as the firm became more settled after the benefits of restructuring since 2002 started to be felt 
throughout the Company. These were seen in increased earnings and market growth.404
Attempts to change its image and appear as a more responsive operator may also be 
seen in the changing emphases in its Annual Reports. Thus, Eircom has also begun emphasising 
its corporate social responsibility in much the same way as the Jamaican incumbent, 
highlighting the many ways in which it is contributing to the environment health and well-being 
of both its staff and communities (see for example, Eircom Annual Report 2006: 19-29). This 
area has thus moved from being an addendum on health and safety in the Director’s report (see
404 See Eircom Annual Report (2006: 19, 28-29).
190
for instance, Annual Report 1999: 15) to being a central feature of reports from 2005 (see 
Annual Report 2005: 15-23).
As such, moves to secure its future did not stop at name change but were accentuated by 
actual modifications in practices and ideology governing operations. The shifts in Eircom’s 
strategies in the post-reform period marked a search for the most suitable means of reorienting 
its operations to face the new and emerging threats unleashed by regulatory reform. These 
strategies therefore, differentiated between the large, slow to respond, incumbent, which existed 
before liberalisation to the now more responsive actor post reform. The switching tactics in the 
early years therefore, help to mark this incumbent as an actor who is capable of changing as 
well as being influenced by other forces such as competition and a desire to appease customers. 
As will be shown in the following two chapters, the internal interests, which exist in the firm, 
have also influenced its tactics and strategies.
Thus, as established throughout this chapter, the Irish telecoms incumbent, Eircom, has 
rapidly undergone enormous adjustments in its commercial orientation. These gains have come 
at a price since Eircom has had to increase its level of investment in the sector to bolster its 
capacity. Thus, with the focused effort to increase service and infrastructure capital expenditure 
was to witness an increase of 28% from 1999 to 2000, just a year into full liberalisation.405 In 
2004, these internal changes had seen Eircom being hailed as, “one of the most vigorously re­
structured and re-shaped Irish enterprises at the start of the 21st century”.406 By the end of the 
2006 reporting year, Eircom’s share value had risen by 62%.407 Furthermore, the firm had both 
the capital and size to withstand attacks on its dominance and influence (Interview: former line 
minister, Dublin, November 11, 2003). These have afforded it time to modernise its procedures.
5.2 Embracing Regulation: Internal Response to Regulatory Reform
Industry reform has, therefore, had a profound effect on the incumbent’s internal organisation, 
operations and its overall ethos. Regulatory reform is thus, shown as presenting the incentives
405 Eircom (2000c). This had also increased by 22% over the previous year in 1999 (TE 1999: 2).
406 Eircom (2004).
407 See note 52.
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for incumbents (and former monopolies) such as the two discussed in this study to make 
improvements in their operations which given their size and reach also equates to an 
improvement in overall quality and access in the national telecoms network. Where the 
incumbent is unable to prevent an unfavourable revision in the rules affecting its status then as 
demonstrated in Chapters four and five, it will turn its attention to improving its operations and 
capability to compete as a means of reducing the risks of losing its market share and overall 
presence in the market.
In such, cases, its incumbency affords it a head start in establishing itself in a reformed 
market given its history, knowledge and experience, capacity and resource when compared to 
other operators. These have allowed the incumbent’s to undergo important internal adjustments. 
This may be seen in the measures adopted by Eircom within the last decade and specifically, 
since liberalisation in 1998. Reform has forced Eircom to become more customer focused, to 
improve the quality and speed of its service, while cutting service charges, staff and costs. These 
are in a similar vein to the reforms initiated by the Jamaican incumbent as it too sought to deal 
with the changes in the rules and structure of its operational environment. Similarly, the reforms 
suggest that regulatory reform is not simply about behaviour and structural change as it relates 
to the regulatory space. Rather, this is also about how incumbents -  the main objects of 
regulation in the pre- and post-reform period -  internalise the external changes using these as 
motivation for internal modernisation, demonstrating the impact of changing rules and structure 
in the regulatory space as a route to securing internal reforms in regulated firms. This is 
important since change here will have an external effect in so far as this can lead to efficiency 
gains, service improvement, choice and lower prices in the wider sector.
Among the shifts in Eircom’s ethos is its attitude to customers. Client relations have 
moved to a priority position in Eircom’s operations and so too has market research and sales. As 
demonstrated in the chapter, one of the first moves was to change its name indicating the 
importance of such moves in signalling a break from the negative aspects of its legacy as a 
monopolist. These measures demonstrate the shifts that have taken place in the incumbent’s
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priorities, customer service, efficiency and network capacity becoming more important with 
changes initiated to fulfil these new demands.
Faced with growing uncertainties and heightened risks resulting from the changing rules 
and structure of its operational space, the incumbent also sought to maintain its dominance and 
central position by attempting to increase its ability to monitor and control the telecoms sector. 
Thus, the activities initiated by both of the incumbents were largely similar and were arguably 
aimed at re-ordering their internal environments and increasing their competitiveness as a means 
of controlling the risks and uncertainties faced in their operational space. However, there were 
some differences in the response.
For instance, where both sought to reduce risks and uncertainties by making their 
environments more predictable the attempt to replicate itself throughout the market (in the form 
of subsidiaries and partnerships) was more significant for Eircom than C&WJ. Thus, for Eircom 
managing its future and controlling risks meant trying to gain as many partnerships and 
subsidiaries, in so doing creating alliances to saturate the market, increase its scope and ability 
to monitor the sector. The increase here is also directly related to the firm’s attempt to sustain its 
dominance by increasing the number of areas and operations under its management. This 
marked a shift from its previous strategy of simply trying to keep rules and structure from 
changing in order to prevent attacks on its monopoly privileges. Instead, it now tried to use its 
first mover advantage (presented by its position as the incumbent, owner of the fixed network 
and brand awareness) to extend itself into all the areas of the sector (see Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988; 1998) for a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of first mover 
status). Here one form of dominance -  legal monopoly -  was being replaced by another -  
physical size and breadth, a point which highlights the complexities which regulators 
sometimes face in regulating the activities of a large incumbent which uses its capacity and size 
to maintain its dominance and in so doing, reduce the level of competition which may exist in a
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market.408 Whereas, Eircom felt that increasing its size through the market would reduce entry 
and competition whereas C&WJ was more focused on advancing its poorly developed mobile 
operations against a rapidly growing Digicel. For C&WJ, this was also about the development 
of in-house regulatory capacity as a means of increasing its ability to monitor activities in the 
sector.
Faced with such strategies from the regulated firm who possess the capacity to extend 
itself over a sector (in so doing reduce entry) an IRA or government regulator may need to 
introduce measures to restrict the areas in which the incumbent can operate, as did Comreg 
when it forced Eircom out of the mobile and cable television markets. Ironically, Eircom may 
have benefited from being forced from the markets, since it allowed the firm to focus more on 
improving quality in the fixed network and Internet. C&WJ on the other hand, found itself 
having to dedicate much of its time to competing in the mobile market.
These developments serve to highlight the tensions between the various interests and 
claims on the firm’s operations as it sought to balance the push from changes in its regulatory 
space with the dictates of its staff and unions. As such, whereas C&WJ had more freedom and 
clearer lines of power (C&W pic.) it may have been able to instigate the reforms outlined in 
Chapter four much easier than Eircom was able to do in the first years of reform. In this sense, 
at least, while reform (i.e. privatisation) allowed for internal adjustments such as the ESOP, the 
strength of the employee/union bloc, the involvement of government as shareholder may have 
muted the extent to which Eircom was able to streamline its operations up to 2002 and 2004. 
For instance, the strength of employees and the intersection with the government owners meant 
Eircom could not shed labour as desired in the first three years. In so doing, the firm was simply 
continuing in the way it had throughout the 80s and 90s, albeit at a more pronounced pace. 
During these early adjustment years recognition of the need for cost reduction and greater 
efficiency had yet to become as intense a desire for the firm’s owners. However, it was not till 
the balance of power shifted once more that the more far-reaching changes were made in
408 For instance, Chapter three has shown how the prices which some small operators have to pay for 
leasing capacity over Eircom’s network and the cost of investing in alternative capacity has forced some 
actors out of the telecoms market.
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addressing size, costs and efficiency within the company. This suggests some limit to 
regulatory reform in explaining the internal motivations of incumbents. Further, it is not being 
proposed that every initiative within the incumbent will be driven directly by an initiative from 
the IRA. Rather, reform is shown as forcing incumbents such as Eircom to rethink its internal 
organisation and how, this is oriented towards success in the regulatory/operational space.
These reforms have been hailed as having been made possible by regulatory reform in 
so much as changing rules, ownership, industry structure and the development of new 
institutions within the sector provided the levers for change within the firm. Thus, whereas 
Eircom was formerly described as being:
vastly overstaffed, its equipment was antiquated, its service was erratic, and 
its charges for both domestic and international calls were among the highest 
in Europe... Even more ominously, foreign investor’s complaints had 
become more severe, as such users compared service in Ireland with that 
obtainable elsewhere in the EU. Factories had extreme difficulty in keeping 
telex lines open to their customers and to their home offices, charges were 
excessive, and billing was chaotic
(Burnham 2003: 543)
The internal modifications since liberalisation have ensured that by 2007 such claims were no 
longer valid.
5.5 Conclusion
The intent in the two chapters in this section has been to demonstrate the change and movement 
brought firstly, by the prospect and then reality of industry change. As such, the approach has 
been to establish a trajectory, which follows the firms from positions of dominance and 
monopoly to a phase of incumbency highlighting and explaining the efforts they make to sustain 
this dominance. This follows from Chapters two and three, which demonstrated the tactics 
employed in dealing with change in the regulatory space.
This experience demonstrates that faced with a changed operational environment, an 
incumbent firm will seek to change its orientation and structure in order to evolve with this new 
operational environment. Even more, where it is unable to control the rules in its operational
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sphere, it is forced to turn inwards to attempt to remodel itself in order to control for the risks 
and uncertainties which it faces from the reconfiguration of the sector rules by which it operates. 
These internal modifications in turn have an external effect in so far as they help the incumbent 
to change the way it operates, advancing its relationship with clients and its ability to cope with 
complaints and increased regulation.
Finally, as indicated in Chapter four, the reforms outlined are not necessarily unique. 
This is most certainly the case for moves such as those to reduce the cost base and to improve 
service quality. However, it is suggested here that these reforms are all the more pertinent in a 
study of incumbency and incumbent’s response to industry change given the position and 
history of these actors in the telecoms field. These are for the most part former monopolies 
whom may have been seen as unresponsive and static. Furthermore, the resources possessed by 
these actors have been important in allowing them to time in which to modernise their 
operations. This is not only in the fact that they were both able to negotiate with government to 
delay reform. This is also the case in the fact that their size, wealth and experience acted as a 
cushion to assist them to search for and adopt measures to allow them to operate more 
efficiently.
The incumbents have now undergone significant changes, which were thought to be 
against their nature and having done so, have managed to retain their dominance given their 
ability to adapt to change. As in Eircom’s case these include tendencies for overstaffing, having 
inflated prices, being wasteful and having poor quality (Burnham 2003: 542). As such, the 
presentation here is not just that of any firm but the story of former monopolies, now 
incumbents and the effect that changes in sector rules and governance has on them internally.
Additionally, the timing and extent of the responses adopted by these firms also sets 
them a part from others. Here, reforms have mainly taken place after actual legislative change, 
which brought about the wider changes in the rules and structure of the telecoms sector. This 
has been the result in the two cases examined in this work. Thus, even where some of the 
initiatives may not all be new or innovative, the vigour with which they were undertaken after 
regulatory reform again suggests the impact of this period on both the Irish and Jamaican
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incumbent firms’ activities. The prospect or certainty of such change has also been 
demonstrated as motivation for incumbents to begin shifting from their monopoly mindsets.
Its tactics and strategies here closely resemble those of the Jamaican incumbent’s 
response. Here, after years of comfort and protecting their position at the helm of telecoms both 
found themselves unable to prevent the tide of change, which was engulfing the telecoms sector. 
Failure to prevent restructuring the operational space in both instances nudged the incumbents 
towards considering the restructuring of their internal operations and organisation more 
seriously. As this occurred change management was to become more significant in both cases 
and can be seen in the many measures adopted to modify structure and organisation as well as 
those aimed at increasing the incumbents’ ability to monitor developments in its regulatory 
space.
Eircom has begun to expand once more, having returned to the mobile market since 
2006. Following from this, it may be argued that reform forced the firm to pay attention to 
increasing efficiency and service quality, introducing more of a competitive spirit in its 
monopoly mindset while affording it temporary freedom from political control to streamline its 
operations (i.e. 2000-2004) for greater competitiveness. Thus, Eircom’s return to the mobile 
market may indicate that it has already surpassed the worst of reform while the continued 
reforms in Jamaica (e.g. change in managers) may suggest that this incumbent is still seeking 
the right fit between its organisation and resources and market requirements. As mentioned 
elsewhere too, the competition experienced by C&WJ has been more vibrant with the firm 
being caught off-guard in its mobile market at the start of competition.
The case of regulatory reform also demonstrates the diverse interests, which exists in 
the firm and the way that these interests, particularly those of the employees and their unions 
have been able to access key industry players to ensure gains from the reform process. As such, 
the chapter makes a case for considering the role of internal interest groups within incumbent 
firms and the way this diversity plays out on the choices and options available to incumbents as 
they seek to respond to regulatory reform. This opens the way for a more dynamic view of these 
actors, one which acknowledges that they are not necessarily monoliths; and which recognises
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the diverse interests and players within this actor, thus helping to advance an understanding of 
regulatory reform and the way that incumbents respond to the changes occurring around them. 
As such, the coming chapters will be dedicated to addressing these issues and how they have 
played out in the Jamaican and Irish context.
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CHAPTER SIX
INTERNAL ORGANISATION AND ITS EFFECT ON C&WJ’S RESPONSE TO
REGULATORY REFORM
6.0 Introduction
The discussion in the previous chapters sought to bring more focus on how the Jamaican and 
Irish incumbents responded to regulatory reform. In so doing, they sought to highlight how the 
strategies, governing ethos and activities have progressed in response to modifications in the 
rules and structure of the telecommunications sector in Jamaica and Ireland. The transformative 
effect of pressures such as competition, enabled and institutionalised through regulatory reform 
coupled with changing expectations from consumers were pivotal in nudging the incumbents 
and former monopolists towards making improvements in their service, reorienting operational 
priorities and expanding infrastructure. The transformation in the incumbent’s relationships in 
the regulatory space particularly with the IRA, government and competitors has also been 
emphasised.
In spite of the similarities between Ireland and Jamaica, the Jamaican case of 
telecommunications reform and particularly, an examination of the incumbent firm’s response is 
also revealing in what it says about incumbent firms that are components of a large 
multinational and how they respond to changes in local operational spaces. The present chapter 
therefore, challenges the notion of incumbents and regulated firms more generally, as 
monoliths. The negotiations for the major phase of reform in the late 1990s are therefore, 
warrant a more focused consideration for a number of reasons. Firstly, the following depicts a 
situation in which a formerly cohesive unit - the incumbent - becomes segmented more 
obviously into the local and parent company. Here the Company’s voice becomes broken into 
different tones and messages with significant impact on how the local incumbent and the head 
office approached industry reform and crucially, how these affected the strategies of local 
regulators.
Secondly, the chapter illustrates the incumbent’s strategic use of its segmented structure 
as a multinational to play the international arm against the local as a method of gaining an
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advantage in negotiations. Here C&WJ more obviously becomes differentiated between C&W 
pic (London) and the local management playing off competing messages against local 
regulators.
Third and lastly, the analysis shows how the varying skills, experience and knowledge 
of each body were used to secure C&WJ’s (and hence, C&W Pic’s) overall advantage in the 
reform process. As balance of power switched between each location the firm was willing to 
play to certain views in its diverse bases in Jamaica and London in order to strengthen its hand 
in local negotiations for industry reform and later to utilise the resources available through its 
network of sister companies to adjust to reform. As such, this case helps to indicate the variety 
of responses available to incumbents when faced with changes in their regulatory space. Here its 
geographically dispersed structure and location within a global network of companies helped to 
empower the incumbent firm in its relations with the industry regulators (IRA and Minister) and 
others within a small country setting, indicating the extent to which the internal organisation can 
affect the level of compliance from incumbents.
But while the findings have implications for the nature of incumbency, this also has 
implications for regulators in small countries faced with securing change in a market dominated 
by large MNCs. Namely, as the firm’s structure offers it access to certain resources, likewise 
these can be utilised by regulators to achieve compliance.
6.1 Internal Organisation and C&WJ’s Response to Reform
Over the years C&WJ has adopted a number of different governance models. These have helped 
to define the relationship between C&WJ and its head office in London.409 C&W pic has thus, 
over the years had various levels of ownership over the Jamaican company since its 
privatisation in 1987 when it gained 21% of the newly amalgamated company, TOJ (Stirton and 
Lodge 2002: 3; also in Wint 1996). By 1999 it owned around 89% of Company shares (C&WJ 
1999: 36). The increase in ownership had come about from the government’s pledge to reduce
409 Interview: Past and present heads of the regulatory team at C&W pic, London, February 23, 2007;
March 26, 2007.
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its hand in the Company overtime, as a condition of the privatisation agreement of 1987 (Wint 
1996: 56). But even while C&W pic was the dominant owner of C&WJ (then TOJ), and had 
final responsibility for C&WJ, the local management still had much autonomy over operations 
and management in the 80s and the early 1990s. So while having a split in its ownership 
structure, the firm nonetheless operated for the most part as a single entity with the government 
dealing with the company as a unit.410
This was to change however, as part of an ongoing effort within the MNC to 
reconfigure its global operations. However, on the eve of major reforms the decision was made 
by the then head of C&W pic to bring the global operations closer under the parent company’s 
brand in 1998 (C&WJ 1998: 4). With this, TOJ became C&WJ. This also saw more focus on 
the role of the Jamaican operation in the context of the MNC’s global network.411 The decision 
was made in 2001 to include the Jamaican operations under the Caribbean operations (C&W 
West Indies - C&WWI) and as the largest country and telecoms market in the English-speaking 
region, C&WJ was to continue to be a leading figure within the region. This was changed once 
again when continuous search for the most effective and efficient mode of organisation saw 
C&WJ being moved even closer to the central body in the UK, after the removal of the 
C&WWI which saw the Jamaican management reporting directly to the team in London. Thus 
even while C&W always had ultimate responsibility for C&WJ, this move was to visibly 
indicate the closer union between the local and international arm of the firm.
Thus, the general trend over the years has tended to be towards an even closer alliance 
between the head and local operations. The irony here was that this attempt at closer oversight 
was to lead to divisions emerging in the incumbent, as well as between C&WJ and its majority 
shareholder.412 These divisions were to become more obvious even while taking on a new 
character from 1998 as the growing disenchantment between C&WJ and the Jamaican
4.0 Recall that the independent regulator, OUR did not appear on the scene till 1997 and even then did not 
feature much in the firm’s purview until after liberalisation had begun.
4.1 Interview: Former member of C&W pic’s legal and regulatory team, London, March 26, 2007. This 
concerned discussions on whether Jamaica should be included in the rest of the region, lead the region or 
be a stand alone entity
412 On the other hand, increasing tension may have been likely if  the local managers felt their power was 
being usurped.
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government became apparent. As noted in Chapter two, this was marked by the entrance of a 
pro-reform minister in 1996. This shifting mood was demonstrated more visibly in the Court 
case between firm and state and the antagonistic stance taken by C&WJ towards sector 
reform.413 Here, governance relations between the local incumbent and its head office were to 
change significantly with events in Jamaica (its largest Caribbean business and gateway into the 
rest of the region) increasing in relevance to C&W pic’s future on the island and the region .
As will be shown below this episode was firstly to see a clear split in the tactics and 
approaches of the local versus its head office as the Jamaican government sought to open the 
telecoms sector to competition. This division was later to be mended as the messages from the 
company became more united and C&WJ and its shareholders began speaking with one voice. 
This came as the Jamaican operations were seen to be a forerunner to future happenings in 
C&W pic operations in the Caribbean and as efforts were made to use its multinational status as 
leverage in local telecoms.
6.1.1 From Monolith to External vs. Internal Management
The first sign of an internal split appeared in 1998 as the minister issued the VS AT licences to 
new operators as it sought to begin the process of opening the sector. As argued in Chapter two, 
this move constituted a direct threat to the legality of C&WJ’s monopoly. As noted by a 
representative from the firm, the differences between the head and local office appeared to have 
been based on whether or not liberalisation was sensible for the Company and in particular, the 
timing of the reforms.414 The differences in how the firm should approach change was mainly 
about the senior management and major share holders with employees and their unions having 
little input in the discussions. Indeed, this was one of the major points of difference between the 
Irish and Jamaican case, with staff featuring much less in the latter.
413 See note 129.
414 Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, Jamaica, March 20, 2007.
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Likewise, the OUR was to have little or no role in the actual negotiations for reform.415 
As such, the Minister fulfilled the role of regulator as was the case prior to the formation of the 
OUR. The minister’s decision to grant the licences had come after C&WJ had made a 
commitment to increase its investments in building up the local telecoms infrastructure.416 The 
local management believed that it would be given the time to recoup these investments. Figue
4.3 demonstrates that the incumbent had in fact delivered on its promise with significant 
increases in its investment between 1995 and 1997. There was an expectation within the 
government that the firm would also continue to increase investments; even while it was 
threatening to break C&WJ’s monopoly. The firm’s position was not that liberalisation was not 
going to occur eventually since this had by then appeared inevitable.
The top management of C&WJ felt the Minister’s action in opening the sector to 
competition to be unfair given that it had met this request for investments in infrastructure while 
requisite measures were not being taken to ensure that it could recoup its expenditure. Rather, 
the local management felt the Company needed more time to position itself to face competition 
and so wanted more time to prepare itself for change (Ibid). The minister’s refusal to retract the 
licences and the subsequent action brought by C&WJ were the result (Interview: senior 
manager, C&WJ, March 20, 2007). This was to see the local office being branded as anti­
competitive with both C&WJ and the government in a stalemate.417
The options open to the government was to deal with the Head office who appeared to 
be more conciliatory or adopt a more confrontational approach -  as implied in C&WJ’s stance. 
However, faced with the prospect of an extended and costly court battle, the government chose 
to do the former with the London office agreeing to support the government’s efforts to open 
the local telecoms market418 The apparent hesitation and stubbornness within the local arm saw
415 See further discussion in Chapter 2.
416 Interview: Senior executive, C&WJ, Jamaica, March 20, 2007.
417 The Company CEO was also credited with the breakdown in discussions, given what was seen as his 
confrontational stance. For instance, one interviewee described his period in charge of the Company in 
the late 90s as “one of fighting and wrestling and trying to find ways to be difficult, even if the inevitable 
was viewed” (Interview: Industry commentator, Kingston Jamaica January 7, 2005). Negotiations may 
not have been advanced by what was seen as his “bullish confidence” (Edwards 2001).
418 The HoA as outlined in Chapter 2 was the result of this support.
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the Minister and his negotiating team conversing directly with the staff at the head offices in 
London above the head of the local leadership at C&WJ (Interview: former C&WJ staff, 
Kingston, Jamaica, November 20, 2006; also in Stirton and Lodge 2002: 7). C&W was also 
encouraged to find a balance when the Jamaican Government also made an appeal to the British 
government (Interview: then Minster, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005; Wint 2005: 330). A 
team from London also came to the island to negotiate the structure of the new regime directly 
with the Minister and his team.
The move by the state to make an application over the head of the local offices to have a 
satisfactory and speedy reform within local telecoms, therefore, marked an effort of strategising 
by the state. The experience here also illustrates the difficulties faced by small states in 
regulating large well-resourced firms who are part of a large MNC. While highlighting the 
difficulties it also suggests how such states can secure compliance from such firms, again 
suggesting a case for viewing external actors as important behaviour shapers in large firms. 
Here, the government’s choice of regulatory strategy shows the value of an awareness of the 
actors and issues which can affect the activities of regulated incumbent firms and how these can 
be brought into the mix of regulatory strategies to increase the likelihood of obtaining 
compliance from regulated companies.419 This is the case particularly where they are dealing 
with firms whose command of resources can rival that of a small developing state and where the 
continued support of that firm is important to the overall economy. This appeal was important 
given that the Jamaican state was not in a position to pay fees that countries, such as Hong 
Kong, had paid C&W pic as compensation for premature termination of its licences.420 
Additionally, the state’s success in getting the firm to agree to liberalise within three years is in 
fact a point worthy of note given that countries such as Lithuania had only managed to get their
419 See Foga and Newman (2001: 11-12). The negotiations were hailed as a success and an example of 
how small states can negotiate reforms.
420 Interview with then Minister, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005. The 1988 Licences had stipulated 
that the state would have had to compensate the incumbent in the event that it revoked the firm’s licence 
(E.g. see 22[1] of the Telecommunications of Jamaica Limited (Wireless Telephony) Special licence, 
1988 and the Telecommunications of Jamaica Limited (Telex and Teleprinter Services) Special Licence, 
1988). As such, there was a legal basis for the firm to require such payments from die state since, 
liberalisation and competition would have necessitated the incumbent giving up some of its extensive 
privileges as guaranteed under these licences.
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incumbents to agree to staged reforms within a seven-year period (Foga and Newman 2001: 11).
This left the local leadership at C&WJ feeling as if the head office had “usurped” its 
authority and had failed to support it in its attempt to protect the firm’s long term interests 
(Interview: a senior executive, C&WJ, Kingston, Jamaica. March 20, 2007).421 This may have 
been understandable given that the local management had thought they were doing what the 
head office would have wanted, again given the freedom which they had exercised over 
management and which had helped secure the firm’s position among the most profitable in the 
MNC’s network of companies.422 However, as has been observed, the local management may 
have been a bit over-zealous or strict in their interpretation of C&W plc.’s wishes in this 
regard.423 On the face of it, this marked a clear divergence in the strategies of the incumbent as 
the MNC indicating the impact of such split governance structures in allowing regulators points 
of entry to influence and direct the behaviour of the whole.
As has been suggested too, the incumbent’s tactics may also have been more 
calculating; playing up the difference in views more than was the case.424 As noted by a former 
member of the regulatory team at C&W pic, the focus at the centre was on how best the firm 
could undergo liberalisation while negotiating for conditions which would allow it the right 
incentives to invest in the sector (Interview: London, March 26, 2007).425 Indeed, by the mid 
1990s there had already been some acceptance of the impending reality of liberalisation. 
Whereas the local arm saw this as a more distant event, C&W pic appeared to have
421 Indeed, the then CEO had been credited with taking the Company to the level of being one of the most 
profitable in the global operations (Jackson 2003). With this in mind it was felt that the local firm would 
have been given more support and leeway by C&W pic. (Interview: former employee, C&WJ, January 6, 
2005; November 20, 2006, Kingston, Jamaica).
422 Ibid.
423 Interview: Then Minister of telecoms, Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005.
424 Interview: Former senior staff at C&WJ (who also acted as an adviser to the government on telecoms 
related matters) Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005.
425 Former episodes of license negotiations between C&WJ and the states had indicated the importance of 
having sufficient negotiating skills during this period in order to secure the best terms possible. For 
instance, the renegotiation of the firm’s license in 1968 which created Jamintel had seen C&WJ emerging 
from that episode with the value of its shares severely devalued and though inflation grew it received no 
corresponding increase in the price for international calls with its fixed assets subsequently dropping in 
value (Spiller and Sampson 1996: 64-65). Secondly, its shortsightedness in negotiating the terms of its 
new 1998 license on the foundation of an outdated legislation has already been mentioned in chapter two.
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acknowledged this reality much earlier.426 As such, their effort was spent, not on preventing 
liberalisation but rather on devising the best way of achieving reform while reducing the 
potential risks that such a situation would bring for its operations in Jamaica 427 The concern 
was therefore, about getting the most from regulatory reform not preventing i t 428
The government has subsequently been described as being pragmatic in its approach to 
negotiations and industry reform 429 However, its readiness to negotiate and its pragmatism can 
also be understood in the context of the delays and confrontation it was having with the local 
leadership and wanted to get going with plans to open the sector. Inadvertently, this may have 
strengthened the hand of the head office when the government did make an appeal directly to 
London for support. As one commentator suggested, the whole affair was one-sided given that 
the government lacked sufficient expertise to negotiate on an even footing. 430 Thus, the 
differences were used to increase its bargaining power with the government by appearing to be 
more willing to concede than the local office.431
Further, the fear of the negotiations breaking down constituted a “big stick” against the 
government’s negotiating team who were eager to move forward with the liberalisation process 
(Interview: former senior executive of C&WJ, January 6, 2005).432 C&W pic therefore, 
appeared to be more willing to engage in negotiations with the Jamaican government. Hence, it 
was seen to be more amicable and more understanding of the desire of the Jamaican state to
426 Their experience of regulatory reform in the UK, and other countries such as Hong Kong would have 
ensured awareness of international trends and developments in the area, which were pointing towards 
liberalisation as a growing reality globally.
427 Interview: Former senior member of C&W pic’s legal and regulatory team, London, March 26, 2007.
428 Interview: Senior executive of C&WJ, Kingston March 20, 2007.
429 Interview: Former senior member of the legal and regulatory team, C&W pic, London, March 26, 
2007. Also see discussion on the 1999 agreement in Chapter 2.
430 Interview: Former senior staff at C&WJ (who also acted as an adviser to the government on telecoms 
related matters) Kingston, Jamaica, January 6, 2005.
431 The resources possessed by the regulator (in this case the minister) proved to be insufficient in coaxing 
the firm to comply with its decision to liberalise telecoms. The firm in turn saw itself as a match for the 
government recognising where it had an upper hand, in terms of its willingness to frustrate the reform 
process by taking the government to court. The slow pace in which decisions could go through the 
Jamaican courts and the willingness of the judiciary to rule against the government has already been 
documented elsewhere.
432 This may in fact have seen the government once again being taken on in the Court and having to pay 
C&WJ for breaching agreements and then to buy the firm out of its licence in order to introduce further 
competition.
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open the sector to competition.433 Thus, as regulators are able to appeal to external actors for 
local regulatory support, regulated firms are able to call on the resources, available through their 
split structure, as leverage over local regulators. Whatever the case, the evidence does indicate 
that the formal agreement was the result of negotiations with a head office staffed by a team 
which was much more experienced in negotiating and drawing up such agreements with 
governments around the world.434 This is not implying however, that the local managers played 
no role in structuring the new regime.435 However, it was the expertise of the London staff that 
had the decisive influence in directing the steps of the local office. This team worked directly 
with C&WJ, guiding it on how to handle negotiations and liberalisation through an in-house 
legal and regulatory consultancy.436 This team was the result of collective knowledge gathered 
by the London office over the years through its experience of negotiating similar reforms 
elsewhere in its global operations. As such, there was some basis for the incumbent to offer this 
kind of assistance to the state given that it had in fact, experienced regulatory reform in other 
territories.
Furthermore, the partnership that the state and firm had engaged in for over a century 
meant that there was more to the relationship than simply that of regulator and firm.437 Thus, 
C&W could say, “look, here is how its worked in other countries...” with the understanding that 
the state could borrow from examples of reform in the plc.’s operations, or not.438 In this way, 
the Jamaican government was able to benefit from C&W’s experience in other parts of the 
world. Thus, responsive regulation in particular contexts may also mean borrowing regulatory 
capacity from the regulated firm itself.439
433 Interview: Former C&W Staff, Kingston, Jamaica, November 20, 2006.
434 Interview: Former adviser to the OUR at the London Business School, June 19, 2002.
435 In fact, the most senior member of the Jamaican team was promoted to a top position at C&W Pic in 
London in 2004. His promotion was taken as a sign of his success in bringing the local firm through the 
rough period of negotiation and readjustment leading up to full liberalisation having taken over from the 
head who had presided over the firm during the turbulence of the 1998-1999 period (Observer 2004).
436 Interview: Former senior member of regulatory and legal affairs team at C&W pic, London, March 26, 
2007.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
439 That is, by laying down a set of terms in the Heads of Agreement, which the government had to 
recognise in any new legislation relating to telecoms. At the time this new legislation was the Telecoms 
Act of 2000. The strong influence of the London team also gives further weight to views that the
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This helped to demonstrate how the incumbent was able to utilise apparent differences 
between the managers and majority shareholders and the geographically dispersed structure to 
secure an advantage over industry regulators playing competing messages to strengthen the 
overall position of the company in negotiating for reform. So given its resources, the state 
regulator’s task of getting the firm to comply with the decision to liberalise was made difficult 
as the firm saw itself as a match for the government recognising where it had the upper hand in 
terms of its willingness to hold up the liberalisation process in the courts. The case also 
illustrates the ways in which a small state is able to secure compliance from large, well- 
resourced firms.440 That is, by making appeals to external actors (in this case, the majority 
shareholders in London as well as the UK government) to lobby C&W heads on its behalf, 
suggesting a place for international actors in explaining the behaviour and pressures faced by 
large powerful incumbents.
This incident was however, not the only manifestation of divergence in views between 
senior mangers on the path the firm should take in dealing with reform. For instance, some of 
the more senior management whom had been with the company since its inception in 1988 did 
not support the reorientation along the lines described in Chapter four.441 For instance, the 
reforms in the skills and background of senior personnel were among those issues affecting 
internal relations. These did not see how the new tactics such as, moving away from the 
engineering focus of the firm to hiring individuals with little or no experience in the sector 
could advance the firm’s aim of increased competitiveness. Indeed, these differences in views 
did contribute to some unsettlement in the firm as it sought to adjust to competition. This 
unsettlement was to cool around a more unified view of the way forward as much of the senior 
executive and management team who were against the firm’s strategies were gradually replaced.
government was overwhelmed by the shareholders in London, resulting in the incumbent having undue 
influence over the negotiation and legislative process.
440 The firm was also a significant contributor to national development where receipts to the government 
totalled around J$4 billion annually. The firm was also a significant employer and one of the largest 
companies in the country (C&WJ-AR 2005: 6). As such, its operations and good relations between the 
firm and state were also important to the state as much as it was for the company itself.
441 See Observer (2001a; 2001b).
208
The majority of these had been with the company since its inception.442
6.1.2 Even Closer ties Between C&W and C&WJ: Post 1999
By the end of the 1990s, the Jamaican operations were to become more closely integrated into 
the C&W global network with internal governance becoming more of a prerogative for 
international shareholders who exercised closer oversight over local operations. As such, there 
was, “a shift overtime as to who was in the driving seat” (Interview: former member of C&W 
pic’s legal and regulatory team, London, March 26, 2007). Closer alliance meant that by the 
time the Ho A was signed and liberalisation of the sector commenced in 1999, the differences 
within the firm had begun to diminish. The departure of individuals less keen on the path that 
the firm had taken also lessened the potential for internal organisational divergences. Internal 
governance and management therefore, became more unified around a desire to improve and 
modernise to face competition.
This was to be the result of a closer relationship among the different interests, namely 
those of the shareholders and managers. Since the start of the negotiating process at the end of 
1998 to present, there has been a shift in the balance in the relationship and reporting structure 
between the local firm and the head company. Ultimately, this balance slid more and more away 
from local managers with the head office, taking a more decisive hand in C&WJ’s affairs. As 
noted by one interviewee there was need for a trade off between the management of operations 
in the local firm and the benefits to be had from linking closer into the wider C&W group 
(Former member of the senior legal and regulatory team at C&W pic, London March 26, 2007). 
Here, the stress was on how best to manage the reform process in order to allow C&WJ and 
hence C&W pic to secure maximum gains; this as opposed to allowing the government to go 
forward to reform the sector without their input. The point also helps to explain the decision to 
take a more decisive role in local operations by bringing the local firm closer under the 
management of the head office in London (C&WJ 1998: 4).
442 Ibid.
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The significance of the events in Jamaica for C&W is not to be underestimated. Prior to 
1998, closeness between C&WJ and C&W was visible mainly in the form of the latter’s shares. 
The threat of market reform was however, to change this as the value of C&WJ in the MNC 
network increased. On one hand, C&WJ’s value lies in the lessons they held for the corporate 
body’s approach to reform elsewhere in the Caribbean and for the future prospects of the Group 
(Collister 2007).443 The Jamaican operation was the first among its fourteen in the Caribbean to 
be liberalised. Developments in the country were therefore, being watched very closely by 
governments in the remaining islands.444 As such, the Jamaican arm:
has had to be right at the leading edge of transforming the company from being an 
incumbent exclusively licensed telco into a ... competitive telco operating in a 
competitive market place.445
C&WJ therefore, remains a model and test ground for the C&W group for how best to 
cope with operating in a new market environment. Hence, the close attention and support which 
the Jamaican incumbent received from its majority shareholder in London in helping it to deal 
with liberalisation and the government’s attempt to change the terms and conditions of its 
licence. This relevance extends beyond the country where the firm currently operates in 33 
countries (Ibid). As such, lessons picked up from the Jamaican experience were considered to be 
useful in helping the firm to deal with regulatory reform in the remaining Caribbean islands in 
which it operated as a monopoly (Interview: senior member of regulatory team, C&W pic. 
London, February 22, 2007). With the Jamaican operations carrying the lead in the Caribbean,
443 Indeed, the island offered the base for any other firm wanting to break into the telecoms market in the 
English-speaking Caribbean. In fact, this had been one of the specific advantages of the geographic 
location of the island, which had appealed to early entrepreneurs who had also used Jamaica as a central 
point of connection. For instance, according to the Chairman of Digicel, “Jamaica has set the pace for the 
entire region to follow and the other islands are following suit because of the tremendous example set by 
Jamaica”. The firm also suggested that Jamaica would become the base of its hub in the Caribbean 
(Observer 2002).
444 For instance, islands such as, Barbados also adopted a phased approach to liberalisation. See the FT 
(2001).
445 Interview: senior member of regulatory team, C&W pic. London, February 22, 2007; also see Collister 
2007.
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happenings in the local firm in the late to early 1990s and (even at present) were particularly 
relevant to the C&W brand and its success across the whole of its business.446
On the other hand, the Caribbean region remains one of the most significant, 
commercially. Again, the Jamaican operations remain the largest, thus having the greatest 
impact on the consolidated results of the C&W group. For instance, C&WJ has in the past 
accounted for up to around 40-45% of the total profits for the entire Caribbean region 
(Interview: senior Executive, C&WJ, Kingston March 20, 2007).447 Thus, the new regime has 
seen C&WJ becoming more closely associated with the C&W pic brand. This has been 
achieved not only via name change but also through the greater relevance of the Jamaican and 
regional operations to the fortunes of the parent company and overall group results.
With the re-branding of the individual entities within the C&W group globally and the 
conclusion of the negotiations for the new regime locally, C&WJ now has closer ties with its 
counterparts around the region, including Panama and the rest of the world. The relevance of 
C&WJ to the performance and continued survival of C&W has meant that the former is also 
more closely watched by the parent Company. The location of the incumbent within a larger 
group of companies and its relevance within this group are therefore, shown as being important 
for the level of support it has received in areas such as, industry reform and the build of 
regulatory capacity. This support has continued as the incumbent and its largest shareholders 
continue to search for ways of adjusting to market changes both locally and globally.448 It is 
within this context as well, that one can understand the seriousness with which the head office 
viewed the happenings in Jamaica.
446 Indeed, the losses sustained by the home company had forced it to recede from some of the businesses 
and acquisitions it had made at the height of the Internet boom. Businesses in the US were thus discarded 
while it also began downsizing in its various operations globally, including in the UK. For instance, a 
report from European Communications (EuroComms)noted that by 2003 1,300 staff had been made 
redundant in Europe and the US. Another 2,200 were due to be axed from these locations in 2003. In the 
UK a further, over 1,500 were to be made redundant over an 18 month period from 2003 (EuroComms 
2003).
447 This relevance has only increased with the Jamaican operations taking the lead in Cable and Wireless 
International’s overall growth in earnings in the 2006/7 reporting year experiencing a 47% rise in mobile 
customers (Gleaner 2007).
448 For instance, the firm’s annual board meeting was held in Jamaica in 2007, the first time since 1999 
that this had been held outside of the UK, this as the majority shareholder sought to mobilise and indicate 
its backing of C&WJ (Collister 2007).
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Even more significant for the present discussion is the type of resources that the 
incumbent has been able to utilise through this new and closer relationship, which has helped it 
in facing the new threats and pressures in its regulatory space. The new relationship has brought 
with it greater possibilities for the firm in terms of opening the door to a network through which 
it can access the skills and competencies to assist it in a new operational environment where 
competition, transparency and accountability are more important. For instance, the investment 
in infrastructure has seen capacity enhancement in the area of e-commerce where locally based 
Data networks and Internet Protocol were upgraded and linked to C&W pic’s global network. 
Thus, while C&W pic’s operations across the Caribbean region had been seen as separate entity 
with each island taking control over its business, this approach was also to change with the 
ongoing search for improvements. Here the firm began utilising its sister operations across the 
region to enhance its competitiveness. This was visible in its Pan-Caribbean Online Services 
Division, which used resources across the region to bring web hosting, e-commerce, content 
distribution, etc. into the Island. While the Island’s customer contact centres offered services to 
other islands including the Turks and Calicos Islands (C&WJ-AR 2002: 7). As a part of a 
regional and global network the firm’s strategy was to leverage its resources across the region 
through greater centralisation and coordination, thus, taking strategic advantage of its size and 
global network. As noted by one senior member of the C&W pic team in London, this has been 
one of the important benefits to accrue from the being linked closer into the C&W network 
(Interview: February 22, 2007).
This has also been seen in the practice of lending managerial capacity and skills from 
other areas of the Group to assist the local office in related areas. For instance, the senior 
regulatory team from the London office had helped to bolster regulatory capacity locally by 
assisting C&WJ in various negotiations with the Regulator’s office (Interview with former head 
of the regulatory team at C&W, March 26, 2007). These were for instance, aimed at shaping 
some of the new rules and structures for the sector on the cusp of reform including, those 
establishing suitable caps on prices (Ibid). This is in keeping with Lodge and Stirton’s 
proposition that, “the ability to draw on expertise internationally allows for professionalisation,
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increasing regulatory capacity vis-a-vis the international resources of trans-national companies” 
(2002: 8). Additionally, by borrowing from the head office C&WJ was given the time to train 
and develop its own expertise in house.
Closer alignment into the C&W network has also afforded C&WJ access to a pool of 
staff with the experience of operating in a competitive environment and negotiating with 
governments for regime change in other territories. As such, C&WJ was to witness a number of 
staff from the main office and other countries joining it at various points throughout its 
restructuring from 1998.449 The last four of the five chairmen that the firm has had since 1998 
have for example been from other parts of the Pic’s empire (as seen from a review of C&W’s 
Annual Reports 1998-2006).450 Further, being a part of this wider network has seen the adoption 
of similar procedures and contracts among the Group’s units. For instance, the C&W group now 
has a single purchasing agreement, reducing the time and necessity to negotiate individual terms 
with clients.451 Through these means, the demands on the attention and resources of C&WJ are 
reduced while simultaneously its capacity and expertise was continually being advanced 
through opportunities to trade best practice with its sister companies. It has also been able to 
monitor developments in the telecoms sector more closely. Thus, as more players have entered 
the market C&WJ has taken to regulating the sector, thanks to the capacity in its Legal and 
Regulatory Department.452
6.2 Discussion: Internal Organisation and Governance and the Incumbent’s Response 
to Change
The analysis has been aimed at demonstrating that incumbent firms are not monoliths. It has 
also aimed to address how they respond to industry change and how their internal structure and 
organisation can assist them in responding to changes in its operational or regulatory space. 
Three important arguments have emerged from the presentation.
449 Interview: Senior regulatory staff at C&W pic, London, February 22, 2007; Former head of regulatory 
affairs at C&W pic, London, March 26, 2007.
450 This is quite a change given that the firm had but one chairman for over a decade when Mayer Matalon 
resigned in 1998 (C&WJ-AR 1998: 7).
451 Interview: Senior member of the regulatory team in C&W pic, London, February 22, 2007.
452 Even helping the regulator to monitor the activities of its competitors. See Thompson (2002a); and 
Chapter 2.
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On the first level, the presentation has been about a geographically dispersed incumbent 
firm operating within two contexts, locally and internationally. The discussion also suggests the 
value of a consideration of incumbents and former monopolies, which acknowledges the 
varying interests and stakeholders, which exists within this entity. It also suggests that 
differences here will also have a role to play in understanding the regulated firm’s choice of 
tactics and strategies when dealing with change.
The main interests at play in the Jamaican incumbent were those of the senior managers 
and the majority shareholder (C&W pic) with employees and other shareholders having little or 
no presence in terms of directing company policy. As will be presented in the next chapter, this 
was the opposite for Ireland where employees were influential in dictating the pace of reform 
not only within the firm but also in the wider telecoms sector. The independent regulator - the 
OUR -  also had little role in the main negotiations for sector reform. As regulatory reform 
loomed on the incumbent’s horizon, this was to give rise to a number of issues, which served to 
dispel the image of C&WJ as a monolith.453
The period of uncertainty and plural views on the way the firm should proceed 
represented a jostling for authority and power between senior management in C&WJ and C&W 
pic. On the other hand, it has also been noted that the differences between the local and overseas 
management may not have been as deep as it would appear but that these may have been 
utilised by the firm to its advantage. In such a case, the presentation also demonstrates how 
large geographically dispersed regulated incumbents are able to use their structure to their 
advantage when dealing with local regulators. On the other hand, this experience also has a 
lesson for regulators. That is the difference in the messages emerging from the firm may have 
allowed the regulator (in this case the Minister) to breach the firm’s defence by appealing to the 
parent company and government regulators in the head office. This move had the effect of 
breaking the stalemate that had emerged between the regulators and local management. Herein
453 It could also be said that these differences had existed prior to this period but had been less visible. 
Indeed, the firm’s structure had always been dispersed since privatisation. As has been argued here, 
however, the key point is the way in which these became more obviously differentiated under the pressure 
of industry reform, again highlighting the complexities, which may exist within regulated firms - 
complexities which regulators must consider when designing and implementing regulatory policy.
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lies a wider lesson for regulators, particularly those in small resource-poor countries, on how to 
break the power or secure support when dealing with large incumbents who are linked into a 
larger international network. That is, where compliance is not forthcoming from the local arm 
then appeals can be made to a more powerful actor in within the MNC network in order to 
secure support for local reforms. This kind of intervention was not necessary in former years 
where both firm and state had a more cordial relationship and where the former minister had 
shared similar views with management on how the sector should be organised and managed. 
The findings here substantiate those of Chapter two.
However, as divergences in views on the timing and path to reform existed in the early 
period, these were quickly dispelled through organisational and personnel restructuring by the 
end of the 1990s. This was achieved through rebranding of the firm under the C&W brand 
signalling that the balance of power would be shifting to London. The response here occurred 
not only within C&WJ but also within the wider group of companies as C&W sought to adjust 
to face globally changing principles and procedures in telecoms. In this way, regulatory reform 
was not just a local phenomenon with local impact. Rather, it was to have a ripple effect on the 
sister operations and those of the parent company as the impact of reforms in Jamaica spread 
outwards to the rest of the Caribbean where local events were being watched keenly by other 
governments and potential competitors. Here the threat of regulatory reform saw the balance of 
power shifting at various periods throughout C&WJ’s operations and attempts to respond to 
industry change. This is demonstrated for instance, in the changes in the corporate governance 
models adopted within the group over the years in response to the changing local and global 
operational environment. In the end, organisational reform throughout phased liberalisation to 
present has seen the firm once again, speaking with one voice and regrouping around shared
454strategies.
On a second level, the case suggests how a firm’s structure and location within a MNC 
network allowed access to resources and experience, which rivalled that possessed by the
454 But even so, the geographically dispersed nature of the firm was still used to C&WJ’s advantage. 
Regulatory expertise could thus be secured from its sister company and its head office in London.
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regulator and government.455 This case depicts the effects regulatory reform can have on 
governance structures and relationships within regulated incumbents who are internally 
segmented given their location within a large multinational network. In this case, the 
segmentation was mainly among shareholders and managers (between the head company and its 
satellite) who had disparate views on the path the firm should take in addressing the changing 
space within which it existed. By acknowledging the role of the internal structure and the 
organisation of C&WJ as an incumbent with ownership and management split between London 
and Jamaica, the presentation adds to the argument made in the opening chapter -  that is, 
incumbents are not monoliths.
Its status as an MNC proved an advantage to C&WJ in its search for ways in which to 
adjust to reform and to deal with regulators. Its sister and parent companies allowed the 
incumbent to increase its arsenal of skills and talents, which it called upon when necessary. This 
is not to say that other companies are not able to gain required skills and talents to cope with 
reform.456 Rather, the suggestion here is that where such resources are available as they were in 
the case of C&WJ, then they potentially constitute another level of support and defence for 
incumbents when faced with threats to its dominance, particularly when (as in this case) the 
incumbent is also operating in a small developing country.457
The incumbent’s advantage here is that it was (and still is) able to utilise its network to 
access required competence and best practices, negotiating capacity, technical skills and 
knowledge of how to deal with governments which it can then store in house for the benefit of 
the overall group. C&WJ has at different points called on these resources to assist its operations 
in Jamaica. For instance, its use of purchasing agreements from sister companies in other 
territories has allowed it access to tried and tested documents that it can utilise in its dealings
455 This point also adds weight to Braithwaite’s point that the networked resources of corporate bodies 
may rival those possessed by state regulators in the developing world (2006: 891; also see note 44 in 
chapter 1).
456 As has been seen in the case of Digicel, its access to resources and expertise for breaking the 
monopoly in Ireland and operating in a competitive telecoms regime may have been instrumental in 
helping it to become the most successful rival to C&WJ in the Caribbean.
457 This may more often be the case than the other way around given the likelihood that the head office 
and locus of operations of the MNC may be located in a developed and not a developing country or 
smaller developed country.
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with competitors locally. Thus, the multiple demands on C&WJ’s in-house resources are 
reduced while allowing it to focus on other activities such as monitoring the activities of its 
competitors and the regulators.
However, it was mainly in the area of legal and regulatory expertise that the use of the 
MNC network was to prove useful. Having experienced regulatory reform in other territories, 
C&WJ was able to benefit from the experience of the wider group. As presented here (as well as 
in Chapter 2) this team assisted the incumbent not only in its relations with competitors but also 
with other industry players such as the regulator and Minister as the incumbent ended up 
assisting the state in designing rules and in governing the sector.
This move has also had important consequences for the ability of the local firm to 
leverage skills and resources needed to assist its operations locally. For instance, it has been 
able to maintain access to the inner circle of regulation given its expertise in operating in 
competitive regimes and has also been able to import agreements and advice developed in other 
locations to assist in its dealings with actors in its regulatory space.
The final level of analysis is related to the two main points noted above. That is, the 
Jamaican case of telecoms reform helps to shed light on how large incumbent firms who are part 
of an MNC are able to utilise their structure and size as leverage not only in negotiations for 
sector reform but also to access a network of expertise and resources which then helps it in 
adjusting to reform. The result is that the firm is able to call upon a wealth of talent and 
information, which may rival that possessed by a small state. But even more importantly for the 
incumbent, this structure may inadvertently allow it to play off competing messages between 
the different levels of management to its advantage. Thus, while the real extent of internal 
differences within C&W and C&WJ’s management remains contested, there is nonetheless the 
suggestion that by the time the actual negotiations for reform had begun, the appearance of 
differences may have ultimately strengthened C&W - the MNC’s - hand against a government 
who was happy to finally be receiving support for its liberalisation policy. From then, C&WJ 
was placed in a position where it could negotiate for a set of conditions more advantageous to
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its future success in a competitive regime. In so doing, the incumbent has been able to maintain 
its presence at the helm of the local market -  in this case, the Jamaican telecoms.
Further, the experience and knowledge possessed by the firm vis-a-vis a small country 
with little experience of regulatory reform, technical expertise or knowledge of telecoms and a 
desire to achieve a swift liberalisation may have weakened the state’s hand in the negotiations 
for sector reform. As such, C&WJ was able to take the upper hand in the discussions. Thus, 
where a small government such as that in Jamaica may not have been able to command the huge 
amount of expertise that the firm possessed given limits in resources, and whereas other local 
telecoms operators did not have the scope or access to a network of resources and global 
expertise, the firm has had somewhat of an advantage over others. As has been shown in this 
and other chapters on this actor, it has not been shy in utilising these when its position of 
dominance has come under threat.
Such insights help to give an account for the sustained dominance of incumbent 
telecoms firms in spite of reforms meant to allow for competition and to reduce their 
stranglehold over telecoms. In so doing, it takes the discussion on regulatory reform away from 
viewing the incumbent firm as a monolithic structure simply complying with the directions of 
regulators to seeing it as a more dynamic, complex entity within the whole debate on regulation.
These findings in turn, have important implications for regulation. Namely, while the 
findings highlight the complexity of the regulator’s task, it also indicates the ways in which 
regulators can develop strategies that are responsive to the regulatory context. Thus, as the firm 
could call on its network, regulators in this case have been shown making attempts to co-opt, or 
enter, this network as a means of gaining support for local regulation as well as to secure 
regulatory capacity. This is the case even where it may mean using the incumbent’s own 
resources. In some ways this may be counter-intuitive, however, the OUR and minister have 
been shown successfully utilising this strategy in Jamaican telecoms.
Finally, the measures undertaken by the incumbent, including the involvement of the 
MNC, have been driven by a desire to reform and bolstering internal capacity as a means of 
coping with the threats it faced from regulatory reform. Perhaps more so than the measures
218
discussed in Chapter four, these have been more directly driven by the IRA and state regulators. 
This indicates the value of legislative reform in recreating the rules and behaviour of dominant 
firms. As shown too, some of the firm’s activities had also been driven by the wider trends 
toward reform in telecoms, which threatened both the local incumbent and its parent company. 
As it concerns this order of relevance, global market pressure (as opposed to the OUR or 
minister) have played a role in C&W’s, and hence C&WJ’s, response. Thus, where national 
regulators are able to keep abreast of global developments and trends, they may be able to be 
timelier in their actions; and in so doing, increase the chance of success and heightened 
legitimacy in regulation. Other drivers here include the firm’s senior managers. However, their 
influence, though important in challenging the regulator, has since become more muted, with 
the closer integration between local and head office.
6.3 Conclusion
The presentation here has been aimed at moving away from a preoccupation of the firm as a 
monolith and a non-malleable actor arguing that there exists a number of interests and groups 
within this actor that have an impact on the way it operates in the sector, the way it responds to 
regulators and how it adjusts to change. This offers another level of analysis on how redrafting 
the procedures and structures within telecoms affected the incumbent operator and how its 
internal organisation affected the way it, in turn, faced reform. This has been demonstrated in 
the firm’s use of its MNC status to gain leverage in its dealings with regulators, the tensions and 
conflicts that emerged as the different interests and stakeholders diverged on the path the firm 
should take in responding to change and the way the firm’s size within the regulatory space vis- 
a-vis the state, gave it an advantage in responding to change.
The case illustrates the importance of internal structure and governance in regulated 
incumbents at three levels. Namely, it highlights how an incumbent firm who is geographically 
dispersed firm -  an MNC -  responds to change. Secondly, it illustrates how industry reform can 
threaten the internal balance and governance relationships within the regulated firm. Periods of 
regulatory flux may offer an opportunity for key interests, such as managers and shareholders to
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attempt to remodel an organisation along a desired path. This can either work for or against the 
regulator and policy makers by rendering the regulatory task more complex or by offering 
regulators points of influence where it can seek support from sympathetic interest groups within 
the regulated firm. On a third level, the chapter also shows the difficulties which a large 
dominant, well-resourced firm pose to regulation as well as, how regulators can in turn utilise 
such resources in securing change. Collectively, the presentation shows that far from being 
single monolithic structures incumbent firms are complex actors. This complexity can 
potentially make the regulator’s task more difficult and less about simply making and 
implementing rules within a sterile context but where compliance is about coming up with 
creative approaches to gain support for its position, particularly so in a small developing country 
faced with resource issues.
Finally, while the case illustrates the difficulties faced by small states in attaining 
compliance from large dominant actors, it also offers solution in terms of illustrating how such 
states can in turn overcome some of these difficulties that may be faced because of size or 
resources. Regulation and regulatory change is therefore presented as a much more complex 
process where the regulator may have to make appeals to a variety of interests within the 
regulated entity in order to gain support for its position. Secondly, the state can overcome 
deadlock between regulator and regulated in a situation of power imbalance by appealing to a 
third party, in this case, the British government. Here again regulation is seen neither as a 
bilateral nor even as a simply localised activity. This ‘other’ also includes supposedly more 
powerful and influential governments who are able to nudge large home based MNCS towards 
complying with regulators and rules in smaller states.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNAL ORGANISATION AND ITS EFFECT ON EIRCOM’S RESPONSE TO
REGULATORY REFORM
7.0 Introduction
Accounts of regulatory reform have tended to ignore the impact that such change has 
had on the regulated incumbent firm, beyond a simple acknowledgement that this actor now 
experiences competition and greater regulation. The complexity that exists in such actors and 
the ways in which they respond to change at an organisational level are also ignored, leading to 
an inability to fully account for the continuing dominance of these firms. As with the previous, 
this chapter aims to address these issues by assessing the effect that change in the regulatory 
space can have on the internal balance and organisation of a dominant regulated entity -  the 
telecoms incumbent -  and how it responds to such changes. Like its Jamaican counterpart, the 
Irish incumbent was to move further away from the appearance of a monolith, to becoming 
more segmented, as the pressure and then reality of regime reform became more pronounced. 
This was partly due to the change in ownership but even more importantly, the result of the 
segregation of the monolith into disparate interest groups as the period of regulatory flux saw a 
struggle for authority and influence over the way the firm should respond to change.
Whereas the Jamaican case was more about shareholders (C&W pic. and local 
management) the Irish case suggests the need for a consideration of the role of another group of 
internal stakeholders, unions and employees, in debates on regulatory reform and the effect on 
the regulated entity and its attitude to regulation and industry change. Here dominant interests 
within the company, namely the employees represented by their unions were able to leverage 
support from political elites to gain access and then to strengthen its hand in internal discussions 
on the direction of the firm. In so doing, the company was able to impose its will on the change 
process influencing the redesign of the telecoms regime and the firm’s choice of strategies for 
adjusting to change. The chapter also shows how reorganisation of internal balance of power 
broke the union’s hold, facilitating the far-reaching rationalisation programme discussed in 
Chapter five. More generally, the chapter illustrates the effect of systemic change on the internal
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balance and organisation of a seemingly monolithic regulated entity. Consequently, it is shown 
that regulation is not only carried by actors in the regulatory space, but also by those within the 
regulated entity, not necessarily in the way covered in descriptions of self-regulation. That is, 
the source of regulatory pressure is not the monolithic structure or industry, but individual 
interests within the incumbent.
The discussion will be arranged as follows: Section 7.1 highlights the changing 
organisation and re-orientation in the firm’s ownership and governance structure from the 
1990s, showing how those changes allowed for different strategies and response. The effect of 
reforms in segmenting the firm into more clearly defined interests is also highlighted. This sets 
the context for Section 7.2, which will focus particularly, on the activities of the employees 
through their unions and their relevance to the firm’s strategies. The paper then closes with a 
discussion in Section 7.3 and conclusion in Section 7.4.
7.1 Changing Ownership of Eircom
Unlike the Jamaican incumbent, Eircom began life as Telecom Eireann, a fully owned 
government entity, when it was demerged from the government owned Post and Telegraphs 
Company in 1982.
Since then it has undergone shifts in its ownership a number of times. In the first place, 
it had moved from being owned by the government to a state of partial privatisation in 1997 
when shares (20%) were bought by KPN and Telia (O’Mahony 1998).458 Ownership was later 
extended with further privatisation in 1999 with KPN/Telia increasing their share in the 
Company by a further 15% (held jointly in a new entity, Comsource) and staff gaining shares 
(14.9%) in the firm. By 2001, however, KPN had sold its 21% stake through a secondary 
offering. Telia had the remaining 14% and it too stepped out of the market (Annual Report 
2001: 52).459 Again, this shifted at the end of 2001 when a new set of partners were found and 
the Company’s assets were transposed into a new holding company, Valentia
458 See note 196.
459 This decision had been made from 1999 when Telia merged with another telecoms firm (Telenor) with 
KPN also deciding to leave to refocus on the Eastern European market (ODTR 1999: 6).
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Telecommunications Limited, when the Valentia Group emerged as the new majority owners. 
This last move was also to see the employees increasing their equity by 15% (Eircom Annual 
Report 2002: 5, 49).460 During this time the firm went from being a public registered to a private 
liability company in 2002 marking the first substantial legal change in the firm’s status.
The early ownership and governance patterns were to gradually lead to the emergence 
of a number of strong interest groups within the Company that at times rivalled each other for 
the right to hold the reigns over Company policy. These included the unions, senior 
management, and the different private owners with the government being thrown into the mix. 
Finally, the firm was to return to public ownership in 2004, again marking a new phase in 
internal relations. As such, the changing governance structure was to be reflected in the 
changing tactics and approach employed by the Eircom in coping with industry reform. Thus, 
while one interviewee asserted that it was monopoly, not ownership that was the issue in the 
firm’s performance prior to liberalisation, it was clear that this had changed by 1997 when 
Eircom experienced its first bout of privatisation.461
As shown in previous chapters (especially, Chapter five) privatisation in 1997 and later 
in 1999 was to allow Eircom to make more investments in advancing the local telecom 
infrastructure, improve overall service quality and introduce more strategic management of its 
business. However, having achieved some reforms up to 2001, it was to become evident that 
governance was still an issue as the balance of power (unions supported by government owners) 
swung against the private investors and managers making certain adjustments, particularly those 
that would threaten the numbers employed by the firm, difficult to accomplish.462 So at a point 
where the firm needed to make specific changes to increase efficiency it was unable to do so 
quite to the extent desired given an ownership structure, which included the government and 
staff who appeared to be willing to support reforms, so long as it did not involve a reduction in 
personnel (see Figure 5.3). Thus, by the end of 2000 the firm found itself still dealing with
460 See ODTR 2001e.
461 Interview: Senior Staff, Eircom, Dublin, November 10, 2003.
462 Ibid. Also, importance of Eircom as a significant employer within the Irish context meant that efforts 
at reducing its labour force were not seen as good for industrial or political relations (see note 182).
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issues of cost, efficiency and an over-staffed entity, in the face of growing competition and 
threats.463 This prompted another bout of reforms in the firm’s governance structure in 2001 as 
government stepped out of the triad and a new set of private investors emerged. It was only then 
that the firm was able to make the most drastic and far-reaching adjustments as it sought to 
contend with the new operational environment. This involved allowing the turn-around from the 
expansionary agenda that had been pursued mainly since 1999 when the employees joined the 
firm as shareholders.464 Ownership was shown to be important to the way the firm responded to 
change.
However, it was not just ownership, in and of itself, but a particular type of governance 
that mattered. Public ownership and political control appeared to have been constraints to the 
firm’s performance. Here, the staff had been able to gain leverage for their position on issues 
such as redundancies, through their access to key political figures and prior to 2001, the support 
they secured from the government through its role as part owners of Eircom.465 Thus, Eircom’s 
response in 1999-2001 was far more erratic and in some ways counter-intuitive to their need to 
reduce costs and increase effectiveness. This is seen for instance, in the case with the increase in 
personnel and acquisitions between 1998 and 2001 (Figure 5.1). Eircom’s response during these 
early years has, in fact, been put down to the role played by employees who gained shares in the 
Company in 1999 and their influence on politicians (Ibid). Thus, as demonstrated here, internal 
interests in the form of employee owners played a role in determining how the incumbent 
responded to reform. Importantly, these moves were not in response to the IRA’s prompting, but 
determined more by the interests of the partners.
It is not surprising that the more far-reaching and coherent period of internal 
reorganisation took place mainly after 2001 when there was less political influence in the 
partnership and the employees lost their allies. The suggestion here is that the employees, their 
unions and politicians had a significant impact on how the Irish incumbent adjusted to reform.
463 Threats here included the global slowdown in the telecommunications industry at the start of the 
Century. Such, threats offered credible challenge to union resistance against retrenchment in the firm’s 
size and scope.
464 These included a reduction in the number of holdings and staff. See Figures 5.1 and 5.3.
465 Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003.
224
Thus, whereas the Jamaican incumbent was geographically segmented and this played an 
important role in the way the regulator dealt with the firm in seeking compliance, this was less 
the case in Ireland.
With the exit of the state and the realisation that more drastic reforms were needed, the 
unions were more willing to accept more extensive reforms after liberalisation and 
privatisation.466 Success and competitiveness, therefore, came to be more about service quality, 
customer care, cost reduction and seeking more actively to engage with regulation and less 
about scope and size 467 In this sense, liberalisation appears to have gone against the predictions 
of sceptics who had expected the worst from reform.468 As shown above Eircom and its clients 
generally seemed to have benefited from change in its ownership, having been freed from some 
of the political constraints it faced under its previous owners.469
7.2 The Role of Employees and Unions in Eircom’s Operations
Integral to this discussion on internal governance is the role that has been played by the 
employees and their union. This case therefore, presents these actors as important and 
influential stakeholders in regulation and the firm’s attitude and ability to accept and adjust to 
change. The following section seeks to demonstrate the relevance of internal interests and 
governance on the way the incumbent firm deals with change, the constraints which these may 
place on the firm and in turn, on industry regulators. This is done by highlighting the role of 
employee and union power and how these have emerged as a dominant force within Irish 
telecoms. This makes a case for a consideration of internal interests and the role of such actors 
in regulatory reform -  actors who have traditionally been less considered in such processes.
The emphasis here is on the role played by key interests or blocs within regulated firms 
and how these can act to constrain (or enable) the incumbent’s response to regulation and its
466 See note 460.
467 As shown in the improvements secured since 2003 (see Chapters three and five).
468 See O’Toole (1992); Hall (1993:11). Nonetheless, the situation here was not unique but represented 
the change that had been occurring globally around issues such as how to protect the public interest.
469 The importance of the agreement has also been backed up in a report by a company chair in 2000 
(Eircom 2000c). Indeed, by 2004 the firm had reduced prices for communications services by 50% since 
1997 (Eircom Annual Report 2004: 10).
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reform. Thus, the firm’s activities may not be directed solely by the IRA, but also by internal 
motivations. Nevertheless, to the extent that the regulator is able to provide an environment in 
which drivers such as competitive pressures can affect the incumbent’s motivations then 
regulation can provide a key rationale for incumbent firm behaviour.
Already the role of employees and their impact on Eircom’s strategies and options have 
been intimated in previous sections of this chapter. The aim here is to tie this together more 
pointedly making a more direct argument for considering the role of employees and their unions 
potentially as key actors in a discussion on telecoms reform and the way incumbents have 
responded to such reforms.470
7.2.1 Empowering Stakeholders: The Basis of Employee and Union Power
The role of employees and unions lies in the particular governance culture of the country itself. 
Labour relations in Ireland are such that unions and employees have been powerful, given the 
emphasis on partnership, consensus, and participation in national planning and industrial 
relations (See, for example Taylor 2002: 1-8). Authors such as Roche and Cradden have 
highlighted the effect of this in areas such as wage negotiations (2003: 76). This has helped to 
strengthen the hand of employees and their unions, making them more influential as actors and 
participants in debates on industry reform, certainly when compared with employees in C&WJ.
This experience of partnership was to become a more institutionalised feature of the 
Irish economic and social landscape, when in 1987 government developed formal partnerships 
involving unions and employees. These tripartite arrangements have been viewed as key to the 
nation’s development (Boylan 2002: 9-27; Wallace 2002: 12); hence the possibility for unions 
and employees to have such a significant role in Ireland, but not in Jamaica. Additionally, this
470 The level of power held by staff was not a new phenomenon. Indeed, attempts by one of the firm’s 
chairmen to overhaul the company in the early 1990s led to staff and board members interceding directly 
with the minister who, siding with the staff, discharged the chair from his duties (Gallagher 1992e: 12). 
Key among the improvements desired by this chair was a reduction of staff within the firm, which stood 
at around 18,000 in 1992. Even while numbers were being reduced gradually, employees were against the 
intensity of changes recommended. These also included calls for heightened accountability and 
professionalism within the firm.
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point helps to provide a context for considering the role of employees and unions in the 
incumbent telecoms firm and as key actors in regulatory reform in Ireland.471
Other points outside this specific institutional feature also help to explain employee 
influence. These will be introduced here but outlined in more detail throughout this section. 
Firstly, as members of the voting public and from 1999, part owners of the firm, the employees 
and the unions had the power to command the attention of policymakers and decision takers and 
as such, could advocate on behalf of the Company.472 Following from this, their activities could 
affect the pace at which industry reform took place as in the 1970s (Ibid.). Secondly, as 
representatives of Eircom’s employees, unions such as, the Communications Workers Union 
(CWU)473 and IMPACT474 had a direct interest in maintaining the dominance and profitability 
of the Company. Finally, as workers whose efficiency and support would affect the performance 
of the firm and the sector, Eircom’s staff and their representatives (unions) have had a degree of 
influence in the sector.
7.2.2 The Exercise of Employee and Union Power
The position the unions took on reforms has shifted over the years between the 1980s to present. 
During this time, their response has moved from being one of outright opposition to a
471 Hence, the willingness to partner with the unions and the difference between Ireland and Jamaica in 
this instance can be explained by this particular feature of Irish political culture. As such, industry reform 
may not occur in the same way in all countries since the institutions and endowment differ. Likewise, the 
power held by stakeholders may vary and may be expressed differently as access (formal or informal) to 
outlets for expression and participation may diverge. For instance, corporatist and neo-corporatist 
arrangements allow for the participation of interests groups such as industry and consumers in 
government (Grant 1995 and 1993; Genther 1990; Cox and O’Sullivan 1988; Cawson 1986; for a 
discussion on this point at the level of regional government see Greenwood, Grote and Ronit 1992). In a 
similar way, actors who are privileged in regulatory debates may vary from place to place, depending on 
the particular ideology.
472 Already, the effect that this group could have on the sector and Company had been experienced when 
industrial action in the late 70s led to widescale review of the sector and ultimately, the restructuring of 
the Post and Telegraph Department. See Burnham (2003: 542-544).
473 CWU is one of the more notable Unions in Ireland. In all it represents 16,000 individuals involved in 
the communications sector (CWU 2003b). It also represents workers in Eircom’s competitors (See CWU 
2003c). The CWU acted on the behalf of a specific category of the firm’s employees -  mid-level and 
junior workers who made up the majority of die Company (Interview: Head of regulatory affairs at the 
CWU, Dublin, November 6, 2003). Much of the employee power and influence over the firm has been 
located in and expressed through this union.
474 The Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT) represented many public servants across 
a number of state-owned companies in Ireland. As such, this group was particularly important during the 
years where the state had ownership in the firm. However, it was not as dominant as the CWU.
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willingness to consider how they could benefit from change and finally, to acceptance of 
change. This has taken place as reform moved from a possibility to an impending reality. Thus, 
the argument is not that union power is visible only where they were able to prevent industry 
change but rather that their input was essential in determining the timing and nature of 
regulatory reform in the 80s and 90s. Later, its input delayed the extent to which Eircom 
adjusted to the modernisation of the rules and structure in its regulatory space.
As suggested in Chapter three, Unions have generally appeared to be unsupportive of 
privatisation and the opening of the economy to competition as noted above. Lack of union 
support had, for instance, been used as a reason for not privatising telecoms in the late 70s and 
80s.475 Their approach was to draw attention to the possible ills of reform. For instance, David 
Begg, then General Secretary of the CWU commented at a general meeting in 1993:
(T)he EC-driven policy of liberalisation would eliminate the smaller companies 
and leave a few large industries. And these may not even be European but could 
be American multinationals seeking to increase their profits.
IT (1993d)476
Resistance was again to resurface with talk of the firm privatising the company in the early 
1990s; the unions promised to “fight tooth and nail against privatisation” (Gallagher 1993b). 
Further, while recognising that the firm was overstaffed, the unions and employees also resisted 
attempts to streamline numbers or introduce other measures to change the organisation.477
The basis for the power and influence held by employees and unions may also be seen 
in the political influence held by this group. For instance, they were able to secure support from 
politicians who saw national firms such as Eircom as, “symbols of an independent and proud
475 Privatisation had been considered an option from the late 70s. The result of a review, The Report of 
Posts and Telegraphs Review Group, had noted the difficulty in moving forward with reforms of this 
nature given the lack of union support (Gol 1979). Also see Hall (1993: 11).
476 Of course, the irony is that the Union failed to acknowledge that at that time the sector had already 
been populated by one big firm who had the greater share of profits from the sector.
477 These had included the attempts by CEO Brendan Hynes in 1992 to reduce the informalism and assist 
the firm in preparing for the changes that had already begun in the neighbouring UK. See for instance, 
Gallagher (1992b) and further discussion in Chapter three.
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economy” (O’Toole 1992: 14).478 Indeed, the decision to reform the firm into a State owned 
enterprise in 1982 instead of outright privatisation was also influenced by the backing of the 
unions of political groups such as the Labour party who were against the idea of privatisation 
(Hall 1993: l l) .479 As such there was some alliance or at least symbiosis in the views of some 
politicians and the unions.
Even where some political figures may not have been against reforms, such as 
privatisation, it had not always been politically expedient to speak directly about this. For 
instance, as one politician interviewed observed, references to industry reform during the 80s 
and early 90s were informed by a conscious attempt not to, “call it privatisation” (Interview: 
Minister, Dublin, November 11, 2003). Concerns about jobs, regulatory reform and 
privatisation were heightened in light of the UK experience, where developments were 
acknowledged as having a significant effect on the Irish Republic (Interviews: Ibid; 
Representative of TIF, November 7, 2003).480
In fact, the ideology of ruling parties and of the line minister has been important in 
determining what direction telecoms policy took over the years.481 For instance, as argued in 
Chapter three, political parties had varying degrees of support for privatisation and full 
competition with parties such as Labour helping to keep these off the agenda and then delaying 
competition, even in the face of EU Directives from 1981-1997.482 However, elections in 1997 
resulted in a coalition that was more sympathetic to liberalisation and market forces, explaining 
the decision to end the derogation and have full competition by the original EU deadline of
478 Some of this came from a suspicion of international business which resembles what happened in some 
developing countries in the 60s and 70s where the involvement of foreign investments was not welcomed 
given the perception that it was destructive to national growth (Gutierrez and Berg 2000: 5; also Dutt, et 
al 1994).
479 See Gallagher 1992b; O’Toole 1992: 14; and MacConnell 1992: 4.
480 Even so, debate on privatisation was opening up from the late 80s, albeit very moderately. As such, the 
governing party in 1998 (Fianna Fail) had also pledged, in electoral campaigns from 1987, that in the 
event they were to come to power shares would be granted to employees should the Company be 
privatised (Interview: Former telecoms Minister, Dublin, November 11, 2003).
481 Though there have been other vital influences, such as the European Union Directives.
482 For instance, the composition of the coalition government in 1981 and 1987, which consisted of
Labour and Fine Gael, made it inherently difficult for any discussion of privatisation to proceed openly 
and without prejudice. The Progressive Democrats have tended to favour markets helping to drive 
through liberalisation when they entered a coalition government with the Fianna Fail in 1997.
229
December 1998.483 There was also growing political support for liberalisation and privatisation 
from as early as 1993 when the new minister Brian Cowen noted that he was not supportive of 
the idea of retaining public enterprises (Brennock 1993: 6). Further, while the existence of a 
pro-reform coalition led to a premature end of the derogation, the position of the unions and 
staff were also advanced thanks to the entry in 1997 of a Minister who was seen to be 
sympathetic to their cause.484
But on the eve of liberalisation the unions recognised that they stood to lose more from 
continuing to deny or prevent competition and privatisation than from approaching these head- 
on (Interview: Head of regulatory affairs, CWU, Dublin, November 6, 2003)485 The first bout 
of privatisation in 1997 had indicated that the tide had shifted and that their rationale for 
objecting to change was receiving less support (Wallace 2002: 13). Further, in the face of 
technological developments they could no longer support arguments against full competition 
and privatisation. This meant moving from a situation where they reacted to whatever policy 
tide was en vogue to becoming key decision makers in the sector. As such, they were 
determined that successful negotiation of any change within the sector and in the Company was 
not to be attained without their active involvement. In fact, even while appearing to be against 
liberalisation and privatisation publicly, the unions had also approached the Minster in charge of 
telecoms from the early 90s to discuss the possibility of gaining shares for its support of any 
privatisation and reform effort (Gallagher 1992e: 12). So while the stance was openly anti­
reform in the 80s and early 1990s, this was to change when the unions recognised that they were
484 Nonetheless, the background of the line Minister and their knowledge and experience of issues related 
to reform have also been vital in determining the level of influence that interests within the firm have had 
within the sector. For example, employee/union power in the late 1990s was seen to have been advanced 
when Mary O’Rourke became the head of the Department in charge of telecommunications in 1997. 
Unlike her Jamaican counterpart, Minister O’Rourke was viewed by employees/unions as an ally in their 
bid to increase their input in company policy (Hastings 2003).
485 While this work has viewed the role of employees and their unions, particularly, the CWU as 
important; one interviewee has in fact questioned their role in the whole process. But while he contested 
the relevance of the CWU in the whole process, he also pointed out that he did not have a very long 
history in the area of Irish telecoms but had only entered the sector as a member of a consulting company 
in 1999. Also, while he did not feel the Union was important, other interviewees and commentators 
(noted in this text) felt this was quite the contrary. Support also came from a senior civil servant within 
the Department in charge of telecoms who was keen to point out the support that the unions received from 
the Labour party (Interview: Senior civil servant, Dublin, November 5, 2003).
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swimming against a powerful tide, signalled by moves in the EU and globally, which was 
suggesting that reform was a must. Reforms in this sector were also being viewed as important 
for the ability to re-shape the economy and draw investment in related areas such as banking 
and IT.486
Subsequently, the decision was made to support the reform process whilst employing 
sufficient negotiating capacity to make an impression on the content of the reforms (Interview: 
Head of regulatory affairs, CWU, Dublin, November 6, 2003). From here the unions 
representing the majority of employees joined together to secure the services of a highly skilled 
legal team to negotiate directly with the government.487 In so doing, they would be able to 
overcome capacity gaps by contracting in those skills they did not possess internally. As such, 
they were able to have a voice in the way the sector was reformed, get the maximum benefits 
from the reform process and gain future rights over new initiative undertaken by the regulators 
(Ibid).
The unions had also recognised the importance of coming to the table equipped and the 
value of securing the support of the politicians. For instance, outside its role as majority owner 
of the firm at this point and its apparent sympathy for the employees, government’s significance 
here may be viewed in light of Section 10[3][d] of the 1983 Post and Telegraphs Services Act, 
which mandated that both the Ministry of Finance and line Minster’s permission had to be 
sought in any decision or arrangement aimed at dividing Eircom’s share capital. The unions 
were also aware of the government’s relevance here and were therefore keen to make appeals to 
them over the heads of management.
Indeed, the firm’s senior management also understood the importance of getting the 
employees onboard if it was to be able to reform smoothly and compete successfully. Past
486 For instance, Burnham addresses these themes, noting the role of the reforms in telecoms in allowing 
for and sustaining the emergence of the Celtic Tiger by laying the groundwork for the development of 
related industries (2003).
487 The unions secured the support of a Wall Street investment bank with experience in negotiating similar 
contracts in the US. They were also able to increase their knowledge of such arrangements through 
research (Taylor 1996: 4).
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experiences had also suggested the importance of securing this support.488 The imperative to 
avoid industrial action and modernise the firm was to become more important with the 
announcement of full liberalisation at the end of 1998. As such, the firm, state and unions went 
into negotiations and were able to conclude an agreement before the end of 1998 (TE 1998: 19). 
It is not a coincidence that this agreement coincided with the opening of the sector also at the 
end of that same year (ODTR 2001d: 1). That is, the management’s realisation that it needed to 
streamline staff in order to enhance its ability to respond to the demands of a new operational 
environment heightened the need for a smooth and speedier transition making the government 
and management more willing to entertain the firm’s demands. Some commentators have also 
observed that the government may have been sympathetic to the unions and hence more willing 
to support their cause (Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003). This also 
finds support in Hastings, who observed that the unions and employee’s position was supported 
by the line minister for telecoms (2003: 158).
In this deal the CWU secured 14.9% of the company for agreeing to full privatisation in 
1999 (Wallace 2002: 13). Shares were to be held in an Employee Share Ownership Plan 
(ESOP). This represented a gain for the unions considering the government had initially offered 
only five percent.489 The ESOP itself comprised two trusts, the Employee Share Ownership 
Trust and the Telecom Approved Profit Sharing Scheme. These shares were not offered all at 
once, but were instead tied to the union’s support for transformation measures within the firm
488 Already they had the experience of industrial unrest in 1979 that had ended in the shakeup of the 
sector when it was moved from a fully nationalised company operating under the Post and Telegraph 
Department to a standalone state-owned company (Hall 1993: 256). The subsequent difficulty in 
achieving privatisation was due to lack of internal support as already mentioned.
489 Chari and O’McMahon have suggested that the role of unions though having some relevance in the 
process has not been significant, particularly when compared with the gains of private investors (2003: 4 
and 38). For instance, the 1997 sale had seen the private investors paying less for their shares than the 
employees had secured in 1999. The unions also had to secure a loan to fund its purchase (2003: 37-38). 
However, the gains made by the firm are all the more significant within the context of their argument that 
such social actors have had little role in the privatisation of state enterprises in Ireland, given the extent of 
the involvement and gains of this group in 1999, which as noted above extend beyond the union’s original 
requests. Furthermore, failure to secure gains on par with the private investors in 1997 does not negate the 
value that this actor has played in the process by allowing for privatisation to take place smoothly and for 
the firm to make specific adjustments, which it identified as being important for its ability to compete in 
an open, competitive regime. For the immediate purpose as well, the involvement of the unions at this 
level is important in illustrating the divers that actors within the regulated firm, who will have a say in 
how regulatory reform proceeds and as such, whom the regulators and policy makers must consider when 
redesigning an industry.
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(TE 1999: 137-138). Thus, while the agreement had been hammered out in 1998, the initial 
share transfer of 13.23% took place May 14, 1999 with a further 1.67% being transferred at the 
end of that year and only after performance targets had been achieved (TE 1999: 11). Through 
these the employees ensured themselves a share and direct interest in the firm’s profits and 
long-term success. Again demonstrated here was the strength of the union’s negotiating team 
that rivalled that of the government and private investors.490
By agreeing to some of the terms laid down by the CWU, the government was thus, 
able to lay the foundation for opening the sector and competing fully in a new telecoms 
regime 491 Thus, the minister was forced to make individual arrangements with union and staff 
in order to increase competitiveness and overall support for industry restructuring (See Taylor 
1996: 4). Demonstrated here are the bargaining arrangements and compromises which 
government regulators sometimes have to engage in when trying to secure support from firms 
whose size, wealth and relevance (beyond their immediate sphere of operation) makes their 
support crucial for any attempt to reform the sectors within which they operate. The offer of 
shares thus, represented a trade-off providing the staff the incentive to lend its support to the 
government and private investors to go ahead with industry change (Hastings 2003: 152; 
Gallagher 1992e).492 In return for the shares the Union agreed to major reforms in work 
practices and cost reduction measures of the Company. But even here, the firm came out 
victorious, since staff cuts were to some extent cosmetic with some of those made redundant 
being relocated to man its new acquisitions.493 The role of the unions in the reform process and 
the significance of this agreement for the firm’s performance and response in a liberalised 
regime are therefore, not to be underestimated. As was observed in the annual report,
490 Interview: Head of regulatory affairs, CWU, Dublin, November 6, 2003.
491 The idea of employees being given a stake in the firm had been proposed by one of the unions 
(IMPACT) representing workers in 1993 (Sweeny 1993: 6). But whereas it was being used as a carrot to 
gain worker and union support for privatisation in 1997, the rationale in 1993, was that the share 
ownership be used as an alternative to privatisation.
492 Chapter five has already been shown the effect of the ESOP in allowing the firm to restructure its 
operations.
493 See Chapter five.
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this comprehensive agreement between the company and the unions is the final 
building block of an approach that will see Telecom Eireann (Eircom) properly 
structured as a fully commercial company competing in a highly competitive 
marketplace.
(TE-AR 1998: 19)
Again, this quote suggests the importance of this agreement in allowing Eircom to move 
forward with redesigning an internal response to industry change. Thus, the role of internal 
interest groups is therefore seen as affecting the strategies or method for obtaining regulatory 
reform. In order to secure support for industry reform, regulators in the Jamaican case had to 
barter with a dominant incumbent; while the government regulators in Ireland has to negotiate 
with a dominant interest group within the incumbent.
As has been argued whether this would in fact translate into the firm actually being able 
to initiate the full breadth of reforms necessary for efficiency and growth was another issue. For 
instance, the fervency with which acquisitions and holdings were pursued and the regression 
back to an upward trend in personnel figures amidst the reductions that had been secured 
gradually since the 80s was the result.494 As such, it has been noted that the employees were 
able to restrain the level of reduction in personnel size for a number of years after regulatory 
reform was achieved (Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, November 10, Dublin). Further, while 
granting shares to the employees may have allowed for a smooth transition into liberalisation, 
others have criticised this decision viewing union and employee power as a restraint on the 
development of the sector.495
This prompted another increase in employee ownership. The incumbent was then to 
become fully private by 2002 with the government also selling its stakes in the firm. The carrot 
of an increase in shares was once again dangled to the unions as a means of securing employee 
support for the further sale of the company and support for more intense reforms (Interview: 
Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003). Interesting enough as was shown in 
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and Table 5.1 this sale marked another significant turn in the firm’s activities as
495 Interview: Representative of TIF, Dublin, November 7, 2003.
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personnel and holdings decreased and efficiency saving measures introduced. Overtime the firm 
has been able to reduce costs and increase its competitiveness. The firm had by then began 
reorienting its outlook and approach to competition focusing more on adding value and quality 
as opposed to adding to its size and scope. Thus, the additional shares also have been issued to 
buy support for further shifts in the firm’s structure and modus operandi. Highlighted here are 
some of the strategies which firm and state regulators have to utilise to secure for reforms when 
faced with powerful internal interests possessing the power to subvert the reform process and in 
turn affect the extent to which the regulated entity can comply with regulation.
As the regulator became more surefooted after liberalisation and the government 
receded this actor’s relationship with the incumbent was to become more important. As the 
union with a significant proportion496 of its members being both owners and employees of 
Eircom, the CWU has since helped Eircom to maintain a direct presence in the development of 
the sector (Interview: Reporter, Irish Times, November 10, 2003). CWU representative also sits 
on Eircom’s Board and has continued to vocalise the firm’s views on a number of issues.497 This 
has seen the CWU making various submissions to the regulator and ministers, as well as, to the 
media on the firm’s behalf.498
These efforts have sought to highlight what it considered to be the over-regulation of 
Eircom and any other area in which it felt the firm was being unfairly targeted by Comreg. As 
such, it has actively lobbied key players and decision makers in order to gain an advantage for 
Eircom (Interview: Technology Reporter, Irish Times, Dublin, November 10, 2003). The CWU 
has been vocal on attempts to limit Eircom’s aggressive win-back strategy and in highlighting 
the many gains that the firm has brought to Irish telecoms market and its customers as 
arguments for Comreg to adopt a less aggressive approach to regulating the firm.499 The union’s 
aggressive tactics have therefore, demonstrated this variety of interests which regulators have to 
take into account in trying to carry out their tasks; the variety of levers which regulated firms
496 It represents 8,500 of Eircom employees, excluding its managers.
497 See for example, CWU (2003b).
498 See for instance, Bride (2003a; 2003b; 2003c); CWU (2003a); Business Plus (2003: 34-35).
499 See notes 487 and 488 above.
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have at their disposal in placing pressure on regulators; and finally, the complexities involved in 
regulation and its reform. Thus, not only must the regulator monitor the incumbent’s activities, 
but it also has to withstand the pressures brought on it from the firm’s supporters.
Thus, thanks to their Union, “the workers have done extremely well out of the 
privatisation of Eircom” (Interview: Technology Reporter, Irish Times, November 10, 2003). 
Employees have since also received significant dividends on their shares (Interview: Head of 
regulatory affairs, CWU, November 6 2003). For example, after a year into liberalisation, 
shareholders (with a significant portion being employees) had received a 26% increase in 
dividends per share over the previous year.500 Thus, in 2004 the chief executive recognised the 
significance of employees in the firm’s internal modernisation noting that:
Eircom’s success in a competitive market depends on the commitment of the 
people who work in Eircom. During a period of rapid downsizing, restructuring, 
and focused management the contribution of the employees has been outstanding.
(Eircom Annual Report 2004: 16)
7.3 Discussion: Internal Differentiation of Regelated Incumbents and its Response to 
Change
The activities employed by the staff and their unions at various points throughout the firm’s 
history have had some influence on the firm and overall telecoms sector. As in the Jamaican 
case, the findings suggest a place for considering interests and actors within the incumbent firm 
and how these affect the way regulation proceeds, as well as the way these firms respond to 
changes in their markets. The existence of such actors is shown as another factor that regulators 
may have to take into account when assessing regulatory strategies. This is to the extent that 
these internal stakeholders are able to frustrate regulation (as with the unions in Ireland) or 
encourage successful regulation (as in Jamaica).
With the aid of sympathetic political groups and unions, staff of the incumbent have 
been able to apply enough pressure to the government to delay industry reform and constrain its 
freedom in policy-making. This is as seen in the decision to restructure the firm along the lines
500 Eircom (2000c).
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of a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) instead of outright privatisation that had in fact been 
recommended by government advisers in 1982 and later, in the 90s, as well as, in the 
government’s decision to press for derogation in the early 1990s. Resistance, to privatisation 
constrained the choices of the government as they still shied away from introducing measures 
that were to be contrary to the unions (in the 90s). Additionally, as suggested in this chapter, 
their role came out again in delaying moves to make the firm more efficient through staff 
reductions, cost containment and slowing up efforts to sell the company between 1997 and 
2002, one of the main periods of telecommunications in Ireland.501
Though Eircom has thus far been dealt with at only one level (as a single entity or 
monolithic structure) there is room to consider the different interests within the firm itself and 
how these affected its operations in the sector. This is particularly relevant for Ireland where a 
recount of regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector would not be complete without 
an attempt to capture the role of employees and their Unions in the development of the sector 
mainly in 1998-2002. Indeed, the findings on the role of unions and the employees here stands 
in stark contrast to observations made by Chari and McMahon about the “relative absence of 
social actors including organised labour” from the privatisation of state enterprises in Ireland 
(2003: 17). In this as in the Jamaican case, the incumbent firm is clearly not just a single actor 
with one definitive overarching voice or position. As shown here, there exists a number of 
divergent interests, in this case unions and employees who have been empowered within a 
specific institutional context which privileges these actors, recognising them as valid 
participants in the regulatory space.502 The inclusion of the Unions in this case was also 
important given what Hardiman recognised as their ability to make life difficult for the Irish
501 Interesting enough, it was one of the unions in the sector (IMPACT) who had also recommended that 
SOEs including Eircom diversify its operations in order to reduce the potential effect that a downturn in 
any one area would have on the firm (Sweeny 1993: 6). This of course was one of the strategies employed 
by Eircom in the late 90s and accelerated after the employees gained shares in the Company.
502 Even were they not recognised as such, it could still be argued that the level of organisation and 
activism within the unions may still have made them visible. Thus, the findings on the role of the unions 
in the process of regulatory reform supports those of Hastings who observed that, the Irish case 
demonstrates “the way in which a union coalition, acting in a highly cohesive and strategic fashion, can 
through the use of their influence at national and local levels deflect and neutralize the strategy of a 
government department” (2003: 151).
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government (1988: 215) as well as a pattern of governance which privileged unions in the 
policy making process.
Chapters two and three focused on the role of actors in the regulatory space and how 
these can be brought into regulating incumbents. Chapters six and seven argue for a 
consideration of another set of drivers, namely those existing within the incumbent (e.g. 
shareholders, employees and their unions) and the impact that these have on the incumbent’s 
choices and actions. As shown in both cases, the consideration of these actors is important, as 
they are seen to affect the ability of industry regulators to carry out their tasks. These divergent 
interests also affect the way the incumbent responds to reform, in particular, its choice of coping 
strategies and how these are implemented. However, the Irish case differs somewhat from 
C&WJ in that here interests outside those of the government and the senior management 
actually demonstrated their power through and on behalf of the incumbent. In other words, 
unions such as the CWU represented, expressed and asserted the incumbent’s influence, thereby 
taking a decisive role in the reform of the sector whereas employees beyond senior management 
have not had as great a role in the Jamaican case. Following from this, the incumbents presented 
here are not one-dimensional, but are shown to be complex actors with different motivations for 
their actions. Importantly, not all these motivations are determined by regulators. Nonetheless, 
the power of regulation here is its ability to unleash forces (e.g. competitive pressures); which 
may secure behaviour modification in an incumbent, where direct regulation (e.g. rules and 
legislation) may not prove as effective.
The issue of governance and ownership and their impact on the firm’s responsiveness 
and propensity for innovation and change emerges as important considerations in understanding 
incumbency and incumbent’s response to change and overall compliance. In the first instance, 
the partial privatisation achieved at the end of 1997 began a process of modernisation within 
Eircom. However, the second phase of ownership change which saw the adoption of an ESOP 
accompanied a turnaround in the firm’s strategies which as noted above were informed mainly 
by a desire to expand ownership and coverage throughout the sector. In so doing, the firm 
sought to enhance its grip over the sector in lieu of the loss of its position as a state monopoly.
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Strategies were to once again shift at the end of 2001 and this coincided with both the 
reductions in personnel and the end of the expansionary impulse witnessed in the first three 
years of regulatory reform. Indeed, as shown in the presentation of the internal strategies 
employed by the firm in coping with the changes in its regulatory space in chapter five, it was 
during this phase that the most far-reaching reforms necessary for streamlining the firm were 
made. Thus, even while regulatory reform began in the late 90s it was not till a group of private 
investors took over the firm moving it decidedly into a fully private market that the incumbent 
began to seriously move towards becoming leaner and more focused; this as opposed to the 
haphazard actions of simply trying to dominate the sector through acquisitions.503
The interesting story here is not only about the change of ownership, but also that it was 
the change to a privately operated entity, which also seemed to matter. The removal of 
government from the triad involving employees and private investors had provided for a degree 
of independence and autonomy within the firm where the extent of changes desired could finally 
be attained. With the removal of this influence, the leverage and support commanded by the 
unions within the firm (and hence their ability to hold out on certain reforms) was reduced 
significantly.504 Unions by then were also becoming more aware of the need to adopt harsher 
strategies if Eircom was to continue doing well.
As such, the more far-reaching changes in addressing size, costs and efficiency within 
the company were further enabled by the shift in the balance of power that came as a result of 
the exit of the government from the triadic ownership structure. Resistance to staff cut was 
therefore, less effective allowing the new private owners to trim the firm as they saw fit. It can 
be recalled that one of the main arguments against competition and privatisation had been that it 
would result in a loss of staff. Within this context it might appear that prior to 2001 there still 
had not been enough desire or political will to streamline staff numbers. Thus, the immediacy 
with which this move was made after full privatisation at the end of 2001 suggests that this 
development had offered Eircom the momentum and freedom to move ahead with
503 See Section 5.2.2.
504 The pressures faced from the global crisis in the telecoms sector at the start of the Century may also 
have placed more pressures on shareholders including, the staff making them more accepting of change.
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improvements, which may have been difficult to achieve under the previous ownership 
structure.
These shifts in ownership therefore, had an impact on the paths taken by the incumbent 
in these years demonstrating the effect of divergent interests and its impact on firm choice. 
What this helps to demonstrate once more, is the notion that regulated firms are not monolithic 
structures even though they may appear as such from the outside. Rather, there may be internal 
differences and interests who have an impact in so far as the incumbent is able to respond to 
market changes. These internal differences also have important consequences for how the firm 
responds to regulatory reform.
7.4 Conclusion
Thus, an important actor in this case has been the staff, who through their unions were able to 
gain the support of key political figures, forming a powerful bloc within the incumbent. The 
desire of government and the firm’s senior management to attain a smooth transformation and 
maintain peaceful relations within the company helped the Union in its bid to secure gains for 
workers. In essence, the management was not willing to rock the boat, preferring to give 
employees a stake in the company in return for their support for new company policy. As such, 
both government and private owners were more inclined to find ways of appeasing this group, 
as with the offer of shares in the late 90s. Through ownership, employees could have a more 
direct and legitimate means of directing company policy. That is, as shareholders, their right to 
sit on company boards and meetings as well as to direct Company policy was now legitimised.
Now staff and their unions could be actively involved in shaping these initiatives and 
consequently, be in a position to monitor Eircom and its regulators. In regulating the regulators, 
the employees and unions have also kept a watchful eye on the activities of the regulator in 
regard to the performance of its rules and responsibilities especially with regard to the 
incumbent, Eircom. In so doing, another level of regulation may be said to have been added 
here as the employees and their unions became overseers of the incumbent, the regulators and 
the wider telecoms sector.
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In this sense, the unions and employees have functioned as one of the empowered 
public interest groups whom Ayres and Braithwaite have given some place in their tripartite 
model of regulation (1992: 54-100). That is, the unions even while acting as protectors of 
employee interest and as such also as advocates of the incumbent firm have also acted as 
regulators (of the regulators, competitors and of the regulated firm itself). The analysis also goes 
beyond this to answer the puzzle posed by Mendelhoff in his review of Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
recommendation for such actors in regulation, namely “where would they get technical and 
legal assistance?” (1993: 718). Here the resources to actively pursue its objectives were expertly 
secured by the union itself. In its intent to secure the technical competence needed to negotiate 
with the government, the board and senior management of the incumbent the unions enrolled 
the support of lawyers and industry experts hence amassing the legal competence to reason with 
these actors on an even footing.
Finally, the presentations in Chapters six and seven have sought to go beyond a 
portrayal of the incumbent firms as recipients of regulation and as monoliths. As has been 
shown, the interests at play within incumbents are not always unified or singular but may 
diverge in significant ways. These divergent interests may have an impact in dictating the firm’s 
stance on reform and how it approaches regulation and regulators. These diverging interests 
may also condition strategies and choices in responding to reforms. Among the key 'interests’ in 
this chapter is that of employees and unions, taking this presentation beyond that in Chapter six 
where the emphasis was mainly on a specific category of employees, i.e. the board and senior 
management. In this case the employees within the incumbent formed a major force to be 
reckoned with. Acting as a separate power broker they chose to negotiate with the senior 
management and government as independent stakeholders. The ESOP has therefore represented 
and allowed for the emergence of empowered union and employees who were to have 
significant power in the industry; a feat which is all the more remarkable in what has been 
described as a country which has been dominated by producer interests.505
505 See for instance, OECD (2001a: 47-59); Chari and O’McMahon (2003: especially 4, 38).
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It is not so much that these divisions did not exist in some form prior to reform. 
However, the uncertainty brought on by sector reform made these more pronounced as each 
group sought to protect its position or gain the most from the reconstruction of the telecoms 
regime. As such, incumbent firms are not necessarily unitary actors but may be seen as housing 
various interests who may choose to sit in different and competing arenas during times of 
uncertainty. While these many interests diverge the aim is still to assist the firm in maintaining 
its dominance. Divergences may not last beyond such periods of uncertainty as the firm seeks 
to secure its dominance in the face of continued market uncertainty. Thus, C&WJ and Eircom 
have, in the post-liberalisation era become more knitted structures with more harmony among 
internal interests.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
8.0 Introduction
This research was aimed at understanding how incumbent firms have responded to regulatory 
reform, in so doing, understanding why these actors have remained at the centre of the telecoms 
sector. This followed from a recognition that the literature on regulatory reform did not fully 
help to explain the sustained dominance of these actors in telecoms after reforms, which have 
taken place mainly over the last two to three decades. It also aimed to understand the drivers of 
change for such firms and the implications for regulation. In addressing these issues, the thesis 
has shown that the incumbent’s response is not only about the developments in the regulatory 
space, but also about how it internalises reform. The value of this work, therefore, rests in its 
attempt to shed light on some of the ignored actors in regulation, specifically, the information 
that it gives on incumbency and how large dominant actors, who are critical to regulatory 
success, operate and what it reveals about the choices and strategies of regulators.
The aim in this final chapter will be to discuss these themes and summarise some of the 
main findings from the previous chapters. In doing this, the chapter takes a closer look at the 
two cases to consider how the incumbents have responded to reform, the influences on the 
incumbent’s behaviour as well as a more specific focus on incumbency. The wider implications 
of the study, namely how the findings can inform regulation and its reform will be assessed, 
particularly as they relate to regulation in small states.
8.1 Incumbent Response to Regulatory Reform
In looking at the ways in which incumbents respond to reform and the influences or forces that 
affect their behaviour the work argued that the incumbent’s response was firstly about its 
activities in the regulatory space (external). Secondly, the incumbent’s response was also about 
how reforms affected it internally and how it reordered itself to respond to change. Finally, it 
demonstrated that incumbents (and regulated firms, by extension) are not monoliths. The
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discussion in this section will examine these three points, ending with a more direct assessment 
of the implications of the overall findings, as they relate to regulation and regulatory reform.
8.1.1 Incumbent Response to Changes in the Regulatory Space
The presentation in Chapters two and three was aimed at showing how incumbents respond to 
change, with their strategies evolving in line with changes in the regulatory space. In the years 
leading up to liberalisation at the end of the 1990s, the tactics adopted by the incumbents in 
asserting their position in the sector had included attempts to appeal directly to government 
officials. This was understandable, particularly in the Irish case, given the role of government as 
owner of the then monopoly. This practice did not change much with the introduction of the 
independent regulators as both incumbents viewed this institution as an interloper in the sector 
and in the relationship between itself and its line minister. The first years of the IRA’s 
operations thus saw the incumbents ignoring the regulators and then challenging its authority, 
competence and legitimacy. Some of this had been guaranteed by a failure to equip the IRAs 
with sufficient power and resources to command legitimacy in the sector, while politicians also 
subverted the role of the IRAs in the years leading to full liberalisation. This also shows the 
importance of equipping regulators with sufficient power to carry out their duties.
However, as the state’s intent to transform the sector became more and more apparent 
(driven by a mix of local and international factors in both cases), both first sought to prevent full 
liberalisation and delay reform. However, as the certainty of reform became more obvious, the 
incumbents also changed their stance. That is, whereas reform had initially been viewed as a 
constraint and something to be avoided, both incumbents began attempting to shape the reform 
process and actively monitor the regulatory space to identify and utilise the opportunities 
provided by reform (for example, legislative loopholes and increased regulation of competitors) 
to their advantage. In so doing, both firms sought to dictate the nature, extent and 
implementation of reform. So whereas in the Jamaican case bypass had affected the firm and it 
had previously sought to increase its exclusivity as a means of reducing this problem, reform
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provided additional institutional resources (e.g. SMA and Telecoms Act) to police this problem 
more closely.
Within these efforts were the incumbent’s attempts to prevent entry and the growth of 
competition through measures such as unfair pricing and withholding access from its 
competitors. This has also been accompanied by a hesitance in both incumbents to unbundle 
their services and provide full information on their capacity to their IRAs. In both cases this has 
been argued to have frustrated competition and the ability of the IRAs to achieve transparency 
in their respective markets.
Importantly, these strategies were accentuated by greater use of the Courts to settle 
disputes, particularly as the ‘cordial relationship’ with policy makers became more strained (as 
in the case of C&WJ) as the IRA became more active (especially in Ireland). Thus, these 
became more obvious as the threats and uncertainty heralding reform became more pronounced. 
Thus, both incumbents have used the courts to delay the introduction of unfavourable regulatory 
rules and legislations. In both cases, their command of wealth and technical expertise has meant 
that they have been more willing than other actors to seek the courts to clarify, delay or impede 
developments in the sector. The courts therefore, became another medium through which the 
incumbents could demonstrate their strength. Ironically though, this development may also have 
been indicative of the success of reforms in changing the informality in relationships and thus 
increasing formalism in the sector.
While there were many similarities, there were also some differences in the incumbents’ 
response. For instance, the Irish incumbent has since utilised the courts more, as a tool for 
monitoring and keeping the IRA in check than has been the case in Jamaica. This may be 
explained by the fact that “competitive” pressures have arguably been felt more by the Jamaican 
incumbent (e.g. mobile) with the incumbent being more concerned with the need to protect its 
market. Eircom has arguably received more pressure from the regulator than from entrants. As 
such, the object of greatest threat in both cases differed, with Eircom turning more to the courts 
to challenge and circumvent regulation and C&WJ, more concerned with pressures from 
competition.
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Chapter one had noted that approaches such as responsive regulation and Capture 
theory largely presented regulation as a bilateral relationship between firm and regulator, 
ignoring the role of other actors in influencing firm behaviour. The presentation in the Irish case 
would suggest that such approaches were valid, even while the use of the courts suggested that 
the firm was unable to capture the regulator. Further, as it relates to drivers of incumbent’s 
behaviour, the main influences may have diverged in both cases, with competitive pressures 
being more dominant in Jamaica and regulation being more influential in Ireland.
The difference in the cases may also be explained by the fact that the Jamaican 
incumbent had a strong hand in the design of the rules and structure of the new regime and thus, 
had little reason to challenge the rules that it had helped to design, whereas Eircom had less 
direct impact over legislation. This form of negotiation, as seen in Jamaica, was important, 
given the state’s desire to achieve a speedy reform and the reality that the incumbent possessed 
resources that it could benefit from. Such negotiation or exchange may occur in small 
developing settings such as Jamaica where government is constrained in the amount of 
resources or technical expertise it can command against a strong MNC that may have 
comparable or even greater amount of technical resources and capital. Responsiveness, in this 
case, may be more about conciliation and negotiation than about confrontation. Comreg, on the 
other hand, could more directly benefit from the regulatory capacity of the EU.
The focus on the firm’s activities in the regulatory space also allowed for an 
identification of some of the main actors influencing the firm’s behaviour. These included, 
entrants and the pressure of competition (real and potential), consumers, external actors (e.g. 
regional and international governing institutions and developed states) as well as the IRA 
themselves. In so doing, the study highlighted the interplay of the different constellation of 
interests and actors in the regulatory space and how these can be brought to bear in influencing 
its behaviour. Cawson has, for instance, argued that the constellation of power is important in 
dictating the nature of the institutional structures that will emerge in a country (Cawson 1990: 
366). In this case, this can be taken as the balance of power and alignment of the actors in the 
policy arena and the rules which determine who is in or out of this arena. These rules shift with
actors gaining varying degrees of power at different periods throughout the incumbent firm’s 
operations. This realignment and shifting balance of power can be the result of industry reform.
8.2 Implications
Following from this, the various influences on the incumbent firm have therefore not been 
constant or static. This may for instance, explain the role played by customers as well as that of 
international actors and even the regulator itself in influencing the behaviour of the incumbent at 
some points as opposed to others. An important lesson learned from this is how the regulators in 
both Ireland and Jamaica have reconfigured their regimes so as to empower actors such as 
consumers and even more to utilise external support to legitimise local regulation and break the 
incumbent’s hold over the sector. In this way, the findings also add value to the smart approach 
to regulation, which acknowledges that actors outside the IRA can also regulate the behaviour 
of the firm.
These are shown as important actors in national reforms given their role in helping these 
countries to overcome national resistance to reform. As such, the findings presented here help to 
shed light on the interplay between international and domestic reform agendas demonstrating 
the internationalisation of telecoms regulation and the role of external actors as legitimate 
participants in national regulation. Thus, where regulators in small, or developing, states are 
faced with constraints (e.g. expertise, power, legitimacy and credibility) then these can call upon 
the resources of external agents, to assist in local regulation.
8.3 Internal Reordering in Response to Change in the Regulatory Space
Chapters four and five, like two and three, illustrated the ways in which former monopolies 
maintain their power and dominance in more open accountable environments where capture is 
less realistic or made less likely by industry reform. Thus, as reform got underway the 
incumbents were awakened to the need to find more diverse ways of responding to reform 
beyond attempting to reduce entry, going to the courts and challenging the regulator. Following
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from this, the incumbents then began to modernise their operations and capacity in response to 
the changes in their regulatory space through a process of co-evolution between incumbents’ 
internal organisation and their operational spaces. The thesis, thus demonstrated that the 
incumbent’s response to regulation is not only about developments in its regulatory space, but 
also about how incumbents move to restructure their operations in order to heighten their ability 
to respond effectively to change and protect their market position; this as opposed to simply 
seeking to affect the rules in their regulatory space.
Importantly as transparency and the distance between the firm and government 
increased (indicated by the entry of the IRA in both cases) so too did the incumbent’s internal 
regulatory capacity. By so doing, they could, when necessary, act to counter growing state 
regulation. Both incumbents have also sought to reduce their size and scope, improve skills, 
training, infrastructure and network quality and overall service, while also revitalising their 
brands and image. Their response also involved more attention to reducing operational costs and 
highlighting their corporate social responsibility. Ultimately these helped to reorient internal 
rules, priorities, culture and ethos, increase efficiency and overall competitiveness in the 
incumbents. These moves were also aimed at maintaining dominance and reducing threats, 
which reforms have posed by enhancing internal capacity to monitor the activities of the 
regulators, their competitors and consumers.
The incumbents in both cases have employed basically similar strategies in trying to 
enhance their ability to compete and play a more pro-active role in the regulatory space, 
suggesting some general trend across states. However, whereas the regulator has had to 
intervene to force Eircom to divest itself of its operations (e.g. mobile) in order to allow for 
more competition, this has not been the case in C&WJ, perhaps indicating that competition was 
more effective in the Jamaican market. C&WJ’s policy, from the outset, was also one of 
retrenchment, while placing more emphasis on improving those areas of its operations that 
would enhance its competitiveness. While Eircom did eventually arrive at this juncture it did so 
only after the failure of its expansionary policy aimed at replacing its legal ownership, with
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physical dominance and coverage in the market, indicating that it could not maintain its 
dominance or earnings by simply expanding size and scope.
Additionally, while the increase in internal regulatory capacity has been more a feature 
of C&WJ this has been less the case in Ireland. Again, the fact that the Jamaican incumbent was 
more closely involved in designing the post 1999 regime and had more of a stake in monitoring 
the activities in the sector to ensure compliance, not only from entrants but also from the 
government and the OUR itself. Furthermore, as a front-runner in liberalisation and regulation 
and as a part of a global network of companies, developments in Jamaica were particularly 
important for the incumbent and its sister companies making technical and regulatory affairs 
particularly important for the company and its future developments in their remaining 
Caribbean markets.
Together, these support the findings of Johnstone (1999: 380) and Souter (1994: 43-44) 
who state that large firms and former monopolies select strategies such as outsourcing, down­
sizing and a reconsideration of cost in responding to regulatory reform. However, whereas 
Souter noted that reform may result in training quality being compromised; both incumbents 
have been shown instead increasing their emphasis on developing the quality and skills of their 
personnel, with competence being advanced in areas such as customer service, sales and 
marketing. Failure to appreciate such response means less of an appreciation of the full impact 
of reform on incumbents and the extent to which they have reformed themselves, to maintain 
their dominance.
The main motivation for change in both incumbents was regulatory reform. Thus, the 
competitive forces (real and potential) unleashed by full liberalisation provided the incentive for 
the incumbents to associate organisational fitness with market fitness. The regulators also 
played a key role in directing these reforms. For example, moves to demerge its Mobile and 
Cable business were a direct result of Comreg’s decision, while C&WJ’s decision to allow 
access to its network and reduce its rates were also at the regulator’s direction. On the other 
hand, both incumbents have been less forthcoming on unbundling. There have therefore, been 
efforts of innovation or self-regulation on the part of incumbents. This is also seen in both
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incumbents going beyond the demands of regulation to reduce their size and prices beyond the 
dictates of regulators. However, it remains difficult to separate the influences on the 
incumbent’s response, where it is recognised that the change in the rules and structure of the 
sector did allow competitive pressures to have more of an impact on the incumbent’s activities, 
with much of the internal reforms being about the its desire to become more competitive and 
responsive in a fully liberalised era.
Finally, all these efforts were to have positive consequences for the firm’s ability to 
compete and withstand the pressures placed on it by regulatory reform. In fact, in the case of 
Eircom, its position in the market is, in some ways, now stronger, having faced reform and 
grown in a fully competitive regime. This is as opposed to the threats and uncertainty it 
experienced under monopoly.
8.4 Internal Organisation and Effect on Incumbent’s Response to Reform
The research also illustrated that the drivers of change were not all external, but also within the 
incumbent. In so doing, Chapters six and seven carried forward the focus on internal response 
presented in Chapters four and five, suggesting that incumbents were not monoliths, or one­
dimensional structures. Rather, their internal organisation and orientation also matters in an 
understanding of how these actors operate in the regulatory space. This research therefore, 
argued for a more nuanced view of incumbent firms, one which acknowledges the internal 
complexities, which may exist in these actors and the effect that this may have on the firm’s 
ability to respond to regulation.
Following the framework in Chapter one, both incumbents were shown to be 
fragmented internally. However, whereas C&WJ was segmented more along the lines of its 
head and local office, the Irish incumbent was more about the differences between the 
employees and their unions and managers, with interests becoming more distinct at the height of 
reform. Briefly, this point also suggests some difficulty, once more, in separating internal 
interests and their effect from regulatory reform as an influence on the incumbent’s activities.
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That is, internal differentiation was shown to have both a constraining and liberating 
effect on the incumbent’s response. This was largely enabling for C&WJ, illustrating how a 
firm’s location in a large and experienced multinational network can allow it to leverage 
resources and influences afforded by this network to its advantage when dealing with national 
regulators and coping with reform. In this case, the collective strength of the incumbent firm as 
a part of a geographically dispersed network rivalled the capacity and expertise of a small 
developing country, strengthening the incumbent’s hand in negotiations for industry reform. 
Even more, the presentation illustrated how incumbents can utilise their dispersed structure and 
centres of decision-making to play-off competing messages to their advantage when negotiating 
with local regulators. C&WJ has therefore accessed negotiating capacity, best practices, legal 
and technological expertise from its network.
The constraining effect of internal diversity was most visible in Eircom’s case and may 
have been due to the more complex ownership and management structure. While there was 
some exchange of skills (as in Jamaica), thanks to its early partners in Europe, the differences at 
the national level (i.e. senior management, employees with the unions and politicians) remains 
the more interesting story for this case. Whereas, balance of power clearly existed with C&W 
pic in the case of the Jamaican incumbent, this was not the case in Eircom with important 
consequences for the ways in which the latter responded to reforms. For instance, the 
amalgamation of political interests and union/employee power has been argued to have been 
serious constraints to the incumbent introducing the level of efficiency (e.g. cost and staff 
reduction) that it could have adopted in its attempt to restructure its operations in the years 
immediately following liberalisation. This effect has not been all constraining as seen in the role 
played by unions in lobbying for the incumbent, especially against what it saw as unfair 
regulation from Comreg. In the end, more groups had to be appeased in Irish reform, with 
negotiations and reform in both cases being more about the regulator’s ability to achieve a 
balancing act among various interests.
Finally, the specificities of ‘regulatory reform’ may differ from state to state though 
there may be general similarities and trends across the board. Thus, the particular timing and
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implementation of the events varied in Jamaica and Ireland, even while there were similarities 
in the nature of the reforms as well as in the incumbent’s response to these changes. 
Additionally, there will be specific institutional features, which may result in slight differences 
in the way the incumbent firm responds to regulatory reform and the way rules and structural 
change play out in the regulatory space. For instance, the constellation of interests differed, with 
unions and employees playing a greater role in dictating the choice and strategies of the 
incumbent in Ireland than in Jamaica. As noted in this work, the difference lies in the specific 
cultural and political ethos in Ireland, which has been informed more by collegiality and social 
partnership, with employees and their unions being more involved in policy planning and 
development. On the other hand, employees beyond the senior management team in Jamaica did 
not have much impact or direction on the firm’s policies. This point also played out in the way 
the firms went about negotiating for reform with both using ties and influence with 
government/policy makers in different ways. Whereas C&W used its segmented structure as an 
MNC with its head office dealing directly with the government to overcome the apparent 
unwillingness of the local branch to agree to reforms, the mass of staff in Eircom were able to 
make direct appeals to the line minister to direct the way the sector was being reformed.
8.5 Implications of Findings
This section examines the implications of the above findings as they relate to incumbents, 
regulation and regulatory reform. The changes outlined in this thesis may be particular to 
incumbents. These, however remain significant and warrant special attention for a number of 
reasons. Among these are the depth and timing of reforms by actors formerly seen as slow 
wasteful and unresponsive. Further, a focus on how this actor responds is particularly significant 
for regulators, given the importance of the incumbent in regulation and their impact on the 
success of reform.
The first point here is that the findings defy presentations of large firms such as incumbents 
(former monopolists) as, “structurally inert or slow to change” (Flier et al 2003: 2165; see also 
Hannan and Freeman 1984). This is particularly so given the pace in which these actors have
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been able to reorient their structures to face risks in their regulatory space. Incumbents are then 
not static targets of regulation. The point here is that these are able to modify their operations at 
paces which defy their state of inertia during monopoly. This indicates the value of regulatory 
reform as an instrument for governments and regulators wishing to obtain particular policy and 
regulatory goals such as competition or improved infrastructure and sectoral performance.
For the most part, their status as large, well-resourced actors possessing the ability to 
change with their markets and regulatory changes may also mean that they have more capacity 
to manipulate regulation to their advantage. Thus, while acknowledging the difficulties that 
such large networked actors may have in accomplishing accounting separation and unbundling, 
the time in which both incumbents have taken to do these remains contentious, given the speed 
in which they have undertaken other intensive reforms that have helped them to become more 
competitive. An awareness of these strategies of creative avoidance can assist regulators in 
designing more targeted interventions. On the other hand, reference to delays in regulatory 
compliance caused by size and number of operations is a legitimate claim, making it difficult for 
regulators to judge the incumbent’s sincerity. The regulator’s task also becomes more difficult 
as the firm’s exercise of its incumbency changes and it takes on new capacity. Regulation in 
such contexts then becomes even more in tune with Selznick’s view of this activity as a 
sustained and continuous process (1985: 363).
The wider lesson here is about the role of regulatory reform in nudging large dominant 
incumbents towards making changes necessary for advancing efficiency, quality and 
effectiveness in their respective sectors, in so doing, increasing value and choice for customers. 
Thus, even where competition does not thrive and where specific institutional concerns (e.g. 
economies of scale) may dictate the level of competition which small markets such as those of 
Ireland and Jamaica can accommodate, the threat of competition is shown as being important in 
achieving regulatory goals such as, increased transparency and overall performance among 
dominant firms. This is important, since the size and reach of the incumbents in such small 
states may have wider implications for overall sectoral performance than in larger states. Thus 
the performance of the incumbent and the level of improvements that it is able to undertake will
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be important, given the limits of the market in facilitating competition. What regulatory reform 
has done is provide the incentives for incumbents to make the improvements necessary for 
increasing their performance, and by so doing the overall performance of the market.
Both incumbents, as shown here, are able to embrace regulatory reform, not necessarily in 
the sense of trying to co-opt, or take over the regulatory agenda (as is shown in the previous 
section), but is more in internalising regulatory principles and competitive pressures to drive 
internal reform. As with organisations under the population ecology approach, external pressure 
for change penetrated the incumbent’s ‘genetic code’ and reformed its ethos and operations (see 
Gaskell et al. 2006: 102). These have marked the firm as a monopolist apart from the firm as 
incumbent.
Secondly, following from the above, the work also demonstrated that regulated firms are not 
simply policy takers, but also act to shape as much as they are shaped by regulation and its 
reform. For instance, they are active participants in the regulatory space, who are able to reform 
their organisations or co-evolve in line with changes in the operational/regulatory space, as seen 
in the far-reaching reforms in their internal operations. An understanding of the nature of 
regulation and attending processes such as regulatory reform will lead to an acknowledgement 
of the fact that regulation is not only carried out by governments or through the courts, a 
position similar to the smart approach to regulation and the regulatory space thesis.
What the study offers is an appreciation of the diversity of interests and actors involved 
in regulation and whereas these may not all be able to participate directly in designing or 
drawing up blueprints for industry reform they nonetheless, may have a direct impact on how 
rules play out during and after the implementation of industry rules. This is seen in their 
activities in relation to reform and other actors in the regulatory space.
Thus, incumbents have been shown having to respond to direct instructions from IRAs 
as well as from the pressures presented by entrants and consumers. The IRA and ministers were 
therefore shown modifying the rules in the sector to unleash these forces to nudge the 
incumbents towards a desired objective and stepping in directly (e.g. forcing Eircom to depart 
the Mobile market) where the full effect of other drivers or influences were not being realised.
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The point here is that knowledge of the forces influencing the incumbent’s behaviour may help 
to inform the regulator’s strategies. That is, whether to intervene directly or to create the 
environment in which other actors will become more empowered and in turn monitor the 
incumbent.
Regulators are also able to expand the regulatory space and borrow capacity and skills 
from these drivers in regulating incumbents. This is particularly the case, for international forces 
of regulation. Importantly, rules or man-power from international or regional regulators, for 
instance, help to lower the cost of local regulation (e.g. since regulator does not have to spend 
time forming new rules and spend time experimenting) and heighten the legitimacy of local 
regulators. It is therefore, not just non-state actors who can be included in regulation as implied 
by Braithwaite’s (2006: 884-898) reworked responsive approach but also large or more 
developed countries and multilateral institutions can be brought into regulation to overcome 
resource constraints faced by regulators in small or developing countries.
International influence has introduced another level, which arguably, cannot be ignored 
by accounts of regulation in a modem era. Authors such as Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) and 
Hall and Soskice (2001: 51) have acknowledged the relevance of this dimension in the spate of 
telecommunications reform that had occurred simultaneously across the globe. In challenging 
the organisation and management of telecommunications, these forces have helped to redefine 
the regulation of national telecoms. A resounding yes would therefore meet Hall, Scott and 
Hood’s question as to whether there has emerged an eighth stage in the development of 
telecommunications regulation involving the increased involvement of international actors 
(2000: 210). Thus, whereas Hancher and Moran noted that internalisation of regulation has 
compromised local regulatory capacity in some sectors (1989: 289), the opposite is true for the 
cases investigated. The suggestion then is that, for small and developing countries, an ability to 
appeal to international actors and institutions for support in local regulation is important in 
helping to raise local capacity.
Following from this, the findings suggest that what regulators need to do in dealing with 
incumbents is understand how relationships, and influence vary and change and how these can
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be brought to bear either singularly or collectively in securing compliance from incumbents and 
large regulated firms. Thus, where the Jamaican government was faced with C&WJ’s 
recalcitrance it was able to turn to international actors and take advantage of timing (growing 
support for reform, as seen in the rise in the popularity of concepts of regulatory reform and 
liberalisation) in order to break the local deadlock between itself and C&WJ. The findings also 
have implications for how regulators and governments in small capacity restrained states can 
obtain compliance when dealing with deeply embedded firms who, as in the case of small and 
developing countries such as Jamaica and Ireland, have resources and capacity to possibly rival 
that of the government itself. This is important, since the success of reform will, to some extent, 
depend on the level of support and compliance from the incumbent. This can also be achieved 
by increasing information flux by placing requirements for reporting and disclosure on the 
incumbent, as was introduced by Comreg. As seen in the Jamaican case, this may even mean 
utilising the regulatory capacity of the incumbent’s network.
The incumbent’s attempt to influence regulation and the way reforms evolved was also 
demonstrated in the cases. This point is most evident in the Jamaican case where the 
incumbent’s power and experience provided leverage for it to negotiate on an even footing with 
the government and influence the shape of the Telecoms Act. This was however, less the case in 
Ireland. That is, whereas both incumbents have affected the pace of competition (e.g. through 
anti-competitive practices) and the regulator’s ability to carry out its task (failing to comply 
fully with rules and use of the courts), the Irish incumbent had less of an impact on the 
formation of the actual rules governing processes such as liberalisation. This may be explained 
by the nature of regulatory governance in Ireland, which as part of a larger regional bloc (the 
EU) arguably has less freedom than Jamaica in deciding the structure of reforms. Further, for 
years the Irish government shied away from introducing privatisation and full liberalisation, due 
to the lack of support from some groups within the incumbent.
Thus, incumbents are therefore, shown attempting to shape the choice, design and 
implementation of regulation and regulatory strategies as much as they have been shaped by 
them. The presentation of internal reforms is also useful to firms and other organisations
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struggling to reform in the face of changing market environments, indicating how intra- 
organisational reform can impact on inter-organisational, or inter-firm competitiveness. It is 
important to note here that there need not be an overwhelming number of examples of regulated 
firms influencing regulation for this point to be relevant. Rather, what is being suggested is the 
need for a more fluid view of regulated firms as proposed by the regulatory space approach. 
That is, that they are not simply takers of regulation, but also act to regulate the regulators.
A third lesson emerging from this work is the fact that regulated firms are not 
monolithic structures. These are instead, more dynamic actors and are segmented internally with 
different interest groups and balance of power. These can, in turn, access support from actors in 
the regulatory space (e.g. government and unions for Ireland) to gain influence over internal 
organisational policy. Periods of uncertainty, such as wider regulatory reform are shown to 
create the climate in which such internal differences will become more apparent, as groups may 
seek to use such uncertainty as an opportunity to renegotiate the balance of power within the 
firm with some implication for how these incumbents choose to respond to reform. For 
example, where local managers in C&WJ resisted reform, the head office appeared more 
conciliatory. As suggested, C&WJ may have been able to play off competing messages between 
the head and local offices in negotiations with the Jamaican government to its advantage, 
utilising the resources in its global network to inform its operations in the local regulatory 
space. As noted in Section 8.1, staff and unions in Eircom were at times able to avoid the IRA 
by making direct appeals to politicians to influence the way regulatory reform (i.e. privatisation) 
was achieved, while the dominance of employee interest arguably limited the extent to which 
modernisation could be achieved in the firm. It has been shown how the use of capacity from its 
sister companies also empowered C&WJ and its ability to monitor the regulatory space.
Fourthly, while this segmented structure can be an advantage to incumbents; this reality 
has more direct implications for regulatory choice and strategy. That is, knowledge and 
awareness of the segmented nature of regulated firms and of the location of the different internal 
actors and interests can yield important information on how to secure compliance from 
regulated firms. Thus, rather than see a firm (in this case, incumbent) as one powerful bloc,
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regulators may choose to appeal to individual sections within the firm (e.g. head office or 
groups of employees and their unions) to secure compliance with rules and regulation. It is 
important to note, however, that not all interests or groups have the same level of access or 
power (with actors in the regulatory space) with cultural differences playing a role here. An 
awareness of these differences may assist in the design of more effective risk regulation. By 
helping to inform regulators and policy makers of what groups will be able to assist or frustrate 
its efforts. For instance, policy makers and regulators who are more aware of the different 
interests in a regulated firm are likely to be better able to develop strategies to increase 
compliance and support from such groups from the outset. Thus, privatisation in Ireland was 
only fully achieved when the state recognised that privatisation would not be successful without 
the support of the incumbent. Giving the employees a stake in the firm meant that reforms could 
proceed quickly while guaranteeing employees a stake in the incumbent’s success.
Again, implications for small capacity, constrained settings involve a potential to reduce 
costs and time involved in trying to secure compliance from large well-resourced firms or actors 
within those firms. This may also be useful where extreme measures such as, licence revocation, 
are difficult to enforce. Further, where Baldwin and Black contend that it may not always be 
possible to use the ‘big stick’ of the responsive approach to regulation (2008: 9-10), then such 
attempts at appeasement of targeted actors may prove more useful in breaking deadlock.
Furthermore, the regulatory capacity and expertise that is available to the regulated firm 
through its network may also be utilised by the regulator. This point has been demonstrated 
more in the Jamaican case, again perhaps, due to lack of access to as much regulatory support as 
the Irish incumbent and support from its membership in the EU vis-^-vis the lack of capacity in 
CARICOM. This illustrates once more the ways in which regulators in capacity constrained 
settings or small countries can in fact increase internal regulatory capacity particularly at the 
start of the reform process, where regulatory experience may be lacking. The challenge remains 
to avoid the risks (e.g. capture) that such a close relationship could encourage. Thus, where the 
regulator is aware of the different drivers, both inside and outside the incumbent, such
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knowledge can help to produce regimes that are more responsive and smaller, insofar as there is 
an awareness of tools and techniques that regulators have at their disposal.
A fifth lesson is concerned with the extent to which regulation (by the IRA, or 
otherwise) can affect the behaviour of a large firm. Thus, the issues around local loop 
unbundling have been a sustained contention in relations between the incumbents and industry 
regulators in both cases. The ultimate here may be for license revocation but this can be too big 
a punishment given the extent of the firm’s operations and relevance for the country and 
entrants. As seen in Jamaica, the incumbent’s power prompted more attempts at conciliation and 
bargaining as well as appeals to third parties in the attempts to liberalise the sector in the late 
1990s. Thus, the size of a market or regulatory space may preclude the use of certain strategies 
as outlined in the responsive or smart regulation framework. Furthermore, as seen in the 
ongoing use of the courts in Ireland, a standoff is not helpful, since this may lead to a waste of 
resources and delays in regulation.
A sixth lesson from the findings is that competition in one area of a regulated market 
may have an impact on the areas of the market where competition is less vibrant. Though all 
areas of the Jamaican market have been opened, there remains little competition in the local 
loop. Competition in the mobile market has, on the other hand, seen increased access to mobile 
phones and lower prices. C&WJ has responded by increasing access, quality and pricing options 
in its fixed line business in order to stem the departure. As such, whereas regulation had failed 
to secure more value for customers in the fixed line market over the years, competition in the 
mobile market has provided motivation for the incumbent to increase service value in its fixed 
line business. In this instance regulation has had its limits but regulatory goals have, 
nonetheless, been advanced by the effect of competition and market pressures on the 
incumbent’s operations.
In the end, regulatory reform has not only been about new legislation and rules. It also 
relates to the overall change that has resulted from the interaction of these rules with the 
regulatory space and the firm’s internal organisation and management overtime. Regulatory 
reform as presented here is not a one-off activity, which only ends with the passing of a piece of
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legislation but also involves the actual process of implementing this legislation. It is also about 
how such legislation plays out in actually changing the landscape of related rules, relationships 
and structures in the regulatory space and here, how they actually affect the incumbent’s 
behaviour towards desired ends.
The presentation has suggested that incumbency offers firms a natural advantage in a 
competitive environment. Thus, incumbency does offer a firm a number of natural advantages, 
particularly at the cusp of a new regulatory regime. For example, they have first mover 
advantages, seen for instance, in Eircom’s ability to expand quickly in its attempt to prevent 
entry from 1999-2001 and C&WJ arguing successfully for a delay in full liberalisation to allow 
it to prepare itself for reform and to recoup investments. These actors also remain the provider 
of choice in their relevant countries, particularly in the fixed market.
Such a status has also proven difficult to overcome given that these actors had access to 
the majority of telephone users and owned the local loop. In the immediate period following 
discussions to liberalise and the entry of new players in the sector this first mover advantage 
made it easier for the incumbents to react to attempts to enter certain areas of the market by 
introducing measures aimed at preventing entry or limit the success of competitors (e.g., unfair 
pricing). In some instances such an advantage had the effect of forcing smaller competitors out 
of the market. In both cases, the decision to grant the incumbents additional time before the start 
of full competition gave them more time to adjust their businesses to lead the pack at the 
onslaught of full competition. Even where this decision was rescinded in Ireland, this was done 
suddenly and may have reduced the time in which others could prepare themselves to enter the 
market, which arguably still allowed the incumbent to have an edge in a competitive market.
The title of ‘incumbent’ does not necessarily guarantee that a former monopolist will 
remain successful overtime or even in the short run. Both incumbents have, for instance, 
suffered from legacy issues with consumers taking up service from other operators. 
Additionally, Digicel, the first entrant in mobile services benefited from the fact that it was new 
and did not have the baggage of C&WJ. However continued success and competitiveness has 
been related to the incumbents’ ability to scan their environments for new opportunities taking
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advantage of loopholes in regulations, transforming themselves to match the needs of their 
customers and a competitive market. As such, the extent to which incumbents underwent 
transformation internally and the pace in which this was translated into improved quality in its 
relations with its customers and in the standard and variety of its network and services were also 
key to the incumbent’s success. Thus, with the realisation by the Irish incumbent, that its ability 
to compete was going to be linked to product and service quality and cost-containment (not 
simply its ability to dominate the sector), the firm gradually changed its orientation, becoming 
more efficient.
The speed with which citizens shifted to competitors of former national monopolies 
may have been indicative of the level of dissatisfaction with the incumbent. Liberalisation has 
afforded customers the choice of showing dissatisfaction with the quality of service and 
customer care by switching to entrants. However, the early march away from the incumbents 
was halted shortly after reform thanks to the steps taken to improve their operations. The Irish 
incumbent has arguably been more successful in doing so. Nonetheless, while C&WJ has not 
been able to dominate the mobile market completely, it has reduced the rate at which customers 
switch to competitor networks.
The status as incumbent nevertheless, helped to provide the resources and time in which 
the firms investigated here could undergo a number of shifts in their internal governance and 
organisation to deal with industry reform and halt the early departure of their clients. Thus, 
continued success and dominance were based on the incumbents’ ability to deliver quality 
service at competitive rates vis-a-vis its customers. In this way, the incumbents’ possession of 
capacity and resources, as well as their ability to affect legislations (either slowing down or 
allowing it time to adjust), have been key in helping them to adjust to reform successfully.
Finally, by focusing on incumbents and regulatory reform, this study has contributed to 
the existing research on regulation by addressing the need for more empirical and comparative 
research on regulation and regulatory reform (Christensen and Laegreid 2005: 2), the effects of 
regulatory reform (Wallsten 2003: 220) and how firms have responded to reform (Koski and 
Majumdar 2002: 455).
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8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the main arguments of the work, showing that incumbent firms 
response to reform is about its activities and relationships in the regulatory space as well as 
about its internal organisation. It is not being suggested that the findings are not beneficial to an 
incumbent in a large space. For example, European states are also subject to the rules of the EU. 
However, according to Hancher and Moran, “economic regulation under advanced capitalism 
has several distinctive features and those features in turn shape the character of regulatory 
activity” (1989: 271). By extension, the effect of such external influence will differ for small 
and developing countries such as Ireland and Jamaica with size conferring different issues and 
capabilities on such states. This holds implications for how large dominant firms operate vis-a- 
vis regulators in such settings and for how the latter responds to such firms and the choices 
available to it. Thus, external actors (donors, regional bodies or large developed states) may 
arguably play a more significant role in the options and choices of the firms themselves as well 
as those of industry regulators in small settings (regardless of the levels of development) than in 
larger, more developed contexts.
Additionally, authors such as Braithwaite (2006: 884-898) have also acknowledged the 
constraining effect of small size and lack of resource on obtaining responsive regulation. What 
this work has done is to suggest the ways in which IRAs in small states have been able to 
regulate firm behaviour and secure compliance and the creative ways in which this has been 
achieved in these environments where regulatory resources may often be limited and where 
options proposed under approaches such as responsive and smart regulation (e.g. licence 
revocation or active consumer lobby) may be absent or weak.
Further, it is not being suggested that all the tactics adopted by the incumbent firms, 
especially its internal reforms are unique to incumbents. Rather, what is important and 
significant here is the fact that these tactics were carried out by a firm that a decade or two 
earlier would not necessarily have undergone these changes in and of itself. The breadth and 
swiftness of the changes achieved within the incumbent are also important. As such the 
importance is the impact of regulatory reform on large incumbent firms and the steps, which
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these take in adjusting to a new environment facilitated by reform. All in all, these have ensured 
that, to a large extent, the firms that existed prior to reform are arguably different in orientation 
and operations from those that exist in the post-reform era.
Thus, in pointing out the experiences of incumbents more directly, the aim has been to 
add to the existing understanding and knowledge around regulatory reform and the effect that 
this process has had on former monopolists as well as to offer an explanation for how these 
actors have responded to reform, the factors influencing this response, and the implications for 
regulation. The activities of the incumbents described here not only indicate that large regulated 
firms are in fact capable of change, but goes beyond this to show that these actors are not 
monoliths and have creatively used their incumbency to assist them in staying at the centre of 
regulation.
The work has also highlighted the specific experiences of two small states, Jamaica and 
Ireland who have faced both legal and capacity restraints in their regulatory bodies (IRAs and 
state) and who have been faced with the task of reforming sectors typified by large, well- 
resourced, entrenched actors. In so doing, the ways in which such actors have managed to 
regulate the incumbent and the choices and tools that have been used in overcoming limitations 
of size and capacity have been highlighted. Importantly, the cases examined in this study add to 
the empirical work on regulatory reform, particularly as it evolved in small countries. In so 
doing, it also aides an understanding of some of the constraints faced by regulators in such 
states as well as the negotiation, compromises and tactics, which they make in order to secure 
compliance from large firms and support for regulatory principles.
Response has largely been similar in both cases even while one is developed and the 
other developing, suggesting the importance of size in a consideration of regulatory reform. 
Thus, to the extent that developments in these cases represent experiences of other small or 
developing environments they can provide useful information that can be used to inform 
regulatory strategies in other small states.
Nonetheless, the findings also highlight the fact that whereas certain regulatory 
strategies may work in one country, they may not work as well in another setting. Thus, in
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Ireland, where the employees were more organised and had a more robust voice they were able 
to act as a counterweight to the government, senior management and investor interests in the 
firm. As such, the success of any initiative to reform the incumbent and by extension, the 
communications sector, meant that the support of this group of stakeholders had to be secured. 
In Jamaica, however, the structure and location of the firm as a part of a wider group of 
companies meant that bargaining was more about trying to secure the cooperation of both local 
and head office for the reform process. However, as shown the head office was seen as the final 
link in the chain thus, where political bargaining at the local level did not appear at first to yield 
the results that the government wanted, it chose to apply directly to the head office in seeking 
support for its cause.
The cases illustrate the value of regulatory reform (particularly, real and potential 
competition) in bringing improvements to the incumbents and in so doing to the wider 
communications sector. It is important to note too that sustained dominance does not necessarily 
indicate failure or success of regulation since telecoms reform was not necessarily about 
‘crushing’ incumbents but providing an enabling environment for competition and choice.
The study has also highlighted the process of internationalisation of regulation and 
expansion of national regulatory spaces and the opportunities, which such a reality bring for 
regulatory strategies in small states. The incumbents here have embraced regulation, moving 
from a state of trying to avoid or capture regulation, to developing their capacity to respond to 
regulation, use it to their advantage, as well as reforming their operations to minimise the 
potentially negative effects of regulation and regulatory reform. There is however, some limit to 
which these actors may be said to have embraced regulation, particularly in the case of Eircom, 
which has continued to struggle with the IRA.
Finally, the emphasis on telecommunications and the small case size may limit the 
extent to which generalisations can be made from the study. Nonetheless, the findings do have 
some value in informing an understanding of other sectors dominated by large firms, even if its 
use is in offering a point of departure.
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